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This thesis aims to contribute to the body of work that seeks to unpack development 
by asking: how does development work? Using a purposive case study of Uganda 
and taking a mixed methods approach, the thesis explores the reality behind the 
rhetoric of aid coordination in a developing health sector, questioning the premise 
that coordination is pursued exclusively to improve the efficacy of official 
development assistance (as inferred by partners‟ vocal commitments to the tenets of 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness). The study focuses on the member 
groups currently empowered to join Uganda‟s most important multi-stakeholder 
forum for health - the Health Policy Advisory Committee - finding that all members 
are guilty of picking and choosing from a checklist of voluntary coordination 
commitments. This is found to be at once logical - for facilitating the semblance of 
partnership between a disparate grouping of stakeholders with differing modi 
operandi, agency objectives and tolerance for risk – and advantageous - for masking 
difference and allowing outwardly homogenous groupings like the Health 
Development Partners to speak with “one voice” when addressing the Ugandan 
government. Most importantly of all however, partial adherence to the aid 
coordination ethos is found to permit the framing that aid to Uganda is at once 
necessary and well targeted, as the Government of Uganda actively invites its 
partners to participate in the processes of government at the central level. Such 
tangible commitments to the tenets of partnership and transparency are integral to 
maintaining donor confidence in the aftermath of two financial scandals involving 
the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunisation in 2005. In sum, the thesis argues that while on the 
surface coordination appears important for its internal significance - as an organising 
principle to improve the effectiveness of aid - in fact, the value of coordination stems 
from its external significance. Coordination creates a façade of unity which permits 
the continuance of aid flows to Uganda, with coordination activities now playing a 
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PRESCRIBING AID COORDINATION IN UGANDA‟S 






When it was revealed that Ugandan Shillings (USH) 3.2 billion of Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) monies (Mugisa and Nsambu 
2009) and USH 1.6 billion of Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation 
(GAVI) monies (Afedraru 2008) had been misappropriated in Uganda in 2005, the 
development community was left aghast.
1
 Long heralded as Africa‟s “success” story 
(Barkan 2005), Uganda has emerged as one of the most oft cited case studies in the 
case made in favour of development aid. Both the original revelations and the fear of 
impunity in the aftermath – where the road to securing prosecutions has proved long 
and uncertain - have rendered it harder than ever for Development Partners to 
continue to give official development assistance (ODA) to Uganda in good 
conscience.  
 
Drawing on the logic of strength in numbers, it was remarkable therefore that a group 
of Development Partners came together in February 2010 to issue the government 
with this joint ultimatum: clean up public sector corruption or you can expect to see 
aid withheld, aid reduced and/or re-programming away from direct budget support 
(Observer Media Ltd 2010).
2
 The implication of this coordinated threat from a group 
of coordinated donors for the focus of this thesis is huge - for belying in one fell 
                                                 
1
 Converting these figures into dollars, $1.5 million of GFATM grants and $750,000 of GAVI funds 
were unaccounted for (using currency conversion site: http://coinmill.com on 20/03/10). 
2
 The ultimatum was delivered as part of a joint statement issued by Uganda‟s “Development 
Partners” at the National Budget Workshop, 25-26
th
 February 2010. Although attributed to Uganda‟s 
“Development Partners” in the press, the official name of this grouping is the Local Development 
Partners Group (LDPG), an umbrella grouping encompassing all of Uganda‟s various development 
partner sub-groupings (e.g. the Health Development Partners). See Appendix 1 for a visual 
representation of the Development Partner coordination structure in Uganda. See Appendix 3 for the 




swoop the extolled view that coordination between stakeholders at the level of the 
aid recipient country is carried out solely in the pursuit of aid effectiveness.  
 
This thesis aims to explore the truth of the aid coordination ethos using a purposive 
case study of Uganda‟s health sector. There, multiple coordination fora are to be 
found in operation, with donor, government and nongovernmental partners all 
empowered to opt in and opt out of multiple alliances (that said, access is not a 
blanket commodity and is mediated by a host of bureaucratic devices, including 
memorandums of understanding and terms of reference). The proffered reasons for 
involvement in such groupings centre on the tenets of aid effectiveness as 
encapsulated in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Paris High-Level 
Forum 2005): ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual 
accountability (see box 2 on p27). However, a closer look at the empirical evidence 
suggests two things. Firstly that meaningful coordination, of the type extolled in 
Paris, isn‟t fully reflected in the reality of coordination activities on the ground. 
Secondly, that stakeholders involved in the country‟s health sector – acting 
individually and collectively - have devised subtle ways to subvert Uganda‟s 
coordination architecture to their own ends, ends that at times appear to have little to 
do with the principles of ownership, harmonisation or alignment. Yet in spite of the 
often tenuous connection to the tenets of aid effectiveness, ODA remains the 
lifeblood of all centre-led relationships in Uganda, with coordination now playing a 
pivotal role in determining who gives aid (and how much), who gets it (and in what 
modality) and how it should be spent (in short, in getting policy right). Indeed, while 
Uganda‟s international reputation hangs in the balance it is remarkable to note how 
coordination has provided the means to continue with the framing that Uganda is still 
a deserving recipient of development aid. Publicly ticked off and publicly penitent, 
and with everyone eager to build public sector capacity, all partners are doing just 
enough to keep the money moving. 
 
Situating the Research 
This thesis concerns itself with the contested terrains of aid and development. These 
concepts, while at least superficially familiar to the majority of people, have the 




not helped by the shifting and conflicting definitions of the terms in common usage, 
and/or by the perplexing array of aid and development-related acronyms that have 
proliferated since the era of development officially began (President Truman‟s 1949 
Inaugural Speech is traditionally depicted as its starting point). Therefore, in order to 
help mitigate against some of the worst frustrations this thesis may pose to readers 
unfamiliar with the specialisation, I will attempt to be explicit about the definitions I 
draw upon throughout this thesis – through the use of text boxes, diagrams, footnotes 
etc – and I will apologise in advance for the dense use of acronyms. Subsequently, 
see box 1 for a brief introduction to many of the central aid concepts introduced over 
the course of this thesis, and find a second pullout copy of the acronym list to assist 
with reading. Finally, be aware that this thesis deals explicitly with official 
development assistance to Uganda‟s health sector, of the sort that can be channelled 
through government budgets, via donor projects and nongovernmental actors.  
 
The truth is that the worlds of aid and development are complex. Moreover, they 
appear unusually susceptible to internal subdivision (Riddell 2007) - whereby new 
areas are continually being marked out for arcane specialisation (a recent example 
being the „good governance‟ agenda), which only serves to convolute the 
terminology and compound the confusion of the layperson. Indeed, this is why 
studies like this - informed by the school of post-development critique which deems 
it pertinent to ask „what does development do, and how does it do it?‟ - have been 
proliferating. It is, quite simply, too easy for the esoteric language and accoutrements 
of development aid to subjugate the casual observer, and to reduce the contestations 
surrounding ODA to moral platitudes and poorly grounded debates over impact.  
 
Ferguson (1990) and Escobar (1995) – the original „deconstructors of development‟ - 
laid the foundations for the sort of post-development critique I am attempting with 
this study. More recently, Crewe and Harrison (1998) and Mosse (2005) have made 
important contributions to the genre. Viewed in sum, each of their works have 
important methodological lessons to teach the researcher of development-based 
organisations, proposing a critical approach which refuses to take discourse at its 




plans and outcomes of aid funded interventions; which challenges the notion of 
apolitical aid; and which advises the researcher to reinstate the complex agency of 
multiple actors into the development process.   
 
Ferguson considers the function of discourse in light of Foucault‟s (1971, 1973) idea 
of a conceptual “apparatus,” considering it as an elaborate contraption which does 
something and which has its own effects that go beyond concealing the true intention 
of development projects. In this way, he observes the way in which the discourse of 
the World Bank has served to reconstruct Lesotho as a “generic „LDC‟ [less 
development country] – a country with all the right deficiencies, the sort that 
„development‟ institutions can easily and productively latch on to” (Ferguson 1990: 
70).  
 
In carrying out his analysis Ferguson advocates the anthropological “decentred” 
approach, underscoring that a growing body of literature within this approach has 
noted the discrepancy between planned social interventions and their outcomes, 
which at times has resulted in formations of control unintended at the outset (and 
potentially unrecognised at the end), but which are made all the more effective by 
virtue of being “subjectless” (e.g. Foucault‟s Discipline and Punish 1979).
3
 
Subsequently, when Ferguson uncovers the unintended or “instrument-effects” 
(Ferguson 1990: 256, citing Foucault 1979) of the World Bank‟s Thaba-Tseka 
Project in Lesotho - “a resultant constellation that has the effect of expanding the 
exercise of a particular sort of state power while simultaneously exerting a powerful 
depoliticizing effect” – he is forced to conclude that “it may be that what is most 
important about a „development‟ project is not so much what it fails to do but what it 
does do; it may be that its real importance lies in the side-effects…” (Ferguson 1990: 
254).  
 
                                                 
3
 The “decentred” approach locates the intelligibility of events and transformations not in the 
intentions guiding key development actors but “in the systematic nature of the social reality which 




On Ferguson‟s reading therefore, “„development‟ is the name not only for a value, 
but also for a dominant problematic or interpretive grid through which the 
impoverished regions of the world are known to us” (Ferguson 1990: xiii). The 
problematic is itself a part of the “development apparatus” or “„an anti-politics 
machine,” which acts by “depoliticizing everything it touches...all the while 
performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of expanding 
bureaucratic state power” (Ferguson 1990: xv). 
 
Like Ferguson, Escobar (1995) has also likened the discourse of development to a 
conceptual apparatus - used to produce knowledge about, and to exercise power over, 
the third world via a process of problematisation. As such he asks his readers to 
consider development firstly as “a regime of representation,” (Escobar 1995: 6) and - 
because it ignores the voices of the people it pertains to help, permitting development 
institutions and professionals to reproduce themselves unchallenged – as a “violence 
of representation” (Escobar 1995: 153). Again like Ferguson, Escobar is troubled by 
the manner in which development discourse appears to render development 
interventions apolitical, maintaining that it is possible to chart the construction of a 
notion of underdevelopment through the discourse of economics, which “conceived 
of development as something to be achieved by the more or less straightforward 
application of savings, investment, and productivity increases” (Escobar 1995: 83). 
In this way, it not only excluded structural, political and cultural factors but also 
occupied the discursive space to such an extent that it crowded out all alternatives. 
This has had the effect of depoliticising and decontextualising problems in order to 
recast them in terms of objective science. 
 
In a similar vein to Escobar, Mosse (2005) has identified the ability of development 
discourse to create “regimes of representation”, arguing that:  
 
“agencies for international development devote their policy processes to 
constantly revising and re-framing development so as to shore up legitimacy 
in a fast-changing political environment…aid or development demand 
constant conceptual work to remain politically and morally viable” (Mosse 





From this stance, Mosse casts doubt on the logical assumption that development 
policy guides practice, his own judgement being that, “At best, the relationship…is 
understood in terms of an unintended „gap‟ between theory and practice,” causing 
Mosse to posit, “what if development practice is not driven by policy?...What if, 
instead of policy producing practice, practice produces policy in the sense that actors 
in development devote their energies to maintaining coherent representations 
regardless of events?” (Mosse 2005: 2). Indeed, this departure is the premise behind 
Mosse‟s study, which asks not whether, but how development works. 
 
Mosse is dismissive of Ferguson‟s and Escobar‟s critical view of policy. Firstly, for 
taking the failure of development to be self-evident, and secondly, for substituting 
the intended goals of development with ill-perceived, unintended ones. This, claims 
Mosse “merely replaces the instrumental rationality of policy with the automaticity 
of the machine” (Mosse 2005: 5). Moreover, he is equally critical of the instrumental 
view of policy as rational problem solving on the premise that it envisages 
development as something to be controlled (which in Mosse‟s opinion constitutes the 
fatal flaw of the “new managerialism”) and is distinguished by both the “morality of 
the black box” (Quarles van Ufford and Giri 2003), and the separation of planning 
and implementation.
4
 In opposition to these views therefore, Mosse states his aim “to 
reinstate the complex agency of actors in development at every level, and to move on 
from the image of duped perpetrators and victims…as well as to revise the false 
notion of all-powerful Western development institutions” (Mosse 2005: 6). 
 
In allusion to this complexity, Mosse notes how recent ethnographies have started to 
blur the boundaries between planning and resistance frameworks - drawing on 
Foucault‟s (1978) conception of governmentality, which allows for degrees of 
negotiation in the development relationship. From this viewpoint, Mosse argues that 
because in reality the operational control of development agencies over practices is 
                                                 
4
 Mosse argues that “international development is characterised by a new managerialism, driven by 
two trends: on the one hand, a narrowing of the ends of development to quantified international 
development targets for the reduction of poverty, ill-health and illiteracy…but, on the other, a 
widening of its means…In the extreme, nothing short of the managed reorganisation of state and 
society is necessary to deliver on the enormously ambitious goal of eliminating world poverty” 




quite limited, the focus of academics investigating development-based organisations 
should shift to investigate how these agencies control their interpretation of events, 
rather than simply the events themselves.  
 
Mosse suggests that successful development projects require interpretive 
communities whereby “the more interests that are tied up with…particular 
interpretations the more stable and dominant development policy models become” 
(Mosse 2005: 8). Moreover, that the cohesion of such communities is assisted by the 
development industry‟s preoccupation with ambiguous/flexible terms or “master 
metaphors” (e.g. „participation‟), and by the constant work of translation carried out 
by skilled brokers who turn policy goals into practical interests and vice versa (a role 
often undertaken by “experts” within project consultancy teams) (Mosse 2005: 9). In 
light of his conclusions, Mosse deems that the ethnographic task is to reveal how, 
despite the fragmentation of stakeholder interests, development actors are constantly 
engaged in creating unity through political acts of composition (Mosse 2005 citing 
Latour 2000). 
 
Like Mosse, Crewe and Harrison (1998) reject the automaticity of the machine in 
development inferred by Ferguson, pointing out that: “The development „machine‟ 
too is composed of a number of parts which are clearly capable of independent 
action, and whose identities are not fixed or rigid but capable of adapting to 
circumstances…” (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 187). Arguing in short, that there isn‟t 
a coordinated conspiracy at work in development and underscoring that plenty of 
projects do fail. Instead, and again like Mosse, the pair seek to reinstate the agency of 
multiple players to the development enterprise - refuting the „us and them‟ 
dichotomy implied by Ferguson and Escobar - and suggesting that: 
 
“Rather than honing in on the perspective of one set of stakeholders in 
development (the developers or the beneficiaries, for example), it is more 
useful to look at the relationships…This involves examining the „interface‟ 
between many different group and actors” (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 19). 
 
Crewe and Harrison also highlight the important role of assumptions in development, 




sometime impel development workers to arrive at assumptions which involve the 
simplification of complex social reality. Such simplifications, they argue, can on 
occasion serve as “the basis for action” (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 4)   
 
In my study, I have been heavily influenced by the post-development thinking of 
Ferguson, Escobar, Mosse, Crewe and Harrison, and the key works of Foucault and 
Latour. Yet while I accept the idea of discourse as a conceptual apparatus and concur 
with the assessment that development has too often downplayed its political 
connotations (in short, with two of the ideas proffered by Ferguson and Escobar) I 
align myself with the more nuanced view of development proposed by Mosse and 
Crewe and Harrison - the view that recognises that the development process is 
influenced by a multitude of stakeholders and variables, and not simply by the 
wicked intentions of the „developers‟. It is thus the interface – where “the different 
actors in the development process” combine “with the structural and historical 
specifics of their institutional location” that has provided the focus of this study 
(Crewe and Harrison 1998: 5). As Crewe and Harrison have observed, such an 
investigation “creates a messier view of reality than many of the „deconstructors of 
development‟ appear to imply, but arguably a more accurate one” (Crewe and 
Harrison 1998: 5). 
 
Finally, my investigation into aid coordination activities in Uganda‟s health sector 
has been informed by the strand of development thought to challenge the aid 
industry‟s current preoccupation with promoting „participation‟ in aid-recipient 
countries. Here I align myself with Cooke and Kothari (2001), Rahnema (2003) and 
Hickey and Mohan (2004), who are all troubled by the manner in which participation 
is promoted as a technical and/or apolitical undertaking, when in fact the very act of 
partaking is inherently political. Thus while I, like Cooke and Kothari “would resist 
being labelled anti-participation” (Cooke and Kothari 2001: 13), given the current 
power imbalance that exists both within the aid relationship and between the 
developing nation state and its citizenry, I remain alert to the currents of power 
underpinning participation activities, and to the potential for the newly initiated to be 






The Resilience of Aid‟s Flight Forward   
 
The implied relationship between the terms „aid‟ and „development‟ is significant. 
The former is commonly depicted as a mechanism for delivering the latter. Yet as 
with many of the claims made on behalf of development aid – including the 
suggestions that aid can contribute to macroeconomic growth and/or poverty 
reduction - this assumption is openly disputed. Former Senior Vice President of the 
World Bank Joseph Stiglitz has formally stated that: “If there is a consensus today 
about what strategies are likely to help the development of the poorest countries it is 
this: there is no consensus…” (2005: 1). While Roger Riddell, having reviewed the 
existing evidence base on aid‟s impact for his study Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, 
concluded that: 
 
“One way in which the necessity of aid has been understood is that „aid is 
necessary for development‟ – meaning that without aid, there can be no 
development. One of the main conclusions to be drawn from a dispassionate 
review of the evidence is that this is not true: it cannot be sustained as a 
general proposition. Development, growth and poverty reduction do take 
place without recourse to aid” (Riddell 2007: 255). 
 
In light of such critiques, which have served to call into question the causal chains 
between the inputs and outputs of development aid, it is remarkable that in the first 
decade of the Twenty-First Century the world is enjoying a massive aid revival. 
More than that, figures suggest that we are currently on track to witness the fastest 
expansion in official aid since records began (OECD 2006: 16). Thus it is the 
resilience of ODA – in the face of its critics - that remains significant. Such 
resilience, Emmerij (2004), Mosse (2005) and Riddell (2007) have argued, has been 
achieved via the constant reinvention and re-branding of the product. To summarise, 
some of the major shifts in the thinking over aid which have helped galvanise its 
durability have included: aid‟s macroeconomic focus being diffused by a diverse 
social and poverty agenda; the principle of aid conditionality being replaced by that 




project aid; and the renewed pro-aid advocacy in the Twenty-First Century, which 
has called for increased, better quality and mutually accountable aid. I will provide a 
brief synopsis of these shifts now.   
 
Diffusing Aid’s Macroeconomic Focus 
The theory that aid might be able to stimulate economic growth in developing 
countries was revitalised for the Twenty-First Century by Hansen and Tarp (2000) 
who, having tested three generations of economic models, found not only positive 
links between aid and investment, between aid and growth, and between savings and 
growth, but also concurred with the Burnside and Dollar (1997) finding that aid 
effectiveness in the growth process depends on the quality of economic policies in 
place.
5
 This updated investigation led the pair to conclude that “It is neither 
analytically defensible nor empirically credible to argue from the outset that aid 
never works” (Hansen and Tarp 2000: 103). While Hansen and Tarp‟s work 
continues to prove popular (see Foster and Keith 2003, and Pronk 2004) it has also 
attracted its critics (Erixon 2005).    
 
What remains remarkable about aid however, is its ability to sustain diverging 
theories simultaneously. Thus since the 1970s, the scope of development aid has 
gradually widened to assume a poverty focus diffused with social considerations 
giving rise to the idea that aid holds the potential to reduce global poverty. And while 
the current thinking on aid experienced a few detours along the way (in the form of 
1980s structural adjustment and 1990s „aid fatigue‟), that served to delay the 
universal acceptance of aid‟s diffused social focus, the World Bank‟s introduction of 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the adoption of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) in 2000 have cemented aid‟s reputation for poverty reduction. 
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 The models they tested were: the Harrod-Domar growth model and the Chenery and Strout two-gap 





Box 1: Glossary of Key Aid Terms 
 
Basket/Pooled Funding: 
“Basket funding is the joint funding by a number of donors of a set of activities through a 
common account, which keeps the basket resources separate from all other resources 
intended for the same purpose. The planning and other procedures and rules governing the 
basket fund are therefore common to all participating donors, but they may be more or less 
in conformity with the public expenditure management procedures of the recipient 
government. A basket may be earmarked to a narrow or a wider set of activities (e.g. a 
sector or a sub-sector). The term “pool(ed) funding” is sometimes used instead of basket 
funding” (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006:2).  
 
Development:  
The simplest understanding of development is “good change” (Chambers 1997) but in fact 
there is no universal agreement on a definition. Thomas (2002) has shed light on the issue 
by suggesting that „development‟ is used in three main senses: “a vision or measure of a 
desirable society; an historical process of social change; deliberate efforts at improvement 
by development agencies” (Thomas 2002: 48). 
 
Direct budget support:  
“Direct budget support is defined as a method of financing a partner country‟s budget 
through a transfer of resources from a donor to the partner government‟s national treasury. 
The funds thus transferred are managed in accordance with the recipient‟s budgetary 
procedures” (OECD 2010). 
 
Division of Labour Exercise:  
“Donors divide sectors and thematic areas among themselves with a view to avoiding the 
crowding of donors in particular sectors and areas. The consequence will usually be that 
donors end up focusing on a relatively limited number of areas or sectors and sometimes 
have to even disengage from some areas or sectors” (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2006: 3). 
 
General budget support:  
“General budget support is a sub-category of direct budget support. In the case of general 
budget support, the dialogue between donors and partner governments focuses on overall 
policy and budget priorities” (OECD 2010). 
 
Good Governance:  
Rising in prominence since the latter half of the 1990s, the emergence of the „good 
governance‟ agenda is best tracked through the policy evolution of the World Bank (1989; 
1992; 1997a; 1997b; 1998; 2000; 2006). The Bank has defined governance as “the means in 
which power is exercised in the management of a country‟s economic and social resource 
for development,” and „good governance‟ as “synonymous with sound development 
management” (World Bank 1992: 1).  
 
Global Health Initiative: 
In the first decade of the Twenty-First Century, a plethora of new funding initiatives have 
emerged, drastically increasing the level of aid for health in low- and middle-income 
countries. Most GHIs involve public-private partnerships and share “a desire for lean and 
efficient organizational structures and an emphasis on linking inputs to quantifiable results” 
(WHO 2008: 3). So far the initiatives have tended to target specific diseases. Currently, the 
three largest Global Health Initiatives operating in Uganda are the President‟s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, and the Global Alliance 










Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): 
The MDGs are set of eight goals, adopted by the international community in 2000, which 
promote the role of human capital in driving development. These are: 1) Eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger; 2) Achieve universal primary education; 3) Promote gender equality and 
empower women; 4) Reduce child mortality; 5) Improve maternal health; 6) Combat 
HIV/AIDs, malaria and other diseases; 7) Ensure environmental sustainability 8) Develop a 
global partnership for development (UN Millennium Project 2005). 
 
Official Development Assistance/Development Aid:  
“ODA consists of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions by official 
agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each 
transaction of which meets the following two criteria: (1) it is administered with the promotion 
of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and 
(2) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 per cent 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent) (Führer 1994: 25). 
 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are prepared by countries through a 
participatory process involving domestic stakeholders as well as external development 
partners, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Updated every three 
years with annual progress reports, PRSPs describe the country's macroeconomic, structural 
and social policies and programs over a three year or longer horizon to promote broad-
based growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs and major 
sources of financing. http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp  [Accessed 30/09/10] 
 
Programme-Based Aid Approaches: 
“Programme-based approaches are a way of engaging in development cooperation based 
on the principles of co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme of development, 
such as a national development strategy, a sector programme, a thematic programme or a 
programme of a specific organisation. Programme-based approaches share the following 
features: 
- Leadership by the host country or organisation. 
- A single comprehensive programme and budget framework 
- A formalised process for donor coordination and harmonisation of donor procedures 
for reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement 
- Efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and 
implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation  
Donors can support and implement programme-based approaches in different ways and 
across a range of aid modalities including budget support, sector budget support, project 
support, pooled arrangements and trust funds” (OECD 2010). 
 
Project Aid:  
“Project aid is directed toward an individual development intervention designed to achieve 
specific objectives within specified resources and implementation schedules (which may or 
may not be implemented within the framework of a broader programme)” (Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2006: 9). 
 
Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp):  
“What characterizes a SWAp is the engagement of donor agencies in supporting a recipient-
government-led, sector-wide strategy, as well as agreement between donors and the 
recipient government on the broad parameters for implementing and managing the sector 
strategy within a medium-term expenditure framework” (Riddell 2007: 196). In Uganda the 





This is not to suggest however, that aid‟s new focus has gone unchallenged (Healey 
and Killick 2000, Easterly 2002, and Erixon 2005 have all offered critiques, and the 
MDGs in particular have come under heavy fire (Easterly 2002, 2007; Foster and 
Keith 2003; Hamner et al. 2000; Mehrota 2004)). Yet it is aid‟s durability that 
remains its defining quality, and the aid donors – rather than the critics - that 
continue to dictate its remit. 
 
Introducing Aid Selectivity 
Following disappointing results and widespread criticism (see Collier 1999; Kanbur 
2000; Singh 2004) the donor practice of aid conditionality has officially been phased 
out since the later 1990s and replaced with aid selectivity. This means that instead of 
ODA being provided with conditions attached in the hope that the recipient country 
will reform their policies/practices (therefore making the aid more effective), the aid 
recipient is chosen on the basis of having already met certain criteria, suggesting that 
the allocated aid might be used more effectively. The practice of aid selectivity is 
underpinned by the Dollar and Burnside (1997) argument that while aid has the 
potential to promote growth in a good policy environment it cannot buy policies in a 
bad one. Some other arguments used to promote selectivity include the idea that it is 
less intrusive on national sovereignty, that policies will prove more effective because 
of their „domestic‟ ownership, and that by targeting „good‟ performers, aid will have 
a greater short-term impact on growth and poverty reduction (Boyce 2004).  
 
In contrast, the main criticisms levelled against selectivity are that the countries in 
the greatest need of aid will be the least able to attract it (Hout 2004; Riddell); that 
the criteria being devised by donors to judge a country‟s eligibility as part of the 
„good governance‟ agenda (e.g. the World Bank‟s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment) are methodologically problematic (Court 2006; Riddell 2007); and that 
many donors continue to give politically motivated aid (Alesina and Dollar 1998; 
Alesina and Weder 1999; Grant and Nijmann 1998; Erixon 2005). 
 
Finally, it is not yet clear that the rhetoric of phasing out aid conditionality in favour 
of selectivity is even well reflected in current donor practices (Mosley and Eeckhout 




GFATM (which requires recipients to meet a long list of conditions termed 
„conditions precedent‟ before allocating grants), it would appear that aid 
conditionality is still in very much en vogue.
6
   
 
Project To Programme Aid 
Providing another example of how donor rhetoric can sometimes outpace action, the 
popularity of project aid as a disbursement mechanism has officially been on the 
decline since the 1970s, thus allowing new modalities – most notably programme aid 
– to emerge (Mosley and Eeckhout 2000). High profile examples of programme aid 
include direct budget support, general budget support and sector-wide approaches. 
Yet while the share of aid disbursed through programme-based modalities has been 
on the rise since 1970s, projects remain the dominant modality through which ODA 
is provided (Riddell 2007). In the bulk of cases therefore, what the majority of aid 
donors are actually championing are mixed aid portfolios, which channel aid through 
project and programme-based approaches.  
 
While doubts have been raised about the perceived advantages of programme aid 
(see Mosley and Eeckhout 2000; Rogerson, Hewitt and Waldenberg 2004; Killick 
2004; Pronk 2004) - for instance that it can reduce the transaction costs incurred by 
the recipient country - De Renzio (2005b) reminds us that the shift towards 
programme modalities has so far failed to make a clear impact and as such, empirical 
evaluations will have to wait. 
    
Scaling Up Aid and Shifting the Focus to Effectiveness 
Following the „aid fatigue‟ of the 1990s (when disillusionment over aid‟s impact led 
to radical declines in aid giving), the first decade of the new millennium has 
witnessed the advocacy for aid revitalised by calls for increased, better quality and 
mutually accountable aid. Such calls have been bolstered by the poor progress of 
Sub-Saharan Africa toward attaining the MDGs (Commission for Africa 2005; G8 
Gleneagles 2005) and by a series of high-level forums aimed at reforming aid 
management (see box 2). And while such calls aren‟t without precedent – the 
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Pearson Report originally called for bilateral aid commitments of 0.7% gross 
national product in 1969 (Pearson 1969) and Easterly (2002: 49) reminds us of the 
“historical amnesia” afflicting the aid industry - the forcefulness with which they are 
now being promoted is unrivalled.  
 
Box 2: High-level Forums Targeting Aid Reform in 21st Century 
 
The Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for 
Development (UN 2002): 
At Monterrey, the international community sought to confront the challenges of financing 
development, and committed once again to reaching the 0.7% GNP target in addition to 
identifying new funding sources to facilitate scaling up aid. It also it laid out eight steps 
aimed at improving the efficacy of aid. 
The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (Rome High-Level Forum 2003): 
Reaffirmed donors‟ commitment to the Monterrey Consensus whilst building on the earlier 
document‟s recommendation that donors strive to harmonise their aid delivery in accordance 
with partner country priorities. 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Paris High-Level Forum 2005) 
Reaffirmed the commitments made at both Rome and Monterrey, whilst making 
recommendations to improve aid effectiveness in relation to five key areas:  
- Ownership: partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies and strategies, and co-ordinate development actions 
- Alignment: donors base their overall support on partner countries‟ national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures 
- Harmonisation: donors‟ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively 
effective 
- Managing for results: managing resources and improving decision-making for results  
- Mutual accountability: donors and partners are accountable for development results 
 
The Accra Agenda for Action (Accra High-Level Forum 2008) 
Aimed at accelerating the implementation of the Paris Declaration (mid-way) and 
responding to emerging aid effectiveness issues. The next High-Level Forum will be held in 
Seoul in 2011 
 
Reminiscent therefore of the “big push” terminology originally progressed by 
Austrian economist Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), the current emphasis on “scaling up” 
aid has once again saved ODA from its worst critics (Easterly 2001, 2002, 2006; 
Erixon 2005; Bauer 1984; Dos Santos 2003; Kanbur 2000), by assigning the earlier 
failure of aid to bad donor practice. Hence the dominant framing that: “Low-quality 




problem is not aid – it is how and when aid has been delivered, to which countries, 




Scaling Up Aid For Health 
In line with ODA‟s expanding social remit, it is salient to the focus of this thesis that 
the impetus for the big aid push has now merged with the consensus that health 
provision in developing countries needs scaled up (Commission on Macroeconomics 
and Health 2001). In fact, two earlier shifts have served to solidify this focus. Firstly, 
the (residual neoliberal) drive towards service privatisation and the subsequent 
diversification of actors and funding mechanisms within the health sector. Catalysed 
in the 1980s by general disillusionment with the role of the nation state, the 
privatisation narrative in health is distinguished by a reassessment of the appropriate 
role governments should play in the health sector, with the conclusion being that the 
state‟s role should be curbed and markets primed to fill the void (Buse, Mays & Walt 
2005). The consequence of neoliberal privatisation has been to encourage a mix of 
financing mechanisms in developing countries - although as the Commission on 
Macroeconomics (2001) points out this was a fait accompli in such settings anyway - 
and the growing popularity of public-private partnerships in health. Related to this 
latter development, a growing trend has emerged for civil society organisations to be 
used as “public service contractors‟” (Korten 1990). The second shift has arisen 
because of the current emphasis on meeting international health targets and in 




Remarkably, given concerns in other sectors about the capacity of developing 
countries to absorb high volumes of aid (De Renzio 2005),
 
absorption is not foreseen 
as a major problem afflicting health aid, or at least in countries that enjoy good 
policy environments (Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001; the High-
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 Jeffrey Sachs, who is one of the main contributors to the UN Millennium Project, continues to 
campaign on behalf of aid (Sachs 2005). Collier (2007) is another vocal proponent. Riddell is a 
cautious optimist who nevertheless defends aid on the basis that “The most reasonable default position 
on the impact of aid is that it should be viewed as helpful, unless it can be shown not to be beneficial, 
rather than (as frequently occurs at present) it is assumed to be detrimental unless proved to have been 
effective” (Riddell 2007: 176).   
8
 WHO (2005) underscores that the health focus of the MDGs isn‟t just restricted to Goals four, five 





Level Forum on the Health MDGs 2004; Hanson et al. 2003). Moreover, for the not 
so fortunate, there is widespread agreement that options for healthcare delivery 
should simply be considered outside the public sector (Commission on Economics 
and Health 2001; Hanson et al. 2003).  
 
In short, in the discourse concerning international development, the health, aid and 
governance agendas have in recent years been rendered inextricably linked.     
 
Aid Conclusion 
To sum up, reinvented and rebranded but never wholly rejected, the case for 
development aid has been reinvigorated in the Twenty-First Century. Evoking what 
Emmerij has described as aid‟s “flight forward,” whereby aid has become a 
permanent feature of international relations by “moving from one priority to the next 
without solving the preceding one” (Emmerij 2004: 36), as time has progressed, all 
that has changed are the expectations placed upon ODA (with its remit now 
encapsulating macroeconomic, social and governance concerns) and the prescriptions 
over what needs to be done to make it more effective.
9
 That the case for aid remains 
strong in spite of its complex evolution (and uneven track record) needn‟t prove 
problematic as long as you side with the school of development thinking that 
believes a key purpose of development aid is to experiment: “it has been argued by 
some aid practitioners that it is inappropriate to expect most aid to be successful, as 
this misconstrues a key purpose of development aid, namely its experimental nature” 
(Riddell 2007: 178).  
 
Viewed from this perspective, what is unprecedented about aid‟s current status is that 
for the first time in ODA‟s contested history the majority of aid donors and recipients 
have ascribed to a shared view of the elements that (should) make for an effective 
aid system - a consensus which Rogerson, Hewitt and Waldenberg (2004) have 
termed the “Monterrey view.”
10
 In short, despite the implicit acknowledgement that 
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 Crewe and Harrison (1998: 15) note that the discourse on reforming development rarely questions 
the need for the “aid industry” itself. 
10
 The key elements in the „Monterrey view‟ are: 1) a compact linking sovereign responsibility in 
developing countries for good governance and development choices with better aid and sharply 




the efficacy of new aid initiatives like the Paris Declaration and the Global Health 
Initiatives are yet to be tested, the majority of interested stakeholders have at least 
agreed upon the parameters of the experiment. 
 
 
The Intuitive Force of Coordination 
 
Long before the advent of the Paris Declaration in 2005, the idea that „coordination‟ 
might be one way to improve the efficacy of development assistance was toyed with. 
Cassen (1986) originally touted the idea, which was subsequently picked up by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD DAC 1992). The OECD DAC established a set of principles 
related to aid coordination in 1992 which, Buse and Walt (1997) argue, can be 
extrapolated specifically to health sectors. Predating the sector-wide approach, such 
principles advocated for donor involvement in sector-wide planning and for the 
subsequent alignment and harmonisation of development assistance.
 11
 Indeed, it was 
Buse and Walt who had remarked on the need to pay the health sectors of developing 
countries special attention in the 1980s and 1990s because of the proliferation of 
external actors (bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental) involving themselves in 
that realm. Such an “unruly melange” they argued, had reduced the ability of MoH‟s 
to lead the health process, and contributed to the donor preoccupation to increase the 
efficacy of development assistance (Buse and Walt 1997; also see Van de Walle and 
Johnson 1996 who highlight the burden placed on countries with multiple donors and 
projects; more recently the OECD DAC Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector has 
highlighted the importance of dealing with the “fragmentation problem” posed by the 
                                                                                                                                          
priorities; 3) partnership approaches including the Poverty Reduction Strategy process; d) streamlined 
conditionality, recognising the failure of conditionality; 5) performance-based aid allocations 
(Rogerson, Hewitt & Waldenberg 2004: 10). 
11
 These are as follows: “The ministry of health should take the lead in managing external assistance 
as part of a national plan of strategy for health development; It behoves donors to provide technical 
assistance to enable ministries to undertake the critical functions of leadership and planning; All 
external resources must be deployed within the framework of the plan; Donors need to subvert their 
administrative constraints, commercial and other interests in pursuit of improving the effectiveness of 
the health sector as a whole; Bilateral and multilateral agencies should be involved with the 





proliferation of funding and delivery channels in health (OECD/DAC Working Party 
on Aid Effectiveness 2009: 12)). 
 
As with the broader aid effectiveness agenda, an empirical grounding to underpin the 
drive for donors to coordinate in health sectors is notable mostly for its absence 
(Riddell 2007) - the concept instead being said to hold strong “intuitive force” (Buse 
and Walt 1997: 449; Walt et al. 1999a: 207). Similarly, the underlying logic for 
coordination mimics that of aid effectiveness, for suggesting that when donors 
worked in isolation their ODA was largely ineffective, thus the converse may also be 
true. In this light, it is enlightening to note that initially the intuitive appeal of 
coordination appeared to reside largely on the side of the development partners in 
host countries, with governments at best sceptical and at worst, actively resistant 
(fearing asymmetrical power relations as well as diminished opportunities for 
playing donors off against each other) (Walt et al. 1999a). And while the tension 
created by early coordination attempts is thought to have been eased somewhat by 
the onset of the sector-wide approach - which at least in theory assigns ministries of 
health a leading role in partnership activities - it is pertinent to the long-term impact 
of the aid effectiveness agenda that the stakeholders in the host country are often less 
enthused about the newest aid fads than the donors.
12
 Hence, the title of this thesis 
“Prescribing Aid Coordination,” because as is so often the case in development, it is 
the aid givers rather than the aid recipients who appear to be driving the agenda. 
Subsequently, the early Walt et al. (1999a) finding that none of the coordination 
instruments they had witnessed in case study countries had excelled – and the 
reasoning behind that judgement – is a forewarning for what is to come in the 
Ugandan case material: 
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 For instance at the Mid-term Review of Health Sector Strategic Plan II, held in Kampala between 
27
th
 and 29th May 2008, it was remarkable to hear Uganda‟s district representatives voicing their 
dissent over some of the aid practices associated with the Paris Declaration. For example, participants 
talked about the „golden days‟ of project aid when districts monopolised project funding in their 
catchment area, and voiced concerns about donors leaving the health sector as part of the division of 
labour exercise (the fear being that their aid would go with them). Such comments vindicate the 
suggestion by Rogerson, Hewitt and Waldenberg (2004) that new aid practices, like budget support, 
may prove less popular with the general public in donor countries as a consequence of being less 




“For example, few [coordination instruments] are led by recipient authorities, 
few embrace all donors active in the sector or a large proportion of aid, few 
command sufficient authority to ensure participant compliance, and as a 
result, few actually dramatically enhance the overall effectiveness of aid 
deployment or ensure that donor contributions support recipient goals. 
Fourth, it is admittedly difficult to judge the effectiveness or impact of aid 
coordination…”  (Walt et al. 1999a: 213). 
 
Indeed this thesis is founded on the idea that although coordination of the type 
extolled in Paris may not be possible or even desirable, there are nevertheless other 
reasons why a partial adherence to the ideal may prove attractive to partners. 
 
All five tenets of the aid effectiveness agenda are implicit in the focus of this thesis, 
yet it is the catchall phrase „coordination‟ that I use to explore health sector relations 
in Uganda. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, the coordination activities and 
fora are the tangible manifestation of the aid effectiveness agenda at the level of the 
aid recipient country. Thus for instance while a partner may state in their policy 
discourse that they are engaging in „harmonisation‟ activities at the country level this 
is ultimately a subjective viewpoint, (and one with which other partners may or may 
not agree). On the other hand, the appearance of a partner‟s involvement in 
harmonisation activities is much easier to verify from the standpoint of the outsider, 
by noting for instance what coordination fora they regularly attend or which 
partnership processes and mechanisms they support (i.e. sector planning, basket 
funding etc). Secondly, unlike the Paris tenets, „coordination‟ has not been assigned 
objective indicators with which to measure progress towards a fixed ideal. Indeed, 
many of the indicators used in the Paris Declaration would have little to say about the 
tradition of partnership activities in Uganda‟s health sector, which as suggested by 
Buse and Walt (1997) long predate the advent of Paris in 2005. 
 
To sum up, in my research approach I have been motivated, like Crewe and Harrison, 
to explore the “messier…but arguably more accurate” view of reality posed by 
Uganda‟s partnership activities - the bits that depend on human relations, and the 
loaded concepts of „partnership‟, „power‟ and „participation‟ (Crewe and Harrison 
1998: 5; also see Sachs 1993; Cooke and Kothari 2001) – which are rarely reflected 




just one in a long line of slippery development constructs or “master metaphors” 
(Mosse 2005: 9), subject to interpretation, negotiation and abuse.
13
 Having said that, 
I am realistic that some boundaries are helpful. Therefore I am grateful to Buse and 
Walt (1996) who, having noted the absence of a definition to pin down what was 
implied by „coordination‟ in relation to a donor-partnered health sector proposed the 
following working definition in 1996:  
 
“any activities or set of activities, formal or non-formal, at any level, 
undertaken by recipients in conjunction with donors, individually or 
collectively, which ensures that external inputs to the health sector enable the 
health system to function more effectively, and in accordance with local 
prioritise, over time” (Buse and Walt 1996).  
 
Moreover, I have been greatly influenced by Walt et al. (1999a), who had a second 
go at pinning down the concept of aid coordination in 1999 when they took the 
practical step of cataloguing the “coordination mechanisms” they had identified in 
developing health sectors.
14
 Indeed, the suggestion implicit to that article - to 
conceptualise coordination in terms of mechanisms and processes rather than as a 
single definition – is the most useful way that I have found to approach the concept. 
Subsequently, it is the mechanisms and processes of partnership between Uganda‟s 
Health Development Partners and the Government of Uganda that constitute the 
empirical basis of this thesis.    
 
To sum up briefly, while this thesis is specifically looking at aid coordination in 
Uganda‟s health sector, the literature cited in this and the preceding sections of this 
introductory chapter have been included to show that the Ugandan case study is not 
operating in a vacuum. Uganda‟s health sector should be regarded as an intersection 
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 Supplant the word “coordination” for “participation” in the following excerpt and you too may 
begin to understand its appeal: “As a legitimizing idea, „participation‟ is sufficiently ambiguous to 
allow many different readings, and several shadow or subordinate models – rationalities validating 
action from different points of view” (Mosse 2001: 29).  
14
 The mechanisms they identified in 1999 were: special units for the coordination of external 
resources; geographical zoning; groups of donor agencies; appointing a lead donor agency; regular 
collective consultations between recipients and donors; comprehensive strategies, plans and 
expenditure programmes; earmarked budget support, pooling and „basket‟ arrangements; and common 




where international thinking over aid and health policy is being actualised. Uganda, 
in short, continues of be a site of aid‟s experimentation.  
 
 
Thesis Structure: Four Propositions About The Reality Of Aid 
Coordination In Uganda‟s Health Sector 
 
Having taken an inductive approach to my fieldwork and data analysis, I have been 
guided by Mosse (2005) in structuring my empirical data around a series of 
propositions.
15
 Subsequently, each of my empirical chapters (Chapters Four to 
Seven) enjoys an overarching proposition. The chapters when viewed together serve 
to validate my larger argument, which proceeds as follows: on the surface 
„coordination‟ appears to be important for its internal significance - as an organising 
principle to improve the effectiveness of aid. Instead, the value of coordination stems 
from its external significance. Coordination creates a façade of unity which permits 
the continuance of aid flows to Uganda (evoking Easterly‟s 2002 “cartel of good 
intentions” imagery). In this view all partners (government, donors and civil society) 
are complicit in the framing that ODA to Uganda is at once necessary and effective 
and its government cooperative and deserving. Yet the stakes in maintaining this 
framing are getting higher and higher – ironically, as a direct result of the 
coordination ethos - because as more aid is provided through multilateral 
arrangements, public/private partnerships, basket funding and joint budget support, 
the pressure on donors to withdraw ODA en masse also grows. This is the tension 
identified in Uganda, where the state has been praised for its willingness to 
„coordinate‟ with its partners yet increasingly chastised for its refusal to be dictated 
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 In Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice, Mosse structures his book 
around five propositions which explore the relationship between policy and practice. These are: 
Proposition 1: Policy primarily functions to mobilise and maintain political support, that is to 
legitimise rather than orientate practice; Proposition 2: Development interventions are not driven by 
policy but by the exigencies of organisations and the need to maintain relationships; Proposition 3: 
Development projects work to maintain themselves as coherent policy ideas (as systems of 
representation) as well as operational systems; Proposition 4: Projects do not fail; they are failed by 
wider networks of support and validation; Proposition 5: „Success‟ and „failure‟ are policy-orientated 





to over governance issues. It‟s the country to watch to see what is most highly valued 
by donors: the tenets of „good governance‟ or the framing of Uganda as aid‟s success 
story? 
 
Elucidation on the problematic relations donors are currently facing with the 
government of Uganda is provided in the subsequent chapter, „Uganda in the New 
Millennium: the Litmus Test for Development Aid?‟ This context chapter begins by 
cataloguing Uganda‟s meteoric rise to fame – whereby the country became 
development‟s most cited exemplar in the 1990s and early 2000s – before citing the 
main instances in its downfall during the latter half of the decade. This overview 
should make clear that it has become harder than ever before for donors to continue 
to give aid (at current levels) to Uganda in good conscience, yet that - in line with 
Kanbur‟s (2000) argument - the aid relationship remains so dysfunctional that it isn‟t 
in anybody‟s interest to punish governance violations.   
 
Following the context chapter, a methodology chapter outlines the mixed method 
approach taken in this study and details the access problems I encountered while 
attempting to research development-based organisations in the field.  
 
Subsequently, the four empirical chapters that make up the main bulk of this thesis 
are laid out as follows. 
 
Chapter Four: „Coordination to visibly pursue the most readily pick and mix element 
of the new aid agenda‟ forwards the proposition that „coordination‟ is a slippery 
development term, which partners can pursue on a partial basis without rejecting the 
ethos in its entirety. They couldn‟t pursue meaningful partnership even if they wanted 
to and they clearly don‟t. This is reflected in the observation that coordination 
activities are never legally binding and there are no repercussions for failure to 
comply. In addition to showing an outward commitment to the aid effectiveness 
agenda, a partial adherence to the coordination mantra nonetheless confers discrete 
advantages on partners, meaning the illusions of partnership and homogeneity are 




partnership in Uganda‟s health sector between two obviously heterogeneous groups – 
the Government of Uganda (GoU) and its Health Development Partners (HDPs) – 
before outlining where partnership commitments (intended to improve the 
effectiveness of ODA) have tended to go awry at the country level. The chapter then 
compares and contrasts the modi operandi, aid volumes, development objectives, and 
headquarter and political restrictions of the donor sub-group of Uganda‟s HDPs to 
highlight the obstacles to coordination that exist even within this superficially 
homogenous grouping, the intention being to shed some light on why coordination 
between overtly heterogeneous groupings such as donors and government might 
prove intensely difficult. Having established thereafter that aspects of the 
coordination ethos can be utilised as if part of a „pick and mix‟ check list, the chapter 
goes on to examine how the HDPs negotiate their differences to attain the semblance 
of speaking with “one voice” in Uganda‟s health sector, and what advantages the 
HDPs glean from maintaining even this façade of unity when facing their 
government partners. 
 
Chapter Five: „Coordination to Meet the Current Demands of the Contrary and Risk 
Averse Global Fund‟ sets up the proposition that while the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria would maintain that coordination between 
heterogeneous partners in-country is necessary to put together a participatory and 
needs-based proposal (which in turn should improve the utilisation and impact of 
grants), instead „coordination‟ is necessary to meet the current demands of the 
contrary and risk-averse aid instrument, allowing it to justify the continuation of 
grants to a previously untrustworthy recipient (i.e. the Ugandan Government). All 
partners have a vested interest in making this happen, in their respective roles as the 
Fund‟s contributors and beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the costs now involved in 
securing GFATM grants has exceeded expectations, placing huge demands on the 
coordination architecture underpinning the health sector. This chapter explores the 
exigencies of developing a country proposal for GFATM Round 8 in Uganda, a 
country that enjoys a notably strained relationship with the aid instrument following 
the discovery of grant misappropriation in 2005. The backdrop to this expensive and 




funding success is far from guaranteed - is the reactive policy making and ad hoc 
growth of the GFATM, which has resulted in widespread confusion over the 
respective roles of partners and increased procedural complexity for the Fund‟s 
applicants. Subsequently, in Uganda it is discovered that the aid coordination 
architecture is being asked to bend and sway to support the GFATM‟s current 
application demands: with Partnership Funds being used to pay for extensive 
consultations and technical assistance in support of proposal development, and 
existing Health and HIV/AIDS coordination fora being asked to subsume Country 
Coordination Mechanism duties. In addition, it is explained that individual partners 
have incurred „unfunded mandates‟ as a result of their involvement with the 
GFATM. Indeed the effort that now goes into a proposal calls into question the 
GFATM‟s original vision to allocate grants according to need. Instead, it seems that 
an inability to manage risk has resulted in the prioritisation of quality-based rather 
than needs-based proposal, and introduced the cost of failure (literally the cost 
incurred when partners invest in failed proposals) to the aid relationship in Uganda. 
In this view, the Fund‟s insistence that all partners „participate‟ in GFATM processes 
at the country level in Uganda is actually a device to introduce extra oversight over 
the use of GFATM grants to prevent a repeat of past abuses.   
 
Chapter Six: „Coordination to Build Policy Consensus as an Act of Legitimisation‟ 
proposes that with aid conditionality out of favour, development partners are 
drawing on „coordination‟ mechanisms and processes to attempt to build consensus 
around their development strategies to permit the continuance of aid flows to 
Uganda. In this way policy actually follows practice (Mosse 2004, 2005) as reaching 
consensus only serves to legitimise what development partners were already doing in 
the health sector. Indeed a failure to build consensus need not create the impetus to 
change donor policy, particularly if what you‟re doing is found to be effective. 
Instead it is likely that more consensus building is what is really required. This 
chapter initially draws on two case studies to highlight how some of Uganda‟s Health 
Development Partners – in this case the Danish International Development Agency 
(Danida) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) - are using coordination 




objectives. At the same time, the question of whether such techniques can resolve the 
tension of instilling country ownership when attempting to forward non-indigenous 
development priorities is considered. Danida and WHO therefore, are found to 
exhibit the modern aid obsession with getting policy right in Uganda‟s health sector, 
a preoccupation not currently exhibited by the US President‟s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Introducing a third case study, the PEPFAR programme, 
having assumed ownership of the threat posed by the global AIDS pandemic, is 
shown to have little interest in influencing Uganda‟s policy environment at present. 
Furthermore, in a challenge to the logic underpinning the Paris tenets of ownership, 
harmonisation and alignment, it is shown to be operating a very successful parallel 
supply chain management system for antiretrovirals, which may have lessons to 
teach the national procurement system. Yet despite major differences in approach, 
the backdrop to all three case studies is the heightened competitiveness of the 
modern aid environment, which determines that funding and seats at the policy table 
are awarded according to comparative advantage. As such, it becomes clear that 
Danida and WHO are both under some pressure to legitimise their programmes in 
Uganda, which they attempt to do by staying relevant in domestic policy. PEPFAR 
on the other hand - deriving its legitimacy from hitting numerical targets set in 
Washington and answerable primarily to the US Congress - is not under the same 
pressure. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes by positing whether the PEPFAR 
Uganda programme, as it transitions from phase one (the emergency phase) to phase 
two (which advocates building sustainable, country-driven programmes), might yet 
be persuaded to develop a penchant for policy.     
 
Chapter Seven: „Coordination to Dilute State Control‟ deals with the growing 
influence being assigned to civil society organisations in Uganda‟s health sector by 
the Health Development Partners and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria. Yet rather than accepting at face value the stated argument that the 
elevated role currently being assigned to nongovernmental partners stems from a 
desire to increase the efficiency of public services in a country with limited public 
sector capacity, the chapter forwards the proposition that bringing CSOs into the 




way that it bypasses the public sector, is an overt attempt by aid donors to dilute 
state control in Uganda. This attempt stems from the residual distrust the state 
created during the neoliberal era and from the logic of „good governance‟, which like 
neoliberalism emphasises the developing state‟s deficiencies, while also promoting 
the democratisation of health (GFATM 2008b). The chapter opens by recognising 
the concessions already made to civil society in Uganda as a result of public sector 
reform, yet acknowledges how the Ugandan state has until recently been successful 
in limiting the role of CSOs in the health sector to that of voiceless service providers. 
Subsequently, the Global Fund is found to be main instigator behind the recent 
invitation for CSO representatives to join the country‟s most important multi-
stakeholder coordination forum for health, the Health Policy Advisory Committee. I 
argue that this has been quietly mandated in GFATM policy discourse, and 
subsequently formalised in Uganda‟s new Long-Term Institutional Arrangements - 
the blueprints for aid management to have facilitated the restart of GFATM monies 
to the country following the 2005 mismanagement. Indeed, as the chapter underlines, 
it was an indigenous CSO worker that turned whistleblower over the GFATM misuse 
in Uganda, a fact which has since validated the Fund‟s view that CSOs are suited to a 
watchdog role in grant recipient countries. The Global Fund – together with a 
handful of Uganda‟s Health Development Partners – is also involved in spearheading 
the new Civil Society Fund (CSF) in Uganda, a basket funding mechanism, which, 
by virtue of the aid harmonisation logic has legitimised Uganda‟s donors channelling 
tens of millions of dollars outside the government budget. Remarkably the operating 
model of the CSF in Uganda is actually based on a United States Agency for 
International Development model, highlighting that it is the template of one of the 
world‟s most risk averse bilateral donors that gains credence when it comes to donors 
pooling their money at the country level. The Civil Society Fund promises to build 
the capacity of Uganda‟s CSOs. Nonetheless, the chapter highlights the dangers 
posed to CSOs that grow too dependent on donors. The final section of the chapter 
acknowledges that in order to gain any sway in the “negotiation process proper” 
(Jeppsson 2002: 2059) in Uganda, CSOs like donors, will have to coordinate 
themselves in order to get their message across at the Health Policy Advisory 




most heterogeneous of the superficially „homogenous‟ groupings represented there; 
moreover, there may be serious pitfalls involved in Uganda‟s CSOs having to 
become „representative‟. The chapter concludes by issuing two warnings: the first to 
the civil society organisations, warning them to beware that it is not their influence 
being diluted by aid coordination measures; the second to donors, reminding them to 
stay alert to the unintended or “instrument-effects” (Ferguson 1990: 256 citing 
Foucault 1979) of their efforts to undermine the Ugandan state, which has grown 
rather adept at negotiating challenges to its dominance. 
 
The thesis concludes by positing that any suggestion to the effect that Uganda‟s 
coordination instruments and processes are not excelling, would be to misunderstand 
what they are really setting out to do. The conclusion also reaffirms the thesis‟s 
overarching proposition; namely, that coordination is primarily important for its 
external significance, for maintaining the framing that aid to Uganda is justifiable at 






UGANDA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE LITMUS 






Uganda is a land-locked country in East Africa, with a population of 32.7 million 
(UNFPA 2009: 80) and a per capita income of US $420 (2008 figures).
16
 It is 
currently rated 157 (of 182) in the Human Development Index (UNDP 2009: 169). 
While Uganda has enjoyed significant economic growth since the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) came into power in 1986, the fruits of the growth have 
been allocated unevenly and a widening inequality has been noted in society.
17
 
Inequality in Ugandan society has long been aggravated by two factors: unchallenged 
regional inequity and a long-standing war in the north of the country against the rebel 
faction, the Lord‟s Resistance Army. As a result of these discrepancies, statistical 
information that attempts to make generalisations about the country should be 
regarded critically. 
 
Although the country‟s health statistics have long been a cause for concern – it 
remains off course for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and is on target 
for just three of the eight indicators it has established to monitor progress toward 
Health Sector Strategic Plan II (MoH 2008b: 7 & 9) - a stagnating HIV prevalence 
rate in the new millennium (6.4%) (UAC 2007: I) and emerging challenges - in the 
form of rapid population growth (3.3%) and unplanned for urbanisation (4.4% per 
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 Uganda‟s economy grew at an average of 7.2% between 1997/8 and 2000/2001, at an average of 





annum) - are augmenting the difficulty of meeting the country‟s rapidly escalating 




Uganda‟s statistics serve to align it with the World Bank‟s definition of generic Less 
Developed Country (although it is increasingly on the cusp) which as Ferguson has 
suggested, establishes it as “ a country with all the right deficiencies, the sort that 
„development‟ institutions can easily latch unto” (Ferguson 1990: 70). Indeed, the 
perceived suitability of Uganda for development‟s input is aptly demonstrated by the 
generous aid flows to the country:  US $1005.68 million from Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donors 
alone in 2008.
19
 Donors provide approximately 50% of the health budget in Uganda, 
although that proportion has been greatly skewed in recent years by the emergence of 
Global Funding Initiatives, such the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (GFATM) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation 
(GAVI).
20
 The nature of aid flows to Uganda clearly points to a culture of aid 
dependency - particularly in the health sector - prompting concerns about the 
sustainability of current resource flows and the feasibility of Uganda to “graduate” 
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 6.4% is the figure cited in Uganda‟s National HIV & AIDS Strategic Plan (UAC 2007); however it 
should be noted that most international bodies are citing a prevalence rate of 5.4% for 15-49 year olds, 
e.g. UNAIDS. http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/uganda.asp [Accessed 
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 Figure extracted from OECD DAC on 17
th
 May 2010; total ODA from “all donors” to Uganda in 
2008 was: US $1656.76 million. http://stats.oecd.org/qwids 
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 The official contribution of Development Partners to Uganda‟s health budget has been found to 
fluctuate between 46% and 54% of the annual budget as expressed in the Medium-Term Framework 
(MTEF) (MoFPED 2010: 249). However, donor project funding is not always declared in the MTEF, 
meaning that once expenditures are taken into account the proportion of donor funds to the health 
sector escalates. For instance, the Annual Health Sector Performance Report 2006/7 breaks down 
expenditure in the health sector for Financial Year 2006/7 as follows “Ug. Shs 239.11bn by GoU, and 
Ug. Shs. 540.12bn by donor projects” (MoH 2007a: 17). The donor figure here includes expenditure 
on projects that were not accounted for in the original MTEF. This points not only to a culture of aid 
dependency in the health sector but also of unaligned and unpredictable donor projects. 
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 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) talks about “graduation” from 
aid as countries attain middle-income status. Although it openly admits “USAID has long found it 




















Expenditure As % Of 
Total Gou 
Expenditure 
2001/02 169.79 144.07 46 313.86 7.6 8.9 
2002/03 195.96 141.96 42 337.92 7.9 9.4 
2003/04 2007.8 175.27 46 338.07 8.6 9.6 
2004/05 219.56 146.74 40 366.3 8.0 9.7 
2005/06 229.86 268.38 54 498.24 9.98 8.9 
2006/07 242.63 139.23 36 381.86 7.84 9.3 
2007/08 277.36 141.12 34 418.48 8.4 9.0 
2008/09 375.46 253.00 40 628.46 10.4 8.3 
 
 
Uganda: The Archetypal Development Case Example 
 
As established in the introductory chapter, official development assistance (ODA) 
remains a hotly contested topic; reinvented and rebranded but never wholly rejected, 
the “aid industry” (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 15) is sustained via ideology and 
discourse, all of which serve to posit why aid – in its current incarnation - will prove 
effective this time around. In a specialisation where systematic evidence remains thin 
on the ground (see Riddell 2007 for an exploration of the evidence base underpinning 
aid‟s impact), case studies of success are rendered invaluable for defending donors‟ 
continued allegiance to development aid. Uganda has therefore proved incredibly 
important to the industry as a whole: providing enough good newsprint to suggest 
that aid surely works and adding more to development‟s technocratic tool kit than 
any other single country. Indeed, an article to appear in the British press in 2009 
aptly summed up the importance of Uganda to the modern development agenda: 
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“Alignment; poverty reduction strategies; heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPC) debt relief; virtual poverty funds; budget support; public expenditure 
tracking surveys…few may be aware that all these terms have their origins in 
a single country – Uganda. Uganda has been one of Africa‟s fastest growing 
economies for the last 20 years and has arguably had more influence on 
current development thinking than any other country” (Whitworth 2009). 
 
Not simply a passive site for donor experimentation therefore, Uganda has in fact 
been the vanguard for many of today‟s development staples. The government‟s first 
notable innovation, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) (MoFPED 1997) 
may have been renamed by the World Bank but its importance as the blueprint for 
the now ubiquitous Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper format is universally 
acknowledged.
23
 In the debate that surrounds development aid, it is important to keep 
in mind that the accoutrements of aid – i.e. the strategies, the guidelines for good 
practice, the modalities – have evolved to become as important as the resource flows 
themselves, because it is only by adhering to a (so far) elusive combination of these 
additives that aid will finally be proved effective. Uganda is one site therefore, that 
international aid donors watch with interest as they attempt to formulate the perfect 
recipe. 
 
Conceptualising the Ugandan government as an active contributor to the modern aid 
agenda is vital when considering the international reputation of the country 13 years 
on from its original innovation - the 1997 PEAP - because in 2010 the Government 
of Uganda is being publicly reprimanded by its donors. Threats are being made to the 
country‟s substantial aid resources - in this instance in protest to the government‟s 
distinctly lukewarm response to verified instances of high-level corruption (Observer 
Media Ltd 2010). Moreover, as I will impress, this is not an unprecedented threat but 
one that has resurfaced with increasing virulence in Uganda since the turn of the 
millennium.  
 
The Uganda case therefore provides donors with something of a conundrum: donors 
fell in love with Uganda‟s authoritarian and proactive government, buoyed up 
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initially with great returns for their development dollar – impressive economic 
growth, a falling HIV/AIDS prevalence rates, and a tacit (when the country is ready) 
commitment from the government to the tenets of democracy and good governance – 
but the realisation has slowly dawned that this forerunner of the aid effectiveness 
agenda ultimately views itself as the main protagonist in the aid relationship.
24
 An 
obsequious or passive recipient of development aid it is not. Uganda‟s ambition to 
evolve into a middle-income country and shake off its faithful donors is tangible in 
the public statements of the country‟s President Yoweri Museveni, who is always on 
hand to put the aid-givers in their place: “OECD countries must get out of the habit 
of trying to use aid to dictate the management of our countries…We need 
independence in decision making. Do they want me to be a slave?” (Vision Reporter 
2005).  
 
The central objective of this contextual overview is to frame the subsequent 
empirical chapters in the following light: Uganda earned itself the moniker of „donor 
darling‟ in the early years of the NRM leadership.
25
 Yet this crown has repeatedly 
slipped in the new millennium, notably on the occasions when the aspirations of the 
government and donors have openly diverged. This calls into question what it means 
to be a „donor darling‟ in light of the Paris tenet of country ownership, and 
underscores the requirement for donors to work in partnership with their peers, their 
governmental and non-governmental partners – i.e. to coordinate at the country-level 
- because simply put, Uganda is a country where the determined supremacy of the 
government retains the potential to challenge the best efforts of development partners 
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 Writing in 2000 (so prior to the country‟s 2006 political transition) Russell described Uganda‟s 
President Museveni as a “pragmatic autocrat,” stating that “Museveni is a firm believer that Africa is 
not ready for multi-party democracy” (Russell 2000: 8 & 282).  
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Winning Favour and Policy Approval: The Making of a Donor 
Darling 
 
Since the NRM government seized power in 1986, it has solicited international praise 
for its innovative and participatory approach to policy making. The 1997 PEAP is a 
case in point. In prioritising poverty reduction and laying the foundations for the 
creation of the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) – a “virtual fund” designed to ring-fence 
monies for the subset of government departments believed to contribute to poverty 
reduction (MoFPED 2004: 200) – the PEAP enhanced donor confidence that funds 
would be used to tackle the social determinants of poverty, permitting early donor 
forays into sector budget support. As Whitworth (2009) has suggested, “Donors 
loved the PEAP.” Quite aside from the poverty reduction focus, which soon became 
the norm for international development policy post-2000, Uganda‟s development 
partners were also impressed with the extensive public consultation that underpinned 
the development of the original document, and to which they themselves were 
invited. The use of widespread consultation in the development of strategic plans 
(including PEAP revisions) is now de rigueur in Uganda, and has contributed to the 
plethora of coordination fora that serve as the focus of this investigation (see 




Several revisions of the 1997 PEAP have been released (MoFPED 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2004). Of these it is the 2001 revision - Poverty Eradication Action Plan Volume 3:  
Building Partnerships to Implement the PEAP - that deserves special mention, for 
including a set of „Partnership Principles‟ intended to guide the government-donor 
relationship in Uganda (MoFPED 2001).
27 
The formal and regulated nature of 
relationship between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and its health donors is an 
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 Appendix 1 provides an overview of Uganda‟s Development Coordination structure. Appendix 2 
depicts an organogram of the official organisational structure of the health sector. While these 
pictorial representations attest that official coordination groupings have proliferated in Uganda to take 
advantage of the government‟s participatory stance toward its external partners, unfortunately they fail 
to acknowledge the numerous unofficial coordination groupings and networks that also feed into these 
official structures (for instance, discussion at the National TB Partnership likely filters into policy 
discussion at the Sector Working Group on Infectious Disease (see Appendix 2)). Unfortunately, the 
number and diversity of such groupings in Uganda‟s health sector mean they can‟t be easily be 
captured in the form of an organisational chart.    
27




important backdrop to the coordination narrative in Uganda, the details of which are 
discussed in Chapter Four. Here, it is enough to note that Uganda‟s 2001 „Partnership 
Principles‟ appear to portent the main tenets of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (Paris High-Level Forum 2005) - for instance, making the case for 
increased budget support - signifying again the influence of the Ugandan case 
example on the broader development agenda.  
 
As popular as the PEAP has been however, the plan‟s successor heralds a new era in 
Uganda‟s developmental approach. Rebranded a National Development Plan (NDP), 
the new title and theme of the plan - “Growth and Employment and Socio-Economic 
Transformation for Prosperity” (MoFPED 2010) - reflect a shift in focus that seeks to 
combine poverty reduction with economic growth.
28
 A Concept Note to precede the 
release of the new NDP suggested this was the logical consequence of certain 
development opportunities to have emerged in Uganda since the last PEAP, which 
include (among other things): oil discovery and mineral development, the improved 
integration of the private sector and investment with poverty eradication, (the 
anticipation of) decreasing aid flows amidst increasing domestic revenue, and the 
return of peace and security in the Great Lakes region (MoFPED 2007). In short, the 
message implicit in the NDP is that official development assistance (ODA) is 
expected to play a less important role in the country‟s future development.  
 
An evaluation looking into the implementation of the Paris Declaration in Uganda 
suggested that the development of the NDP had already represented a trade off for 
donors – with the GoU choosing to lead the process, thus minimising donor input. As 
a result, Uganda‟s development partners had been forced to prioritise their 
commitment to country ownership over their desire to participate (Office of the 
Prime Minister 2008: 43). How well they will now support the NDP – which doesn‟t 
necessarily reflect their objectives to the same extent as the old PEAP-format  
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 The NDA explains that “While the PEAP stressed poverty eradication and prioritised social 
services, the NDA maintains the poverty eradication vision, but with an additional emphasis on 
economic transformation and wealth creation thereby intertwining sustainable economic growth with 




(Riddell (2007) underscores that for many donors the moral case for ODA centres on 
its perceived role in poverty reduction) – remains to be seen.  
 
Shifting the focus now to Uganda‟s health sector, Uganda‟s 1990‟s health reforms 
garnered widespread praise and international attention for the NRM government. 
These were initiated under The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda in 1995, 
which established the right for all Ugandans to access health services and the 
compulsion of the state to ensure the provision of basic medical services to the 
population (GoU 1995: Preamble XIV (iii) & XX). Followed in 1997 by the Local 
Government Act (which established the GoU‟s policy of decentralisation) and the 
country‟s first PEAP (MoFPED 1997), Uganda‟s health focus was fully cemented by 
the National Health Policy (MoH 1999) and Health Sector Strategic Plan 2000/01-
2004/05 (HSSP I) (MoH 2000).  
 
HSSP I is viewed as an important juncture in GoU policy, for signalling to donors 
that Uganda was on track with the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp).
29
 HSSP I 
established Uganda‟s Minimum Health Care Package through which “cost effective 
interventions that are considered to have the highest impact on reducing morbidity 
and mortality from the major contributors to the disease burden…” are prioritised 
within the country‟s limited resource envelope (MoH 2000: 15). It also established 
the sort of targets – for instance, to reduce infant and maternal mortality rates and to 
control communicable diseases – that confirmed it as a donor-friendly document, 
aligned with international targets the Millennium Development Goals (although it 
omits the actual terminology). The HSSP I like the PEAP, therefore added weight to 
the argument that Uganda was increasingly ready to move away from project aid and 
toward budget support; an intention made explicit in „Partnership Principle Six‟ - 
“donors will continue to increase level of untied sector budget support” (MoFPED 
2001: 4). 
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 The sector-wide approach (SWAp) in Uganda‟s health sector was instigated in 2000. For an 




An updated version of the HSSP was released in 2005, and it is Health Sector 
Strategic Plan 2005/06-2009/10 (HSSP II) that currently guides the sector-wide 
approach in the health sector in 2010.  
 
By establishing targets for the sector and prioritising areas for intervention, the 
HSSPs have served to create a degree of public accountability for healthcare in 
Uganda that hadn‟t existed previously. Thus while health indicators haven‟t been 
revolutionised during the course of the two medium-term plans, there have at least 
been targets in place to compare results against and a burgeoning culture of data 
collection and analysis in the health sector to measure the country‟s incremental 
achievements. Moreover the SWAp has meant that all partners acting in the health 
sector – including nongovernmental partners – are now obliged to consider how their 
activities contribute to the national framework; with donor projects being subject to 
government approval. The HSSP thus provides an overarching framework for all 
decentralised and organisation-specific planning in the health sector. That Uganda‟s 
Health Development Partners have embraced the health SWAp is evidenced in the 
increased levels of sector budget support recorded for the health budget each year.  
 
Retaining a health focus, it would not be possible to discuss Uganda‟s ascendancy to 
„donor darling‟ without addressing what has become the country‟s biggest claim to 
fame to date: a country-led HIV/AIDS offensive attributed with a 20% drop in the 
national prevalence rate (from 30% to 10%) over the course of the 1990s (Parkhurst 
2002: 78). In terms of winning international attention and establishing Uganda as a 
development exemplar, such statistics have proved fundamental. The Ugandan case 
example remains the most frequently cited in international discourse on the global 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, with a popular version of the Ugandan narrative proceeding as 
follows: 
 
“In contrast to governments that ignored the looming [HIV/AIDS] crisis, 
President Museveni and the NRM government were open about AIDS from 
the time they won power…While violent predecessor regimes relied upon 
centralised, corporatist state institutions, the new government fostered a 
vibrant civil society of voluntary associations…The extent of collaborative 




enabling context for change, with debate, dialogue and action” (Schoepf 
2003: 553-554). 
 
Another important insert at this point is that Uganda originally championed the 
preventative element of the “prevention, treatment, care” continuum, emphasising all 
aspects of the ABC (Abstinence, Be Faithful, Condom Use) approach to behavioural-
change. That was, until the moralising influence of US foreign policy served to 
downplay the importance of condom use in the new millennium (Schoepf 2003, 
2004; also see http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/aids/2005/uganda/ [Accessed 
11/03/10]).  
  
Today, the claims made on behalf of Uganda and its HIV/AIDS offensive have been 
somewhat modified. The revised figures attest that Uganda‟s prevalence rate peaked 
at 18% (rather than 30%) in 1992, and was to be found stagnating at 6.4% in 2007 
(UAC 2007: i). Indeed as Parkhurst explains, “Many claims of the success of Uganda 
in dealing with HIV/AIDS have been predicated on selective pieces of information, 
which have been falsely presented as representative of the nation as a whole” 
(Parkhurst 2002: 78). Furthermore, international discourse has tended to overplay the 
role of the Ugandan government – and its select interventions - when explaining the 
decline.
30
 Yet even in spite of the mitigating factors, Uganda‟s achievements are to 
be applauded and no other African country can yet boast a comparable decline in 
HIV/AIDS (Parkhurst 2002). The intention in mentioning the distorted claims 
therefore, is to impress how important the Ugandan case study has become for both 
the discourse on development aid and HIV/AIDS. Interestingly, Parkhurst has 
attributed the mass acceptance of questionable statistics to „donor fatigue‟, blaming 
the political pressure on donors to present an image of success to sustain funding at 
all costs. This pressure is thought to be so strong in the Ugandan case that “The 
standard of proof for policy recommendations seems to have been lowered to provide 
the international community with the African success story it wants, or even needs” 
                                                 
30
 It is important to remember that the GoU is but one player in Uganda‟s multi-partnered, multi-
sectoral HIV/AIDS approach, that individuals can change their behaviour for reasons unrelated to 
intervention campaigns and that there is a notable time lag in the mathematical models that suggest 
prevalence rates will come to reflect declines in incidence (Parkhurst 2002). Schoepf weighs in on the 
issue, noting “What types of preventative action have stimulated the most change [in Uganda], 




(Parkhurst 2002: 80). Evocative of Mosse‟s (2005) work on the role of interpretative 
communities in development, I shall consider the resilience of the Ugandan „success 
story‟ toward the end of this chapter. For now it is enough to consider that Uganda 
receives 10-15% of PEPFAR‟s funding, despite accounting for just 2-3% of its 
global targets (Institute of Medicine 2007: 108).   
 
Sadly, Uganda‟s HIV/AIDS gains are being severely tested in the new millennium as 
the national HIV/AIDS Partnership is forced to cope with new challenges. The 6.4% 
prevalence rate is publicly referred to as „stagnating‟ but the real concern is that it is 
actually on the rise.
31
 This is partly blamed on the changing nature of the epidemic in 
Uganda, uncapped population growth and the de-emphasis of the prevention prong of 
the three-pronged approach in recent years, in favour of treatment. While prevention 
is now being re-emphasised in the national strategy (UAC 2007), the lingering 
influence of the USA‟s last conservative government is still being felt in the 
inflexibility of the earmarked PEPFAR programme - which funds a large proportion 
of the national response in Uganda - and which continues to prioritise treatment and 
promote abstinence-only projects.  
 
A final and unexpected blow to Uganda‟s reputation for HIV/AIDS came in the form 
of this off-the-cuff comment by President Museveni in 2007: “To die of Aids is 
treason. Because you would have betrayed your family, which had invested in you 
and had hope that you would help them…Instead of being an asset you become a 
burden…is that not treason?” (Butagira and Kibuuka 2007). Prompting an instant 
rebuttal from the once Assistant US Global AIDS Coordinator - Jimmy Kolker - 
(Medical News Today 2007) the statement evoked widespread exasperation and 
embarrassment in country.  
 
To conclude this section, Uganda‟s reputation as „donor darling‟ has largely resulted 
from its government‟s innovative policy-making and openness to working with 
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 The National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2007/8-2011/2012: Moving toward Universal Access notes 
that “The third phase of the Uganda HIV epidemic (since 2000) has been characterized by 
stabilisation of HIV prevalence ranging between 6-7%. However, there are anecdotal indications…of 




external partners. Moreover by its reduction of its HIV/AIDS prevalence rate and an 
impressive track record of growth in gross domestic product (GDP).  
 
 
The Centrality of Good Governance: Uganda‟s Slipping 
Crown 
 
Turning now to an issue at the crux of the aid effectiveness agenda, that of „good 
governance‟, a quick glance at Uganda in 2010 – which boasts a system of multiparty 
politics and various institutions dedicated to tackling corruption - would also suggest 
that the country is in line with the aspirations of its development partners.
32
 In this 
respect however, a cursory look would not suffice, disguising the fact that the GoU 
and its development partners have been in battle for the best part of a decade over 
what „good governance‟ looks like in Uganda.  
 
Indicative of the mission creep inherent to development organisations, donors have 
come to view domestic politics as another area suited to their input.
33
 While the logic 
behind this encroachment is commonly held to be the Dollar and Burnside (1997) 
argument – that aid is most effective in a good policy environment (an idea readily 
embraced and exported by the World Bank (World Bank 1998; Kaufman et al. 1999) 
- there remains no universal definition for what „good governance‟ is. The indicators 
to measure the phenomenon are multitudinous and vary wildly, with the only tacit 
agreement being that „good governance‟ now constitutes something of a global 
public good. Kapur and Webb (2000) have called it “a matter of interpretation;” 
Hyden and Court have described it as a “catch-all concept” (Hyden & Court 2002: 
12). Such statements therefore, draw natural comparisons with this excerpt from 
George Orwell‟s Politics and the English Language: 
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 In addition to its judicial system, Uganda boasts the Inspectorate of Government and the Office of 
the Auditor General. A dedicated Anti-Corruption Division of the Ugandan High Court also exists. 
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 While the term “mission creep” was traditionally associated with military operations – denoting the 
gradual expansion of a mission beyond its original objectives – it has since been used in relation to 
development, most often in reference to the do-everything approach of donors. Thus while donors 
were originally focused on providing aid for its perceived macroeconomic benefits, they have since 






“In the case of a word like democracy, not only is there no agreed definition, 
but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides. It is almost universally 
felt that when we call a country democratic we are praising it: consequently 
the defenders of every kind of regime claim it is a democracy, and fear that 
they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one 
meaning.” (Orwell 1946: 3)  
 
In Uganda therefore, the dispute between the government and its donors is more 
often than not a dispute over definition, over what constitutes „good governance‟ and 
indeed what constitutes „democracy.‟  So much so that even when a disagreement 
appears to centre on corruption it still harks back to governance, because as the 
World Bank has established, corruption is to be viewed as an outcome of poor 
governance rather than as a component of it (World Bank 2006). Needless to say, the 
issue is a sensitive one in Uganda, where the government and its outspoken President 
are resolutely averse to perceived challenges to national sovereignty. Governance 
therefore represents the complicating factor in the international community‟s 
relationship with Uganda, and is the issue threatening the country‟s crown as „donor 
darling‟. The main incidents in the souring of the relationship are recounted below. 
 
Donors have been growing progressively wary of the political climate in Uganda 
since the turn of the Millennium, with Museveni‟s Presidency being perceived as 
increasingly authoritarian. Tensions first bubbled over in 2002 when the GoU cut the 
budget of several departments to increase its defence allotment. In protest, donors 
from the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland withheld development aid. Undeterred, in 
2003 Uganda‟s defence budget grew by a further 29%. Subsequently, in 2004 the 
USA deleted Uganda from a US $7 billion multi-country aid programme citing 
concerns over human rights and governance issues (Atoo 2005). 
 
Disagreements between the Ugandan government and its donors finally came to a 
head in 2005 as concerns about the political transition in Uganda - from the 
„Movement system‟ to multiparty politics and project Kisanja (i.e. the „third term 









Writing in May 2005, Atoo (2005) provided a commentary on the political situation 
in Uganda at that time. Her account noted that in the preceding months donors had 
expressed concerns over the following issues: the constitutional amendment, the slow 
transition to multiparty politics, the alarming increase in foreign debt and the attack 
on the political opposition. Atoo underlined that concerns were quickly translating 
into threats to withhold aid; and indeed around that time, Ireland announced its 
decision to withdraw 2 million Euros from its Uganda programme over the failure of 
the NRM government to implement political reform (O‟Farrell 2005). 
 
In addition, Atoo highlighted the publication of two reports that served to document 
the concerns of the country‟s international donors at that time: the OECD‟s Africa‟s 
Economic Outlook 2004/5 (OECD 2005) and the confidential World Bank document: 
The Political Economy of Uganda: The Art of Managing a Donor Financed Neo-
Patrimonial State (Barkan et al. 2004). The former suggested that Uganda‟s 
economic success was largely due to its high aid levels and warned its handling of 
the 2006 general election could put these at risk. In addition, it highlighted some of 
the institutional weaknesses stifling growth in the country and the increasing debt 
disturbing donors. Finally, it remarked on some perceived improvements in 
governance in the country but stressed that corruption was still a major problem and 
had driven up the costs of public sector investment. The latter report, while leaked, 
remains ostensibly confidential. It is helpful therefore that its primary author, Joel 
Barkan, published his own paper shortly after the World Bank publication, which I 
anticipate mirrors many of the concerns expressed in the original.  
 
Barkan‟s article „An African “Success” Past Its Prime‟ (2005) argues that “Once 
hailed as a compelling „success story‟ of Africa, Uganda today is at risk of becoming 
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 “The Movement system was originally conceived as a competitive political system within a „no-
party‟ or non-partisan framework – i.e. the NRM was not a party in the political sense, but rather a 
„big tent‟ to which all Ugandans belonged and within which all could compete on the basis of their 
own „individual merit‟ rather than on the basis of their party affiliations” (Barkan 2005: 12). 




another African tragedy” (Barkan 2005: 9). Writing one month prior to the country‟s 
referendum on the decision to return to multiparty politics, he determined that it was 
Uganda‟s continued failure to complete the process of democratisation that was 
putting its reputation in jeopardy. Moreover, he held the country‟s high aid levels 
responsible for financing the downfall - “aid flows totalling $690 million per 
annum…now provides roughly 51 percent of Uganda‟s budget, making the country 
one of the most aid-dependent in Africa” (Barkan 2005: 10) – maintaining that 
donors were providing the means for the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
regime to stay in power.  
 
Barkan highlighted three main areas of concern in the country at that time: the 
transition to multiparty politics and the repeal of presidential term limits, the war in 
northern Uganda, and corruption. Addressing the issue of most concern to donors, 
Barkan outlined how the combination of a return to multiparty politics and the third 
term issue had split the ruling party, leaving Museveni with a government dominated 
by less talented „yes men‟. Furthermore, he suggested that support for the third term 
issue had been achieved through bribes and force, leading him to anticipate either the 
threat of repression or insurgency in the run up to the 2006 elections. In conclusion 
therefore, Barkan judged that “After an extended period of political 
liberalization…Uganda has slipped back into a period of neo-patrimonial, or „big 
man‟ rule” (Barkan 2005: 11).  
 
Discussing the continued instability in northern Uganda, Barkan argued that the war 
with the Lord‟s Resistance Army had in part been allowed to continue because it has 
served Museveni‟s political purposes: by helping him to secure power in Buganda, 
by providing him with an army patronage network that has bought him support and 
protection, and by muting donor criticism over the slowing of the democratic 
transition and the third term issue as long as the Uganda‟s People Defence Force 
were seen to be seriously engaged in the conflict. 
 
Finally, on the issue of what he termed “corruption for the purposes of regime 




problems, as he claimed that the high levels of aid provided in budget support 
directly and indirectly financed corruption in the country and removed the incentive 
for Uganda to balance its books (Barkan 2005: 19).  
 
In his conclusion, Barkan impressed that Uganda was not yet a failed state and 
challenged its donors to stop denying the reality of what was happening, saying: 
 
“ Having celebrated Uganda‟s success, the United Sates and the rest of the 
donor community should now acknowledge that the Museveni government is 
an increasingly corrupt and authoritarian regime that has probably overstayed 
its welcome. It should also be acknowledged that the current volume of aid, 
through budget support in particular, sustains this situation” (Barkan 2005: 
23). 
 
Ruhakana Rugunda, Uganda‟s then Minister for Internal Affairs was quick to refute 
Barkan‟s depiction of Uganda as a success story past its prime (Rugunda 2005). In 
defence of the repeal of the constitution to allow President Museveni to run for a 
third term he underscored that “We proposed the removal of term limits as a 
principle and not for President Museveni” (Rugunda 2005: 32). In addition, in his 
defence of Uganda‟s political state of affairs, Rugunda highlighted some of the 
indiscrepancies in what donors demanded of partner countries and what they did in 
practice, positing, “If no term limits bring good governance in Britain, where Tony 
Blair has just been elected to a third term, why should it bring chaos in Uganda?” 
(Rugunda 2005: 33-34).
35
 Finally, he argued that what Uganda wanted was access to 
global markets - not aid – echoing both an earlier exhortation made by the President 
(New Vision 27
th
 May 2005) and a widespread anti-aid sentiment that resurfaces 
with surprising regularity in the Ugandan press.
36
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 In November 2007, President Museveni was similarly asked to pass comment on the removal of 
Presidential term limits as Uganda hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 
responding, “You know countries like Britain don‟t have term limits. I don‟t know whether I should 
call you undemocratic.” http://www.ugee.com/20071124111/Latest-News/Term-limits-are-a-question-
of-history-or-convenience-MUSEVENI.html [Accessed 03/07/10]  
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 Just a few examples of stories with an anti-aid overtone to appear in the Ugandan press during 
fieldwork included: „Mwonda, Museveni, Muhwezi: Whence the IGG?‟ suggested: “The only people 
not yet indicted for gross negligence [in the trial over lost GAVI funds] would be the donors writing 
cheques for monies used so irresponsibly” (Ssemogerere 2007);  „Africa must discard the begging 
bowl‟ (Sankore 2007); „G8 making the wrong diagnosis for Africa‟: comments on the futility of 
foreign aid (Byaruhanga 2007); „Africa needs stronger Parliaments‟: reports that foreign aid may have 





With hindsight one can determine that several of the concerns raised by Barkan in his 
2005 publication did not materialise. The July 2005 referendum on the return to 
multiparty politics and the March 2006 election took place with minimal disruption. 
Yet today there‟s talk of a fourth term for Museveni, with a credible alternative 
seemingly lacking within the NRM or opposition parties. Indeed of his retirement, 
Museveni has said “A good fighter doesn‟t retire in the middle of the struggle” 
(Mukasa 2007). Moreover, the NRM‟s internal definition of democracy evokes 
concern when its figurehead makes comments such as this “We would not allow bad 
leaders who kill people to be in control. If you did not elect us in 1996 and had not 
given us the mandate, we would have gone back to the bush to fight” (Matsiko 
2007).  In short, the enduring appeal of the war mentality within Uganda‟s ruling 
party remains a concern for donors. 
 
While Barkan‟s fears over the democratic transition failed to materialise in 2005, his 
concerns over corruption were amply validated that year, as it was discovered that 
Ugandan Shillings (USH) 3.2 billion of Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 
(GFATM) monies (Mugisa and Nsambu 2009) and USH 1.6 billion of Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) monies (Afedraru 2008) had been 




It is significant that it was money from two performance-based Global Health 
Initiatives (GHIs) that went awry in Uganda, calling into question both the logic of 
providing such huge injections of cash to a country with weak institutional capacity, 
and the manner in which more traditional health aid – not so stringently monitored – 
may have also been mishandled in the past. Without question the revelations have, 
and continue to be a public relations disaster for Uganda (and for the GHIs), and not 
                                                                                                                                          
Another story to have captured a lot of headlines during 2007 concerned the expiration of life-saving 
drugs at the National Medical Stores (NMS), which certain donors had left in store (using NMS as a 
third-party procurement agent) but had failed to distribute; this sparked off a wave of vitriol against 
the guilty health donors: „Shs3.6b malaria, ARV drugs rot in NMS‟ (Nandutu 2007a); „ARVs worth 
sh1b to be destroyed‟ (Basudde 2007); „Drugs scarce yet stocks expire at Medical Stores‟ (Nandutu 
2007b).   
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 Converting these figures into dollars, US 1.5 million of GFATM grants and US $750,000 of GAVI 




just because of the widespread corruption that they exposed in the country‟s health 
sector (and the loopholes in the GHI‟s approach).
38
 Five years on from the 
revelations, the GHI cases have called into question both the GoU‟s ability and 
commitment to hold the alleged embezzlers to account. Put simply, if corruption is to 
some extent tolerable within the aid relationship (and in conjunction with the  „good 
governance‟ agenda), outright impunity is not. This logic is played out in the case of 
the GFATM mismanagement, which has proceeded as follows.  
 
When missing GFATM monies were exposed in August 2005, the GFATM 
immediately suspended its grants to Uganda until suitable interim arrangement could 
be made. Subsequently the funds were restarted in November 2005 using parallel, 
nongovernmental arrangements. The GoU then initiated an extensive consultation 
(inclusive of donors and civil society partners) to devise a new way to manage future 
grants. The resultant Long-Term Institutional Arrangements (LTIAs) were finalised 
and accepted by the GFATM Secretariat in 2007 and now guide all aid-centric aid 
relations in the country.
39
 In so far as restarting the flow of GFATM monies and 
working to rebuild GFATM confidence therefore, Uganda was quickly back on track 
following the 2005 revelations. Where it remains off track however, is in its bid to 
secure prosecutions for those implicated in the GFATM embezzlement. Given that 
373 people were originally implicated in the mismanagement – including the 
country‟s Health Minister of the time - it is a poor reflection of the GoU‟s 
commitment to countering corruption that just two of the cases had made it to the 
High Court by April 2009 (Mugisa and Nsambu 2009). Moreover, the sheer number 
of people implicated at every level of the mismanagement appears to point to an 
ingrained culture of small-scale fraud throughout the public administration. 
 
The snail‟s pace of the GFATM prosecutions is surprising when you consider that 
shortly after the scandal broke, President Museveni appointed a judicial commission 
to investigate the alleged mismanagement, determined to show that “Uganda would 
use all its might to root out corruption in the use of money and punish wrongdoers” 
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 Cohen (2008) underscores that it wasn‟t the GFATM that discovered the corruption in Uganda, but 
rather a whistleblower from civil society organisation Aidspan. 
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(Cohen 2008: 522). The output of that commission was the Ogoola Report, which 
catalogued the widespread misuse of GFATM monies between 2003 and 2005. 
Subsequently, the GoU issued a White Paper in November 2006, outlining its 
agreement with the majority of the commission‟s findings and demanding both the 
repayment of US $1.6 million and rapid prosecutions. The GFATM Secretariat, it 
appears, was initially rather pleased with the GoU‟s response, with the then 
Executive Director of the GFATM, Richard Feachem quoted in the press as saying 
“The openness and thoroughness with which President Museveni addressed the 
Global Fund‟s concerns…has set an example for how allegations of corruption 
should be managed” (GFATM 2006b). In short, in the immediate aftermath of the 
scandal, the government made all the right noises. Following that period however, 




Figure 1: Cartoon highlighting pressure from Uganda‟s donors that 






In July 2007, the national committee set up to investigate the GFATM abuse reported 
having no money to pursue the investigations (Hussein Bogere 2007). This 
eventually led to open criticism of the GoU approach from within the ranks of its 
development partners, with the Danish Ambassador declaring the GFATM case a 
“litmus test” for how serious the GoU - and the GFATM - were about tackling 
corruption (cited in Cohen 2008: 522). A subsequent visit by the Inspector General 
of the GFATM to assess the progress of the prosecutions in May 2008 confirmed 
growing frustrations within the donor community (Comment 2008), the allusion 
being that continued inertia over the GFATM mismanagement was making it harder 
for every donor to give aid in good conscience. 
 
The GFATM case was given a kick-start in 2008, with the appointment of a new 
GFATM Inspector General and some assistance from the European Anti-Fraud 
Office and the UK‟s Serious Fraud Office (Serious Fraud Office 2009). Money to 
advance the prosecutions has now been released by the Ministry of Finance and an 
Anti-Corruption division of the Ugandan High Court has been established. After a 
slow start therefore, the prosecutions over the GFATM embezzlement have begun. 
Now it only remains to be seen how many prosecutions will be secured and whether 
the damage caused to international relations during the delay can be repaired. 
Looking at the manner in which the GAVI case has proceeded, however, the GoU is 
not out of the woods yet. 
 
The GAVI case was originally construed as a much more straightforward case than 
the GFATM one. Without the need for a commission or a report, 57 alleged 
perpetrators were quickly identified and trial proceedings initiated (Mugisa, Ariko 
and Anyoli 2007). Several of the higher-profile suspects in the GAVI case are also 
implicated in the GFATM mismanagement, and it was initially quite reassuring that 
their cases were brought to court first (in July 2007). That said, something strange is 
afoot with the GAVI trial. Recurrent disputes over procedural issues – instigated in 
almost every instance by the high-profile defendants – have caused multiple 
adjournments and postponements, meaning it is not now clear whether the case will 




– former confident to the President and the man cited as “politically responsible and 
accountable for the overall mismanagement of the [GFATM] project” (Mugisa and 
Nsambu 2009) - whose possible impunity poses the greatest threat to Uganda‟s 
reputation for upholding the rule of law. Accusations of political interference, and 
worse nepotism, would be the natural consequence of his acquittal.  
 
The issue of corruption remains at the top of the agenda for Uganda‟s donors and it 
was continued concern over impunity in the face of corruption that prompted the 
country‟s Local Development Partners Group to issue this warning to the 
Government in February 2010 (in a statement picked up by the national and 
international press (e.g. Ford 2010)):   
 
“The Government‟s failure to act on high level corruption will have 
implications, and donors under the Joint Budget Support Framework are 
currently considering a range of actions. This may include withholding 
disbursements, reductions in aid, or re-programming away from direct budget 
support etc…we would like to assure the government of Uganda that 
Development Cooperation will increasingly be a results-orientated 
partnership, where development partners can demonstrate to their own 
taxpayers money is well spent” (Observer Media Ltd 2010).  
 
To sum up, while some of Uganda‟s donors have individually threatened to, and on 
occasions, cut aid to the GoU since the turn of the Millennium, by 2010 a 
coordination grouping known as the Local Development Partners Group had clubbed 
together to read it the riot act.
40
 This points to the literal fulfilment of a fear identified 
within the higher echelons of Uganda‟s political leadership several years ago - that 
budget support has emerged “not only as a „carrot‟ for good governance, but also a 
„stick‟ in the event of poor performance” (Office of the Prime Minister 2008: 47). It 
also points to another undisclosed property of the aid effectiveness agenda – that of 
strength in numbers - as the implications of donors‟ threats to withhold aid have 
increased in correlation with their commitment to the Paris principle of 
harmonisation (an issue addressed in Chapter Four). 
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UGANDA‟S RANKING IN TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL‟S CORRUPTIONS 
PERCEPTIONS INDEX  
(Note: the higher the number the worse the 
ranking) 
 
UGANDA‟S RANKING IN THE 
FAILED STATES INDEX 
 
(Note: The lower the number the 
worse the ranking) 
2001 88 (out of 91)  
2002 93 (out of 102)  
2003 113 (out of 133)  
2004 102 (out of 145)  
2005 117 (out of 158) 27 (out of 76) 
2006 105 (out of 163) 21 (out of 146) 
2007 111 (out of 179) 15 (out of 177) 
2008 126 (out of 180) 16 (out of 177) 
2009 130 (out of 180) 21 (out of 177) 
  
 
So far this discussion has pointed to several of the more serious incidents to threaten 
Uganda‟s reputation as „donor darling‟ since the turn of the millennium. The list it 
should be said is far from exhaustive. Other questionable events to tarnish the 
government‟s reputation abroad have included the inability to account for US $27 
million in relation to the country‟s hosting of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting in 2007, the appointment of First Lady Janet Museveni as a 
member of cabinet, the continued heavy-handedness of Uganda‟s law enforcers in 
the event of public protest, and the proposed Anti-Homosexuality Bill, which, if 
passed, could make homosexuality punishable by a life sentence or even death in 
Uganda. The latter issue in particular has prompted international outrage, prompting 
President Museveni to exclaim, “Prime Minister Gordon Brown came to see me and 
what was he talking about? Gays. Mrs Clinton rang me. What was she talking about? 
Gays” (BBC News 2010). Indeed, the heated reaction of the international community 
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 Sources: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009 and 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=323  




to a proposed piece of domestic legislation in a relatively small African country 
reinforces just how important Uganda remains for the defence of development aid.  
 
To conclude this section detailing the issues threatening Uganda‟s crown as „donor 
darling‟, let it be made clear, it is the country‟s donors who – whilst coupling 
punishment with diplomacy - are working hardest to prevent the crown falling. While 
the threats have amplified over the years, there has been as yet no ultimatum. 
Moreover there is little indication to suggest that the Ugandan government is unduly 
concerned by the political posturing, a position well explained by De Renzio‟s 
(2006) theory on the “primacy of domestic policies.”  
 
De Renzio highlights the fragility of Uganda‟s earlier good governance commitments 
when challenged by the primacy of domestic politics and advises donors that since 
aid will not prove a powerful bargaining chip, they need to deal with the reality that 
domestic politics take precedence in recipient country affairs and assume a humbler 
approach.
42
 If you accept this argument, then you can see that donors are facing 
something of a conundrum in Uganda. Firstly, although the evidence belies the 
ability of aid to buy policy (Burnside and Dollar 1997), the main tool at donors‟ 
disposal remains ODA. And while the Paris Declaration extols the principle of 
national ownership, donors don‟t want to be seen to support a belligerent and/or 
corrupt government. Finally, to follow through on the threat to withdraw aid to 
Uganda would be to lose development‟s exemplar - the case example most readily 
used to justify the continuation of aid in less amenable environments.   
 
It is helpful therefore that donors have another, lesser publicised tool at their 
disposal, which allows them to circumvent all the tricky variables that make aid hard 
to justify in an aid recipient country that just won‟t tow the line: framing. Mosse 
(2005) referred to this when he identified the role of interpretative communities in 
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 “This is a clear indication that whatever donors think or do, in many cases domestic politics takes 
precedence when power-holders feel that their regimes are being questioned. Donor pressures and 
threats to cut aid are less important than internal control over the levers of power, especially in 




determining the success or failure of development projects.
43
 Easterly (2002) pre-





During fieldwork, a story to appear in the Ugandan press commented on the tabloid 
claim that President Museveni has just two pictures on the wall of his office, one of 
himself and one of Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe (Ruzindana 2007). The 
truth or otherwise of the claim isn‟t important. Instead it‟s the insinuation that 
Museveni‟s style of leadership has on (any) occasion evoked that of Mugabe that‟s of 
interest in this - a conclusion interested in the idea of framing. In the run up to the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Uganda, a related 
article appeared in the Ugandan press, publicising the “CHOGM Paradox” by which 
the north readily praised CHOGM host Museveni while damning Mugabe, despite 
the two boasting similar paths to power and comparable leadership styles (at least in 
the opinion of the writer). The author explained the paradoxical framings of the two 
African leaders as follows “Where President Museveni distances himself from 
Mugabe is in the way he understands and ably deals with the dynamics of 
international relations” (Sengoba 2007). There are two points one can infer from this 
story. Firstly, that Museveni-Mugabe comparisons - which appear quite innocuously 
in the Ugandan press – would be actively avoided in development discourse, which 
seeks to frame Museveni in a manner that justifies the continuation of aid flows to 
Uganda. Secondly, that Museveni (as head of ruling party, the NRM) is cognisant of, 
and complicit in the development community‟s framing, doing just enough to make it 
possible for donors to continue with the status quo. Thus while Museveni may balk at 
international interference in a piece of domestic legislation such as the Anti-
Homosexuality Bill, he will nevertheless take the call when Mrs Clinton or Mr 
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 Mosse has underscored the importance of interpretative communities in development, whereby “the 
more interests that are tied up with their particular interpretations the more stable and dominant 




Brown phones up to complain.
44
 And when money goes missing from a huge GHI 
like the GFATM, he will send out the clarion call while the cameras roll even if the 
momentum for action is fleeting. Through their work Development Brokers and 
Translators Lewis and Mosse (2006) have helped to shed some light on such 
contradictory behaviour. Subsequently, rather than inhabiting binary roles as tyrants 
or victims, Museveni and the GoU should be depicted as skilled aid “brokers,” who 
inhabit shifting positions to deal with the “multiple rationalities of development” 
(Mosse & Lewis: 15).
45
 Viewed in this manner, the behaviour soon appears quite 
rational, as the GoU strives to appear strong in front of its people (it won‟t be 
dictated to by external parties) while speaking the language of partnership with its 
donors (to maintain the flow of aid the country needs). This is certainly not a 
scenario peculiar to Uganda, but to aid relationships everywhere.  
 
The Uganda case study underlines the symbiotic relationship that exists between 
donors and their recipients (and validates Kanbur‟s (2000) argument that it isn‟t in 
donors‟ interests to punish governance violations). It also points to the wider 
relevance of coordination and harmonisation principles in the aid relationship, 
because while the crown may have slipped in Uganda, it is clear that donors are not 
yet ready to denounce Uganda‟s status as aid‟s success story. Furthermore, Uganda‟s 
ruling party remains willing to do its part (although just enough and no more) to 
render such a framing plausible. Put bluntly, Uganda‟s earlier successes and role in 
the making of the modern development agenda has rendered it too important to 
sacrifice. Thus while Barkan determined Uganda to be the “Africa test” for American 
foreign policy back in 2005, I would elevate its significance further, arguing that in 
2010 - in view of the high levels of development assistance awarded the country over 
the last twenty years and its tentative advances toward establishing a liberal 
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 This excerpt from Museveni‟s 12
th
 May 2006 swearing in speech suggests that he might not have 
appreciated the phone calls: “Surrendering of sovereignty on decision-making is a very big mistake. I 




 The complementary yet equally contradictory roles inhabited by donors according to this logic are 
those of development “translators,” whereby donors help to stabilise the representations of 
development projects through a process of “„translation‟ that permits the negotiation of common 
meanings and definitions and the mutual enrolment and co-option into individual and collective 




democracy - Uganda has emerged as the litmus test for development aid in general.
46
 
It is the case example that most seriously threatens to overthrow current thinking on 
the dynamics of aid, governance and development in practice. 
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 “Uganda presents the Bush Administration with the „Africa test‟ of its announced policy of 
promoting freedom and democracy around the world. If the Administration cannot pass the test here, 











Taking a Mixed Methods Approach 
 
This thesis aligns itself with a growing body of ethnographic research that concerns 
itself with how development works (Mosse 2005), and yet it is not itself an 
ethnographic piece of work. The distinction needs to made, because while the mixed 
methodological approach adopted for this thesis drew on a number of qualitative 
methods readily found in the ethnographic tool box - in-depth interview, discourse 
analysis, naturalistic observation and triangulation - and while the tight knit aid 
community encircling Uganda‟s health sector could well be considered a suitable 
target for an ethnographic study (a relatively small group of informants in a naturally 
occurring setting (Brewer 2000)), the tangible barriers precluding „outsiders‟ gaining 
sustained access to what is, at present, a gated community, prevented me from 
securing the degree of engagement required for a full ethnography. Furthermore, 
coming as I do from a multidisciplinary background – Arts and Social Sciences – and 
being situated in the multidisciplinary department of African Studies, it was logical 
that I would draw on a number of disciplines when designing and conducting my 
research, in this instance: African Studies, Development Studies, Health Policy, Aid 
Policy and Anthropology. To sum up therefore, this thesis drew on a mixed methods 
- and largely - qualitative approach, although some quantitative methods were also 
used to establish patterns of donor giving to Uganda‟s health sector. 
 
That said, while this thesis doesn‟t constitute ethnography per se, it does nevertheless 
share a common objective with that methodology: “to understand the social 
meanings and activities of people in a given field…” (Brewer 2000: 11). 
Furthermore, as previously documented in Chapter One, the thesis has been heavily 
influenced by several of the more prominent ethnographies of aid and development 
to have emerged over the last 30 years. Such ethnographies have a lot to teach the 




which, for instance, refuses to accept discourse at its word - considering instead in a 




Whilst accepting that Ferguson (1990) and Escobar (1995) laid the foundations for 
the type of study I have attempted with this thesis, I align my thinking with the more 
nuanced understanding of the modern aid relationship championed by Crewe and 
Harrison (1998) and Mosse (2005), which rejects both the dichotomous „them‟ and 
„us‟ view championed by the original „deconstructors of development‟ and the 
automacity of the machine inferred by Ferguson. In this way, my research is founded 
on a desire to “to reinstate the complex agency of actors in development at every 
level…as well as to revise the false notion of all-powerful Western development 
institutions” (Mosse 2005: 6); this necessitates “examining the „interface‟ between 
many groups and actors…” (Crewe and Harrison 1998:19).  
 
Also from this school of development critique, the approach taken for my thesis 
takes as a given the disjuncture between policy and practice, acknowledging like 
Mosse that practice doesn‟t follow from policy yet that this need not be problematic 
so long as the “interpretative communities” that sustain stable development policy 
models function efficiently (Mosse 2005: 8). Moreover that such disjuncture allows 
for the emergence of “unintended yet instrumental elements” (Ferguson 1990: 21; 
Foucault 1979). This stance stems from a belief that development organisations 
actually wield limited operational control over practice (Mosse 2005) and indeed 
often overestimate their importance in the field (Ferguson and Crewe 1998).  
 
In sum, the methodological approach adopted for this study aligns with the “messier” 
but arguably “more accurate” view of development reality forwarded by Crewe and 
Harrison (1998: 5), which as I will argue is sustained at the country-level in 
Uganda‟s health sector via negotiation and compromise, unwritten rules of 
engagement and fluid alliances between the heterogeneous stakeholders.  
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 Ferguson considers the function of discourse in light of Foucault‟s (1971, 1973) idea of a 
conceptual “apparatus,” considering it as an elaborate contraption which does something and which 







A Brief Introduction to the Research Topic 
 
The research topic is concerned with the logic implicit in the aid effectiveness 
agenda that suggests that coordination between national and international partners at 
the country-level is the practical undertaking required to achieve the means  - i.e. 
ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability in the aid 
relationship - to the end: effective development aid. „Coordination‟ therefore 
provides a useful catchall term with which to encompass both the tenets of the Paris 
Declaration and the intentionally slippery development terms „partnership‟ and 
„participation‟ upon which it is founded. While seemingly encompassing a lot, the 
logic of the coordination ideology is actually very simple, positing that when donors 
worked in isolation from their peers and in parallel to the developing state, official 
development assistance (ODA) was largely ineffective, thus the contrary may also be 
true.      
 
This study seeks to unpack the reality behind the rhetoric of coordination measures 
carried out in the name of aid effectiveness in Uganda, using a purposive case study 
of the country‟s health sector, and specifically the aid relationships that underpin the 
sector‟s most high-profile multi-stakeholder forum: the Health Policy Advisory 
Committee.
48
 The study posits initially whether meaningful coordination between 
heterogeneous partners at the country-level is currently even possible, before 
pondering whether, if not, there might still be something to gain from sustaining the 
framing that it is (i.e. that practice follows policy)? It is a research topic that, as I 
shall explain in the next section, was not the centrepiece of the original research 
design but which emerged – via the logic of induction – from the fieldwork 
experience.   
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 The Terms of Reference for the HPAC (see Appendix 5) state that: “HPAC is not a part of the 
Ministry of Health establishment and does not replace the regular decision-making process in the 
Ministry. HPAC is a parallel structure that facilitates and compliments the Government‟s decision-
making process. It provides a forum for health policy issues to be discussed and an opportunity for 





The Value of an Iterative Research Design  
 
An advantage of taken a mixed methods approach in the social sciences is that it 
permits an iterative approach to research design and the freedom to make alterations 
to the study topic according to the reality on the ground. Such freedom reflects with 
my epistemological stance of interpretive induction. 
 
This is not to suggest however that I embarked on fieldwork a firm research idea. 
Instead, I had formulated a research topic and accompanying design that focused my 
gaze very firmly on Uganda‟s health sector and the impact of aid flows to it, but 
which nevertheless afforded me the freedom to cast my net far and wide within that 
confine. The original research design for the fieldwork thus articulated the research 
topic in the form of a broad question: in what ways does international development 
assistance mediate the relationship between state and non-state provision of key 
medical services in Uganda? The topic was elucidated upon via eight sub-questions, 
derived from an extensive literature review undertaken in 2006 and looking at the 
interplay between recent shifts in the development agenda which demanded 
increased and more effective aid, good governance and the fulfilment of social 
development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (with their strong 
health focus).
49
   
 
The original research design was structured around the eight core elements of social 
research design outlined by Blaikie (2000), and proposed a multiple, embedded case 
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 The original sub-questions were as follows: 1) Does current development thinking play a concrete 
role in shaping health policy and provision in Uganda? 2) Does current thinking shape the 
international development policies of bilateral donors such as USAID and DFID? 3) What channels 
other than budget support are DFID and USAID individual donors utilising to disburse aid within the 
country? 4) What are the limits to Uganda in shaping its own governance agenda? What governance-
related conditionalities, if any, are accompanying current aid disbursements? 5) How will international 
perceptions of Uganda‟s governance climate guide the future of its donor-recipient relationships? 6) 
How is the commitment of non-state actors in health sector to good governance assessed? Are issues 
of accountability being incorporated into the good governance agenda? 7) What are the limits of 
health provision in Uganda? How can they be broadened? 8) How are global interactions facilitating 
the transfer of health policies to Uganda? And what parties are influencing this transfer of policies? 





study design influenced by Yin (1994), which took development-based organisations 
as the unit of analysis. Within this methodological framework, the in depth interview 
was envisaged to play a central role. It was in this regards that I took comfort from 
Hakim - who finds that “A study that takes organisations (or parts of them) as the 
unit of analysis may still collects information through interviews with individuals…” 
(Hakim 2000: 160) - and Namenwirth et al. (1981), who maintain that organisational 
representatives are able to distinguish between their own views and those of the 
organisation, which can in fact differ significantly. 
 
The goal during the planning stage was to target four organisations that, by virtue of 
their different modi operandi and positioning vis à vis the Ugandan government 
would offer points of contrast and comparison with which to discuss health aid. 
These were the bilateral donors, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the UK‟s Department for International Development 
(DFID); the UN‟s Specialised Agency for Health, the World Health Organisation 
(WHO); and the humanitarian non-governmental organisation Médecins Sans 
Frontièrs (MSF). At the time of planning I had high hopes that in addition to 
discourse analysis and in depth interviews, I would also be able to gain sustained 
access to the case study organisations in order to assume the role of participant 
observer. With hindsight however, it is clear that the latter objective was short 
sighted, failing to take into account the strictures of high-profile development 
organisations operating in aid-recipient countries. 
 
I will deal with the issue of access in more detail in the next section but suffice to say 
my research design demanded immediate alteration on entrance to the field - 
Uganda‟s capital city Kampala. Whilst I had received a promising response from 
USAID prior to arriving in Uganda in March 2007, I had received no response 
whatsoever from my other target organisations and subsequently struggled to make 
contact once in situ. During the early months of fieldwork my research diary was 
littered with entries concerning „out of office replies‟ and non-committal responses. 
Moreover, it became rapidly apparent that the one organisation which had sounded 




fulfil it. Yes, USAID could possibly allow me a few meetings with USAID staff - 
intense planning cycles and staff leave permitting - but I wasn‟t going to be allowed 
to spend sustained periods in USAID‟s high-security building as a participant 
observer.  
 
The upshot of my early stumbles in the field was that I decided to cast my net further 
than the four case study organisations. To get ideas, I bought the newspapers every 
day and set about mapping out the organisational structure of Uganda‟s health sector, 
noting the diverse range of stakeholders involved and their specific interests in sector 
affairs. The newspapers in Uganda – specifically the New Vision and the Daily 
Monitor – are a surprisingly rich source of development and donor information. 
Indeed it would seem that if a donor or a non-governmental organisation (NGO) is 
undertaking something new in Uganda, they are keen for the Ugandan people to 
know about it – it is the logical extension of the donor preoccupation with attribution 
for results. Subsequently donor and NGO projects/project tenders made it in into the 
newspapers, as did announcements concerning major health incidents, new treatment 
protocols and of course health-related scandals (Global Health Initiatives, the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunisation claim a surprising number of column inches). In addition, it became 
clear that the Ministry of Health was just as active a protagonist in the press as the 
donors, and consequently that there was a serious appetite for health news in the 
general populace. Finally, and rather helpfully for me, major events and conferences 
in the health sector were also announced and reported upon in the dailies. In short, 
newspapers helped to fill the information void that I faced at the start of fieldwork 
and enabled me to devise more robust strategies to overcome the problem of limited 
access, pointing me in the direction of new people to approach and up to date topics 
to approach them about. 
 
In addition, in the early months in the field I attempted to capitalise on my dual 
nationality as British/Irish to make some approaches to the respective donor 
agencies. Much to my surprise, the health focal point at DFID in Uganda turned me 




as he encountered so many similar requests for research access he couldn‟t possible 
agree to them all.
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 This early refusal from an organisation I thought to be a safe bet 
proved a huge knock to my confidence, and as the health team was a one-man show I 
couldn‟t foresee a way to circumvent the blockage (I had encountered the archetypal 
gatekeeper). Thankfully I had more luck at the Irish Agency for International 
Development, which despite having recently withdrawn from of the health sector as 
part of a division of labour exercise nevertheless agreed to a meeting, during which 
the ex-focal person for the sector provided me with valuable information about 
current developments and supplied me with several contacts for snowballing. 
Moreover, it was through this meeting that I first learnt about the existence of 
coordination fora in the sector and decided that I should look into requesting access. 
Ironically, it was the down to the fact that my request to attend the donor health 
forum, the Health Development Partners (HDPs) Group, was formally denied (on the 
basis that I was not a signatory to a Memorandum of Understanding) that I developed 
an interest in coordination groupings in the sector, their raison d‟être and rules of 




The chance to attend a coordination forum in the health sector – one that wasn‟t 
governed by a Memorandum of Understanding - didn‟t actually materialise until 
eight months into fieldwork. And I was most gratified to be issued with a formal 
invitation from the Ministry of Health, which I had secured via a tip off from the 
WHO country office. I‟m going to expand on how I finally gained permission to use 
WHO as a case study in the next section but for now I should impress that personal 
networks are incredibly important in Uganda. Poor Internet access (and a general 
failure to update organisational websites) coupled with the absence of a citywide 
phone book makes contact information very hard to come by in the public domain. 
Therefore I was relieved to find that the personal mobile phone numbers of 
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 Email from DFID‟ Health Representative in Uganda, dated 27
th
 February 2007. 
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 I was denied entry to the higher-level health sector fora via an email from the Chairman of the 
Health Development Partners dated 25
th
 April 2007, into which all the HDPs were cc-ed. The 
explanation was as follows: “Participation in the monthly meetings…is limited to representatives from 
all organisations/agencies listed in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of 
Health and the Development Partners for the implementation of HSSP II [Health Sector Strategic Plan 
II]. Consequently it will not be possible for you to participate in these meetings.” See Appendix 6 for 




colleagues and acquaintances could be supplied quite liberally following a successful 
face-to-face meeting, facilitating rapid snowballing within certain networks. 
Subsequently, it was the right name, dropped in the right ear that helped me win an 
invitation to the biennial National Health Assembly and the annual Joint Review 
Mission in October 2007. Together these conferences represented my first sustained 
opportunity to see the dynamics between Uganda‟s multiple health stakeholders play 
out at first hand.  
 
The National Health Assembly (NHA) and the Joint Review Mission (JRM) – which 
were two days and three days long respectively in the same week – differ in that the 
former places the greatest emphasis on the district and community levels (i.e. the 
health providers) while the latter is more of a holistic sector overview (i.e. more 
policy driven). Together they represent major events in the sector calendar, as was 
demonstrated by the mass turn out for both.
52
 Attendance at the 2007 NHA 
fluctuated between around 300-600 people each day, and included a wide range of 
stakeholders including high-level Ministry of Health staff, MPs, donors, non-
governmental figures and of course representatives from Uganda‟s 83 districts. The 
JRM was a smaller affair – 250 invitees – but again a wide range of stakeholders 
were in attendance from: the Ministries of Health, Finance and Public Service; 
Parliament; the Private Not-For-Profit sector; the trade unions; the prison health 
services; the media; and academia. Moreover, the turnout of the Health Development 
Partners at this forum was remarkable – I personally noted staff from: Belgian 
Technical Cooperation, DFID, Danish International Development Agency (Danida), 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), WHO, Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Italian Cooperation, the World Bank 
and USAID.  
 
The JRM represented a unique chance for me to put names to faces and to ponder the 
dynamics amongst the heterogeneous partners. Naturally, I took copious notes on all 
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 The need for and reasoning behind holding the annual JRM is stipulated in section 6.2.1 of the 2005 
MoU, which reads “The Joint Review Mission (JRM) shall be held once a year. The mission will 
review the performance of the health sector during the previous financial year and agree on sector 
priorities and resource allocation for the next Financial Year. The JRM shall also monitor the 




manner of topics but the three things I would mention here are the behaviour of the 
donors, a disappointing day of group sessions and my general confusion as to the 
forum‟s actual purpose once it was all over. To elucidate briefly: I noted that 
although just about every Health Development Partner in the sector was represented 
at the JRM, it was only the HDP Chairman (from BTC) who would formally address 
the forum. The HDPs therefore would confer during the day before arriving at 
common positions for him to voice. This, it was later explained to me, helped create 
the semblance that the HDPs spoke with „one voice‟, but at the time I found it most 
peculiar given how readily the other forum participants spoke up and over each other 
whenever the chance arose (taken together the forums were lively affairs, full of 
debate and laughter). At a subsequent health sector conference held in May 2008 – 
the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of Health Sector Strategic Plan II - I again noted 
unusual donor behaviour when on day one of a three-day conference, all the HDPs 
showed up only to say nothing at all. An HDP representative explained to me that 
because the MTR was more of a policy forum the Government had to own and lead 
the process, hence it was right that the donors take a back seat. Such behaviour 
confirmed my suspicions that the behaviour of the HDPs in joint coordination fora 
was at once strategic and premeditated. This led me to question both the value of the 
strategy and its implications vis à vis the coordination ideal; in short, if the 
engagement is staged, can it still be meaningful?  
 
On day two of the three day JRM the participants split into working groups to discuss 
particular facets of the sector‟s remit and to devise „undertakings‟ – or priorities - for 
the coming year. I chose to attend the breakout session that appeared to have the 
greatest relation to development aid: the Budget Framework Paper Working Group. 
After a promising start I had to mute my exasperation as the group failed to stay 
either on topic or to devise realistic targets. I noted that the two donor representatives 
in our group of 20 quickly lost all interest and sat back, typing on laptops, while 
certain special interest groups tried to usurp the session to get their issue prioritised. I 
found it a frustrating experience and was initially quite worried that terrible things 
would befall the health sector if the undertakings the group had adopted were ever 




matter; that the session, while obviously valuable from the perspective of giving 
certain people a rare opportunity to participate in sector discussions, was otherwise 
inconsequential. It was quite simply not an occasion for decision making. Hence the 
donors‟ palpable boredom and the entire group‟s lack of focus. Indeed, my 
suspicions as to the general futility of the exercise were confirmed on the final day of 
the JRM when the priorities to emerge from each working group were assembled to 
create a list of undertakings for the entire sector. It then became abundantly clear that 
(by and large) the same undertakings emerged from every annual meeting of the 
JRM, as the resources required to action them remained wanting. I was left 
wondering therefore, what had been the point of hundreds of people assembling at 
great expense to reach the same inevitable conclusions?
53
 It was following the NHA 
and JRM therefore that my growing conviction that there was something worth 
investigating in the coordination ethos took hold. 
 
Following the NHA and JRM I was faced with the decision of whether to retain my 
case study focus, which still hadn‟t really got off the ground, or to widen my study 
sample to try and gain insights from more disparate groups within the health sector. 
By this time I was au fait with the Health Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC) - the 
most important multi-stakeholder forum in the sector (meeting monthly) and one half 
of the Country Coordination Mechanism for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and 
Malaria - and had noted a number of the HPAC members at the NHA and JRM fora. 
In short, following the NHA and JRM I knew whom to approach and under what 
pretext (so many issues were discussed at these fora that I had gleaned what the key 
issues were for each stakeholder). Subsequently at the eight-month mark, I decided 
rather pragmatically to attempt to do both – to keep up my efforts with the case study 
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 It is an aside to the coordination debate to posit how much these combined conferences cost to put 
on, but given the venue – the upmarket Speke Resort on the shores of Lake Victoria – the food - a full 
lunch and two tea/snack breaks each day - and full board for all of the out of town visitors I can 
comfortably suggest a bill exceeding $100,000, which it should be noted was paid for out of a 
Partnership Fund paid into by the donors (Partnership Funding is addressed in the empirical chapters 
of this thesis). Knowing this helps put into perspective how important such conferences may be for the 
morale of attendees, specifically the district representatives who are for the most part physically and 
intellectually removed from centre-level structures (i.e. where the decision are made). Viewed in this 
light, the opportunity for Uganda‟s health service implementers to socialise in an upmarket setting, to 
air grievances and/or publicise successes to an audience that boasts the higher echelons of the 





organisations whilst concurrently trying to get interviews with as many 
representatives of the HPAC forum as possible.  
 
That said toward the end of the fieldwork period in May 2008 I had informally put 
the case studies to one side and prioritised the HPAC‟s membership (specifically the 
members with a vested interest in ODA) as my basic study sample. This is 
demonstrated in how many really crucial interviews I amassed during the last two 
months of fieldwork, when the research topic really came together. That‟s not to say 
that I had completely discarded my case study options. Let us not forget I had 
fortuitously included three HPAC members in my original sample – two bilateral 
donors (with DFID superseded by DANIDA as a case study) and WHO. MSF 
therefore became the odd one out and fell to the wayside. Yet that in itself was 
helpful as regular access to the humanitarian non-governmental organisation had 
proved nigh impossible to sustain (MSF‟s staff spend the majority of their time out 
of Kampala in areas out of bounds to most researchers).  
 
By the end of fieldwork, using my revised sample I had successfully secured 
interviews with just about every HPAC member group with a vested interest in 
development aid to the health sector: the Ministries of Health and Finance, the 
majority of the HDPs, the Chair of the AIDS Development Partners, and the lead 
representatives for civil society and the Not-For-Profit Sector. It followed that once I 
was more certain about my research topic it became easier to convince people to 
meet with me. In addition, through the process of snowballing, one door inevitably 
led to another and the experience confirmed that people were happier to meet 
someone who had already met with a colleague. Therefore while I will admit that the 
momentum took a while to build during fieldwork, I am happy that the thesis topic 
has been derived from the process of induction and not from a preconceived idea I 
may have had about what was important in Uganda before I arrived.  
 
Together my interviews, conference material, field data and the additional material I 
had secured via my case studies served to provide a rich overview of the 




investigations had unearthed a rabbit warren of sub-group coordination networks 
operating beneath the HPAC. It was in these fora that I realised the seemingly 
homogenous partners where busily negotiating difference and comparative 
advantage, forming alliances and most importantly agreeing on common positions 
before facing their government partners at the HPAC. By the end of the fieldwork 
period therefore, the iterative nature of my original research design had been put to 
the test and proved its worth. On returning to the UK in June 2008 I was sure that my 
thesis would be focused on the multiple alliances I had witnessed in the field, and 
specifically on pondering the tangible properties of the coordination discourse I had 
witnessed put into practice.  
 
 
Researching Development-Based Organisations: Barriers to 
Access 
 
I want to say something specific about my experience of researching development-
based organisations because it wasn‟t an issue I had seriously thought through when 
preparing my research design. Moreover, although had I taken guidance from the 
likes of Crewe and Harrison (1998) and Mosse (2005) before embarking on my 
fieldwork in Uganda, I had not fully internalised the distinction that they were on the 
„inside‟ of the development world they researched, while I would remain resolutely 
on the „outside‟. I will elucidate further on my positioning in the research in a later 
section but for the purpose of this discussion it is enough to note that my outsider 
status initially had a detrimental impact on my access in the field.  
 
The harsh truth is that while the pursuit of a PhD feels incredibly important to the 
student, it carries little weight in the wider world (of development at least). It offers 
you nothing to barter with, leaving you reliant on good will and good networking to 
operationalise your methodology. Moreover, the insignificance of the personal PhD 
endeavour is compounded if you consider the demands placed on the average 
development worker in the field in the form of: the annual planning and reporting 




leave (to compensate for living away from home); two- to three-year postings (i.e. 
massive staff turnover); endless meetings to attend with partners, beneficiaries, and 
representatives from headquarters; obligations to entertain visiting missions and 
researchers; and all this on top of your actual work – which may be as a technical 
specialist, a team leader or a diplomat. To enter into this fray and ask for a meeting 
when you have nothing to offer of strategic value is a humbling experience. 
  
Looking back, the issue or - to be more explicit – the problem of access dominated 
the entries in my research diary. In my case I can see now that there were at least 
three types of barrier to overcome which, in descending order of importance, I would 
term: the official, the logistical, and the physical. I‟ll use the four case studies that I 
included in my original research design  - DFID, USAID, WHO and MSF – to 
exemplify the existence and effects of these barriers in the field. 
 
To start with the „official‟ barrier, I refer of course to gaining permission to carry out 
the research. Clearly in the DFID case therefore, I failed at the first hurdle: the focal 
person for health at DFID deployed his prerogative to say no. Furthermore, he used it 
on two occasions 14 months apart, despite my having greatly demoted my demands 
on his time (when I first approached DFID I had hoped to do a full case study, by the 
end of the fieldwork all I wanted was a single interview). My reflexive self could 
find lots of reasons to the effect that I had made a faux pas in my approach but 
sometimes you just have to allow that some people will say no. With regards to 
USAID, my experience couldn‟t have been more different: I received a positive reply 
from the US Head of Mission before leaving the UK. On arrival the Health Team 
Leader at USAID was primed to meet me, yet feely admitted that if the order hadn‟t 
come from above her head she would never have conceded to the research (she was 
brand new to the job and exceedingly busy). In short, with USAID I had picked the 
right gatekeeper first time. I should state however, that having met with the Health 
Team Leader, she couldn‟t have been more helpful and the enduring problems of 
access I experienced at USAID centred on the logistical. WHO was a different case 
entirely. I originally met with a key staff member who had been recommended to me 




firstly from the WHO Representative in Uganda (WR) and secondly from the staff 
themselves. Subsequently, the process of navigating officialdom at WHO was 
lengthy: it took me two meetings, two drafts of my research proposal and an official 
letter from Edinburgh university to convince the WR; it took a third, longer draft of 
my proposal, and a presentation at a staff meeting to convince the staff. From first 
contact to first official interview at WHO took 7 months (not to mention countless 
emails and phone calls) but it was worth it, because once I had the official stamp of 
approval everybody I approached at WHO appeared willing to meet with me. 
Moreover, through my network at WHO I was permitted to attend monthly meetings 
of the UN Health Cluster, which the organisation heads. Turning now to MSF Swiss 
(I should specify that there are several MSF missions operating in Uganda and I had 
the most positive response from the Swiss division), although it took me a while to 
track down the Head of Mission, he was actually very forthcoming. However when 
we met, he explained that I would have to apply for official research permission from 
the MSF research office in Geneva (which tracks all the research carried out on the 
organisation). This process took several months and taught me that non-
governmental organisations, which rely on voluntary donations, have to be more 
careful with their reputation than publicly funded ones.  
 
As a final aside on officialdom, I should also note that I applied to Uganda‟s 
National Council for Science and Technology, which is a necessity for carrying out 
research in the country; rather than posing a barrier however, the US $300 price tag 




Moving on now to the logistical barriers to fieldwork, I‟ve already hinted at why it 
may be difficult to pin down the staff of development-based organisations, even if 
the permission and the will are already in place. It would be too laborious to recount 
all the numerous delays I encountered in the field (even following a tentative 
commitment from the interviewee) yet to provide a brief overview the main delays I 
encountered at USAID related to the intense annual planning cycles the staff endure 
and which necessitate lengthy delegations from HQ, annual leave and staff turnover. 
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At WHO, the central issues concerned staff having to work both up-country and out 
of the country on numerous occasions, and the mandate for the team to respond to 
real-time health emergencies, which in the course of 15-months in Uganda included 
outbreaks of Marburg fever, cholera, Hepatitis E and Ebola. Access to MSF Swiss 
was also hampered by staff turnover (the Head of Mission actually changed over 
during the early months of my fieldwork) and the fact that all of the staff are almost 
consistently out of Kampala, in areas strictly out of bounds to the researcher. With 
the best intentions imaginable, and concerted effort on both sides I had only managed 
three meetings with MSF Swiss in seven months - which was actually excellent 
considering how small the visiting staff pool of staff is to Kampala. Yet the prospects 
for new interviewees looked slim and the hope that I could amass enough material to 
produce an individual MSF case study soon faded.  
 
To finish up with physical barriers to access, it‟s clear that several of the issues I‟ve 
categorised as „logistical‟ barriers could just as easily have been categorized as 
„physical‟ (e.g. when staff are up-country or abroad). But what I am referring to 
under this banner is actually a more rudimentary form of physical barrier, and it is 
perhaps best exemplified using the USAID case study.  
 
The USAID office in Uganda, situated as it is in a shared compound with the US 
Embassy and all other US government departments that operate in situ, is an 
imposing site and the first thing to be noticed besides the numerous guards at each 
entrance is that cars aren‟t allowed to pause next to it. Entrance is by appointment 
only and proposed visits must be recorded in advance in a logbook held at the first of 
two secure receptions. Here, if you are fortunate enough to have secured an 
appointment, you will have your passport checked; moreover, your person and your 
bags will be scanned, your digital media will be temporarily confiscated and your 
mobile phone will be switched off. After clearing the first reception it is a short walk 
outdoors to the bombproof USAID building, and a second secure reception. Here you 
will have your body and bags rescanned and your mobile phone removed. Then you 
wait for the person you are meeting to be called to reception and essentially take 




marine who will exchange it for a temporary pass to be worn in clear view at all 
times. Please note that possession of this pass doesn‟t imply that you are now free to 
wander within the confines of the USAID building, the person who has signed you in 
will remain responsible for you until you leave and will even have to accompany you 
to the bathroom should the need arise. It is helpful that USAID staff habitually warn 




USAID is of course the extreme example of a hard-to-access development 
organisation in terms of physical impediments, but even government ministries and 
NGOs with offices in Kampala will operate some form of security. The walled 
compound and security guards are givens. After this the variables are whether or not 
the guards are armed, what ID you will be asked to show on arrival and whether or 
not you‟ll be asked to formally sign in. The idea, in short, that as an „outsider‟ you 
could simply call in for an impromptu chat at a donor or UN agency is ludicrous. 
Development agencies operating in Uganda may be set up to help the people of the 
country, but the physical barriers erected around their staff would suggest that aid‟s 
beneficiaries are also in some respects „outside‟ development. 
 
The official, logistical and physical barriers I encountered with development-type 
organisations while operationalising my fieldwork brought home to me the wisdom 
of spending a sustained period in the field. I was in Uganda on and off over a period 
of 15 months (10.5 months in all), and while I might have got by with a little less 
time in the field, the barriers I encountered as an „outsider‟ remained so arbitrary and 




While many of the issues demanding reflexivity have been addressed at earlier points 
in this chapter, there are several more that deserve attention here.    
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accounts from other people visiting USAID in other countries, I understand that my experience of the 




The Wider Relevance Of The Setting And Topic: The Grounds For 
Generalisation 
As suggested, the case study of Uganda‟s health sector was arrived at through 
purposive sampling. The country‟s health sector is remarkable for its high 
dependency on development aid (over 50%), as well as its now mature commitments 
(in place since 2000) to the World Bank‟s Poverty Reduction Strategy process and 
the Sector Wide Approach. The upshot of these developments is that the GoU has 
opted for a formalised relationship with its health donors, as established in the 
country‟s „Partnership Principles‟ and the MoU that exists between the GoU and its 
Health Development Partners. These features taken alone would have been sufficient 
justification for an in depth study of the aid dynamics underpinning Uganda‟s health 
sector, which has to date been lacking, but there is yet more that marks Uganda out 
for special attention. Viewed in the 1990s and early years of the new millennium as a 
„donor darling‟, declining governance ratings and scandals involving the GFATM 
and GAVI mid-decade have combined to make Uganda the “Africa test” for 




Whilst widespread generalisation has never been an objective of this study, it is clear 
that there are several issues running through the empirical chapters that may warrant 
comparison with other settings, for instance Uganda‟s overt commitment to the 
tenets of aid effectiveness and its renewed concerns over aid dependency in the face 
of Global Health Initiatives such as the GFATM. Nevertheless, the thesis forwards 
Mosse-inspired propositions (Mosse 2004; 2005) derived through the process of 
induction, as opposed to overt generalisations. 
 
Limitations Of The Thesis Study 
A PhD thesis study is by its very nature limited. It is worth stating nonetheless that 
the stipulation to focus on a single issue, combined with finite time, financial and 
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 Barkan actually stipulates that Uganda is the Africa test case for US foreign policy: “Uganda 
presents the Bush Administration with the „Africa test‟ of its announced policy of promoting freedom 
and democracy around the world. If the Administration cannot pass the test here, where is the policy 
credible?” (Barkan 2005: 23) Yet with the centrality of the good governance agenda to international 
donor policy, the same question could be asked of aid generally. See Chapter Two for more detail on 




human resources precluded me, like all researchers, from exploring every aspect of 
my subject matter, even to my own satisfaction. Moreover, as highlighted at some 
length within this chapter, my particular research topic and positioning as a 
development „outsider‟ curtailed or - to frame it more positively – informed the 
breadth of my study yet further. Therefore while I am generally happy with the focus 
of my final study, I acknowledge that there were, and are, of course numerous related 
areas of study worthy of further exploration. I suggest just few of these in my thesis 
conclusion (Chapter Eight).   
 
Methods 
Although the majority of the research methods utilised for this study are qualitative, 
some quantitative methods were also used, for instance to gather data on patterns of 
donor giving. 
 
From the qualitative toolbox, discourse analysis was a key research method 
employed at all stages. In this context I refer to a variety of source types: peer-
reviewed and non peer-reviewed academic publications, the strategic plans and 
policy briefs of various donor/development organisations, the strategic plans and 
sector reviews of the Government of Uganda. I also consulted the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System (for detailed 
information on aid flows) and a host of grey literature, including: evaluations and 
opinion pieces on overseas development aid, Uganda and the aid-funded 





Discourse therefore awarded me a longitudinal view with which to chart the 
emergence of the modern aid effectiveness agenda. It was also very important in 
highlighting the disjuncture between donor plans and donor activities in the 
fieldwork country, evoking in this instance Mosse (2005). The disconnect between 
policy and practice rapidly came to make sense from my vantage point in the aid-
recipient country, where five-year plans produced at donor headquarters were 
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naturally waylaid by the everyday realities of operating in Uganda. Moreover, by the 
pragmatic realisation that „man is not an island‟ in the modern aid environment - put 
simply you have to get along with a host of heterogeneous stakeholders to get 
anything done. Plans, therefore, are often subject to manipulation or outright 
rejection on the ground even if they are sustained superficially. 
  
Similar conclusions emerged from my investigations of national strategies and 
evaluations. As in many developing countries, in Uganda policy represents an ideal 
of what might be done, yet often exists without the impetus – i.e. the resources – for 
implementation. Nevertheless, the very existence of policy tells a story and it is 
insightful that some donors foresee policy as an area for their input (Riddell 2007). In 
a related vein, it is remarkable that many of the national reviews of the health sector 
conducted in Uganda are carried out using basket-style funding.
58
 If we now allow 
that policy and statistical quantification serve as triggers for donor funds (Ferguson 
1995, Escobar 2000) then the proliferation of donor-funded policy and review in 
Uganda‟s health sector also belies the linear logic of practice following policy.   
 
Another area where discourse analysis played a really integral role was in gaining a 
better understanding of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM). 
It was incredibly helpful that despite the strange positioning of the Fund in country - 
whereby it is at once absent and omnipresent (the GFATM maintains no country 
presence yet regularly dominates the agenda of health sector fora) - the GFATM is 
universally praised for its commitment to public transparency (Oomman 2007). It 
fulfils this commitment via an extensive website, which provides all manner of 
supporting documentation including: policy documents, statistical information on 
grants, updates on current awards and numerous links to internal and external 
audits.
59
 I drew on this resource at length. 
 
Spending a sustained time in the field allowed for the absorption of a lot of 
contextual data. I have already mentioned the value I attached the local newspapers 
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but the role of participant observer was also very important, even if it wasn‟t feasible 
for me to gain sustained access to development organisations or high-level 
coordination fora. It helped that my social circle was built around actors in the health 
- if not development - sphere, who were for the most part connected to a healthcare 
provider I had once worked for in Kampala (please see the next section for 
expansion). These friendships forced me to question the significance of the 
coordination circles I was attempting to infiltrate in Kampala, which appeared totally 
disconnected from the everyday realities of providing healthcare. It was certainly 
telling that my healthcare friends were unable to provide me with any inroads into 
my sample grouping of high-level donor, government and civil society 
representatives.   
 
The semi-structured interview was of vital importance to my fieldwork. I have 
already discussed the access difficulties I experienced during fieldwork at some 
length, the upshot of these was that when I did secure an interview I was without 
question grateful. In so far as my gratitude is expressed in this thesis, I hope it has 
impacted positively: via my endeavours to represent people fairly and truthfully, and 
in an express effort to quote people within the context of their comments. As to how 
my feelings of gratitude impacted on the fieldwork, I would admit to over preparing 
for interviews. This was at once a consequence of limited access and the realisation 
that the coordination networks I was attempting to infiltrate were extremely close 
knit. Indeed, a pressure I felt keenly throughout the fieldwork period was that I 
couldn‟t afford to have a bad interview. In my mind, the doors that were opening 
sequentially – through snowballing - could just as easily close sequentially. This was, 
in all probability, paranoia common to the lone researcher, but my response to it was 
to over prepare for interviews believing in most instances quite rightly that I would 
never get the chance to meet with this person on an individual basis again. I am 
without question a fan of the semi-structured interview and I would defend this 
stance, again citing the barriers of access - it simply wouldn‟t have been plausible for 
me to go in expecting to have an informal chat. Semi-structured interview transcripts 
provided me with the means to appear purposeful and serious, and the flexibility to 




I employed, throughout I cast a broad net: asking about the respondent‟s job, the 
organisational modus operandi, working relationships with other partners and 
something current from the newsreel (ten questions at most). As time moved on, and 
my research topic became more refined I continued to ask similarly broad questions 
but demanded more clarification on the areas that really sparked mine - or the 
respondent‟s - interest. I certainly wasn‟t a slave to the interview guide however, as 
is demonstrated in the empirical data addressed in this thesis, the majority of which I 
couldn‟t have envisaged prior to the fieldwork. My over-preparation therefore, didn‟t 
stem from an attempt to control the conversation but to ensure that I could readily 
comprehend what was said to me, so as to get as much as possible out of every 
meeting. 
 
By the end of fieldwork I had interviewed twenty seven representatives of the Health 
Development Partners (note that almost half of these respondents came from within 
WHO), four government officials (targeted for their association with health aid), and 
five civil society representatives. However that was in addition to numerous phone 
calls and emails, and more impromptu meetings at coordination fora etc. Therefore 
while the Health Development Partners are clearly over represented in the interview 
sample, this was offset to some extent by the over representation of the government 
partners at joint stakeholder fora and in national strategies, policy discourse etc. 
Indeed the top echelon of Ministry of Health staff are so in demand that coordination 
fora provide the only feasible way for the average researcher to see them in action. 
As the Chairman of the HDPs explained:  
 
“We [the donors] are the culprits in a sense that we often invite these people 
to come and testimony of their experiences in Uganda…and they have to 
participate as representative of their country at this conference and blah, blah, 
blah…And at the Ministry what do you have? Three Ministers, a PS [Private 
Secretary] and a Director General. And one of them always has to be 
representing the country because you cannot have an assistant commissioner 
to represent Uganda in a high-level conference or forum. And the result is 
these people are often out of the country” (BTC Interview 10
th
 April 2008).  
 
Happily therefore, I was able to witness this elusive echelon of the Ministry on 





In light of my multiple methods, by the time I came to analyse my data I was 
confident that I had gathered sufficient resources to verify the internal validity of the 
data using triangulation.  
 
Ethics 
Before entrance to the field I addressed the ESRC Ethics Framework and 
Edinburgh‟s School of Social and Political Studies Research Ethics Policy and 
Procedures; regarding the latter, it was concluded that I would be a „level 1‟ 
candidate.
60
 Therefore while I do not regard the final research topic as overly 
controversial, I have opted to obscure the identities of my respondents (although I do 
acknowledge what organisation they work for). This decision has been informed by 
the Ethical Guidelines for Good Research Practice issued by the Association of 
Social Anthropologists (1999)
 
and my own understanding of the development 
community in Uganda.
61
 To clarify, the pool of stakeholders working in the higher 
echelons of the health sector in Kampala is so small that the study participants likely 
know each other. Knowing this, it is my own point of courtesy that specific names be 
omitted from the study, even if organisational identities may yet provide enough of a 
clue to the people in the know. 
 
My Position Within The Research 
With regards to my positioning in the research process, I take my lead from 
Kleinman, who suggests that researcher‟s observations are best understood as 
“positioned interpretations of positioned interpretations” (1995: 75). My duty as the 
researcher is therefore to be explicit about my own position – background, social 
commitment, conceptual orientation etc - in order to shed light on my encounters 
with members of my target community, who are themselves positioned. Kleinman 
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stipulates that “The empirical results of this utterly human – though professionally 





While Mosse has depicted himself as a “Foucauldian subject within, as well as 
outside the discourse,” (Mosse 2005: xi) and Crewe and Harrison have 
acknowledged “We are clearly part of what we write about” (Crewe and Harrison 
1998: 21), it should be clear by this point that my particular vantage point was 
different. For the majority of the fieldwork I was apart from the action – gaining 
insight to it only through the accounts of the protagonists, via the interview process. 
That said there were occasions where my peripheral placement permitted me first 
hand access to the action in real time, e.g. at large conferences and joint fora. Yet 
even there I may have missed some of the subtleties involved in the various group 
dynamics had I not also had the opportunity to question group members about their 
actions (utilising my outsider status). Drawing on a distinction outlined by Brewer 
(2000: 60) therefore I would say that on the few occasions when I was invited to 
really participate, I was inhabiting the role of „participant observer‟ (adopting a new 
role) rather than „observant participant‟ (utilising an existing one).  
 
This said my outsider status during the PhD fieldwork should not obscure the fact 
that I had some prior experience of working and carrying out research in Uganda. 
During 2002-3, I spent six months working as an assistant to the manager of a private 
hospital in Kampala. Whilst in 2005, I carried out a month‟s fieldwork looking at the 
country‟s emerging private health insurance market. While neither of these 
experiences proved advantageous from the point of view of accessing development-
based organisations in 2007-8, they did lay the foundations for a considerable degree 
of contextual and cultural familiarity with the case study country and a valuable 
social network in Kampala.   
 
Crewe and Harrison acknowledge the impact of their social identities on how they 
have approached their fieldwork: “Our own social positioning, as white, middle-class 
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anthropologists, has plainly inclined both of us towards a particular shared 
intellectual disposition” (Crewe and Harrison 1998: 21; also see Visser 2000). While 
I would acquiesce to inhabiting a very similar social position and intellectual leaning 
– in my case I am a white, middle-class social scientist – I find it more pressing to 
consider the impact of my positioning from the vantage point of my respondents. 
Here I think it is informative to address the different facets of my culminative 
identity in turn.  
 
If I were to hypothesis which aspects of my identity were deemed the most important 
from the perspective of the Ugandan respondents I would say unequivocally my 
status as Caucasian and/or British/Irish. In the local dialects the word „mzungu‟ is a 
universal catchall term for both these identities (translating literally as „foreigner‟), 
and it was common for me to hear Ugandan respondents refer to me as such 
whenever speaking to their colleagues. Mzungu is a difficult term to fully unpack in 
the sense that it is rarely used in a derogatory fashion (at least in a professional 
setting) yet it remains a term that people at work - switching seamlessly between 
English and their local dialect - probably wish you hadn‟t understood as referring to 
you. In such settings, the term is intended simply as a statement of fact. Nevertheless 
it is undoubtedly packed with certain assumptions about the bearer: that you are 
wealthy, enjoy some power/status and are an outsider. My experience of Uganda 
over the years has taught me that even if I were to live the rest of my life there, my 
first and most important identity would always be mzungu. Indeed the implications 
of the mzungu tag transcend native Ugandan society. At some level all expatriates in 
the field will infer similar assumptions about you based on your shared „foreignness‟, 
and I have no doubt that at times I enjoyed preferential treatment. For instance, 
having asked an expat donor representative who would be the best person to 
approach for an official invite to a health sector conference the respondent suggested 
that I could simply gatecrash, inferring that my status as a white Brit would make it 
hard for a Ugandan official to turn me away; and while on the one hand I was 
distinctly uncomfortable with this suggestion I understood that it contained some 





Regarding my nationality I have already admitted that I was guilty of shifting 
between my British and Irish identities depending on the audience. While the 
distinction would not necessarily make much of a difference to everyday Ugandans, I 
did perceive a slight bias in certain circles toward the Irish identity. For instance, 
Irish citizens do not require a visa to enter Uganda – they do not suffer from the 
baggage of colonialism. Similarly, within donor circles Irish Aid is well respected 
and considered “sincere” in government circles (MoH Interview 7
th
 April 2008). Yet 
as I said, the difference is negligible, although it did make sense to alternate my 
nationality when it was to my obvious my advantage, i.e. prioritising „Irish-ness‟ 
when approaching the Irish Agency for International Development and „British-ness‟ 
when approaching DFID.   
 
My status as a female researcher undoubtedly impacted on my research but in what 
specific ways I couldn‟t confidently say (I have no basis for comparison). This was a 
more subtle aspect of my identity therefore. Indeed it is noteworthy that woman are 
fairly well represented in the higher echelons of the Ugandan administration so the 
sight of a woman in a professional setting is not unusual. Moreover, in development 
circles women are probably slightly over-represented. Therefore I would suggest that 
it was really the amalgamation of the many facets of my identity - white, 
British/Irish, female, in my late twenties (at the time of fieldwork) and a student – 
that marked me out as a non-threatening prospect for engagement during fieldwork. 
This status no doubt helped and hindered my research in equal measure, as the 
picture to emerge was that I wasn‟t very important so there was no pressure on 
respondents to meet with me, nor was I a cause for concern, thus they felt no impetus 





My experience of attempting to access the coordination architecture underpinning 
Uganda‟s health sector revealed how the broad rules and processes of engagement 




proper” (Jeppsson 2002: 2059). For that reason it was clearly significant that a (non-
legally binding) Memorandum of Understanding was used to exclude me from 
attending the Health Development Partners group, while I received formal invitations 
to attend joint coordination fora, the National Heath Assembly, the Joint Review 
Mission and the Mid-Term Review. The former is an arena where the HDPs iron out 
their differences before coming face-to-face with their government counterparts at 
the Health Policy Advisory Committee, thus it‟s imperative to keep those differences 
concealed. The latter are master classes in public grandstanding and diplomacy, 
where carried-over priorities attest that the real nuts and bolts of partnership are 
happening elsewhere, out of public view. To draw a parallel between my own 
experiences and those of Uganda‟s health stakeholders therefore, it is clear that 
“access” is not a blanket commodity in Uganda‟s health sector, and that no one party 
enjoys the keys to the kingdom. Rather, access to the processes of partnership in 
Uganda is multi-faceted and subject to negotiation, confirming once and for all that 
coordination isn‟t an apolitical activity aimed solely at improving the effectiveness of 
aid. At stake are resources, power and reputation, hence why not everyone can be 
allowed to participate on equal terms. Subsequently, the tacit achievement of the 
coordination drive in Uganda is the superficial illusion that all parties are working 
together toward a common agenda. Such artifice evokes Mosse, who suggests that 
the ethnographic task is to reveal how, despite the fragmentation of stakeholder 
interests, development actors are constantly engaged in creating unity through 







COORDINATION TO VISIBLY PURSUE THE MOST 







In this chapter, I forward the proposition that „coordination‟ is a slippery 
development term, which partners can pursue on a partial basis without having to 
entirely reject the ethos. In doing so I argue that even a partial adherence to the 
coordination ideology confers discrete advantages on partners, making the illusion of 
meaningful partnership engagement worth upholding. It is this „pick and mix‟ quality 
therefore that has rendered coordination one of the easiest elements of the aid 
effectiveness agenda for partners to be seen to pursue.   
 
„Coordination‟ in itself is not one of the trademark commitments of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Paris High-Level Forum 2005) in the same way as 
„harmonisation‟ or „alignment‟ are. Instead it is depicted as one of the central means 
to those ends: a universally agreeable tool, which appears to contain within it the 
logic for improving the effectiveness of development assistance by virtue of its rather 
simplistic appeal. This suggests that when donors and partner countries worked in 
isolation official development assistance (ODA) was generally ineffective, thus the 
converse may also be true. The failure to identify if the former statement denotes 
causation or correlation is a reflection of the inadequate evidence base currently 
underpinning debates over what works and what doesn‟t in aid effectiveness (Riddell 
2007). Moreover, it serves to explain this somewhat underwhelming finding of the 
Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Uganda: “There is a 
general consensus in Uganda that theoretically the link between the Paris Declaration 





Furthermore, in the same vein as „capacity building‟ (another means to an end), the 
term „coordination‟ benefits from having no obvious downsides: a donor can‟t be 
accused of throwing their weight around by offering to coordinate or capacity build 
in an aid-recipient country. An ostensibly innocuous term therefore, in this chapter it 
will be argued that when compared to the more problematic components of the new 
aid agenda – such as „mutual accountability‟ - coordination has become one of the 
easiest aid effectiveness tools for stakeholders in Uganda‟s health sector to visibly 
pursue. Conversely however, it will also seek to demonstrate that it is, nevertheless, 
one of the hardest elements to satisfy.  
 
These ideas will be explored firstly through an examination of the formal partnership 
commitments that already exist between the government of Uganda and the Health 
Development Partners in Uganda (I will also explore partners compliance to them); 
and secondly, by exposing the innate differences that exist amongst even a 
superficially homogenous grouping like the donor contingent of the Health 
Development Partners Group. Such differences it will be argued, serve to make 
meaningful engagement incredibly difficult even within this group. Nevertheless the 
group has found ways of glossing over their differences to reap certain rewards, 
demonstrating that there may be advantages to maintaining a guise of homogeneity 
when it comes to facing up to your obviously heterogeneous counterparts in 
government. 
 
As such, coordination‟s undisclosed property in this chapter is derived from its pick 
and mix utility, which allows Uganda‟s health partners to take or leave certain 
aspects of the coordination ethos without seeming to abandon it completely. Riddell 
laid the foundations for this line of argument when he suggested that “donors have 
adopted what could be described – quite accurately – as a „pick and mix‟ approach to 
aid, morality and the obligation to provide it (Riddell 2007: 146). In short, just as the 
impetus for donors to provide aid remains voluntary so does the compulsion to 
reform aid practices, resulting in partners‟ pick and mix compliance to aid 
effectiveness agreements. The crux of this argument is quite simple, donors and 




draw on an age-old analogy, differences in funding restrictions, development 
objectives, modi operandi, and issues of sovereignty render Uganda‟s Health 
Development Partners the equivalent of square pegs trying – in some cases quite 
genuinely - to squeeze through round holes. That said, there is nonetheless enough 
advantage to be garnered from pursuing coordination objectives in a superficial 
manner, and this explains the partners‟ enduring faithfulness to the concept.  
 
Before proceeding to the numerous obstacles that can undermine partner 
commitments to coordinate in Uganda‟s health sector, it is first important to 
underline how such commitments have been formalised and outline how successfully 
they have been implemented up to the present period. The aim in doing so is to 
illustrate the discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality of commitments 
towards coordinated action in the sector. 
 
 
Formalising Partnership Commitments in Uganda  
 
While the Paris Declaration is now depicted as a watershed in the history of 
international development commitments, it is interesting that from the vantage point 
of the Ugandan government, it is merely a reworking of a set of principles it had 
developed four years earlier. Uganda‟s „Partnership Principles‟ (see box 5 on p96) 
were published in 2001, in Volume 3 of the revised Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
(PEAP): Building Partnerships to Implement the PEAP (MoFPED 2001). Viewed as 
a part of this broader document, the „Partnership Principles‟ can be understood as 
both a request by, and a mechanism for, the Government of Uganda to establish 
ownership of the new partnerships being stimulated by increased aid flows to the 
country.  
 
The impetus behind seeking to stimulate more coordinated action on the part of the 
Government of Uganda (GoU) in 2001 was derived from its desire to receive a 
greater proportion of aid as general budget support, or more specifically, 




new ways of working which serve to reassure Uganda‟s traditionally risk averse 
donor community that Uganda can be trusted with aid delivered in this format. To 
proffer some key examples, it is proposed that, “all donors who are providing fully 
flexible budget support…should be invited to participate in the review of any sectors 
where they can contribute useful expertise.” Moreover, that development partners 
raise issues of concern “in budget consultations, rather than imposing additionality 
conditions on budget support” (MoFPED 2001: 72). The 2001 document even 
demands new forums to facilitate the new working relationship, in order to 
“exchange ideas on how the partnership is being implemented” (MoFPED 2001: 83), 
with explicit recommendations including: a more regular channel of communication 
for donors, and for government capacity to be strengthened across the board “so it 
speaks with one voice” in coordination forums (MoFPED 2001: 3). Joint discussion 
therefore, signals a component of the new aid agenda - as determined by the GoU - in 
2001, and one which laid the basis for the institutional arrangements I found guiding 
aid relations in 2007-8. Furthermore, to encourage the more meaningful participation 
of donors in country-level deliberations, the „Partnership Principles‟ asks the Health 
Development Partners to “increase [the] level of delegation to country offices” 
(MoFPED 2001: 4). This is an issue I shall return to in due course. 
 
Additional to this notion of joint working in Uganda is an overriding appeal for 
Development Partners to respect the national government‟s ownership of central 
processes. Consequently, while donors are advised that they will be invited to 
participate in open discussion with the GoU, they are nevertheless warned that, 
“Government, on its side, cannot guarantee to agree with donors‟ positions, but will 
certainly take them into account in determining overall allocation” (MoFPED 2001: 
72). This position provides an interesting caveat to the concept of coordination, 
which again appears to present different utilities to different partners. Therefore 
while I shall tackle coordination from the vantage point of the health donors later in 
this chapter, what can be discerned from this early government statement was that 
the GoU had initially hoped that coordination measures might provide some means 
of pacifying its donors by increasing their participation in the discussion processes 




backfire – as highlighted in the Chapter Two and again toward the end of this chapter 
(with budget support depicted as a “stick”) – again points to the lack of empirical 
grounding of the new aid agenda which fails to take into account the unexpected 
consequences of new aid initiatives (Walt et al. 1999b). 
 
 
Box 5: The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) Partnership 
Principles 
 
The need for improved partnerships has been increasingly recognised both by the 
Government and by its development partners. At the 1999 Stockholm conference on „Making 
Partnerships Work‟, a set of principles for the management of donor assistance was 
proposed by the Government delegation. These principles are as follows:  
 
 
Shared commitment  
 
Donor support will only be sought/provided for programmes that are in the Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan  
 
 
In addition Government will …  
 
1. Continue with increased focus on poverty eradication [at minimum PAF funded 
programmes as a share of total budget will remain constant]  
2. Continue with increased tax revenue effort  
3. Assume full leadership in donor co-ordination process (at central, sectoral and district 
level)  
4. Decline any offers of stand-alone donor projects  
5. Strengthen monitoring and accountability (including value for money evaluations)  
6. Continue to improve transparency and combat corruption  
7. Continue to strengthen district capacity  
8. Develop comprehensive, costed and prioritised sector wide programmes eventually 
covering the whole Budget  
9. Further develop participation and co-ordination of all stakeholders (including 
Parliamentarians)  
10. Strengthen capacity to coordinate across Government (so it speaks with one voice)  
 
 
In addition donors will …  
  
1. Jointly undertake all analytical work, appraisals and reviews  
2. Jointly set output/outcome indicators  
3. Develop uniform disbursement rules  
4. Develop uniform and stronger accountability rules  
5. Ensure all support is fully integrated into sector wide programmes and is fully consistent 
with each sector programme‟s priorities  
6. Continue to increase level of untied sector budget support  
7. Increase level of delegation to country offices  
8. Abolish topping up of individual project staff salaries  
9. End individual, parallel country programmes and stand-alone projects  
10. Progressively reduce tying of procurement  





Remarkably, Building Partnerships to Implement the PEAP most clearly pre-empted 
the Paris Declaration when it suggested that “The best way to harmonise donor 
procedures is to harmonise around the Government‟s own procedures” (MoFPED 
2001: 78). Considering that coordination measures – such as the fora and networks 
mentioned above - are just one means to achieving this end, it is interesting to note 
the other practical measures the GoU envisaged for itself and its partners to advance 
progress towards this vision. Thus donors were asked to “ensure all support is fully 
integrated into sector wide programmes and is fully consistent with each sector 
programme‟s priorities;” to “end individual, parallel country programmes and stand-
alone projects;” and to “progressively reduce tying of procurement” (MoFPED 2001: 
4). In addition, the GoU appealed for the donors to harmonise with one another, 
imploring them to “jointly undertake all analytical work;” to “jointly set 
output/outcome indicators;” and to develop “uniform” disbursement and 
accountability rules (MoFPED 2001: 4).   
 
On its behalf, the GoU hoped to facilitate the stipulated donor changes by: assuming 
full leadership in donor coordination (at central, sectoral and district level), by 
declining “any stand-alone donor projects,” by strengthening monitoring and 
accountability, and by developing “comprehensive, costed and prioritised sector wide 
programmes…” (MoFPED 2001: 3). Finally, although strongly favouring budget 
support in 2001, the GoU remained realistic that it might take some time for donors 
to move toward that aid modality. Consequently, it offered up progressively 
ambitious funding options to safeguard donor money in the short-term. The most 
simple of these was a vigorous project screening process, which still permitted 
donors to fund projects in the health sector so long as they met certain criteria, for 
instance to ensure compliance with sectoral strategies. The most important interim 
concession however, was the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) - a ring-fenced fund, which 
ensures aid intended for pro-poor areas is protected from mid-year budgetary cuts. 





While the 2001 „Partnership Principles‟ are an important footnote in the narrative of 
development cooperation in Uganda, clearly it is one thing to propose change and 
another thing to solicit commitment to it. Therefore it is remarkable that in 2003 the 
Government and the Development Partners in Uganda signed off on the PEAP and 
„Partnership Principles‟, formalising their commitment to more coordinated and 
harmonised action at the country level. It was two years after this that the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was signed off at the international level, and 
although thought to add very little to the existing commitments in Uganda – one 
Ministry of Finance interviewee suggested “the Paris Declaration photocopied the 
„Partnership Principles‟” (MoFPED Interview 22
nd
 May 2008) – Paris has since been 
depicted as catalysing activities towards the fulfilment of both (Office of the Prime 
Minister 2008). One literal manifestation of this is believed to be the Development 
Partners mainstreaming of the „Partnership Principles‟ (PPs) and Paris Declaration 
(PD) commitments into the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (Office of the Prime 
Minister 2008: 41). 
 
The Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS Partners 2005) is salient to this 
discussion by virtue of donors‟ reaffirmed commitment to the international aid 
effectiveness agenda.
63
 The document stresses that:  
 
“The UJAS Partners understand „working better together‟ to mean 
increasingly using common arrangements to deliver aid and to achieve a more 
effective division of labour among themselves in supporting specific sectors 
or programs. To this end, partners will strive to increasingly harmonize 
programming and policy dialogue, and to rationalize engagement in sectors, 
choice of aid instruments, and advisory capacity” (UJAS Partners 2005: 14). 
 
It is also important for providing an early insight into the sort of challenges Uganda‟s 
Development Partners were confronted with when attempting to develop their first 
joint strategy. Thus while the partners were united by a mutual recognition of the 
imperative to harmonise, they nevertheless struggled with the logistics of carrying 
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out a division of labour exercise.
64
 Subsequently, questions arose over how 
comparative advantage should be assessed and indeed how this might change over 
time, and over the need for country office staff to regularly consult with, and to 
reflect the requirements of their different headquarters. Finally the completion of the 
UJAS strategy was said to have been delayed because “Different assessments of the 
risks posed by corruption and the political transition created tensions among some 
UJAS partners, making it difficult to draft a strategy acceptable to all” (UJAS 
Partners 2005: viii). Indeed, this idea of differing perceptions of corruption – as 
reflected in the different governance indictors donors utilise and the resultant risk 
minimisation strategies that they employ - is an issue I shall return to again in this 
chapter.
65
 I suggest that this is perhaps the main barrier to meaningful coordination in 
the Ugandan setting. 
 
In a further effort to formalise agreement over the proliferating aid effectiveness 
commitments emerging post-2000, the Ugandan Government and in this instance the 
Health Development Partners, signed off on a revised Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) in 2005.
66
 That document, while neither mirroring the PPs or 
the PD, served to institutionalise their shared ethos in the context of the health sector 
and provided explicit instructions for managing the partnership. So for example, all 
parties committed to funding only activities reflected in the framework of the Health 
Sector Strategic Plan II (HSSP II), and to sit together at the Health Policy Advisory 
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Committee to advise on the implementation of it. Donors were awarded a larger joint 
role in the monitoring of the sector, while also agreeing to rationalise their use of 
technical assistance, to use national procurement systems (where possible) and to 
“work towards ensuring that budget releases are made according to a schedule agreed 
with the Government” (MoU 2005: 6.4.4). The GoU for its part, agreed to “provide 
overall leadership in planning, administration, implementation and monitoring of 
Health Sector Strategic Plan II” (MoU 2005: 3.1) and to ensure that the proportion 
of the Government budgetary allocation to the health sector would increase annually 
in real terms. 
 
To sum up, the 2005 MoU between the GoU and the Health Development Partners 
(HDPs) provided a detailed framework for operationalising aid effectiveness rhetoric 
in Uganda‟s health sector, and as such, a means of measuring adherence to an agreed 
set of standards. Thus it is in light of these commitments and the tenets of the Paris 
Declaration that one can now begin to assess the manner in which Uganda‟s 
stakeholders have honoured their pledges to date. While three years (please note my 
fieldwork concluded in 2008) is not a sufficient time period to reach any definitive 
conclusions about the nature of partnership commitments in Uganda‟s health sector, 
it is at least long enough to identify some of the main barriers to the ideal and to 
suggest why – during the second half of this chapter - meaningful coordination may 




Operationalising the Health Partnership in Uganda 
 
During the course of the fieldwork various interview subjects voiced strong opinions 
over where the GoU-HDP partnership had so far gone awry. This information was 
supplied on an ad hoc basis as opposed to systematically.
67
 Nevertheless, even the 
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opinions of these subjective commentators demonstrated enough consistency to 
induce some confidence in the main issues that have arisen to date when attempting 
to operationalise the health partnership in Uganda. Moreover, one output of a recent 
mid-term review of the Paris Declaration was a detailed country case study on how 
the Paris Principles have been implemented in Uganda during its first phase (Office 
of the Prime Minister 2008).
68
 This has proved a valuable addition to the fieldwork 
material, both as a source of triangulation and as a source of additional interviewee 
input.  I draw on these resources, in addition to salient MoFPED financial reports, 
throughout this chapter. 
 
The first and most forthright source for evaluating compliance to the „Partnership 
Principles‟ came in the form of a senior staff member at Uganda‟s Ministry of Health 
(MoH Interview 7
th
 April 2008) - a staff member who it should be remarked has been 
employed, at least in part, to clean up the image of the MoH following the Global 
Fund mismanagement. In a frank interview, he identified which of the „Partnership 
Principles‟ government and donors had showed weakest adherence to so far. For 
government, they were: “Continue with increased tax revenue effort,” “Decline any 
offers of stand-alone projects,” and “Continue to improve transparency and combat 
corruption.” For the Health Development Partners, they were: “Develop uniform 
disbursement rules,” “Ensure all support is fully integrated into sector wide 
programmes and is fully consistent with each sector programme‟s priorities,” 
“Abolish topping up of individual project staff salaries,” and “End individual, 
parallel country programmes and stand-alone projects” (MoFPED 2001: 3-4). When 
asked what problems there might have been in meeting these principles, the 
interviewee suggested weak discipline – for instance, the government is supposed to 
say “no” to stand-alone projects but hasn‟t done so consistently – and a continued 
lack of confidence in government and government structures, which had seen some 
donors continue to favour parallel management arrangements. When then asked what 
repercussions there were for partners who failed to adhere to the PPs, the interviewee 
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HDPs” (MoH 2008: xxii). 
68
 The Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness took place from the 2-4 September 2008.  
Unfortunately the country case study produced to evaluate the implementation of Paris in Uganda 




suggested that beyond waste and duplication there really weren‟t any. This highlights 
a central problem to the coordination ethos, and one seen echoed in the Evaluation of 
the Implementation of the Paris Declaration (Office of the Prime Minister 2008): a 
lack of mutual accountability. 
 
The Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration in Uganda finds a 
“general paucity of information on mutual accountability” (Office of the Prime 
Minister 2008: 61), and this is despite identifying several potential mechanisms 
deemed adequate for jointly reviewing progress toward accountability commitments. 
It also noted that whilst UJAS was explicit on how it intends to monitor progress 
toward the Paris goals of alignment and harmonisation, it remained less so on mutual 
accountability. Finally, while the report notes that there is a least one forum that the 
donors can draw upon to hold the GoU to account, there is as yet no forum that both 
parties can utilise for mutual review. Therefore, given that the commitment to mutual 
accountability is perhaps the most radical of the five proffered by Paris, it is a poor 
reflection of overall commitment to the Declaration that Uganda‟s government and 
donors have already been found guilty of attaching different levels of importance to 
each.
69
 Moreover, even if the concept of mutual accountability is overlooked as 
simply a feature of an international initiative, the issue that the Ministry of Health 
interviewee highlighted was that if both sides of a partnership fail to meet shared 
commitments – whether completely or just inconsistently - then the high moral 
ground to demand compliance on either side is lost. To turn now to the HDP vantage 
point, to identify where donors perceive the two sides have been failing, one can 
begin to see how difficult it is to demand reform in a dysfunctional working 
arrangement. 
 
The Chairman of the HDPs identified the following failings on either side of the 
health sector partnership.
70
 For government, he identified a failure to increase the 
proportion of overall government allocation to the sector, and to consistently meet its 
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reporting obligations to donors. For donors, he suggested a failure to rationalise 
technical assistance to the MoH, to submit new projects to the proper screening 
process, and to announce new funding to the sector as several areas where donors 
were undermining the MoU (BTC Interview 10
th
 April 2008).  
 
Additional data to back up these claims can be found in the Annual Health Sector 
Performance Report FY 2006/2007. The report notes that the percentage of the GoU 
budget being allocated to the health sector had actually decreased when compared 
with the previous financial year - slipping from 9.7% in 2004/2005 to 9.6% in 
2006/07 (MoH 2007a: 83). It also found that non-HSSP II inputs such as technical 
assistance and project management costs continued “to take a high percentage of 
donor project funding at 31%” (MoH 2007a: 88); and that a significant proportion of 
donor project funding remained off-budget. Furthermore, that even excluding those 
funds, just 41% of donor project expenditure was reflected in the Mid-Term 
Expenditure Framework. Finally, the report noted that 74% of donor project 
expenditures were being made in the private sector, where the MoH was unable to 
ascertain the expenditure‟s contribution to the realisation of sector objectives (MoH 
2007a: 87). In sum, on the HDPs‟ side, the report revealed that a significant 
proportion of project aid to Uganda‟s health sector remained unaligned with sector 
priorities. 
 
A further issue thought to be complicating the discussion over compliance to 
partnership commitments in Uganda - raised by the HDP Chair and likely to have 
skewed some of the statistics highlighted above - relates to the huge injection of aid 
now entering Uganda‟s health sector as a result of Global Funding Initiatives like the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM) and the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI). To provide a concrete example, a Public 
Expenditure Review in health identified that a trend beginning in 2004/05 - for 
overall donor project funding to increase while GoU financing decreases - directly 
coincided with the introduction of Global Health Initiatives to the country.
71
 And as 
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the HDP interviewee points out, such funds aren‟t yet signatories to the 2005 MoU 
(although the GFATM and GAVI have now expressed an interest in joining (BTC 
Interview 10
th
 April 2008)).  
 
New developments in the international architecture of aid will no doubt pose new 
challenges to Uganda‟s existing health partnership (in other chapters I will deal more 
explicitly with Uganda‟s Long-Term Institutional Arrangements which are already 
signalling transformation for Uganda‟s aid management structures). Indeed, Uganda 
is already witnessing vastly increased funding to civil society organisations from the 
likes of GFATM and the President‟s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
the impact of which is yet to be discerned.
72
 Yet Uganda‟s partnership arrangement 
could change again if the sector were to attract one of the new bilateral aid donors 
such as China, whose reputation suggests a desire to further economic as opposed to 
development concerns and a negligible interest in the Paris Declaration (Office of the 
Prime Minister 2008). Or should the new US Presidency choose to revise the vertical 
aid initiatives commenced under the Bush administration: PEPFAR and the 
President‟s Malaria Initiative (PMI). In short, while the new aid architecture will 
continue to alter the nature of coordination and partnership in Uganda‟s health sector, 
it‟s difficult to speculate on what form these changes might take at this time.  
 
For the remainder of this chapter therefore, I shall focus the discussion on why the 
early years of partnership in Uganda‟s health sector might not have yielded stronger 
adherence and compliance to the commitments voluntarily entered into by the GoU 
and HDPs. Specifically, I will concentrate on the donor members of the HDPs (see 
box 6 for the distinction), vocal proponents of the partnership initiated by the GoU 
and the sector-wide approach in the health sector.
73
 I do so as a means of exposing 
the obstacles to coordination even within a superficially homogenous grouping. The 
hope is that by highlighting differences here - in modi operandi, aid volumes, 
development objectives, HQ restrictions and even personality - it might be possible 
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to provide some insight into why coordination between overtly heterogeneous 
groupings such as donors and government might prove intensely difficult. However, 
this is not to say that I maintain a naive conceptualisation about the homogeneity of 
government - I hold with the Walt et al. notion that even the abbreviation MoH: “is 
conceptual shorthand for a number of different players, who may take opposite or 
contradictory positions” (Walt et al. 1999b: 274).
74
  I am merely concentrating the 
examination on how a central facet of aid effectiveness rhetoric is being pursued by 
the aid givers. In doing so, I will also endeavour to posit why, in view of the 
difficulty of achieving meaningful coordination within a single grouping, the actors 
nevertheless remain faithful to the ethos. Here I will return to the notion of 
coordination as a „pick and mix‟ checklist, and suggest why outwards adherence to 
the ethos might retain some attraction for donors. 
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African Development Bank (AFDB) 
Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) 
Danish International Development Agency (Danida) 
European Commission 
Italian Cooperation 
Japan International Development Agency (JICA) 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) 
UK Department for International Development (DFID) 





Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau 
Uganda Protestant Medical Bureau 
Uganda Muslim Medical Bureau 




I turn first to one of the simplest distinctions that can be made between the HDPs at 






The working arrangements of Uganda‟s various donor HDPs on the ground in 
Uganda are distinctly heterogeneous: ranging from teams where there is a plethora of 
technical expertise to ones where the sole staff member assigned to health was based 
outside Uganda. As such, the activities and levels of engagement they demonstrate 
with regards to the sector and the health partnership contrast widely.  
 
To start with the smallest health teams in terms of staff numbers, one can 
immediately start by highlighting that it was in the cases of the two multilateral 
donors to Uganda‟s health sector – the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank (AFDB) – that the health representatives were found to be out of the country 
when approached for comment. The World Bank representative was away for a 
period exceeding three months in 2008 (World Bank email 17
th
 April 2008) - 
seemingly with no interim cover - while the AFDB health representative was based 
in Tunisia for an unspecified period (AFDB email 19
th
 May 2008); although in this 
instance, the AFDB Country Operations Officer was found to be attending to sector 
activities in his absence. This staff member however had only been attending to the 
Bank‟s health portfolio for a period of two and half months when approached to 
discuss his involvement in July 2008 and had not therefore engaged in many 
partnership activities (World Bank emailed questionnaire 14
th
 July 2008).   
 
Certain bilateral donors were also found to have just one representative assigned to 
health in their country offices; however, in these cases, the salient staff members 
were found to be present and correct. DFID and SIDA fall into this category, 






 DFID for example, although having a single health specialist based 
in Kampala, did appear to have additional administrative support within the country 
office to assist him. Moreover, although managing the health programme largely 
unaided, the DFID representative for health had nevertheless accrued additional 
duties outside of the traditional programme remit. In this way he was found to be 
operationalising a “silent partnership” with Irish Aid – put simply: informing Irish 
Aid of developments in the sector in light of its recent withdrawal as part of a 
division of labour exercise (Irish Aid Interview 2
nd
 April 2007); he was acting as the 
vice-Chair of the HDP group; and he was found to be the focal person for the AIDS 
Development Partners (ADPs) Group at the HDP forum. In short, DFID, despite only 
boasting a one-man health team, was proven to be a very active supporter of 
Uganda‟s health partnership at the time of the fieldwork.  
 
SIDA on the other hand, was found to have just one staff member in-country, 
charged with managing both SIDA‟s health and HIV/AIDS programmes, and this 
was without any additional administrative support at the Swedish Embassy (although 
there was some hope that an additional appointment might be made in 2009 to ease 
this dual workload). As such, at the time of meeting, the SIDA representative was 
open about having to prioritise involvement in the HDPs over that in the ADPs in the 





Moving on now to address a two-man donor health team, the fieldwork found that 
the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) had developed an innovative working 
arrangement to fulfil its desire to fully engage in the health partnership in country. 
Thus while the staff member appointed to oversee BTC‟s health programme was not 
himself a technical specialist – he is in fact Deputy Ambassador to the Belgian 
Embassy – BTC has employed a full-time health economist since June 2006 to 
participate in the policy, technical and financial dialogue with the GoU and to advise 
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the Attaché at the Embassy on health issues. In this way, BTC was able to take over 
the Chair of the HDPs in January 2007 - a role it carried over into 2008 – to 
coordinate and facilitate the activities of the HDP Group. This particular modus 
operandi is evocative of the Evaluation of the Implementation of Paris, which 
suggests that in pursuit of aid effectiveness goals donor country staff will need to 
develop “skills in negotiation and facilitation in addition to technical skills” (Office 
of the Prime Minister 2008: 34). As such, BTC employs an expert to meet the 
technical demands of its health programme and a professional diplomat to deal with 
what can be the messy business of partnership building. 
 
To address two of the largest HDP health teams now – Danida and USAID – one can 
again see two wholly different models at work. Danida at first sight appears to have 
two teams engaged in health sector work in Uganda: the first based at its national 
Embassy and comprised of just a few staff members, the second situated at Uganda‟s 
Ministry of Health and made of a core team of four technical experts (supported by 
additional administrative staff).
76
 The latter grouping is known as the Health Sector 
Programme Support (HSPS) team, and it is the HSPS‟s positioning that marks the 
Danish modus operandi out as unique in the Ugandan setting. To elucidate, in spite 
of the physical division between the Embassy and the MoH teams, the two are 
tangibly connected, with the Coordinator of the HSPS team based at the Embassy. 
The impetus behind this unusual set up is explained as follows: 
 
“It is absolutely crucial that the functions of the HSPS Coordinator be 
separated from the functions of the Senior Technical Advisor…because the 
latter is part of the MoH organizational structure and will not be in a position 
to monitor the implementation of HSSP II and HSPS III. The HSPS 
Coordinator position will therefore be maintained in HSPS III and continue to 
be based at the Royal Danish Embassy in Kampala” (Danida 2005: 77). 
 
In short, the section of the team based at the MoH is explicitly concerned with 
monitoring the implementation of Danida‟s strategic plan for the health sector (HSPS 
III), while the division at the Embassy (which includes the HSPS Coordination and a 
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program officer) is additionally tasked with monitoring Uganda‟s national plan for 
the sector (HSSP II).  
 
When asked about the above arrangement, the Danida focal point at the Ministry 
suggested this unusual set up was but an “interim” capacity building arrangement 
(Danida Interview 7
th
 May 2008). Nevertheless he made it clear that it was one that 
had been ongoing for several years. It is indicative of the respect accorded Danida, as 
one of the “progressive” Nordic donors, that it is permitted to behave in this way – 





In comparison to the other HDPs, Uganda‟s largest donor USAID would appear to 
have a relatively small health team if one were to compare the size of the workforce 
to the scale of USAID‟s current funding to the sector: it has approximately 20-25 
staff members engaged in three programmatic areas. However, as shall be addressed 
in the later stages of this discussion, this is accomplished by the specific operational 
model utilised by USAID, which employs private sector companies, civil society 
organisations and occasionally government bodies to act as “implementing partners” 
in its development work. As such, USAID has approximately 48-50 “prime” 
implementing partners on the ground in Uganda that serve to operationalise its vast 




    
 
To now compare the modi operandi of USAID and DFID – Uganda‟s two largest 
bilateral donors to Uganda – it should become clear that the size of donor health 
teams at the field level (which vary wildly) have little correlation to the volume of 
aid the donor agency contributes to the sector. It may help at this point to highlight 
the other major issues that serve to belie the homogeneity of Uganda‟s HDPs. 
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 Brainard (2007a) reminds us that donors like Danida are not burdened by the colonial history of 
strategic entanglements in the same way as say, the US. Please see Chapter Six for more information 
on the Danida modus operandi and strategic plan in Uganda. 
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 “Prime” implementing partners are also sometimes referred to as “prime contractors” because of 
their ability to engage additional “sub contractors” to implement USAID-funded projects. In this way 
USAID may actually be funding several hundred organisations in country, while only charged with 




Aid Volumes and Development Objectives 
The most obvious difference to demarcate the HDPs relates to the official 
development assistance (ODA) they each devote to Uganda‟s health sector: the 





Given that the Paris Declaration is, at least in part, a response to the unpredictability 
of aid it should come as no surprise to note that up to date data on the breakdown of 
ODA to Uganda‟s health sector remains sketchy. As such, the figures I draw upon 
here are approximations of donor aid commitments as they stood in 2007/8 - the 
intention being to provide a selection of aid data (as provided by the donor agencies 




To start with the biggest health donors, the fieldwork data suggested that USAID‟s 
ODA in FY 2008/9 would be as follows: PEPFAR: US $279 million (USAID 
Interview 30
th
 April 2008), PMI: US $22.5 million and an unspecified – though 
much smaller - volume for other USAID health work.
81
 Moreover USAID‟s funding 
to the sector – in accordance with US Congressional constraints – will continue to be 
provided in project form. A representative for the AFDB has suggested that it will be 
providing an estimated Units of Account (UA) 52 million – again as project support - 
over the period 2008-10, which is the equivalent of about US $33.28 million 
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 Walt et al. (1999a) confirm that the ideal to coordinate aid is constrained by the differing objectives 
of the different actors.  
80
 A good resource for comparing aid flows between donors is of course the OECD/DAC Creditor 
Reporting System. Yet, it is acknowledged that even there the quality of data is only as good as the 
information the donors provide. For the purpose of this discussion, I have opted to use self-reported 
data on aid to Uganda, as provided by the donors. The list is not intended to be comprehensive, only 
to illustrate variance.   
81
 USAID‟s general health sector remit in Uganda covers: child survival, family planning and 
reproductive health, neglected tropical diseases, health systems strengthening and Avian Flu (USAID 
Interview 13
th
 May 2008). 
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 “ADB financial statements are expressed in UA, or Units of Account, whose value is defined as 
about 0.8887 grams of fine gold. As of 2001, 1 UA equals approximately US$1.28” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Development_Bank [Accessed 14
th




DFID‟s bilateral health programme awarded Uganda £8,548,000 in FY 2008/09, of 
which just over half  - £4,550,000 was termed “Notional Allocation of General 
Budget Support to Health” or Poverty Action Fund budget support (Freedom of 
Information response from DFID 18
th
 December 2008).  
 
SIDA takes a different view to describing its aid flows to the sector, by relaying the 
expenditure on health for the prior year as opposed to future projections, which it 
finds “more interesting”; thus for 2007 the annual expenditure for health was said to 
be approximately US $14.5 million, of which 75% was provided as Poverty Action 
Fund budget support, 10% went to projects and 15% went to civil society (SIDA 
Interview 22
nd
 May 2008).  
 
Finally, taking BTC as the last example, it was found to be awarding the health 
sector around 4 million Euros – or just under US $5.5 million annually - which it 
delivered predominantly as Poverty Action Fund budget support (BTC 2007). 
  
Clearly therefore, there is massive diversity in the volume of ODA that Uganda‟s 
HDPs award its health sector and in the proportions of aid channelled through 
different modalities. Yet, what about the specific objectives the HDPs attach to their 
aid? While it‟s relatively easy to determine the thematic areas that project-based 
donors such as USAID and AFDP prioritise in Uganda‟s health sector – USAID is 
directing the majority of its funding toward HIV/AIDS and malaria-
prevention/eradication activities while AFDB favours maternal and mental health 
inputs – it is useful to note what the HDPs who provide the majority of their funding 
as Poverty Action Fund budget support list as their thematic priorities (see box 7 for 




















Primary Health Care Conditional Grant 
Contribution to HDP Partnership Fund 




Support to district health services 
Support to districts in the north 
Central-level support to Ministry of Health 
Support to the training of enrolled comprehensive nurses in private-not-for 
profit schools 




Health policy and administrative management 
Basic health care 
Infectious disease control 
Health education 
Health personnel development 
Reproductive health 
Maternal and neonatal health 




Sexual and reproductive health/rights 
Maternal health 








Family planning and reproductive health 
Neglected tropical diseases 




BTC sector budget support has three components: a grant to the Primary Health Care 
Conditional Grant - which finances HSSP II implementation in the districts, a 
contribution to the Partnership Fund and the salary of the health economist employed 
as BTC‟s technical expertise in the health sector (BTC 2007).
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 SIDA‟s priorities in 
the sector are sexual/reproductive health and rights, maternal health, and human 
resources for health (SIDA Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). DFID has a comparatively 
large health remit targeting: health policy and administrative management, basic 
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health care, infectious disease control, health education, health personnel 
development, reproductive health, maternal and neonatal health and HIV/AIDS 
including sexually transmitted disease prevention (Freedom of Information response 
from DFID 18
th
 December 2008). Finally, Danida‟s programme has five integral 
components: support to district health services, support to districts in the north, 
central-level support to the MoH, support to the training of enrolled comprehensive 
nurses in private not-for-profit schools and pharmaceutical sector support (Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005).  
 
In sum, while certain aspects of HDP health programmes demonstrate a degree of 
crossover, a breakdown of the thematic areas underscores how different their 
priorities actually are on the ground. Of course, in one way this serves to satisfy the 
facet of aid effectiveness rhetoric that discourages duplication. Nevertheless, the 
question remains as to how successfully these key thematic differences are ironed out 
at the country-level when the HDPs are forced to reach common positions on 
Uganda‟s various health issues? I will return to this question in due course. However, 
before I do, the following anecdote from a new donor representative to join the HDP 
Group in 2007 is perhaps insightful: 
 
“We are sitting there around a table and we‟re supposed to find our common 
views on government issues and to get our ideas you know, together for our 
one consolidated development partner view…position, and I don‟t even know 
what the others are doing in their programmes, what are their goals, why are 
they here? And I think that‟s very poor. And of course at the same time…you 
know when you‟re new you tend to be a little: „Oh, I can‟t bring this up 
because they probably talked about this a couple of months ago.‟ But now 
when I start talking to people everybody‟s saying: „No, I don‟t know what the 
others are doing. I have no idea‟” (SIDA Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). 
 
Could it be therefore that maintaining largely superficial relations at the country 






Headquarters and National Politics 
A major finding of both the Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris 
Declaration in Uganda (Office of the Prime Minister 2008) and the Paris Synthesis 
Report (Wood et al. 2008) was the following:  
 
“No matter how well developed the country systems and procedures…it is 
noted that some donors are still reluctant and/or formally constrained in using 
country systems due to policies and restrictions imposed by their 







“without the political will at higher levels, many DPs [Development Partners] 
contend that the framework for strategy and programming around the Paris 
Declaration principles would not exist and country offices remain stifled, 
even though their counterparts may be making much more progress” (Office 
of the Prime Minister 2008: 41).  
 
In short, the reports highlight two additional factors that could be serving to 
undermine meaningful partnership at the country level in Uganda: diverging political 
agendas which impact on the level of engagement advocated in partner countries by 
national headquarters (HQs), and a subsequent disconnect between field office staff 
and their HQs – who may begin to subscribe to very different levels of engagement 
as a result of their contextual vantage points. I would suggest that the main issue 
behind this disconnect, and the key factor discouraging full compliance to the 
principles of alignment and harmonisation at the country level in Uganda is one I 
have already touched upon in this discussion: concerns over governance.  
 
Differing perceptions over the risk posed by alignment and harmonisation around 
Uganda‟s existing institutional structures remains a source of contention between 
different donor agencies at all levels and one unlikely to be resolved in the 
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 The Paris Synthesis Report presents a synthesis of 19 separate evaluations of the implementation of 
the Paris Declaration during Phase One in 8 partner countries (including Uganda) and 11 development 
partner/donor agencies. All contributing partners were self-selected and different methodologies were 




foreseeable future. Moreover, as the context chapter in this thesis has already 
highlighted, Uganda‟s donors have good reasons to question the integrity of 
Uganda‟s systems; following the mismanagement and misappropriation of both 
GAVI and GFATM funds in 2005/6, President Museveni‟s revision of term limits in 
2005 and the shaky transition to multi-party politics in 2006, donors have been 
increasingly questioning Uganda‟s status as a „donor darling‟ (Atoo 2005; Barkan 
2005). Furthermore, despite a fairly stable couple of years, frustration over the delay 
in securing prosecutions for the misappropriation of funding is palpable; a point that 
finds a mention in Uganda‟s Paris Implementation Report, when the reluctance of 
donors to move toward unconditional budget support is explained as follows: “DPs 
find it difficult to justify BS [Budget Support] to their taxpayers when corruption is 
rife and reported cases go without investigation” (Office of the Prime Minister 2008: 
47). 
 
Considering that Uganda‟s UJAS donors were already conflicted over corruption 
concerns when devising their strategy in 2005, it is easy to understand why 
developments in the country since then have only served to vindicate an already 
cautious engagement. Indeed, while certain countries like Ireland and the UK 
reduced their aid to the country in 2005 in reaction to the developments at the time 
(O‟Farrell 2005; http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/pressreleases/uganda-
reduction.asp [accessed 19/12/08]), the fieldwork revealed that following the spate of 
disorder, SIDA had actually considered withdrawing aid from Uganda altogether 
(SIDA Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). And of course in February 2010, Uganda‟s Local 
Development Partners Groups threatened to withdraw ODA on masse over 
continuing concerns over corruption and impunity for corruption (Observer Media 
Ltd 2010).
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 In short, if an unequivocal commitment to the principles of aid 
effectiveness could be viewed as a strategy that might serve to heighten the level of 
risk incurred through aid giving, then one can begin to understand why donors tend 
to pick and choose from the different facets involved in the coordination checklist, 
leaving out those that would see them ceding the most control over aid to the partner 
country, like general budget support. This is evidenced first by the aid giving 
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strategies of the HDPs – who favour project aid and/or providing budget support via 
the ring-fenced Poverty Action Fund - and second by the fact that the division of 
labour exercise initiated in Uganda was depicted by Development Partners as 
applicable: “in all other cases except in the field of governance, where donor 
selectivity would result in a weak voice” (Office of the Prime Minister 2008: 15).  
 
Turning now to look at the most overtly risk averse of the bilateral donors – USAID 
– one can see how the United States (US) micromanages its aid to Uganda, while all 
the while affirming a serious commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
The US provides a good case study to illustrate not only some of the activities 
employed in averting the risks associated with aid giving, but also the consequences 
of this from the standpoint of field staff at the country level. The Congressional 
constraints affecting US aid are well documented and, in light of the intransigence to 
change demonstrated by the numerous failed attempts to seriously reform the 1961 
Foreign Assistance Act (Nowels 2007) they are unlikely to be revoked in the 
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the volume of aid the US has been allocating to 
health through its global initiatives the President‟s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) and President‟s Malaria Initiative (PMI) has risen drastically in recent 
years, demonstrating a revised faith in the utility of bilateral development assistance 
for furthering US concerns abroad (Riddell 2007).
86
 I stipulate „bilateral‟ because as 
Brainard points out, multilateralism does not sit well with the US – it is too impatient 
and too important to work with partners. This is well exemplified in the launching of 
PEPFAR just two years after the US government committed its support to the 
GFATM (Brainard 2007a) and the finding that just 10% of US foreign assistance was 
channelled via multilateral institutions in 2003 (Riddell 2007: 57). It is perhaps 
interesting to ponder therefore, that despite Congressional restrictions – for instance, 
earmarking ODA and precluding US foreign assistance being provided as budget 
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 Riddell reminds us that post 9/11, the 2002 National Security Strategy promoted development to 
become the third pillar of US Foreign Policy, alongside defence and diplomacy. Indeed, that: “The 
primary purpose of United State‟s aid has always been to further and promote its own interests, with 
foreign aid an essential arm of foreign policy, with massive amounts of aid channelled to America‟s 
allies. As a result, foreign aid allocations have always been critically influenced by national security 
priorities. However, within this broad framework, development and humanitarian goals have also been 




support in countries with poor governance ratings - the US is a signatory to the Paris 
Declaration. The Paris Implementation Report, while understanding of the restraints 
placed on US aid, notes that this stance creates a somewhat conflicting image of the 
donor in the Ugandan setting: 
 
“Some donors speak the language of the PD but in practice disagree with 
some of the principles, especially the use of country systems…For some 
DPs…the principles on which they were established, and the general 
conditions that govern their operations would have to be reformed first before 





The consequence of this for country staff at USAID is pronounced. While other 
donors continue to use a mix of aid modalities without apology, USAID‟s sole 
employment of project aid in the Ugandan setting provokes open criticism from its 
peer groups, which one staff member termed “tiresome” and a “waste of energy” 
when it wasn‟t an issue she was even empowered to act upon. Her view was that it 
would be more constructive for all involved if everyone could just accept the status 
quo and make it work as best they could (USAID Interview 30
th
 April 2008). 
Another USAID interviewee agreed that the staff got tired of defending themselves 
over the same issue yet at the same time suggested that such criticism tended to be 
voiced in public - for show - and that her personal one to one relations had always 
been fine (USAID Interview 13
th
 May 2008). This is an interesting point and one to 
be explored in the next section, when I consider how donor coordination may be 
influenced by individual personalities at the country level. First however, it is worth 
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 Brainard has also underscored the discrepancy between the reality and promise of the US‟s 
commitment to aid effectiveness, noting “Unfortunately, in the United States, there is a tension 
between implementation of these [PD] principles and congressional and public support for a sectoral 
approach to assistance…” (Brainard 2007a: 12). Moreover, that “At a time when coordination of 
assistance among donors has been recognized as one of the most importance principles for increasing 
aid effectiveness, the United States appears to be moving in the opposite direction (Brainard 2007b: 
39-40). He highlights some of the significant barriers to the US honouring the harmonisation and 
alignment tenets, noting that “coordination in the field looks enviably simple when compared with the 
overlapping jurisdictions in Washington”  (Brainard 2007b: 33) (there are twenty organisations 
involved in the provision of US foreign assistance, each with competing objectives); and that “The 
current system defies basic management principles by separating policy from operations and both 
from budgeting” (Brainard 2007b: 44). To focus specifically on the PEPFAR programme, the need for 
attribution of results and Congressional earmarking both undermine USAID‟s ability to realise its 





noting some of the other ways USAID has devised to be seen to pursue aid 
effectiveness goals, while staying within the confines of its national policy.  
 
Despite being outside of the UJAS framework, USAID has introduced a periodic aid 
effectiveness monitoring survey to be carried out for all its overseas missions, the 
results of which it disseminates on a website where US citizens can direct questions 
at government; thus presumably increasing the accountability of US aid. Moreover, it 
has employed focal persons to support the completion of the survey who coordinate 
the collection of the data and clarify the definitions of the aid effectiveness indicators 
used, thus raising the profile of the aid effectiveness agenda throughout its field staff 
(Office of the Prime Minister 2008: 39). Furthermore, in addition to the activities that 
directly relate to the signing of the Paris Declaration, the USAID team also engages 
in each of the coordination forums in Uganda health sector that pre-date the Paris 
commitment – the technical working groups, the HDP Group, the ADP Group and 
the HPAC – and has even offered to lead the HDP Group as part of Division of 
Labour Exercise in 2009. Finally, although not necessarily a regular occurrence, the 
PEPFAR programme aims to hold an annual PEPFAR Dissemination and 
Stakeholders Consultation to allow Uganda‟s health stakeholders and implementing 
partners to feed into the future plans of the fund.
88
 They do this through panel 
sessions and break out groups aimed at identifying ways the fund could perform 
better and priority setting.  
 
Yet just how meaningful USAID‟s participation can be in such forums when its 
agenda is set elsewhere and its interventions run parallel to national systems is 
questionable.
89
 The Paris Report reveals that the US had at one time expressed an 
interest in joining the UJAS; however the amendments it suggested – which 
challenged both the primacy of budget support and the rationale for using country 
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 I was invited to attend this meeting on 3
rd
 May 2007. By mid-2008 however it wasn‟t clear if it 
would take place that year. 
89
 Brainard highlights the disconnect between the US field staff and their Washington counterparts 
when he notes that “Currently, there is clear separation of policymaking from implementation for a 
large share of foreign assistance programming.” This set up “assumes that aid decisions can be made 
solely on the basis of policy considerations – such as U.S. objectives – without regard to the technical 
aspects of the particular sectoral or functional activity or to feedback from implementers in the field” 




systems – were turned down and saw its interest dwindle. Given that the majority of 
the HDPs are UJAS members, or at least in favour of earmarked budget support, it 
seems that the US position might be too diametrically opposed to that of the other 
donors to facilitate meaningful partnership at the country level. Moreover, in light of 
other strong criticism directed toward the USAID programme in Uganda during the 
fieldwork period, one can begin to discern another reason why the USAID Uganda 
team may have been disadvantaged by the decisions made by HQ over its head. 
 
The fieldwork revealed that criticism directed at USAID‟s involvement in Uganda‟s 
health sector was stimulated by a more complex issue than its continued refusal to 
deliver aid as budget support. The finding that the majority of US project support 
was considered “off-budget” was just one part of the puzzle.
90
 Another was the 
Annual Health Sector Performance Report finding that where project aid was being 
spent in the private sector it had a doubtful alignment to HSSP II priorities (MoH 
2007a). The final piece of the puzzle came following various ambiguous remarks 
made at sector forums, which were explored during interviews at Uganda‟s Ministry 
of Finance. Here, the interviewees alluded to a funding agreement between the US 
and the GoU to accept aid that fails to demonstrate alignment with sector priorities; 
moreover to have that money channelled via a lead agency appointed by the donor, 
rather than the MoFPED. This was the arrangement being used for PEPFAR money 
at the time of the fieldwork, and in his explanation of it, one interviewee alluded as 
to why it might prove unpopular with Uganda‟s other HDPs: 
         
“What the PEPFAR money is, is off-budget. Therefore it is rather big. We 
don‟t know what it‟s spent on for instance and which unit costs USAID is 
following – the expenditure units. We don‟t really know what they‟re 
spending the money on. We can‟t tell how much money comes into the 
country even. But we know we‟ve signed an agreement” (MoFPED Interview 
25
th
 April 2008). 
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 Off budget or ex-budgetary aid – means aid not captured under Mid-Term Expenditure Review 
sector ceilings. Even project aid should be captured in MTEF ceilings under the GoU-HDP 
agreement; because even if it‟s not being channelled through Uganda‟s financial systems, the 





The Paris Implementation Report also hints at this kind of arrangement when it 
suggests that project support is undermining the GoU‟s leadership of the 
development process, saying that this applies mostly to projects: 
  
“approved at a higher level than the sector concerned, or by those 
development partners who neither have joined the UJAS nor signed the 
Partnership Principles and whose projects do not get discussed by Sector 
Working Groups prior to approval” (Office of the Prime Minister 2008: 42). 
 
Asked why such an exception might have been made to accept the PEPFAR money 
in light of the GoU‟s own stated preferences in the Building Partnerships document 
(2001), the MoFPED interviewee suggested that “the reality is we have got the 
financing gap and we welcome any support that could alleviate the gap in the 
interim” (MoFPED Interview 25
th
 April 2008). The contradictory situation the 
PEPFAR money forces the GoU into recalls the work of Lewis and Mosse (2006), 
whereby the GoU should be regarded as a skilled aid „broker‟ rather than a victim for 
allowing such a deal to exist.  
 
Van de Walle and Johnson have argued that until “governments are willing to turn 
down aid that is granted through channels that undermine government coordination, 
donors will continue to use the channels that suit them best” (Van de Walle and 
Johnson 1996: 110). Yet in this finding one is reminded of the unequal aid 
relationship that persists between partner and donor countries, which means that 
money can still buy loopholes in even the most well established partnership 
agreements.
91
 It is an unequal balance that undermines the more tricky tenets of aid 
effectiveness like transparency and alignment, and shows that meaningful 
coordination remains a checklist where even the most superficial compliance – in the 
form of an aid effectiveness survey – can be reported as overall adherence.  
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 Partnership Principle 4 commits the Ugandan government to refusing any stand-alone projects. This 
means it should be turning down any projects which are off-plan (i.e. when it cannot ensure the 
project is contributing to sector priorities) and/or off-budget (i.e. when the precise volume and use of 
funding is unknown, meaning the government cannot factor it into the Medium-Term Expenditure 
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Remarkably, having in the later stages of the fieldwork shed some light on the 
PEPFAR funding pact with the GoU, many of the comments that had emerged 
during the earlier stages began to gain new resonance; because while the PMI 
programme seemed to be viewed quite favourably by malaria partners in-country, the 
PEPFAR programme repeatedly evoked strongly-worded criticism. For example, one 
interviewee at WHO cited the USAID/PEPFAR team‟s apparent disinterest in 
forging partnerships beyond that which it enjoys with Uganda‟s AIDS Commission 
as evidence that “the US is the Minister for Health for HIV/AIDS in this 
country…Yeah, they are too much, they are too much” (WHO Interview 7
th
 
November 2007). While a government official said of USAID “They‟re bullies,” in 
the context that they still refused to inform the MoH of all the activities they were 
funding in the sector (MoH Interview 7
th
 April 2008).  
 
A final salient interview excerpt recounts an incident where the Chair of the HDPs 
depicted the USAID field staff as “passive participants” in sector forums and 
underlined his disappointment that USAID had shown no interest in putting itself 
forward as a „Lead‟ of the health sector as part of the division of labour (DoL) 
exercise being undertaken in the health sector. While elucidating on why he thought 
this might be the case - which included suggesting quite logically that USAID‟s 
remit to manage all its implementing partners in country might preclude such an 
engagement - the interviewee made all manner of allusions as to how the US were 
funding Ugandans working in security firms in Iraq and training troops for Somalia - 
in sum, serving to blur the distinction between the objectives of US foreign aid and 
the actual USAID health programme in Uganda (BTC Interview 10
th
 April 2008). 
Yet, the inaccuracy of this interviewee‟s earlier conjecture was revealed less than 
three weeks later when a senior interviewee at USAID explained that USAID had 
just put itself forward to assume the „Lead‟ of the health sector for 2009, thus 





The staff I encountered at USAID in Uganda were very upbeat and philosophical 




imagine the true frustration they feel when, despite their best efforts at the country 
level to facilitate successful health programmes and to forge fruitful alliances with 
partners, they find themselves discriminated against and hindered by decisions over 
which they have no control, and for which they will nevertheless become the default 
focal persons for blame.  
 
USAID presents the most extreme example of a donor agency whose staff at the field 
level are constrained as a result of policies, political pacts and HQ restraints 
determined far above their heads. However, it‟s clear that all donor agencies have 
their own peculiar rules and constraints, devised in their national settings and over 
which staff based in partner countries will have little or no capability to overturn 
(Crewe and Harrison 1998).
 92
 It is these sorts of restrictions that cause the 
disconnect between HQs and field offices identified in the Paris Implementation 
Report, and which has resulted in the suggestion that there needs to be a greater 
delegation of responsibility to field office staff if aid effectiveness goals are to be 
achieved.   
 
Some additional everyday factors, highlighted in the Paris Report, and with the 
potential to curtail the potential of field staff to participate meaningfully in 
coordination activities at the sector level include such things as: uncertain funding 
cycles which undermine the “timeliness and predictability of aid disbursements” to 
Uganda (Office of the Prime Minister 2008: 45); diverging views at HQ over the 
extent to which donors should feed into policy discussions with national 
governments; and of course the contrasting preferences donor agencies demonstrate 
with regards to the proportion of aid they allocate through different modalities. 
 
During this section of the discussion, I have attempted to expose several of the main 
differences that serve to belie the homogeneity of the donor subset of the Health 
Development Partners Group in Uganda. These have been identified broadly as 
differences in modi operandi, aid commitments, aid objectives, strictures from 
headquarters and national politics. Furthermore, using a case study of USAID, I have 
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sought to demonstrate how such differences can serve to mitigate a donor‟s 
engagement with aid effectiveness commitments at the national and international 
level, and how this mitigated engagement can impact on in-group relations. The 
broad aim in providing this overview has been to allude as to why meaningful 
partnership between Uganda‟s health donors and the overtly heterogeneous 
stakeholder sub-groups in the sector (government, civil society etc) may currently 
represent an unattainable ideal.  
 
In the next section, I discuss some of the strategies Uganda‟s Health Development 
Partners have developed to try and overcome their differences and question why, in 
light of the difficulty of the task they have set themselves – to reach common 
positions and speak with “one voice” at joint sector coordination fora – they persist 
in the illusion that they are a coalesced grouping.  
 
 
Dealing With Difference 
 
To tackle the issue of coordination fora first, it should be noted that prior to their 
monthly participation at the most important multi-stakeholder forum for the sector - 
the Health Policy Advisory Committee – Uganda‟s health donors meet together as 
the Health Development Partners Group, together with other stakeholders who have 
also attained the status of “HDP” (representatives from the World Health 
Organisation and Uganda‟s Religious Medical Bureaus).
93
 All in all the grouping 
probably averages around 15-20 members, who are all focal persons from the 
signatory organisations to the original 2000 MoU with the GoU. In addition, other 
visitors may occasionally be invited by the HDPs to attend, for instance to provide 
supplementary technical expertise. 
 
The Terms of Reference (TORs) for the HDG Group tell us that its purpose is to 
provide a more formal forum for coordination between the Development Partners 
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working in health; to reduce transaction costs for both agencies and Government in 
implementing the Health Sector Strategic Plan; and to strengthen the partnership 
between the GoU and HDPs to ensure more effective implementation of the HSSP 
through the SWAp process.
94
  Specific functions include enabling partners to 
“coordinate and collate joint responses to issues in the sector…” and providing “a 
means by which the partners can communicate amongst themselves and with the 
Ministry of Health more effectively” (HDPs 2006: 2.3.ii & iii). To facilitate the joint 
responses to be issued to the MoH or at sector forums, the HDP Group appoints an 
annual Chair from its membership to act as the focal point for the group. That is not 
to say other members are not allowed to speak at the sector forums, only that they try 
to adhere to the mechanism they themselves have devised. In instances where there is 
a minority view, the TORs allow that it too will be represented to the MoH.  
 
During the fieldwork the literal translation of this idea of the HDPs speaking with 
“one voice” was witnessed at various sector forums, such as the Joint Review 
Mission and the Mid-Term Review of the HSSP II.
95
 On these occasions, a joint 
HDP statement would be read to the group by the appointed chair, with no deviation 
from the written statement. In this way the impression of the HDPs‟ common 
position was maintained.  
 
Clearly the idea of partners reaching a common position is very much in keeping 
with the idea of harmonisation promoted in both Rome and Paris Declaration; 
however, I would suggest that this behaviour - beyond saving time at sector forums 
and minimising waste and duplication - boasts additional benefits for development 
partners interacting with a domineering government; for instance, for the purpose of 
attaining strength in numbers. 
 
 An example from the fieldwork suggests that strength in numbers – attained by 
creating the semblance of unity – may offer some protection from the tactic of divide 
and rule the GoU has sometimes utilised against its partners. In Chapter Seven, I 
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 The HDP Terms of Reference are included as Appendix 4. 
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 October 2007 and the Mid-Term Review from 27-
29
th




recount an incident whereby donor partners were found to be taken advantage of as a 
result of having coordinated themselves poorly whilst developing a new basket 
funding mechanism for civil society. In this instance, certain government bodies 
were said to have attempted to divide and rule the partners, although to no serious 
effect in that instance beyond wasting time. Yet it is remarkable on that occasion, the 
donors were not in fact organised under the auspices of the “HDP group” but instead 





In contrast, when they have operated within their coalition, the donors do appear to 
have had some degree of success in forcing the government‟s hand. This practice is 
alluded to in the Paris Implementation Report when certain government officials are 
suggested to been reconsidering their preference to receive aid as budget support: 
 
“some reports point to the waning popularity of BS [budget support] at higher 
political levels. This development stems from recent threats of some UJAS 
partners…to use BS not only as a „carrot‟ for good governance, but also a 
„stick‟ in the event of poor performance. This threat, which has become even 
more prominent with greater collaboration and harmonization of donor 
strategies through the UJAS, has back lashed in declining local political 
support for it and fuelled scepticism about donor intentions within the UJAS 




Indeed, as the context chapter of this thesis has made clear, the GoU‟s concern over 
budget support emerging as a “stick” has been realised in Uganda, with the Local 
Development Partners Group threatening to withhold joint budget support en masse 
in response to concerns over governance (Observer Media Ltd 2010). That budget 
support could evolve into such a double-edged sword for GoU points again to the 
unexpected consequences of new aid initiatives (Walt et al. 1999b). 
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 In a similar vein, the HDPs have complained about a lack of coherent strategy for the GoU to solicit 
technical assistance; in this way different donors have been asked by their government partners for 
similar inputs, contributing to waste and duplication in the provision of TA. Clearly therefore, a 
framework which forces the GoU to approach the HDP group for TA would reduce wastage and 
permit the donors to see if they‟re being taken advantage of.   
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 On the other hand, “some government stakeholders believe that the Paris Declaration gave them a 







It appears the commitment to coordination may boast a second advantage for 
Uganda‟s HDPs: by fostering the mutual sense of responsibility and trust required to 
see informal lending occur between the partners. Here, I refer to the practice of donor 
bridging loans at the country level, which while not well publicised, do occasionally 
transpire (GFATM 2006; Oomman et al. 2007). This was confirmed for me in the 
Ugandan context when it was recounted that USAID/PMI had stepped in after a 
particularly arduous funding chain involving two of the other HDPs had temporarily 
stalled, endangering the country‟s plans to commence Indoor Residual Spraying 
during the summer. To expand, the original agreement had required funds to pass 
from DFID, to WHO, and finally to the Ministry of Health (i.e. the implementing 
partner). Yet a delay in the chain had meant the money had failed to make its way to 
the MoH in time. This prompted USAID/PMI to step in – it not only advanced 
funding but also arranged that the spraying be commenced using insecticide it had 
already acquired (and which it was explained, was soon due to expire). The 
understanding thereafter was that USAID/PMI would be reimbursed for the money 
and the insecticide after the original funding chain had completed (USAID Interview 
31
st
 July 2007).  
 
Such a bridging loan bodes well, even for the „pick and mix‟ version of the 
coordination ethos identified in Uganda. The drive to coordinate literally stimulates 
HDPs to stay in regular contact, providing the opportunity to flag up potential 
problems and to develop faith in one another‟s system, which is exposed as a huge 
advantage when the need for mutual assistance arises. Indeed, the incident recounted 
here only serves to confirm the suggestion that there is a disconnect between 
headquarters and the field offices of donor agencies (how else to account for the 
missing funds?), a disconnect which this incident tells us may be part compensated 
for through good peer-to-peer relations. For example, it makes sense that by virtue of 
their shared vantage point, partners in-country would agree that Indoor Residual 
Spraying should be commenced on a particular date and not simply put off until the 
aid filters through (something a donor HQ may not appreciate). Moreover, it‟s a 




with their own HQ, would become predisposed to assist their in-country partners, at 
least when able to do so. Thus while donor bridging loans may not be a regular 
occurrence at the country-level, their very existence is a welcome sign – particularly 
in relation to health aid - pointing to a shared concern in the intended beneficiaries of 
the aid, a sub-grouping too regularly de-prioritised during conflicts over internal 
bureaucracy. 
 
A third advantage to the version of coordination practiced by Ugandan‟s HDPs is one 
that relates most clearly to the provision of budget and sector budget support, but 
also arguably to the provision of well-aligned project aid: the ability for HDPs to 
claim a share in the attribution of sector-wide results in the health sector. Thus 
instead of having to measure impact and account for every penny (and ignoring the 
numerous confounding factors that can help or hinder a health intervention‟s 
success), donors can cite impact for their aid using national reports such as Uganda‟s 
Annual Health Sector Performance Report (AHSPR) (MoH 2007a), and more ad hoc 
ones such as the Demographic and Health Survey (UBOS and Macro International 
2007). And indeed they might, when HDPs provide the lion‟s share of funding to 
produce such publications. Thus while the costs of regular reports – such as the 
AHSPR - are covered by the HDP‟s Partnership Fund, funds for publications like the 
Demographic and Health survey are readily topped up by Uganda‟s donors, who in 
turn enjoy a well-placed logo and a mention on the inside cover.
98
 Yet the logic in 
claiming joint attribution goes beyond the practical difficulty of chasing donor 
dollars from general budget to end beneficiary. If one accepts that statistics are a 
prerequisite for the flow of development aid, then the shared attribution of results is a 
huge advantage of the coordination ethos for all partners at the country level, HDPs, 
GoU and civil society alike. 
 
Having previously suggested that maintaining a semblance of unity in the face of the 
sometimes domineering GoU has the utility of giving the HDPs an increased sway in 
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 For example, the Uganda‟s Demographic and Health Survey 2006, while produced by Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics and Macro International, was financially supported by: USAID/Uganda Mission 
PEPFAR, DFID, the GoU, the Health Partnership Fund, UNICEF, UNFPA and the Government of 




sector discussions, I would now like to posit that the very etiquette of speaking with 
“one voice” is just one of a set of quite bureaucratic processes that Uganda‟s HDPs 
have adopted through which to project a notion of commonality. Through these 
means the donors can focus on a shared set of behaviours and procedures, which 
serve to detract from and to mask their differences. These include such things as the 
Memorandums of Understanding, TORs, the Partnership Fund and the formal 




Several interviewees hinted at the central - seemingly disproportionate - emphasis 
that is placed on managing processes at the HDP Group meetings. For example, one 
interviewee was exasperated by the undue attention being paid to ensuring 
accountability for the Partnership Fund when vast aid sums given elsewhere in the 
sector went missing without explanation: 
  
“We do put in money to that [Partnership Fund]. And as far as I‟m concerned 
I think that‟s a total waste of…not a waste of money but that little kitty…so 
here [Uganda] all sorts of funny things go on and we don‟t really know 
what‟s happening with all of our money, including the PAF money which is 
all donor money, and then we hold onto a very small kitty of money and 





Another donor representative underlined that she had initially been quite dismayed 
by all the administration and processes involved in her work in Uganda, which 
seemed somewhat at odds with the job advert she had responded to: 
 
“I feel it‟s more relations with the other donors and going to meetings, and of 
course also sitting here and reading all these mails and getting things done, 
decisions, contracts – it‟s a lot of administration and stuff. So I feel until 
now…I really haven‟t seen so much of the country and the health problems, I 
haven‟t talked to people out in the huts about their problems and this is what I 
really, really miss” (SIDA Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). 
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 The Health Partnership Fund is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. Its existence is also 
alluded to in the Terms of Reference for the Health Policy Advisory Committee in Appendix 5. For 
now it is suffice to say that the Partnership Fund a donor-funded kitty, intended to cover the 




Finally, one interviewee suggested that her experience of attending the HDP Group 
was to get lectured by the Chairman about processes before going to the HPAC for 
discussion, after which decisions were made behind closed doors at the top 
management level (USAID Interview 13
th
 May 2008). This is an interesting point, 
and indeed, I would suggest that the utility of such bureaucratic processes – their 
utility in binding disparate partners together - is in fact derived from their inherent 
lack of consequence, which is why the partners find it possible to reach agreement 
over them. 
 
As suggested in an earlier section, the key to maintaining aid partnerships could be to 
keep them on a superficial footing; that way no party finds itself inextricably bound 
to another or to a set course of action. This is demonstrated through the 
Memorandums of Understanding the partners have agreed upon in the health sector. 
Indeed the first section of the 2005 MoU opens with the line: “This Memorandum of 
Understanding is not a legal document but reflects the commitment of all parties, 
who recognize it as guidelines…” (MoU 2005: 1) - it is this line that basically sets 
the tone of the GoU-HDP partnership.  
 
The Chair of the HDPs offered this insight into his own experience of developing a 
MoU in Uganda: 
 
“Don‟t forget the MoU is not a legally binding document. And it‟s sometimes 
a pity that it is not but it is necessary…in order to get such a diverse spectrum 
of donors with different procedures, with different legal obligations - like still 
exist in the US law that American Development Cooperation money cannot 
be used for budget support, it‟s still there; even if they would like to they‟d 
have to change their law first…And the World Bank they don‟t want in this 
kind of MoU too many political orientated articles - they say, „Politics is not 
our business‟ - but they are an important donor so you want them on board. 
So in order to finally reach agreement on a document that everybody is ready 
to sign you dilute of course the obligations, and any MoU supporting a 
sectoral plan has to start more or less with that sentence: “This is not a legally 
binding document” (BTC 10
th
 April 2008). 
 
Moreover, the HDP Chair confirmed that – as with the 2001 „Partnership Principles‟ 





In short therefore, my argument is that aid relationships between Uganda‟s HDPs are 
kept intentionally superficial at the present time. This is supported by the numerous 
key differences in funding, modi operandi, risk aversion, legal restrictions etc, which 
serve to actively preclude donors from meaningful engagement with their peers. And 
it is in response to this – as yet - insoluble situation that HDPs at the field level in 
Uganda have devised all manner of bureaucratic devices to derive the advantages of 
coordinated action, while circumventing the risks involved. These have the dual 
benefit of creating the façade of coordination (external partners will see that the 
accoutrements of partnership are in place: the MoUs, Terms of Reference, 
Partnership Funds, meeting minutes etc) and in binding the disparate partners 
together around a set of – crucially - risk-free processes and behaviours.  
 
The Paris Synthesis Report suggests that new incentives are needed to achieve 
greater compliance to the principles of aid effectiveness. Furthermore, that the 
incentive structures currently in place are actually proving detrimental: 
 
“In terms of direct incentives, donor personnel are generally committed to the 
Paris Declaration, but their performance is often measured in terms of their 
own corporate results frameworks, sometimes coming back to the delivery of 
inputs or outputs – i.e. short term results” (Wood et al. 2008: 23-24). 
 
I would suggest that a revision of the incentive structures in place for field staff may 
also be one way to improve the levels of engagement both within the HDP grouping, 
and across the HDP-GoU partnership, because as established, while donors agencies 
will not submit to there being any negative ramifications from other partners for non-
compliance to aid effectiveness commitments, their modi operandi do not preclude 
positive reinforcements within their own organisation. Indeed, the basic logic behind 
developing an incentive structure was intimated to me by a SIDA interviewee, who 
told me about SIDA‟s „Dialogue Strategy‟ for Uganda. As part of the strategy, the 
donor agency is compelled to set dialogue targets, suggesting which partners it would 
like to interface with, and to what ends. The upshot of this was that SIDA staff could 
claim “impact” on behalf of their coordination activities (SIDA Interview 22
nd
 May 




change to field staff having to solely demonstrate impact on behalf of their 
development aid.    
 
More resources to supplement coordination activities – in terms of man hours and 
trainings - would also be a positive reinforcement for donor field staff to coordinate 
at the country level, recognising at last the increased workload they‟ve inherited in 
tandem with the aid effectiveness agenda (PEPFAR, World Bank & GFATM 2006).    
 
The lack of forward planning that has gone into considering how aid effectiveness 
rhetoric should be best operationalised at the country level (from all the Paris 
signatories) is another sub-text to the difficulties facing heterogeneous partners to 
meet all the requirements of the coordination checklist. This was demonstrated 
during the donors‟ initial attempts to undertake a Division of Labour Exercise (DoL) 
in Uganda, when it was noted that some lower level staff were actively against the 
idea of reducing overall sector involvement for fear of losing their jobs; moreover 
that sectors had not been assured that their overall funding would be remain at 
current levels should donors withdraw (Office of the Prime Minster 2008). Finally, it 
was demonstrated again when certain donors decided to pull out of the health sector 
early on in the process without ascertaining the preferences of the host government. 
Subsequently, one senior official at the MoH expressed his extreme disappointment 
that the Irish Agency for International Development, which he described as  
“sincere,” had pulled out of health, despite other “hypocritical” donor agencies 
opting to remain (MoH Interview 7
th
 April 2008). 
 
Indeed, the Paris Implementation Report has suggested that the DoL in Uganda has 
proven be a “divisive process” (Office of the Prime Minister 2008: 34) - presumably 
because it is so antithetical to donor agencies need to be in control. Subsequently, the 
Report suggests it will require staff across the board to develop new skills in 
facilitating and negotiation to see it through to completion. 
 
I highlighted earlier the foresight of the BTC health team for having partnered a 




representative that such a large percentage of her work seemed to have little 
connection to what she termed the “field.” In consideration of these and the Paris 
Implementation Report recommendation to develop the negotiation skills of country 
staff, I will now address the final means through which the health development 
partners attempt to overcome their differences on the ground: through personal 
relations or, to put it another way, by virtue of the individual personalities currently 
participating in central sector processes. 
 
The importance of individual personality at the country level in aid relations cannot 
be underplayed. As Walt et al. found: 
  
“There is a fundamental, ongoing tension between the formal mechanisms 
established to coordinate aid, and the acknowledged importance of informal 
communications and relationships between different actors, in making 
coordination and management work” (Walt et al. 1999b: 278). 
 
This explains the pressure that one new donor representative felt when she was first 
introduced to the multitude of coordination processes and groups inherent to 
Uganda‟s health sector. She told me she was confronted by “all these donors that you 
have to liase with and get to know and get relationships with, and you‟re not really 
comfortable…Who should you actually team up with and why and how?” (SIDA 
Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). Indeed it was the same interviewee who underlined the 
importance of break times during some of the longer sector forums such as the 
Health Policy Advisory Committee, during which partners are able to approach each 
other informally to “lobby” for their own priorities and interests. And this lobbying 
was something I witnessed myself during the course of the fieldwork at large sector-
wide forums such as the Joint Review Mission and the Mid-Term Review, where 
partners were to be seen approaching one other during panel presentations to hold 
private discussions, and conducting a bit of more overt networking during the coffee 
breaks. The issue of personality may also shed light on some of the behaviours the 
donors have been found to demonstrate on the ground. Hence why the DFID 
representative is engaged in so many extra-curricular activities in addition to 









In short, I hold with the position that “people matter” (Walt et al. 1999b: 274) when 
it comes to discussing organisational commitments to a coordination ethos, and when 
it comes to glossing over the differences that could make partnership at the level of 
Uganda‟s health sector appear at first sight untenable. And while the following 
statement relates specifically to the “tyranny” of participation (Cooke and Kothari 
2001), I think it holds true for all development endeavours, “we have possibly 
overlooked the significance of such highly personal criteria as respect, trust and even 
friendship in determining the success of many development projects” (Hailey 2001: 
88). I would suggest therefore that the majority of donor representatives engaged in 
Uganda‟s health sector at the field level are indeed committed to attaining the most 
meaningful engagement they can with their peers; yet that this commitment has to be 
viewed through the prism imposed by a multitude of inter dependant factors, over 
which those field staff have little of no control to change. Thus that a convincing 
semblance of coordination is currently being maintained within the sector forums is 
testament to the hard work of these individuals. It is important to attribute this feat to 
them personally – both within the HDPs Group and across government – because as 
Walt et al. warn, the success of coordination activities is contextually fragile “as 
contexts change, coordination which may be effective in one period, may not be in 
another” (Walt et al. 1999b: 274). Indeed, the challenges posed by such intransigence 
are well encapsulated in the following statement by a donor representative, who 
stands out in the HDP grouping for having spent ten years in her current position:  
 
“Coordination - and like the way we‟ve seen it in Uganda - is very people 
intensive. You need to keep at it and keep moving in a certain direction, so 
you need for people to feel that and to keep that vision going. And it‟s not 
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 To introduce an example of the importance of personality to development from outside the donor 
sample, my fieldwork with WHO revealed that the politically neutral CSO Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF) had been convinced to partake in the UN Cluster for Health, HIV/AIDS and Nutrition in 
Uganda as an observer, despite MSF‟s international stance damning the Cluster for contributing to: 
“The increasing politicisation of humanitarian action.” (Dubuet & Tronc 2006) I would suggest that 
this has been facilitated by the then-Health Cluster Chairman, who was himself an MSF employee in 





easy with quite high [staff] turnover…both in the Ministry and also on the 
donor side…It‟s not always possible to depend on what‟s written 
down…‟cause even what was written down – quite often things are behind 
what was written down – and so nowadays you go to a meeting and you see 
people questioning – not that they shouldn‟t question – but you know, lacking 
the basic understanding …and then you realise that‟s part of the problem: 
[new people] not really knowing that we agreed to do this because of a, b and 
c. There are very good reasons why we agreed to do this. It wasn‟t a whim…” 
(Danida/MoH Interview 9
th




Viewed in this light, not only is coordination hard and at times frustrating work, it is 
also an invaluable exercise to try and instil some historical memory into the 
development process (countering the “historical amnesia” proposed by Easterly 
(2002: 49)).  
 
In this section, I have suggested that despite the numerous obstacles to coordinated 
action even between an outwardly homogeneous grouping – that of Uganda‟s aid 
givers – the semblance of partnership can be achieved through several means: by 
keeping relations on a largely superficial footing, through a set of shared - yet 
inconsequential - bureaucratic devices, and through the subjective will of the 
personalities found within the sector at any one time. Moreover, that there are 
distinct advantages in pursuing even the most „pick and mix‟ adherence to the 
coordination ethos: strength in numbers, donor bridging loans and the ability to share 
in sector-wide health successes. Finally, it has been suggested that, in accordance 
with the Paris Implementation Report, carefully designed incentives might facilitate 
greater compliance with aid effectiveness rhetoric in the field, even in lieu of what 
donors agencies would never submit to - punitive measures.  
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 Commenting on Uganda‟s health SWAp, Oliveira Cruz et al. noted that “Uganda has so far 
benefited from a remarkable mix of individuals on the government as well as on the Development 
Partners side, who have shown strong character, leadership skills, vision, commitment and reform 
spirit as well as operational abilities to transform vision into practical steps. But individuals come and 
go. Hence the replacement of individuals in the MoH or the DP [Development Partners] groups may 
threaten the SWAp partnership if newcomers do not understand the essence of it, are not committed, 
or are too familiar and perhaps attached to the incentive structure of the project mode of funding” 
(Oliveira Cruz et al. 2006: 37-38). Such reasoning provides the backdrop to this comment, found in 
Danida‟s strategic plan for Uganda‟s health sector “a concern had been expressed…that with the 
departure of most of the original members of the partnership (on the government and HDP sides), the 
commitment to some of the SWAp principles is less clear than it was in the past” (Danida 2005). 






The process of developing the UJAS in Uganda offered the first indication that 
reaching consensus between the HDPs wouldn‟t prove to be an easy task (and that 
process boasted a set of donors already united by their commitment to aid 
effectiveness). If you now factor in the complexities of involving a donor like 
USAID (whose field staff are heavily dictated to by the decisions of Congress) 
and/or the new Global Health Initiatives, one can begin to appreciate the magnitude 
of operationalising meaningful coordination measures at the country level in Uganda, 
even within the seemingly homogenous donor grouping. To then factor in the need to 
coordinate with obviously heterogeneous parties – government, civil society, the 
private sector – and the scale of the task can begin to appear untenable. Yet rather 
than suggesting that the coordination ethos is doomed to failure in Uganda, the HDP 
case study has affirmed that a „pick and mix‟ version of the ideal is better than 
nothing. More than that, it boasts distinct advantages. Hence why both the HDPs and 
the GoU continue to strive toward an inconsistent adherence to the „Partnership 
Principles‟ and attach different weightings to the tenets of Paris without rejecting the 
ethos in its entirety. The finding that aid donors and recipients may choose to pursue 
a development concept on a pick and mix basis, and in ways that serves their own 
ends is hardly a surprising finding of this thesis. It is a finding nonetheless and one 
which resonates with similar arguments already made by Sachs (1993), Crewe and 
Harrison (1998) Riddell (2007), Cooke and Kothari (2001), Mosse (2005) etc.    
 
Crewe and Harrison (1998) have long belied the superpowers of donors. More 
significantly however, they made the connection that the Achilles heel of donors 
resides in their propensity (or lack thereof) for coordination: 
 
“Donors are sometimes portrayed as strategically wielding the control they 
have over recipients for their own ends in a coordinated way to uphold the 
present capitalist system…[Yet] often donor interventions are neither 
strategic nor for their own ends because frequently, in practice, abuse of 
power is overshadowed in importance by a lack of coordination between 





Thus, the HDP‟s faithfulness to a partial version of the coordination ethos in Uganda 
can be understood at once in terms of a genuine if not slightly pragmatic 
commitment to the tenets of aid effectiveness but also and more importantly, in terms 
of power. The act of creating a façade of unity - of homogeneity - vis à vis a 
domineering host government is an exercise - an exertion - of power, and it‟s vital if 
the donors are going to prevent the government employing divide and rule tactics. 
This was the conclusion I arrived at while watching the HDP Chairman deliver the 
shared donor statement at the Mid-Term Review of the Health Sector Strategic Plan 
in May 2008, in which the HDPs warned the MoH saying they wouldn‟t tolerate 
“business as usual.”
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 Moreover, it was reaffirmed for me in February 2010 when I 
learnt that Uganda‟s Development Partners Group had delivered a common 
statement threatening to withdraw development aid from Uganda en masse, realising 
the GoU‟s worst fear that budget support could be used as a „stick‟ to beat it with 
over governance disputes
 
(Observer Media Ltd 2010).
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 In both instances, the 
donors employed the device of speaking with “one voice,” when addressing the 
GoU, attesting that coordinated donors can issue coordinated threats, even when 
their own commitment of the coordination ethos remains resolutely „pick and mix‟.  
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 Quote from the Health Development Partners Group Statement, delivered on the closing day of the 
MTR of HSSP II, delivered on 29
th
 May 2008. 
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 To underline the scale of the threat now in place and its connection to the coordination ethos, it is 
significantly donors under the Joint Budget Support Framework that are behind the threat aimed at the 
GoU in February 2010. Joint budget support wasn‟t in place at the time of the fieldwork but it was on 
the table. On my return from fieldwork therefore I asked DFID‟s UK office to explain the terminology 
and received the following explanation: “[Joint budget support] simply means that all general and 
some sector budget support decisions are linked to a joint assessment framework.  That is, we work 
with the Government to agree on a set of performance indicators.  Each year we assess progress 
against these performance indicators and produce a joint assessment report. Each budget support 
partner uses this assessment to make their individual budget support decisions” (Freedom of 
Information response from DFID, received 18
th
 December 2008). It should be noted that about one 
third of Uganda‟s donors were not yet signed up for Joint Budget Support Framework by 2008 (Office 











COORDINATION TO MEET THE CURRENT DEMANDS 






Time and again this thesis refers to the “unintended” (Ferguson 1990: 21), 
“instrument-effects” (Ferguson 1990: 256 citing Foucault 1979) and/or “unexpected 
consequences” of new aid initiatives (Walt et al. 1999: 279), suggesting that their 
existence owes much to the ideological (rather than empirical) underpinnings of the 
aid effectiveness agenda and the inherently “experimental nature” of official 
development assistance (Riddell 2007: 178). In this chapter the argument is made 
more explicitly as the focus shifts to the Global Health Initiatives (GHIs), which 
again share a common intuitive – rather than proven – appeal; namely that vast sums 
of money, concentrated on single-issue health interventions can reap rapid results for 
the global good.  
 
Even a cursory look at the GHIs warns that there is no tested formula at work here - 
different funding models, guiding principles and management styles attest that the 
eighty plus GHIs to have emerged in the new millennium (WHO 2008: 2) are 
operating without an instruction manual. The situation is such that the three largest 
GHIs currently operating in the field of HIV/AIDS – the President‟s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (GFATM) and the World Bank‟s Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Programme for 
Africa (MAP) – have been accused of undertaking a “large scale experiment” 
(Oomman et al. 2007: 3). The GHIs therefore provide the perfect medium with 
which to explore a further unforeseen by-product of the coordination ethos: 
coordination as a precondition for GHI funding success. Or to be more specific, 




because, as I shall demonstrate, the GFATM has with some regularity changed its 
mind about what it requires from a successful applicant. 
 
In the introduction to this thesis I acknowledged the complexity that characterises the 
modern aid agenda. Such complexity is well evoked by the new GHIs, and in 
particular the Global Fund – which has greatly expanded the vocabulary of 
development specialists to reflect its peculiar working model. To provide a brief 
introduction, established in 2002 the Global Fund is a public-private partnership 
(incorporating governments, civil society, the private sector and infected 
communities) which works to attract and distribute new funding for the „big three‟ 
infectious diseases thought to be placing an undue burden on developing health 
systems: HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Offering a new funding channel for 
existing bilateral and multilateral donors (as well as new benefactors), since its 
creation the Fund has grown to: 
 
“become the main source of finance for programs to fight AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria, with approved funding of US$ 19.3 billion for more than 572 
programs in 144 countries. It provides a quarter of all international financing 





Knowing something of the scale of the GFATM should tell you something of the 
current importance of the Fund to applicant countries in terms of global health 
funding – particularly in the fields of tuberculosis and malaria. Yet in order to glean 
something of how the Fund‟s existence impacts on the day-to-day working life of its 
country partners (beyond scaling up aid for the „big three‟) it helps to know a little 
about the GFATM operating model. The first thing to note is that the GFATM is not 
an implementing agency – it is conceived of as a financial instrument, designed to 
mobilise and distribute funds. And while this description evokes an image of relative 
simplicity, the scale of the resources currently on offer and the ideology of the Fund, 
which values the participation of multiple stakeholders in reflection of its own 
heritage of public-private partnership, have over time resulted in recipient countries 
having to develop supportive infrastructure to attract and manage GFATM grants. 
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Boxes 8 and 9 are included to provide an overview of some of the key structures and 
processes involved in grant management at the country level. From a research point 
of view what is remarkable - given the complexity of the current GFATM modus 
operandi - is how well internalised the key concepts and processes are among the 
salient stakeholders at the field level.  
   
Turning now to the case study, a handful of GHIs now operate in Uganda‟s health 
sector: the GFATM, PEPFAR, the President‟s Malaria Initiative (PMI) and the 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI). Of these, it is the GFATM 
that has, and continues to pose the greatest test to the coordination architecture at the 
country level. In part, this is as a logical consequence of its conceptualisation as a 
financial instrument as opposed to an implementing agency, which has meant it: 
“aims to operate within a broader network of partners, whereby its funding is 
complemented by the activities, expertise and resources of other agencies, national 
governments, NGOs, civil society organizations, and private sector partners” 
(Oomman 2007: 31). This was the model clearly established for it in the GFATM‟s 
2002 Framework Document, which boasted of “a simplified, rapid, innovative 
process with efficient and effective disbursement mechanisms, minimizing 
transaction costs,” that would support national strategies (including Sector-Wide 
Approaches) and give “due priority to the most affected countries and 
communities…” (GFATM 2002: 2-3). Yet as time has moved on, it appears that the 
reality of implementing the untested financial instrument has failed to live up to the 
hype, with an evaluation of its first five years of operation warning that the “bubble 
of unrealistic expectations” (GFATM 2009: 7) which accompanied its creation could 




In this chapter I examine how the Fund‟s ideal to have a simplified and rapid 
disbursement process has played out at the country level in Uganda, arguing that a 
lack of clarity emanating from the GFATM Board with regard to partner 
responsibilities and funding guidelines has placed more demands on partners than at 
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 The evaluation identifies an array of financial, organisational, operational and political risks 
threatening the sustainability of the Fund, including most saliently to this discussion “A loss of partner 




first envisaged and earned it the moniker of “$60 million worth of nuisance” in some 




 In doing so I forward the 
proposition that „coordination‟ is necessary to meet the current demands of the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), helping it justify 
the continuation of grants to Uganda following the 2005 mismanagement scandal. 
Subsequently, while the Fund would couch the impetus for Uganda to demonstrate 
broad stakeholder consultation in the application and grant management process in 
terms of creating a participatory, needs-based proposal, and improving the utilisation 
and impact of grants, my argument is that the processes and mechanisms of 
participation/coordination also serve to allay some of the risk incurred in providing 
aid to Uganda by increasing the number of stakeholders involved in grant oversight. 
And while such a set up isn‟t in and of itself overtly problematic – given that it is in 
the interest of all Uganda‟s stakeholders (in their respective roles as GFATM 
contributors and beneficiaries) to maintain the flow of Global Fund monies to 
Uganda – the costs incurred in allaying the Fund‟s concerns have escalated in recent 
years in response to the GFATM‟s own uncertain strategic development. This I argue 
is because the Global Fund is as suggested, a large-scale experiment, where all 
partners at the country and global level are embroiled on a steep and costly “learning 
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 An interviewee told me about a scene she witnessed at a conference where someone vocalised their 
exasperation with the GFATM, saying „You know it actually comes across as a nuisance.‟ A GFATM 
representative at the conference was annoyed at this suggestion, retorting “$60 million of nuisance?” 
(which was approximately how much Uganda had been approved to receive that year). The 
Interviewee explained that now several people weighed in: “We said: „Yes that‟s what it is.‟ Because 
it could do a lot, lot, lot, lot more than it is currently” (Danida/MoH Interview 9
th
 May 2008).  
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 A tracking study covering the early years of the GFATM‟s operation in Uganda noted that 




Box 8: Global Fund Structures 
 
 
A. At the central level: 
 
The Global Fund Secretariat manages the grant portfolio, including screening proposals 
submitted, issuing instructions to disburse money to grant recipients and implementing 
performance-based funding of grants. More generally, the Secretariat is tasked with 
executing Board policies; resource mobilization; providing strategic, policy, financial, legal 
and administrative support; and overseeing monitoring and evaluation. It is based in Geneva 
and has no staff located outside its headquarters.   
 
The Technical Review Panel (TRP) is an independent group of international experts in the 
three diseases and cross-cutting issues such as health systems. It meets regularly to review 
proposals based on technical criteria and provide funding recommendations to the Board.   
 
The Global Fund Board is composed of representatives from donor and recipient gov-
ernments, civil society, the private sector, private foundations, and communities living with 
and affected by the diseases. The Board is responsible for the organization‟s governance, 
including establishing strategies and policies, making funding decisions and setting budgets. 
The Board also works to advocate and mobilize resources for the organization.  
 
B. In the recipient country:  
 
The Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) is a partnership composed of all key 
stakeholders in a country‟s response to the three diseases. The CCM does not handle 
Global Fund financing itself, but is responsible for submitting proposals to the Global Fund, 
nominating the entities accountable for administering the funding, and overseeing grant 
implementation. The CCM should preferably be an already-existing body, but a country can 
instead decide to create a new entity to serve as CCM. 
 
In Uganda, the CCM is composed of two existing bodies: the Health Policy 
Advisory Committee and the Partnership Committee of Uganda AIDS 
Commission 
 
The Global Fund signs a legal grant agreement with a Principal Recipient (PR), which is 
designated by the CCM. The PR receives Global Fund financing directly, and then uses it to 
implement prevention, care and treatment programs or passes it on to other organizations 
(sub-recipients) who provide those services. Many PRs both implement and make sub-
grants. There can be multiple PRs in one country. The PR also makes regular requests for 
additional disbursements from the Global Fund based on demonstrated progress towards 
the intended results. 
 
The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development has been 
appointed as the sole Principal Recipient in Uganda 
 
Since the Global Fund does not have staff at country level, it contracts firms to act as Local 
Fund Agents (LFAs) to monitor implementation. LFAs are responsible for providing 
recommendations to the Secretariat on the capacity of the entities chosen to manage Global 
Fund financing and on the soundness of regular requests for the disbursement of funds and 
result reports submitted by PRs.  
 
International Accounting Firm PriceWaterHouseCoopers is the Local Fund 
Agent for Uganda 
 








A. Round Funding  
 
As the diagram to the left outlines, the GFATM board is charged with 
issuing calls for proposals. Until recently, these calls for proposals 
have been made exclusively via a Round system. Since the Fund‟s 
creation in 2002, ten rounds have been advertised, each with their 
own specific guidelines. 
 
In country, the members of the CCM are charged with developing 
country proposals. It is the decision of this coalition of stakeholders 
whether or not to submit an application in a given funding round and if 
so, whether the country will submit a proposal for one, two or all three 
of the disease components (i.e. HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria). 
Proposals are detailed affairs and in addition to requesting a specific 
amount of funding, applicant countries must account for how they 
would utilise an awarded grant.  
 
Submitted country proposals are subject to review by the Technical 
Review Panel, which can either choose to accept or refuse proposals 
outright, or advise applicant countries of potential changes they might 
make to render the application successful. 
 
The GFATM board approves grants based on technical merit and the 
availability of funds. Applicants are informed of whether or not 
they have been successful and if so, how much money has been 
awarded in principle.  
 
Before signing off on the grant, countries must meet a list of 
conditions precedent (CPs) determined by the GFATM. These 
conditions for receiving the funds will be peculiar to the funding round 
and the applicant country. It may take many months for the country to 
meet every CP. Once these are met, the GFATM and the country will 
proceed to grant signing. 
 
Following grant signing, the first two-year instalment of the GFATM 
grant will be issued to the designated Principal Recipient in country. 
As the GFATM is a performance-based funding initiative, the release 
of subsequent funding tranches is dependent on the country‟s 
performance in using the first instalment. 
 
 
B. National Strategy Applications 
 
In 2008, the GFATM approved the launch of the pilot of a new application procedure, called 
National Strategy Applications (NSA). This simplified application route is intended to 
negate the need for countries to develop individual, round-specific applications. Instead, 
eligible countries submit existing national disease strategies as the primary basis of their 
application (although some supplementary information is also required). 
 




The Donor Perspective 
 
Although extremely difficult to quantify in terms of a quotable figure, the fact of the 
matter is that coordination between the various stakeholders in Uganda‟s health 
sector costs - not just in terms of money but also in terms of time expended (i.e. the 
opportunity costs). While the idea of burdensome transaction costs to the recipient 
country is well documented in aid discourse, for the purpose of this introduction it is 
easier to exemplify the full range of costs incurred by the GFATM at the country 
level from the perspective of the Development Partners, who in Uganda‟s health 
sector have traditionally covered the financial and thus - pre-GFATM at least - 
predominantly administrative costs of partnership. Consider therefore the following 
hypothesised scenario, which attempts (if a little crudely) to condense the issues 
involved in managing the GFATM partnership from this vantage point.  
 
You work for a donor organisation based in Uganda, a country that has met your 
government‟s criteria to receive foreign aid. In keeping with both the spirit of 
Uganda‟s sector-wide approach (SWAp) in the health sector and the principles 
underpinning the Paris Declaration, your organisation is an active member of the 
coordination forums that guide actors in the health sector. In this role you will have 
likely participated in health policy discussion at the Health Policy Advisory 
Committee (HPAC) and perhaps even helped to develop strategic plans for the sector 
in the Technical Working Groups (TWGs). Your national government has made a 
substantial donation to the GFATM in the belief that its comparative advantages 
made it the perfect mechanism through which to scale up the global response to 
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. From your vantage point it seems obvious that the 
GFATM should be supporting national efforts to combat the „big three‟ in Uganda 
but there‟s a complication: in order for your host country to have any chance of 
receiving GFATM funding your donor organisation at the country level is being 
asked to dip its hand into the pot a second time to fund the convoluted application 
process that has become a key feature of the GFATM. This is to help fund external 




are adequately represented in the proposal.
108
 You could attempt to bypass one or 
other of these extremely costly variables but then you could be fairly certain that the 
country‟s application would be unsuccessful. Moreover, in the event that the 
proposal is approved, you should be prepared to pay out a third time in Uganda 
because it is now agreed that the implementation of the GFATM grants needs to be 
supported with partner-funded long-term technical assistance (TA). The onus 
therefore is on you and your in-country partners to “make the money work” (GTT 
2005).
109
  And just in case you were wondering, you can‟t make an advance claim for 
TA as part of the GFATM application - or can you? Quite frankly no one is very 
clear on what exactly you can and cannot apply for - the GFATM Secretariat is not 
always good at issuing guidance – meaning that the only thing you and your partners 
really know for sure is that you can‟t afford to make any mistakes.
110
 In short, your 
mantra with regards to the GFATM at the country-level needs to be „speculate to 
accumulate‟, and this alludes to both your time and your money, because lest we 
forget the monthly coordination forum you have regularly attended in the health 
sector has recently been designated as the new Country Coordinating Mechanism 
(CCM) for the GFATM. 
 
Turning now to the response of a real-life Development Partner to this set up, it 
becomes clear that this wasn‟t the working relationship envisaged by contributing 
partners at the time of the GFATM‟s inception:  
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 The central role of outsourced technical assistance in securing GFATM grants is evidenced in the 
Fund‟s endorsement of Avrett, S. & Rivers, B. 2004. The Aidspan Guide to Obtaining Global Fund-
Related Technical Assistance. It terms this “a valuable source of information, which includes a list of 
organisational and individual providers” (GFATM 2006: 21).  
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 In 2005 the Global Task Team on Improving AIDS Coordination Among Multilateral Institutions 
and International Donors produced a report making recommendations on how to increase the 
effectiveness of HIV/AIDS funding, including through the strategic use of donor-funded technical 
assistance. This was a follow up to a multi-stakeholder consultation held on 9
th
 March 2005 entitled: 
“Making the Money Work: The Three Ones in Action.” 
110
 The GFATM application guidelines suggest that following review by the TRP, proposals are 
graded in four categories to be submitted for Global Fund Board approval: Category 1 - recommended 
for approval without changes; Category 2 - recommended for approval with minor changes; Category 
3 - not recommended in its current form, but strongly encouraged to re-submit following major 
revision; and Category 4 - rejected. http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/rounds/applicationprocess/ 
[Accessed 20/01/09]. However, a review of the GFATM review process in 2006 suggests that “Under 
the present guidelines, the TRP recommends either accepting or rejecting a proposal in its entirety.” 




“Everything right now [in Uganda] seems to centre on the Global Fund. It‟s 
just driving me crazy… And now HPAC [Health Policy Advisory 
Committee] and PC [Partnership Committee of the HIV/AIDS Partnership] 
are somehow joined together as CCM and as much as I see that as being 
extremely relevant because they do touch it also means everything focuses on 
Global Fund. And to me it‟s just a financing mechanism. It‟s a shame the 
Ministry [of Health] has to dedicate so much time to it. At the same time they 
don‟t want to do it so that hire eight really expensive consultants to write the 
proposal. But that‟s not right either…And we‟re big donors to the Global 
Fund but I‟ve also talked to our Swedish Board members about this and 
they‟ve taken note. They said it shouldn‟t be like this. It shouldn‟t be that 
AIDS Commissions and CCMs recruit eight external consultants to do 
proposals. And then they ask the same donors that are putting money into the 
Global Fund to fund those consultants. It‟s sick. They were shocked when I 
told them but that‟s the way it is” (SIDA Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). 
 
Shakow has likened the escalating costs incurred by in-country partners through their 
involvement with the GFATM to the economic problem of the “free rider.” In sum, 
the envisioned light touch of the GFATM (in particular its determination to have no 
country presence) has led to:  
 
“an increased demand on the staff of other organizations to do the Global 
Fund‟s in-country project development, proposal writing and follow-up 
work…It has also created in other organizations, especially WHO, a direct 
financial burden for unfunded services…” (Shakow 2006: 21).   
 
I shall return to notion of “unfunded mandates” (GTT 2005: 15) and the escalating 
costs of managing the GFATM through the partnership model at the country level in 
Uganda in due course. First however, it is insightful to see where the GFATM ideal 
may have gone awry at source – at the level of the GFATM architecture.  
 
 
The Reactive Evolution of the GFATM   
 
At some level all GHIs are conceptualised as an alternative to „business as usual‟ in 
the provision of development aid.
111
 For the GFATM founders, this stance was 
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 Rogerson et al. (2004) view vertical health initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB 
and Malaria as “a response to the perceived failures of „big aid‟” (Rogerson, Hewitt & Waldenberg 




perhaps most keenly reflected in the early years in its strong statements about what it 
would not do, as opposed to how, beyond simply mobilising and distributing 
funding, the GFATM would rally its partners to “make the money work” (GTT 
2005). What was stated explicitly was that it wouldn‟t mirror the traditional donor 
modus operandi. It wouldn‟t waste valuable resources or challenge national 
sovereignty by maintaining a country presence. It wouldn‟t burden countries with 
high transaction costs or slow disbursement processes. And it wouldn‟t politicise aid, 
allocating instead according to the greatest need and adamant that the format of the 
country proposal “should not be overly elaborate and not impose undue burden on 
the countries” (GFATM 2002: 7). The virulence of this reactionary stance has 
subsequently been picked up in several studies, whereby the determination of the 
GFATM architects to set themselves apart from “old, established agencies” (Shakow 
2006: 43) has been blamed for creating tensions with their counterparts at the World 
Bank and UN agencies.
112
 This position now appears somewhat shortsighted given 
that the centrepiece of the GFATM vision is the partnership model, which 
necessitates the support of all partners.
113
   
 
The recent Five-Year Evaluation of the GFATM concluded that in its first five years 
of operation the GFATM lacked an overarching strategic vision, subsequently “the 
                                                                                                                                          
demands of traditional aid modalities, they underscore how such approaches aim to mobilise and 
disburse resources quickly in order to tackle emerging global health threats. The GFATM has 
attracted praise from the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, which acknowledged that 
scaled-up health funding required “a new modus operandi” (Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health 2001: 13). That said, the additionality of GHI funding is extremely hard to prove and the 
evidence base is mixed. Lief et al. (2006) have argued that increased spending on HIV and AIDS has 
not come at the expense of funding for other areas, while Shiffman (2008) has suggested that donor 
prioritisation of HIV/AIDS is likely to have caused some displacement, although aggregate increases 
in global health aid may have mitigated some of the crowding-out effects. Nabyonga et al. (2009) 
suggest that an agreed approach to measuring the additionality of donor aid would be useful in 
Uganda. 
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 The Five-Year Evaluation of the GFATM commented on the “persistent efforts of the Global Fund 
to distance itself from more explicit partnerships with the three institutional members of its Board 
(WHO, the World Bank, and UNAIDS) during the evaluation period” (Macro International 2009: 55). 
It also noted that “We are not the UN” was among the most frequently made statements concerning 
GFATM identity made by board members in interviews undertaken for the evaluation (Macro 
International 2009: 36). 
113
 The GFATM Framework Document states: “The Fund will promote partnerships among relevant 
players within the existing country, and across all sectors of society. It will build on existing 
coordination mechanisms, and promote new and innovative partnerships where none existed” 
(GFATM 2002: 5). The mechanism devised to operationalise this ideal at the country level is the 




ad hoc growth and reactive evolution of the Global Fund architecture has brought 
with it increased procedural complexities and a spate of policy that have led to 
confusion, and in some cases, contradictions” (Macro International 2009: 54). It 
notes that the governance structures of the Fund have developed slowly and its policy 
incrementally – so less strategically than was needed to cement a partnership model. 
As it stands, collaborating organisations are left to “„wait and see‟ where the Fund is 
going,” unable to adequately plan their own strategic interventions. More worrying, 
many of the issues the GFATM board are found to be debating five years into 
operation are so fundamental that decisions taken in a particular direction could 
render the Fund unrecognisable. Case in point, the Evaluation‟s comment that “The 
board has thus far not dispelled that uncertainty with respect to its intention to remain 
a „financing instrument only‟ institution, or seek to broaden its functionality” (Macro 
International 2009: 55).  
 
The GFATM has been undergoing a strategy review since 2006, which appears to be 
an inordinate amount of time for such a young initiative and begs the question: why 
has it found it so difficult to reach decisions?
114
 A telling finding therefore - given 
the theme of this thesis - is that the sheer breadth of stakeholder participation and the 
high representation of special interest constituencies on the GFATM Board has made 
consensus very hard to achieve and meant that broad policy issues are rarely at the 
heart of its agenda (Shakow 2006).
115
 Of the issues on which the Board continues to 
demonstrate a lack of clarity, three have direct bearing on the role of partners at the 
country level. These concern: the respective responsibilities of partners, the funding 
of technical assistance and the correct role of the GFATM in funding health system 
strengthening.
116
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 Alluded to in PEPFAR, World Bank & GFATM 2006: 11 
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 The GFATM board is made up of multiple constituencies, including a high percentage of civil 
society representatives. Chapter Seven establishes how the Fund has attempted to mandate this model 
be emulated in Country Coordinating Mechanism at the recipient country level.  
116
 Please note in addition to the issues raised in this discussion, the GFATM is also debating whether 
or not to continue round-based funding (PEPFAR, World Bank & GFATM 2006). Furthermore, the 
Five-Year Evaluation hints that the GFATM may not be entirely averse to the idea of establishing a 
country presence should the need arise. The Evaluation recommends that in order to ensure in country 
representation of the Fund and functional partnership at the country level the GFATM should consider 




An assessment carried out by the GFATM in 2006 found that persistent 
misconceptions about the Fund‟s principles at the country level demonstrated the 
“inability of the Fund to effectively mobilise its bilateral and multilateral partners, 
who have a country office and who could correct such misconceptions” (GFATM 
2006: 23). At this point an ineffective communication strategy was blamed for the 
communication breakdown at the country level. By 2009, the poor quality of the 
relationship between the GFATM and its partners is depicted in a more serious light 
as the Five-Year Evaluation finds that “The Global Fund‟s approach during its first 
five years reflects a “„friendship model‟ rather than a genuine „partnership model‟” 
(Macro International 2009: 34).
117
 It goes on to say that the approach has been 
undermined by a lack of clarity concerning the roles and responsibilities of 
individual partners and a failure to establish effective collaboration between them. 
The unclear division of labour is found to be particularly detrimental at the country 
level where widespread confusion over respective roles was identified within CCMs 
and between GFATM entities such as CCMs, Local Fund Agents, Principal 
Recipients and Sub-Recipients. Moreover, an ongoing dispute between the GFATM 
and Development Partners at the country and global level over the interpretation of 
the following passage of the GFATM Framework Document threatens to turn ugly: 
“Technical support for preparing proposals and developing country level partnership 
could be provided for by partners active in the country, such as bilateral donors and 
UN organizations” (GFATM 2002: 12). A textbook case of slippery wording, the 
2009 Evaluation warns that: “This lack of clarity…is contributing to a perceived 
problem of „unfunded mandates‟ among technical partners who have much to do to 
systematically mobilize themselves to provide technical assistance to Global Fund 
grants” (Macro International 2009: 37). 
 
Indeed the issue of who should fund technical assistance (TA) has become a hot 
potato for the GFATM and one that threatens to alienate donors. The issue has been 
compounded by the reactive, rather than strategic development of the Fund, which 
had failed to anticipate the scale or complexity of TA that would be required by 
recipient countries for grant implementation. Whereas TA was originally judged 
                                                 
117
 Dr Ian Harper at the University of Edinburgh thinks a more apt description would be the “tyranny 
of financial determinism” (Discussion 28
th




necessary for putting together country proposals and facilitating partnership fora, it is 
now widely recognised as integral to the success of GFATM – and other GHI - 
funding (Sidibe et al. 2006). The ongoing debate is quite simply over who should 
pay - a fundamental distinction the GFATM neglected to pin down at its inception 
(the Five-Year Evaluation alludes to a persistent belief within the Fund of the  
„trickle down‟ effects of aid).
118
 The upshot, as both the 2009 Evaluation and this 
Uganda study attest, is that many partners feel they have already paid up front for TA 
in their contribution to the Fund and should not be asked again. 
 
Another issue over which the GFATM has been slow to take a definitive standpoint 
regards Health Systems Strengthening (HSS).
119
 Again the debate has been confused 
by the ambiguous wording of the original Framework Document and now centres on 
a question of comparative advantage; in short, is HSS something the GFATM is 
suited to funding?
 120
 Certain features of the Fund‟s modus operandi would suggest it 
is not. Firstly, two to five year grants would imply an inadequate timeframe to make 
lasting system changes. Secondly, it has been noted that the Technical Review Panel 
set up by the GFATM to review country proposals lacks the capacity to judge HSS 
applications, which would require a high level of up-to-date institutional and political 
knowledge.
121
 Finally, certain GFATM Board members have voiced their own 
concerns that a foray into HSS would signal a dilution of the Fund‟s original 
mandate to focus on the „big three‟ (Sidibe et al. 2006; Shakow 2006). In spite of 
such objections however, the GFATM has been incrementally developing a 
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 The Five-Year Evaluation notes that while the GFATM was established with an expectation that 
partners would be proactive about addressing TA requirements, “the financing of technical assistance 
was not explicitly addressed except for the assumption that increases resources in-country would 
enable more „demand-driven‟ international technical assistance – putting the onus for TA requests and 
financing on program countries” (Macro International 2009: 13).  
119
 The Five-Year Evaluation suggests that the GFATM was established “with the expectation that 
strengthened health systems would be an almost inevitable consequence of increased health sector 
spending…[HSS] was not a first order preoccupation at the time” (Macro International 2009: 11-12). 
120
 The GFATM Framework Document states the Fund will support programs that “Address the three 
diseases in ways that will contribute to strengthening health systems” (GFATM 2002: 4). Yet Shakow 
2006 and Sidibe et al. both question the suitability of the GFATM to involve itself directly in HSS. 
Shakow argues the GFATM should avoid making HSS into a separate priority category in Round 6 
and future RFAs, explaining: “This does not mean that the Global Fund should be unconcerned with 
health system strengthening, but it should mean that the lead role in this area should generally be 
assigned, as a matter of policy, to the World Bank (Shakow 2006: 50). 
121
 The Technical Review Panel has raised its own concerns in this area, pointing out that “the 
GFATM system is currently not set up to generate strong Health Systems Strengthening proposals nor 




specialisation in HSS since Round 5 when HSS was first introduced as a cross-
cutting category. Since Round 7, the Fund has encouraged - and now requires - 
proposals to include an HSS cross-cutting component (Macro International 2009). 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the contextual background to this shift – 
because the GFATM does not operate in a vacuum – and the momentum to include 





Ignoring the suitability or otherwise of the GFATM to fund HSS, for the purpose of 
this discussion it is more instructive at this point to mention that out of the thirty HSS 
applications submitted to the GFATM in Round 5, only three were approved by the 
Technical Review Panel. Shakow has explained the mass failure as follows: 
“guidelines were unclear, preparation time was short and few health systems 
programs exist in-country on which to build new proposals” (Shakow 2006: 27). In 
short, the majority of HSS applications submitted in Round 5 were deemed sub-
standard by the Technical Review Panel. I would posit however, sub-standard 
according to what criteria? Without issuing clear guidelines as to what is expected 
from applicants, the GFATM opens its review processes up to accusations of 
arbitrariness. The Fund‟s lack of preparation to either solicit or review proposals 
points again to the reactive policy making of the GFATM. 
 
Taking these issues together it is clear that the lack of long-term strategic vision and 
slow pace of the GFATM Board‟s decision making have become major stumbling 
blocks at the country level to funding success. So much so, that I would posit the 
uncertainty surrounding the Fund has added a new potential cost to multi-stakeholder 
coordination at the country level: the cost of failure. This is the cost incurred when 
countries, struggling to decipher the requirements of the GFATM from afar, invest in 
what ultimately become failed proposals. As the Ugandan case study will attest, a 
natural response for partners to such failure is to invest even more time and money 
(for instance contracting external expertise) when developing future proposals. The 
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 For instance, the WHO supports a HSS approach http://www.who.int/healthsystems/en/ [accessed 
15/05/10], and the Stop TB Partnership has incorporated a HSS component into its global strategy 




idea that esoteric expertise should be required to access life-saving funding is 
without question an anathema to the original conceptualisation of the Fund. 
Moreover, the notion is rendered wholly problematic if you accept that the GFATM 
isn‟t always clear about what it‟s looking for.  
 
The overriding message to emerge from the numerous critiques of the GFATM in 
recent years is that the Fund needs to offer clarification on a number of fundamental 
issues or risk its reputation with partners and donors. This, at its crux is a warning to 
the Fund‟s own sustainability (GFATM 2006; Shakow 2006; Sidibe et al. 2006; 
Macro International 2009). 
 
 
The GFATM in Uganda 
 
The Ugandan case study provides a wealth of material to demonstrate the impact of 
the GFATM‟s ambiguity at the country level. Most striking is that in the course of its 
seven years of operation the Fund has taken a u-turn in its policy toward Uganda. 
From turning down the country‟s integrated proposal in Round 1 - the Fund at this 
stage demanded that the disease components be separated and that the country set up 
a Project Management Unit (PMU) to manage the grants – the GFATM demanded an 
integrated proposal and endorsed the country‟s Long-Term Institutional 
Arrangements for managing the grants in Round 7.
123
 In the midst of this u-turn there 
was of course the high-profile mismanagement of the GFATM grants in Uganda in 
2005 and the Fund‟s subsequent three-month suspension - an incident after which the 
GFATM emerged looking rather well in international circles for demonstrating its 
punitive muscle (Shakow 2006; Sidibe 2006), but which left some in Uganda with a 
bad taste as the Project Management Unit the GFATM had insisted upon installing 
(and which sat, dislocated from the state apparatus) was found to have provided the 
perfect vehicle for the mismanagement. 
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 The overriding principle guiding of Uganda‟s Long-Term Institutional Arrangements is: “the 




A high-level Ministry of Health official expanded on the previous arrangements 
governing the GFATM funds in Uganda. He told me the PMU had been forced on 
Uganda and had caused a lot of confusion. With it there had been no alignment with 
the government, no proper supervision and a lack of direction. He also pointed out 
that the PMU had led to a lot of duplication (MoH Interview 7
th
 April 2008). His 
account recalls some of the original concerns voiced about the PMU in an earlier 
study:  
 
“The structure of the Global Fund fiduciary system in Uganda raised the 
question as to whether the CCM was adequately positioned to perform the 
oversight role envisaged for it by the Global Fund. The CCM was not part of 
the chain of information sharing, decision making and responsibility that 
linked the MoFPED (as the Principal Recipient) with the PMU, as the body 
responsible for day-to-day management of funded activities. Consequently 
many stakeholders shared concerns about matters of decision-making, 
transparency and accountability. Locating procurement under the PMU was 
also a cause of considerable disquiet among some CCM members” 
(Donoghue et al. 2005: 44).   
 
Biesma et al. have also commented that the government of Uganda and its 
Development Partners regarded the PMU in 2003 “as a distortion of Uganda‟s policy 
of channelling all funds to support a coordinated national health sector strategy” 
(Biesma et al. 2009: 242).  
 
Such findings evoke the unequal relationship that still exists between aid recipients 
and their donors where the recipient country is powerless to overturn the donor‟s 
prescriptions. That the GFATM – having been burnt in Uganda – has since rescinded 
both its decision to operate through a PMU and to insist upon a disaggregated 
proposal is again indicative of the Fund‟s trial and error approach.  
 
A second, less high-profile caveat to the Ugandan experience of the GFATM grant 
process is the country‟s relatively poor success rate in winning funding: out of nine 
GFATM funding rounds to date, Uganda has only succeeded in three rounds for 
HIV/AIDS, three for malaria and two for tuberculosis (see box 10 below).
124
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 http://www.theglobalfund.org/programs/portfolio/?countryID=UGD&lang=en [Accessed 
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Country develops, but then fails to 








Of course Uganda has not applied for funding in every round, but as an examination 
of Uganda‟s experience in recent funding rounds will reveal, this in itself says 
something about the increased bureaucratisation of the aid instrument. Furthermore, 
as even a quick glance at the table above would intimate, members of Uganda‟s 
Health and HIV/AIDS Partnerships have been expending energy in proposal 
development on an annual basis since the Fund‟s inception, regardless of outcome.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
regards the GFATM however. Another statistic to consider is „Grants in Progress‟. This takes into 
account only those grants for which the country is enjoying disbursements in 2011. This sees Uganda 
receiving just five grants. To put this into context, in 2011 Rwanda is receiving seven grants and 
Kenya twelve. This reflects the finding presented later in this chapter that Uganda has had two grants 
discontinued since the 2005 mismanagement scandal. Of course both a notion of funding „success‟ 
and the idea of comparing different country awards are problematic when you consider that the 
GFATM is not providing competitive funding. Rather the Fund was envisaged as a simple 








A third and related issue concerns the disbursement rate of the GFATM. In Uganda it 
appears that getting the money (after approval in principle) takes an inordinate 
amount of time. I shall touch on this issue later when addressing the inherent tension 
undermining the Fund‟s raison d‟être: its current inability to manage risk.   
 
The point I wish to make using the Ugandan case study is not simply that there are 
costs involved in operationalising the Fund‟s partnership model at the country level – 
that is a given. The point is that the costs have escalated beyond what was anticipated 
in the original conception of the Fund. It is these uncapped costs – incurred as a 
result of the shifting goalposts of the GFATM (and perhaps even its lack of country 
presence) - that the stakeholders involved in Uganda‟s Health and HIV/AIDS 
partnerships are now being asked to absorb.
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 The definitive example concerns the 
expense now involved in developing country proposals, which shall become the main 




Producing a GFATM Proposal 
The fieldwork that forms the basis of this thesis was carried out in 2007 and 2008 
when Uganda was involved in funding Rounds 7 and 8 of the GFATM. I shall 
introduce the empirical data from this period forthwith. First however, it is helpful 
for the purpose of this discussion that the GFATM commissioned a country tracking 
study in 2005 (Donoghue et al. 2005), capturing the early years of the Fund‟s 
operation in Uganda. A significant finding of that study was that for GFATM 
funding Round 1, Uganda‟s Ministry of Health devised a cross-cutting proposal for 
the three diseases, reflecting the country‟s burgeoning health SWAp and its 
commitment to decentralisation in the sector.
127
 The country and its Development 
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 In Uganda the AIDS partnership is separate although logically connected to the health SWAp. This 
is because the AIDS partnership represents Uganda‟s multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS. (See 
http://www.aidsuganda.org/npdf/overview_of_coordination.pdf [Accessed 10/03/10]). Whereas in 
other chapters I have focused predominantly on the Health Development Partners (HDPs) who 
support the SWAp, in this chapter I also discuss the AIDS Development Partners (ADPs), who 
provide financial and/or technical expertise to the AIDS Partnership in Uganda. In many instances 
there is overlap between the members of the HDPs and the ADPs (for instance DFID and SIDA are 
both health and HIV donors). But there are also examples of ADPs not attached to the health sector 
(for instance Irish Aid, which funds HIV/AIDS activities connected to the education sector).  
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 Please note that my fieldwork did not address the issue of managing, or assessing the performance 
of, GFATM grants in Uganda.   
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Partners were thus dismayed when the proposal was rejected by the Technical 
Review Panel, which asked that the proposal be redrafted and broken down into three 
component parts along disease lines. The amended version was submitted in the 
format requested. Nevertheless, only the HIV/AIDS component was successful.  
 
Donoghue et al. have suggested that Uganda‟s experience with Round 1 had “quite a 
profound impact, which appeared to influence Uganda‟s subsequent approach to the 
Fund” (Donoghue et al. 2005: 9). In short, the government was left disillusioned with 
the GFATM, feeling that it didn‟t understand what Uganda was trying to achieve 
with its sector-wide approach in health. 
 
While there was some improvement in what was perceived as the GFATM‟s 
sensitivity to country processes during Round 2, for Rounds 3 and 4 the Ministry of 
Health decided to outsource the proposal drafting to external consultants, reporting 
that “the Round 1 process had consumed too much time and energy of senior MoH 
staff” (Donoghue et al. 2005: 11). Moreover, it was noted that the proposal 
preparation guidelines, which had been considered as inadequate for Round 1, had 
become overly complicated by Round 3.  
 
By Round 4 the process of developing the GFATM proposal was reported to have 
become better internalised in Uganda. Nevertheless Donoghue et al. reported that 
“Lack of certainty about the rules and requirements persisted into later rounds” 
(Donoghue et al. 2005: 12). Furthermore, the uncertainty noted in Uganda was found 
to be consistent with the experience of other countries, as the GFATM‟s Assessment 
of the Proposal Development and Review Process found in 2006, “The Assessment 
elicited a number of misconceptions at country level about the Global Fund 
principles, policies and procedures, which are negatively affecting the proposal 
development process” (GFATM 2006: 12).  
 
By Round 5 it was remarked that despite conscious efforts to avoid excessive 
amounts of information being submitted in proposals (in an effort not to over burden 




context and capacity became requisite inserts for the application. Moreover, it was 
warned that the volume of information would likely escalate again as data became 
more systematically available at the country level and countries began to comment 
on the performance of their previous grants (GFATM 2006). This development is 
verified in the Ugandan case material, where a WHO interviewee was heard to say:  
 
“The Global Fund says they‟re simplifying now but there are areas where you 
get repetition. You answer the question and then you go ahead and think 
„isn‟t this the same question from before that they‟re asking again?‟ If you 





The same interviewee also highlighted the relative difficulty of amassing the 
requisite information in the context of a developing health system, saying: “it may be 
easy in your country but for us it is not so easy. It‟s hard where to pick that data 
from” (WHO Interview 22
nd
 April 2008). 
 
In sum, early discourse on the GFATM points to two unplanned for deviations from 
the GFATM‟s original pledge that the country proposal “should not be overly 
elaborate and not impose undue burden on the countries” (GFATM 2002: 7). 
Namely, the bureaucratisation of the Fund‟s application procedure and the creation 
of a pseudo-profession, professional form-filling, carried out either by external 
consultants, the technical staff of in-country ministries/partner organisations or both. 
Both these phenomena are amply demonstrated in the Uganda case study with 
regards to Round 8, by which time it was found that the proposal guidelines had 





GFATM Round 8  
Toward the end of the fieldwork period in May 2008, the stakeholders in Uganda‟s 
health SWAp and multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS partnership were found to be busily 
preparing the GFATM country proposal for Round 8. Indeed, this is the context of 
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 In Chapter Seven, I explore how the GFATM has over time tacitly mandated the inclusion of civil 
society and other NGO partners in CCMs. The representatives of these parties must solicit the views 




the sound bite near the start of this chapter, when the Health/AIDS Development 
Partner complained: “Everything right now seems to centre on the Global Fund. It‟s 
just driving me crazy…” (SIDA Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). Beyond mentioning that 
the MoH were now so fed up with the GFATM‟s time-heavy bureaucratic processes 
that they have hired “eight really expensive consultants,” the same donor went on to 
attach a figure to the financial cost of Uganda‟s Round 8 application. 
 
“We got this budget yesterday for the Global Fund and for them to put this 
together…is going to cost – this is just for curiosity – Uganda Shillings 653 
million.
129
 This is including field consultations, and then of course you have 
full-board for 15 participants in all the districts, transport refund, DSA for the 
consultation team, DSA for the drive, airtime. And then you have like a 
writing retreat - full board in Jinja for writing and drafting things; and then 






Moreover, a costly complication involving the hired consultants is acknowledged:  
 
“Actually all these consultants are local because we asked [for that] which is 
good but they are recruited through a firm in Nairobi so they have 
international rates…the Partnership Fund which you know they can use for 
their own discretion is paying lead consultants US $600 to do this proposal” 
(Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). 
 
There are several points to take away from this account. Perhaps the most important 
from the perspective of this discussion, is that the added layers of red tape the 
GFATM has incorporated into the revised application process have resulted in at 
least two new financial costs to the applicant country: the outlay associated with 
ensuring broad stakeholder consultation and the expense involved in hiring external 
expertise. The former, as the following advert demonstrates, now means there is a 
need to conduct district reconnaissance missions and extensive field consultations.
131
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 USH 653 million is the found to be equivalent to US $347,345.62 on 11
th
 December 2009, using 
conversion site http://coinmill.com 
130
 The 2002 GFATM Framework Document underlines that the transaction costs of the Fund will 
need to be assessed, including the cost associated with producing a proposal (GFATM 2002: 18). 
While the proposal process has indeed been assessed by the GFATM in a general way (GFATM 
2006) I have been unable to locate any hard figures on the financial costs involved in producing a 
proposal. 
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 Chapter Seven outlines the manner in which the GFATM has encouraged the inclusion of civil 





Figure 2: Advert for regional consultative meetings to contribute to the 
development of the GFATM Round 8 Country Proposal (The New Vision, 
19th May 2008, p20) 
 
                                                                                                                                          
proposal development, the CCM representative for civil society requested US $500,000 for the 




The latter cost is indicative of a general rule of thumb in development, namely that 
anything involving funding can be turned into a specialisation. That local consultants 
can charge international rates demonstrates firstly, that the knowledge required to 
produce a successful proposal is perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be arcane. And 
secondly, that GHIs such as the GFATM have multiple distortionary effects in 
recipient countries - in this instance the envisaged reward has driven up the amount 
the country is willing to invest/gamble in/on its proposal (and created a lucrative job 




Another salient issue flagged up in the last except is the interviewee‟s suggestion that 
the “Partnership Fund” is covering the salaries of the lead consultants. It is not made 
explicit in this instance but the interviewee is most likely referring to the AIDS 
Partnership Fund, a voluntary basket fund that Uganda‟s AIDS Development 
Partners pay into, situated within the Uganda AIDS Commission.
133
 Uganda‟s Health 
Development Partners also maintain a Partnership Fund, situated in the Department 
of Planning at the Ministry of Health, but it is a much smaller pot, originally 
conceived of (as once they both would have been) to cover the administrative costs 
of partnership/coordination at the country level over the course of a given year.
134
 
Indeed, the key difference between the two funds is that the former boasts a 
dedicated budget line for GFATM proposal development, while the relatively small 
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 Other distortionary effects attached to GHIs regard fiscal ceilings (GHI additionality is hard to 
prove) (Nabyonga et al. 2009) and human resources for health (with GHIs accused of hiking up wages 
in the private sector) (Biesma et al. 2009).  
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 The AIDS Partnership Fund was envisaged in a similar manner to the health sector Partnership 
Fund detailed below. Its specific uses are laid out in Doc 2 of the LTIAs (Doc 2 2006: 7). An 
interview underlined the voluntary nature of the fund, so currently ADPs Irish Aid, DFID, Danida and 
the salient UN agencies were contributors (SIDA had just noted its interest to contribute) but USAID 
was not. Indeed the US agency was not permitted to donate to the fund and was instead contributing to 
the Uganda AIDS Commission‟s Integrated Work Plan (Irish Aid Interview 20
th
 May 2008).  
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 The Department of Planning within the MoH submits a budget to the HDPs each year, detailing 
what ideally would be funded in the Partnership Fund and the HDPs donate as they see fit, again on an 
ad hoc basis (even giving at different times of the year and topping up if necessary). The health sector 
Partnership Fund is traditionally quite small, and intended only to cover the administrative costs of 
Partnership in the sector, so for instance paying for annual reports, coordination events such as the 
Joint Review and Technical Missions etc (Interviews 10
th
 April 2008 and 22
nd
 May 2008). Notably, a 
Ministry of Finance interviewee suggested that the Partnership Funds cover the “speciality costs” of 
partnership, which are not a top priority of the government (MoFPED Interview 25
th
 April 2009). 
Walt et al. allude to the widespread existence of such funding, saying: “Ministries of health need to be 
prepared to devote substantial resources, time and energy to coordinating and managing 
resources…donors can be called upon to help, for example, by earmarking resources for aid 




contributions the Health Development Partners make to the latter - and their vocal 
objections to the escalating costs attached to the proposal - confirm that their Fund 




Nonetheless, I would argue that the appropriation of either fund to produce the 
Round 8 proposal has been a reactive, rather than pro-active shift on the part of 
Uganda to adjust to the - as yet - uncapped demands of the GFATM. This is further 
evidence of the aid instrument – through a lack of clarity – dragging the applicant 
countries along with it on its “learning curve” (Donoghue et al. 2005: 10). It is also 
the first concrete example evoked by the case study material of the GFATM 
piggybacking on the coordination infrastructure established to facilitate the health 
and HIV/AIDS partnerships in Uganda.    
 
To weigh in now on the side of the GFATM, it could feasibly be argued that it was 
the decision of Uganda‟s health and HIV/AIDS partnerships to hire external 
consultants to prepare the country‟s Round 8 proposal, and that the expertise required 
to develop a successful proposal already exists in country. This is a credible 
argument but one that doesn‟t hold up to scrutiny in the Uganda case study. Firstly, 
because it presumes that the national programmes for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) 
and malaria have an unlimited amount of time to dedicate to the proposal. Secondly, 
because it suggests a level playing field, whereby each of the national disease 
programmes boasts an equality of financial, human and technical resources, when in 
fact nothing could be further from the truth.
136
 The HIV/AIDS field is notoriously 
replete with donors (MacKellar 2005 identifies it as the top priority for international 
health assistance) – boasting three GHIs worldwide (two in Uganda) - and this 
translates into additional human and financial resources at the country level. So much 
so that I would posit that the more funding that already exists for a disease in 
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 The Chair of the HDPs was referring the Partnership Fund for the health sector when he suggested 
that coordination between partners in Uganda was “expensive in time but not money”  (10
th
 April 
2008). The Chair of the AIDS Development Partners underlined that whereas the ADPs Fund 
contained a budget for proposal development, the HDP Fund had not been set up with that function in 
mind. She does note however, that the HDPs were “beginning to realise this is something they need to 
have” (Interview 20
th
 May 2008). 
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 Even back in 2005 Donoghue et al. had noted that: “During proposal development, there has been 
a disease imbalance on the CCM with no voice and lack of technical expertise for malaria” (Donoghue 




country, the better the chance of GFATM funding success for that disease. It‟s a 
controversial hypothesis and one that stands in overt opposition to the reputation of 
the GFATM as a „gap filler‟.
137
 Nevertheless, the empirical evidence at the country-




Consider again the Round 8 application. The Chair of the AIDS Development 
Partners recounted a problem the malaria and TB partners were having mobilising 
the requisite resources to prepare their parts of the integrated proposal. In sum she 
noted that while the AIDS Partners had a dedicated budget line in their Partnership 
Fund for developing the HIV component of the proposal - and had previously 
bankrolled the proposal for all three disease components in Round 7 – the Health 
Partnership was being asked to fund the malaria and TB components of the GFATM 
proposal for the first time, causing real difficulties. Rather late in the day (the 
deadline for the Round 8 proposal was 1
st
 July 2008 and this conversation took place 
toward the end of May 2008) she noted that the Private Secretary of the Ministry of 
Health had said: “she was going to look around for funding, so that we could jointly 




 The contrast in funding 
available for the individual disease components was aptly demonstrated therefore in 
the report that the malaria and TB programmes had engaged consultants for just one 
to two weeks of the Round 8 proposal preparation while HIV/AIDS had budgeted for 
consultants to see the process through to completion. Moreover, to zoom in on the 
TB component in particular, it was clear from the anecdotal accounts that even the 
idea of contracting external expertise for TB was a new development in Uganda. A 
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 The Five-Year Evaluation of the GFATM reiterates the original vision that: “The Global Fund 
would serve to fill funding gaps in otherwise partner-financed country programs conceived and 
packaged coherently through „Country Coordinating Mechanisms‟ led by governments and inclusive 
of civil society and the private sector” (Macro International 2009: 12). Nonetheless, the role of the 
GFATM as a “gap filler” is up for dispute. For instance, Oomman et al. found the GFATM 
“disproportionately focused on [HIV/AIDS] treatment and care at the expense of prevention.” Noting 
the same bias in the PEPFAR and World Bank MAP programmes, the authors found this “somewhat 
surprising given that the Fund‟s money is intended to fill financing gaps, and treatment is well-funded 
relative to prevention” (Oomman et al. 2007: 62).   
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 Clearly we can‟t say the same is true of other GFATM countries. Oomman et al. underline that the 
manner in which GFATM programmes are implemented in case study countries may not be indicative 
of practices elsewhere (Oomman et al. 2007: 5). That is why all GFATM assessments tend to adopt a 
purposive case study approach.  
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 The Permanent Secretary of the MoH is also the Chair of the Health Policy Advisory Committee 




WHO staff member recounted the more typical experience of putting together the TB 
proposal:  
 
“Unfortunately it‟s a very tedious exercise because usually it‟s a small team 
and you have a number of volunteers from partners who are actually not paid. 
I‟ve never seen them paid. They‟re not given anything. And sometimes it‟s so 
tedious. It will be like weekends – Saturday and Sunday – so you find the 
[national] programme manager sitting alone with the programme officers. 
The partners of course they are coming on a voluntary basis so they can‟t be 
here all the time…And sometimes it goes on until about 9pm and you‟re 





The same interviewee went on to say “I think HIV/AIDS, because they are more 
funded - they have more resources – I think they pay people to review those things, 
which does not happen in TB because in TB you rarely find that money easily 
available to assist in like that process” (WHO Interview 1
st
 October 2007).  
 
The comparative advantage of the already well-supported HIV programme is 
evidenced once again in this vignette concerning TB, which in this instance 
addresses the post-GFATM application process. It relates to the period following the 
approval of Uganda‟s TB proposal for Round 6.  The Round 6 grant release was 
delayed in Uganda first by the typical back and forth between the GFATM and the 
country to meet conditions precedent before sign off but then again by three events in 
country. Firstly, a partner charged with sending a final clarification to the GFATM 
forgot to do so, leaving the country and returning before the mistake was finally 
realised. Secondly an agreement sent by the GFATM for the country‟s approval went 
AWOL in country for two months, with no one from the TB programme even aware 
it had arrived (the GFATM eventually called Uganda to ask what the hold up was). 
Thirdly, a requisition for TB monies sent from the MoH to the Ministry of Finance – 
Uganda‟s Principal Recipient – languished on a desk for three months until the WHO 
Representative for Uganda asked that someone find out what was delaying the 
signing of Round 6. While the interviewee who recounted this tale was open that the 
latter delays were no fault of the GFATM, he did underline that they pointed to a 




where the communication is passing is very, very, very, very narrow” (WHO 
Interview 22
nd
 April 2008).   
 
The point of including this account at this point is simply to posit what might be the 
likelihood of a similar chain of events unfolding with regards to an HIV/AIDS grant? 
Given the national HIV/AIDS program‟s wealth of resources, multiple donors and 
dedicated AIDS Commission I would suggest not likely at all. In sum, I would confer 
the same advantages to the HIV/AIDS programme in developing a GFATM 
proposal. 
 
It is interesting to the overarching theme of this thesis that it was the WHO 
Representative who emerged as the saviour in the TB Round 6 saga – maintaining an 
interest in the theoretical promise of GFATM funding long after the TB partners who 
had drafted the proposal had become reabsorbed into the every day business of 
implementing the programme. In Chapter Six, I highlight the growing impetus for 
the UN‟s Specialised Agency for Health to demonstrate “added-value” (WHO 
Interviews 19
th
 October 2007 and 12
th
 November 2007) in a sector increasingly 
typified by multiple voices and skewed funding opportunities, which it is attempting 
to do by re-emphasising its first core function, “to provide leadership on matters 
critical to health and to engage in partnerships where joint action is needed.”
140
 Now 
however, I will briefly focus on how WHO is operationalising this mandate with 
regard to the GFATM in Uganda. 
 
Levelling The Playing Field and Filling the Void: The World Health 
Organisation’s Unfunded Mandate in Support of the GFATM 
The Five-Year Evaluation of the GFATM found that the Fund‟s evolution has been 
reactive and lacking in strategic vision (Macro International 2009). In contrast, I 
would posit that the WHO‟s policy regarding the GFATM (and other GHIs) has been 
at once responsive and strategic. Even a cursory examination of WHO‟s work in 
Uganda attests that the organisation‟s country office has been proactively responding 
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to the demands and deficiencies of the GFATM and conferring collective benefits to 
the Health and HIV/AIDS Partnerships in the process.
 141
 In its simplest sense, this 
has meant helping the under-resourced TB programme attract GFATM funding by 
providing the supplementary TA the national programme couldn‟t afford to hire 
externally – in essence, helping to level the playing field for the most under-
resourced of the „big three‟.  At its most serious, it has meant WHO temporarily 
assuming the role of third-party procurement agent for the GFATM following the 
2005 suspension - thus instrumentally restarting the flow of GFATM monies to 
Uganda.  
 
The demands placed on WHO country offices (WCOs) and their partners by the 
GFATM at the country level were formally recognised in 2008 with the launch of 
Maximizing Positive Synergies Between Health Systems and Global Health 
Initiatives (WHO 2008), yet the Ugandan case study material establishes that WHO‟s 
central and regional tiers have been helping host countries and their WCOs to 
navigate the GFATM application process for several years now via the issuance of 
trainings and guidelines. This facet of WHO‟s work epitomises its efforts to fill the 
void created by the GFATM‟s lack of strategic foresight, by assisting countries to 
access the funding to which they may be eligible but which they are nevertheless 
struggling to access. 
 
To return again to GFATM proposal development, the interviews revealed that WCO 
staff were involved in the preparation of all three disease components in Uganda. 
Moreover, they revealed that salient in-country staff had been sent on WHO-
facilitated trainings to learn how to produce successful country proposals. The WHO 
National Professional Officer (NPO) for TB recounted how he had been sent on three 
trainings, in Geneva, Harare and South Africa. When asked what he had learnt, he 
replied:  
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 Please note that WHO is considered both a Health Development Partner and an AIDS 
Development Partner in Uganda, despite bringing no financial advantage to either partnership. It is the 
organisation‟s technical expertise that makes it a natural shoe-in to each group. By including the 
WHO case example I hope to demonstrate that involvement with the GFATM is incurring partners 
with individual and collective costs; moreover, that by filling the information vacuum left by the 
GFATM, the WHO Uganda – as an individual HDP/ADP - is conferring benefits to the collective 





“I think one of the things one learns there – let me say negatively – is the 
things that one should avoid putting in…You know we have a short time so it 
must be clear what you want to do and it must be clear how you arrive at your 
figures and so on. And if you are saying you want money it must be clear that 
it‟s linked to your identified gaps” (WHO Interview 22
nd
 April 2008).  
 
The TB NPO explained that GFATM staff - for instance from the Technical Review 
Panel – had participated in the WHO organised trainings he attended, passing on 
their experiences of having reviewed GFATM proposals. The implication was that 
the trainings had helped Uganda win a TB grant in Round 6.  
 
The significance of WHO‟s in-house trainings to Uganda was impressed more 
fervently by an NPO for malaria, who argued for causation rather than correlation 
between the trainings and the country‟s recent funding success in GFATM Round 7 
for malaria:  
 
“For Round 7 we got some training. I was in Harare…and then eventually we 
went to Nairobi. Yeah that‟s what we did. That‟s why we wrote a successful 
proposal. Remember malaria Round 5? We didn‟t get it…Round 6? We 
didn‟t get. So this time, Round 7 we said, „We must get it!‟ So that‟s why we 
put a lot of time and energy and got it” (WHO Interview 6
th
 May 2008). 
 
Similarly, the importance of WHO‟s contribution to the development of the 
HIV/AIDS proposal was also impressed by a salient NPO, “WHO has I think been 
key in developing the HIV/AIDS Round 7 grant proposal technically and financially. 
And if we get the money from that it‟s really WHO - ok with partners - but I mean if 
WHO had not pushed…” (WHO Interview 7
th
 November 2007).  
 
Clearly one should anticipate that interviews conducted at WHO‟s Uganda country 
office are subject to a degree of subjective bias. Nevertheless I would at least surmise 
that the WHO trainings would not have been offered to country staff if a need had 




years of operation in Uganda suggests that WHO was attempting to respond to a 




A related point to emerge from the WCO interviews suggests that while confusion 
over funding guidelines may have at times hampered Uganda‟s application attempts 
– thus necessitating training for WCO technical staff to assist the national proposal 
development - a continued lack of clarity surrounding the GFATM at the country 
level was now proving detrimental to grant utilisation. This points to a further gap in 
the GFATM approach: 
 
“Definitely Global Fund is not well utilised because people don‟t even know 
what they can have…People don‟t read things. They don‟t know. They don‟t 
know…that they could have much more, even for health system 
development, even for support activities. They don‟t read, except those that 
write the proposal – who read the document – but otherwise no one reads 
what‟s available, what‟s possible, what‟s impossible” (WHO Interview 7
th
 
November 2007).  
 
To sum up, the WCO interviews underscore firstly what was already suspected - that 
specialised knowledge is now needed to win GFATM funding. Hence the imperative 
for the WHO to provide staff trainings and – as evidenced in an earlier section - the 
pressure on country partners to fund external consultants to provide a similar 
function. This again points to the growing professionalisation of the GFATM 
application process. More disconcertingly however, the latter excerpt also suggests 
that the specialised knowledge now needed to develop a successful country proposal 
is confined to the select few. In short, there appears to be a disconnect between the 
form-fillers and the grant implementers, which could seriously undermine the 
potential of GFATM monies. Riddell 2007 has also pointed to the existence of such a 
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 As suggested, Uganda has submitted 16 (disease-specific) applications over 9 funding rounds, of 
which 8 have been successful. To attach figures to the grants: Malaria has been successful in two 
GFATM rounds (2 and 7); of the $286,250,427 Uganda has requested in total, $212,100,635 has been 
approved. TB has also been successful in two rounds (2 and 6); of the total $24,723,519 Uganda has 
requested, $12,795,127 has been approved. HIV/AIDS has been successful in three rounds (1, 3 and 
7); of the $336,633,357 requested, $165,518,234 has been approved. 









With regards to the GFATM, the chasm of knowledge that exists between the form-
fillers and the implementers was exemplified in an anecdote concerning the 
aftermath of HIV/AIDS‟ successful Round 3 approval in Uganda when it was 
remarked that national bodies didn‟t realise they, like civil society organisations, had 
to apply to receive their share of the funding. Certain ministries – feeling that “they 
were important” – overlooked this technicality and risked missing out on funding 
altogether (WHO Interview 7
th
 November 2007).  
 
In addition, as the latter excerpt surmises, it also seems likely that national bodies are 
missing out on funding opportunities in health system strengthening (HSS) due to a 
lack of understanding about what exactly the GFATM funds. This is hardly 
surprising given the GFATM‟s uncertain foray into this area. Once again therefore, 
the proactive approach of WHO to counter the detrimental effects of GFATM 
confusion is admirable – a glance through WHO‟s international website reveals an 
array of technical support materials entitled: “Support for the Global Fund Round 9 
call on health system strengthening,” aimed at helping applicant countries put 
together their HSS applications.
 144
 In Maximizing Positive Synergies WHO makes an 
explicit mention of the continued confusion surrounding GHI‟s strictures, stating 
“countries would benefit from receiving more explicit guidance for the range of 
issues for which they may request funds from each GHI, as well as from greater 
clarity on funding options for supporting health and community systems” (WHO 
2009: 3). During the interim, it would seem that WHO has taken up the mantle on 
behalf of the GFATM. 
 
On the one hand, the manner in which WHO has responded to the GFATM could be 
viewed as epitomising the Fund‟s original conception of the partnership model, yet 
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 “The growing acknowledgement of the complexities of development has led to increased 
specialization with the development profession. But this has also led to the compartmentalization of 
different subgroups within the fields of development, often leading to isolation from, ignorance about, 
and sometimes even indifference to other dimensions of development” (Riddell 2007: xvi). 
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WHO‟s Maximizing Positive Synergies Initiative plainly belies this notion by 
suggesting that any success the GHI has enjoyed with partners to-date has come 
about by happy accident rather than design: “In the absence of any common 
Framework, many of the benefits [attributed to GHIs] are being derived more as a 
result of positive spill-overs than from proactive and strategic work…” (WHO 2008: 
8).
145
 Indeed, the lack of strategic vision has clearly proved costly to WHO and 
partners, hence the affirmation that “The time has come to move from the current 
situation where outcomes are often subject to trial and error and reliant on goodwill, 
to a more systematic framework of active management by all stakeholders” (WHO 
2008: 8).   
 
The financial and opportunity costs incurred through the trial and error approach of 
GHIs such as the GFATM were first recognised in 2005, when the Global Task 
Team on Improving AIDS Coordination Among Multilateral Institutions and 
International Donors identified the UN‟s “unfunded mandate” (GTT 2005: 15). This 
relates to the mismatch between the need and availability of UN technical support 
being requested by countries to finance proposal development and to support the 
scale up of HIV/AIDS responses in accordance with the GHIs. In short, the GTT 
noted that the rise in demand didn‟t correlate with any additional resources for the 
UN system; hence the UN‟s “unfunded mandate”, which in 2005 was estimated to 
stand at US $166.4 million over a period of two years (UNAIDS 2005: 2). The 
notion of an unfunded mandate in relation to the GFATM has since been deemed 
applicable to other partner organisations (Shakow 2006). 
 
In the context of Uganda, I would argue that WHO‟s unfunded mandate is more 
serious than an unmet financial outlay and is in fact contributing to a distortion of its 
core mandate, yet to be fully appreciated. Such distortion is well exemplified in the 
following statement by a WCO national professional officer, who assured me that: “it 
is one of our core activities to support the Ministry [of Health] in resource 
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 Through the Maximizing Positive Synergies Initiative the WHO aims: “to identify where there are 
positive synergies between health systems and Global Health Initiatives and to foster the systematic 
exploitation of these synergies to ensure maximum, mutual added value and commensurate gains for 




mobilisation” (WHO Interview 6
th
 May 2008). Yet even a quick glance through 
WHO‟s six core functions alludes that this is a tenuous interpretation of the 
organisation‟s original remit, meaning the multiple months the agency is now 
dedicating to GFATM applications should be a cause for concern (particularly when 
winning a GFATM grant is far from guaranteed).
146 
Moreover, if one now considers 
the role WHO Uganda has played in attempting to regain GFATM confidence in the 
country following the 2005 suspension, its decision to assume the role of third party 
procurement agent for the GFATM while national capacity improves (or at least until 
the post can be put out for competitive tender) takes on a new resonance. Asked 
about this unexpected role – which WHO had originally agreed to take on for one 
year but which it was found to be continuing to do past the original deadline of 30
th
 
September 2007 – the Drugs and Essential Medicines National Professional Officer 
at WCO noted:  
 
“We are not comfortable with continuing because it‟s not consistent with our 
core mandate. We only came in because we were to fill a gap and help the 
government not to lose the money. It has consumed a lot of our time and 
because it is not our core mandate we have not done it so well” (WHO 
Interview 8
th
 November 2007). 
 
The international reputation of WHO was the deciding factor in the GFATM 
entrusting it with the responsibility of third-party procurement agent in Uganda yet 
WHO‟s reputation is a consequence of its adherence to its core functions and 
comparative advantage. Subsequently, by inducing WHO to deviate from its clear 
remit, the GFATM threatens to undermine the very reputation it is entrusting. This is 
troubling given the GFATM‟s muted hostility to the UN agency, as highlighted in 
the Five-Year Evaluation of the GFATM (Macro International 2009). From this 
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 The Core Functions of WHO: 1) Providing leadership on matters critical to health and engaging in 
partnerships where joint action is needed; 2) Shaping the research agenda and stimulating the 
generation, translation and dissemination of valuable knowledge; 3) Setting norms and standards and 
promoting and monitoring their implementation; 4) Articulating ethical and evidence-based policy 
options; 5) Providing technical support, catalysing change, and building sustainable institutional 
capacity; and 6) Monitoring the health situation and assessing health trends.  





vantage point the GFATM‟s partnership model regarding the UN agency starts to 
appear slightly parasitic. Maximizing Positive Synergies – in which WHO appoints 
itself as the lead agency in another global coordinated response – can therefore be 
viewed an effort to off-set the worst failings of the aid instrument by drawing upon 
another by-product of the coordination ethos - coordination to build policy consensus 
– whereby WHO is attempting to drum up some collective pressure on the Fund (and 




In addition to facilitating the restart of GFATM monies to Uganda following the 
2005 suspension by acting as the Fund‟s third-party procurement agent, it is 
important to note that the WCO - together with other Health and AIDS Development 
Partners - assisted the national process of regaining GFATM confidence through the 
development of the Long-Term Institutional Arrangements (LTIAs) during 2006 and 
2007 (indeed it was the LTIAs that formally established WHO as procurement agent 
(Doc 1 2006: 25)). The LTIAs, which establish that the national health sector and 
HIV/AIDS coordination forums become Country Coordination Mechanism for the 
GFATM, attest that it is not only the core functions of the UN‟s Specialised Agency 
for Health that risk being distorted through sustained involvement with the GFATM 
at country level.  
 
Uganda’s Long-Term Institutional Arrangements  
Devised originally for the GFATM and now heralded as the blueprint for all aid-
centric relations in Uganda, the overriding principle underpinning the LTIAs is “the 
realignment of all funding mechanisms to existing institutional arrangements, 
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 WHO plan of action for Maximizing Positive Synergies is three-fold and signals a reaffirmation of 
the organisation‟s core functions: a two-part evidence gathering process, whereby existing evidence 
on the GHIs is gathered and then new research commissioned to address the obvious gaps, will be 
complemented by a broad international consultation. WHO will lead this process, drawing upon its 
“convening power to bring together both the knowledge and the individuals and organizations that 
have a role to play in the evidence gathering and subsequent policy development” (WHO 2008: 10). 
This initiative epitomises the manner in which WHO is increasingly having to work within the new 
aid architecture, where fostering partnerships and showing added value have become essential to the 
organisation‟s ability to exert policy influence at the international level in the face of skewed funding 
incentives (most often typified by GHIs) and multitudinous voices.  See Chapter Six for further 




thereby minimizing duplication and fragmentation of efforts” (Doc 1. 2006: 5).
148  In 
short - and in keeping with the alignment principle promoted in the Paris Declaration 
- the central message is that aid donors should use existing systems and structures 
within Uganda, contributing to national capacity where needed. In accordance with 
this premise, it was decided that existing coordination structures in the Health and 
HIV/AIDS Partnerships should take on the role of Country Coordinating Mechanism 
(CCM) for the GFATM: with the Health Policy Advisory Committee (and its 
respective Technical Working Groups) subsuming CCM functions for the 
management of the TB and malaria grants, and the Partnership Committee of Uganda 
AIDS Commission (and its respective working groups) subsuming respective 
functions for Uganda‟s multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS response.
149
 While this set-up may 
give the false impression that there are now two CCMs in Uganda, the LTIAs 




The LTIAs set out an expanded scope of work for the HPAC and the PC in line with 
their revised remit as CCM. Indeed, a cursory look at the guidelines for the HPAC, 
which establishes seven additional, CCM-specific duties, signals a clear increase in 
workloads for both fora (see box 11). 
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 Rather than being contained in one document, the LTIAs have been refined via a series of 
documents, which express the iterative exchange the country was engaged in with the Global Fund 
Secretariat during 2006 and 2007. I draw on five of those documents in my thesis. References for 
these are to be found in an annexed section at the end of the main bibliography. 
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 While it is not a focus of this discussion, it is perhaps significant to the future working relationship 
of the MoH and the UAC within a joint CCM that Donoghue et al. (2005) noted tension between the 
MoH and UAC back in 2005 as each wrestled for control and funds in the unclear division of labour 
surrounding the GFATM. It is significant therefore that the minutes of a HDP meeting in 2008 
reported that the current relationship between Uganda‟s MoH and UAC was judged as: “not 
encouraging” (Minutes of the Health Development Partners Group Uganda 8
th
 January 2008).  
150
 The linkage between the HPAC and PC is articulated as follows: “The UAC will be at the same 
level as HPAC on matters of HIV/AIDS and there will be two way communication on policy issues 
relating to HIV/AIDS as the 2 organs subsume the roles of the CCM” (Doc 3 2006: 12). That said, to 
ease any confusion at the level of the GFATM secretariat with the arrangement, the Chairperson of the 
HPAC – the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health – is identified as the channel of official 
communication to the GFATM. Although again the equal importance of the PC is stressed: “It is 
important to note that this memorandum is not a legal document meant to reduce the statutory 
mandate of the PC. It is meant to have a smooth and consistent communication channel to and from 
GF Secretariat” (Doc 4 2007: 16). In Chapter Four I underline that appearing to speak with one voice 
is a central tenet of the coordination principle, conferring partners with the advantage of strength in 




Box 11: Additional Duties for the Health Policy Advisory Committee in 















The new responsibilities far exceed the proposal development stage that forms the 
basis of this discussion and point to long-term oversight and reporting commitments 
on behalf of the GFATM Secretariat.
151
 As with the use of the health and HIV/AIDS 
Partnership Funds for funding proposal development, this development equates to the 
piggybacking of the GFATM on the coordination structure underpinning Uganda‟s 
health SWAp and multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS response. This begs the question: how 
has the appointment of the two coordination forums as CCM impacted in Uganda? 
 
The first thing to note about the arrangement found in place during the fieldwork 
period is that CCM activities were never intended to be dominant items on the 
individual HPAC and PC agendas. Instead, CCM business was supposed to be 
confined to quarterly meetings held under the official auspices of „CCM‟, and to the 
occasional ad hoc meeting if and when the need should arise (Irish Aid Interview 20
th
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 The suitability or otherwise of the current generation of CCMs to fulfil these duties is called into 
question in the Five-Year Evaluation of the GFATM which notes multiple problems plaguing the 
CCM model: the clarity over precise roles within CCMs remains unclear; CCMs are often still 
perceived as GF entities rather than entities for promoting country ownership; CCMs are often viewed 
as political rather than technical and thus are unsuited to overseeing grant implementation; and 
relations within CCMs can vary wildly, as do the capacities of different members to participate 
(Macro International 2009).  
1. Overall Global Fund programme oversight, coordination and development 
  
2. Overseeing the development of proposals to the Global Fund 
  
3. Review and approve project proposals to Global Fund 
 
4. Review and approve Global Fund work plans 
  
5. Monitor and evaluate progress and implementation of projects funded by Global 
Fund, within the framework of implementation of the Health Sector Strategic 
Plan 
 
6. Review and approve Global Fund progress reports 
 
7. Make decisions on renewal or applications to Global Fund and approve such 
applications  
 





May 2008). However, the finding to emerge from the fieldwork interviews was that 
GFATM issues were consuming a lot more time in the monthly HPAC and PC 
meetings than initially expected.
152
 The situation was such that the Chair of the 
Health Development Partners (HDPs) highlighted it at the biennial meeting of the 
National Health Assembly in 2007. There, he underlined that while the HDPs were 
happy with the way HPAC had been reorganised following the CCM appointment 
(HPAC membership was expanded in accordance with the LTIAs), they were 
nonetheless concerned that the GFATM was taking up a lot of time and energy in the 
HPAC forum, thus undermining its prescribed role to influence policy.
153
 When 
asked whether things had improved during a subsequent interview with the HDP 
Chair in April 2008, his response was “No, not yet” (BTC Interview 10
th
 April 
2008). The problem he explained was that although the preliminary work of 
developing GFATM proposals was supposed to be completed at a lower level than 
the HPAC and PC - at the level of the technical working groups - some of the 
technical working groups were not yet operating well (meeting irregularly or not at 
all), meaning that technical issues concerning the GFATM were filtering up onto the 
HPAC agenda.
154
 When asked whether he envisaged the problems with the technical 
working groups could be resolved in the foreseeable future, the HDP Chair replied 
“no,” the implication being that GFATM matters would likely continue to skew the 
agenda of the sector forum for some time. 
 
Viewed at its most benign, the encroachment of the GFATM on the HPAC agenda 
can simply be construed as “really, really tedious” (MoH/Danida Interview 9
th
 May 
2008). This was the general opinion raised by HPAC attendees, and was most often 
accompanied by acquiescence that it was nevertheless right the forum should be one 
half of Uganda‟s CCM.
155
 Yet, the encroachment angle can also be viewed more 
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 I need to qualify this point by saying that the fieldwork period fell in what might be termed the 
teething period of the new arrangements (which were operationalised in June 2007); moreover, that 
the end of the fieldwork coincided with the preparation of the Round 8 proposal. 
153
 In fact the HDP Chair complained that the GFATM and GAVI were taking up too much time in 
HPAC. This point was raised during a panel discussion at the National Health Assembly meeting that 
took place on 24
th
 October 2007. 
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 See Appendix 2 to see how TWGs fit into the overall Health Sector Organisational chart. 
155
 One interviewee pointed out that this was the arrangement Uganda originally proposed to the 
GFATM: “Right from the beginning when the Global Fund indicated that they needed a CCM, for us, 




seriously, in line with the HDP complaint that GFATM matters were undermining 
the prescribed role of the HPAC to determine policy. Indeed it was in this vein that a 
MoH official expressed his dismay that the HPAC forum - established to support the 
entire health sector - was still being dominated by GFATM issues (i.e. the „big 
three‟) by mid-April 2008. These complaints point to a distortion of the forum‟s core 
mandate that resonates with the previous WHO case study (Interview 16
th
 April 
2008). Whether or not this proves to be an interim distortion while the CCM 
arrangement matures in Uganda (and while the TWGs develop their capacity) it is 
nevertheless a disconcerting finding, and one that supports the WHO suggestion that 
GHIs have re-ignited the horizontal versus vertical debate over health (WHO 
2009).
156
 The notion that the GFATM is an anathema to the sector-wide approach is 
an issue that has been speculated upon time and again in the discourse.
157
 
Nevertheless, the decision to appoint the coordination forum as CCM is surely the 
best way for Uganda‟s health stakeholders to reassert its commitment to the sector-
wide approach by attempting to gain more ownership over the GFATM monies.  
 
Uganda‟s success in winning HIV/AIDS and malaria grants in Round 7 attest that the 
new LTIAs have indeed sown the seeds for renewed GFATM confidence in the 
country. This is to be applauded, and it must be stressed that the government and its 
Development Partners are behind the LTIAs and the idea of using national systems to 
manage the GFATM funds. Indeed, just to be clear, it was an integrated proposal and 
the use of country systems that the country originally proposed to the GFATM in its 
Round 1 proposal. The perverseness of the current situation is thus well encapsulated 
                                                                                                                                          
at things, So it took quite some time for them to get back to that position...It‟s right. That‟s where it 
should be but it‟s tedious” (MoH/Danida Interview 9
th
 May 2008). 
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 See Oliveira-Cruz et al. (2003) for the main points in the horizontal and vertical debates.  
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 Donoghue et al. uncovered the belief that the GFATM had created an obstacle to „three ones‟ in 
Uganda (Donoghue et al. 2005: 22). The GTT (2005) found that many GHIs were utilising a project 
approach, thus entrenching a vertical approach to HIV/AIDS and refusing to accept national plans 
over project proposals. At this time it advised GHIs to move from project to programme style aid. 
Oliveira Cruz et al. (2006) has suggested that the GHIs and their renewed interest in vertical funding 
“may adversely affect the SWAp and risk destabilising the significant progress made in the health 
system in Uganda since 2000” (Oliveira-Cruz et al. 2006: 29). A GFATM study remarked on 
concerns in recipient countries that the GFATM decision to provide funding in rounds was more in 
keeping with doing discrete projects than strategic programs, and was perceived to be “undermining 
coordinated approaches such as SWAps and causing disharmony for national planning, 





in the following statement of a MoH staff member, who, having worked in the same 
position for over a decade appears immune to the “historical amnesia” plaguing 
much of the aid industry (Easterly 2002: 49). She impressed that the LTIAs were 
nothing new in Uganda: 
 
“I don‟t think they‟re anything revolutionary, no. It‟s like I said, five years 
ago – so when the Global Fund started – as a country we prepared one 
proposal for the three diseases with a systems approach, and we would have 
preferred to have run it through the government systems. We went to the 
Global Fund and they didn‟t like it. They threw it out and they told us they 
wanted a whole separate back up. They went down that road, they were 
seriously burnt…they came back to ask how would we really like to go about 
it” (MoH/Danida Interview 9
th
 May 2008). 
 
This same position on the LTIAs was reinforced repeatedly in the country interviews, 
in which interviewees often cited Uganda‟s 2001 „Partnership Principles‟ (MoFPED 
2001) as the original template for the arrangements.
158
 And while the turnaround in 
the GFATM‟s approach to Uganda aptly epitomises the trial and error methodology 
of the Fund argued throughout this chapter, the acknowledgement of the “large-scale 
experiment” (Oomman et al. 2007: 3) fails to hint at the full range of costs incurred 
by the country and its development partners as its subjects. However, I would posit 
that even a cursory examination would view the 18 months of back and forth needed 
to reach agreement with the GFATM Secretariat over the LTIAs – in short, to 
convince the Fund to accept the original modus operandi the country suggested five 
years earlier – as an unnecessary outlay. A working figure of loss would also have to 
estimate how much potential funding the country lost out on while the LTIAs were 
being finalised and perhaps take into account the figure misappropriated as a result of 
the grants‟ mismanagement, which is commonly blamed on the positioning of the 
Project Management Unit away from government oversight.  
 
A final calculation might also take into account the money Uganda has spent on 
outsourcing financial and management expertise to manage GFATM monies while 
national capacity develops in line with the Fund‟s expectations. Here I would point 
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 Please see Chapter Four for elucidation on Uganda‟s „Partnership Principles‟, which have served to 




to the GFATM funding being diverted in Uganda to international accounting firms 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernest and Young, and Deloitte and Touche. To elucidate, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, while initially brought in to investigate the charge of 
mismanagement levelled against Uganda in 2005, has since been appointed Local 
Fund Agent for Uganda.
159
 While following the suspension of grants in 2005, Ernest 
and Young was contracted by Uganda‟s Ministry of Finance to provide financial 
oversight on all GFATM monies. Finally, Deloitte and Touche has been appointed 
Technical Management Agent of the Civil Society Fund, a new basket funding 
mechanism for civil society in Uganda that will allocate and disburse GFATM 




The Five-Year Evaluation of the GFATM has attributed both the outsourcing of 
fiduciary and oversight functions and the dramatic growth of the GFATM secretariat 
(which has increased beyond original expectations) to the failure of the Fund to 
realise its partnership model (Macro International 2009).
161
 I however, would simply 
highlight how both developments have inevitably increased the overheads involved 
in managing the grants, leaving less money available for direct targeting of the „big 
three‟. In short, just as the increased bureaucratisation of the GFATM application 
process has hiked up the costs incurred by applicant countries so has the increased 
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 Concern has been voiced on the use of such firms as LFAs: “In about 80 percent of countries 
receiving Global Fund grants, representatives of global accounting firms are responsible for 
monitoring progress in project implementation…About 42 percent of the Global Fund‟s annual 
operating budget is spent on this function, While these agents perform many valuable functions, they 
are generally not well-equipped to assess and evaluate substantive development issues as they rely 
more on traditional accounting approaches” (Shakow 2006: 24). Shakow has also highlighted a 
concern over LFA “mission creep” in cases where it has been noted that LFAs have sought to become 
involved in proposal development and implementation. This is problematic first and foremost for 
country ownership but also because most LFA members aren‟t qualified to get involved in substantive 
matters (Shakow 2006: 22).  
160
 See Chapter Seven for more detail on Uganda‟s Civil Society Fund. 
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 The Evaluation comments on the dramatic growth of the GFATM Secretariat saying “Rather than 
addressing the tensions in the Global Fund‟s guiding principles and affirming the primacy of the 
partnership model it initially subscribed to, the Global Fund Board defaulted to a 50 percent per year 
increase in staffing…” It also notes that “Absent clear policy intent and despite concerns expressed by 
some members of the board, the Secretariat took the path of contracting out in-country fiduciary 
functions and hiring in additional program oversight capacities, rather than partnering with other 
international entities. What followed was a continuous cycle of Global Fund hiring in Geneva to catch 
up with the oversight requirements of the Fund‟s expanding portfolio, with the Secretariat to take on 
functions that arguably other partners were in a better position to execute on the Global Fund‟s 




bureaucratisation of the Fund‟s governance structures - which have thus far proved 
reluctant to delegate meaningful responsibility to partners.   
 
While spelling nothing new in Uganda, the LTIAs do hint at a new epoch in the 
GFATM‟s relationship with Uganda, where a concerted attempt is being made to 
improve national ownership of the aid instrument and its governance structures.
162
 
While this will likely prove to be a gradual process, there are renewed reasons for 
optimism. Case in point - the GFATM‟s “first learning wave” of National Strategy 
Applications, which seems particularly well suited to Uganda‟s mature health SWAp 
and multisectoral HIV/AIDS response.  
 
National Strategy Applications and the Domino Effect of GFATM 
Round- And Performance-Based Funding 
In November 2008, the GFATM approved the launch of the “first learning wave” of 
National Strategy Applications, representing a new way for countries to apply for 
grants. Information about the initiative was initially felt wanting on the GFATM site, 
nevertheless GFATM-observer NGO Aidspan went some way to filling the 
information void, explaining:  
 
“NSAs involve submitting a national disease strategy itself – rather than a 
Global Fund-specific proposal form – as the primary basis of the application 
for Global Fund financing. NSAs are part of the Fund‟s efforts to streamline 
its applications and funding process” (Aidspan 2009a: 1).  
 
Attesting therefore to a significant change in the GFATM application process, the 
NSA offers hope that the GFATM is now on course to honour its commitment on the 
„Three Ones‟ principle promoted by the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS and is, in the process, attempting to make the GFATM proposal process 
more applicant friendly.
163
 This is great news, both in terms of the focus of this 
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 Oomman et al. (2007) affirm the GFATM‟s commitment to foster country-ownership: “The Global 
Fund‟s philosophy of country-ownership is evident both in the variation across countries of the 
programmatic activities supported, and in the types of ROs [Recipient Organizations] that manage this 
funding” (Oomman et al. 2007: 42). 
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 The "Three Ones" principles are that countries should have: one agreed HIV/AIDS action 
framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all partners, one national AIDS 




discussion and the fact that Uganda fulfils several of the entry criteria for the pilot 
study: boasting strong partnerships with bilateral donors and technical agencies in-
country to support the application process and grant implementation, and having at 
least one “well articulated and documented national strategy, developed through an 




A further criterion for entry into the “first learning wave” provides pause for thought 
however. This stipulates that participation in the pilot is open only to countries that 
applied for, but were unsuccessful in their application for Round 8. Given therefore 
that a large part of the empirical data used in this chapter addresses the period when 
Uganda‟s Health and AIDS stakeholders were developing the country‟s Round 8 
proposal, it may come as somewhat of a surprise now to reveal that Uganda never 
actually applied in Round 8. Despite the months spent planning, the disruption in the 
HPAC and PC forums, the use of the Partnership Funds to contract external expertise 
and the fact that informed commentators from all three disease programmes indicated 
the country‟s intention to apply for Round 8 funding, the final proposal was never 
submitted. More than any other study or vignette I can draw upon in this chapter, it is 
this single piece of information that attests to the cost of failure now associated with 
involvement with the GFATM experiment. Moreover as will shortly become 
apparent, this cost rarely results in a finite outlay in the applicant country. Instead as 
a consequence of the GFATM‟s earlier choice to champion round and performance-
based funding, failure appears to pre-empt subsequent failure, at least in the Uganda 
case study. 
 
So what happened with Uganda‟s Round 8 proposal? A newspaper account following 
the end of the fieldwork explained that:  
 
                                                                                                                                          
monitoring and evaluation System. 
http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/MakingTheMoneyWork/ThreeOnes/default.asp  
[Accessed 13/10/10] In 2005, the GTT complained that most GHIs were still utilising a project 
approach and refusing to accept national plans over project proposals. 
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 While Uganda does not have updated strategies for malaria or TB, it does boast the National 
HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2007/8-2011/2012 (UAC 2007). It does also boast a now out-dated national 




“As a result of delays in the first seven rounds, Uganda could not apply for 
Round 8 grants, whose application deadline was July 1. „We are finalising 
with the Round 7 funding. Applying for fresh grants would be illogical…‟ 
said a source at the Uganda AIDS Commission” (Wendo and Businge 2008).  
 
Moreover, the article underlines that the compound effect of delay associated with 
GFATM funding goes back a lot further than Round 7:  
 
“Out of $36m allocated to the country in 2003 for HIV/AIDS activities under 
Round One, over $10m has not been released as the Fund was not satisfied 
with how the first instalments were used. Another $24 was allocated in 2004 
for malaria activities under Round 2, but $2m has not been disbursed…An 
official of the NGO [Aidspan] told the New Vision that due to the huge time 
lag, the withheld grants „have become irredeemable.‟ „Uganda failed to 
satisfy the Global Fund in time that the arrangements put in place after the 
suspension were good enough to protect their money in Uganda.‟…Uganda 
now hopes to get funds under Round 3 and Round 7” (Wendo and Businge 
2008).  
 
Clearly the matter is now hugely convoluted, evoking the notion of a domino effect 
of delays and failure. I will sidestep the decision of the GFATM to withhold some of 
the Round 1 and 2 grants - the backdrop to which is the 2005 mismanagement issue - 
focusing instead on the failure of Uganda to submit a Round 8 proposal despite all 
indications to the contrary and in spite of the new optimism surrounding the LTIAs, 
which appeared to draw something of a line under the events of 2005. Here, I have 
identified two key issues: the delay in signing off on the approved Round 7 grants 





Figure 3: Cartoon alluding to the termination of two GFATM grants in 
Uganda 
 
The Round 7 grants were approved in November 2007 amid much fanfare in the 
national press. The good news was that malaria had won all the funding it had 
requested, while HIV/AIDS had won a high proportion of its requisition. Yet as those 
au fait with GFATM funding procedures will be well aware, the announcement of 
GFATM approval doesn‟t signal immediate disbursement, and a process of back and 
forth to meet the Fund‟s conditions precedent is to be expected before signing. 
Moreover, signing doesn‟t signal immediate disbursement and another – although 
much shorter - delay is to be expected following this milestone.
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 An official based 
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 The GFATM explains the proposal process as going through the following stages: call for 
proposals; preparation; first screening; technical review; board approval; option for appeal; Local 
Fund Agent selection; Secretariat and PR negotiate grant agreement, which identifies specific, 
measurable results, to be tracked using a set of key indicators; grant agreement signed. Based on 
request from Secretariat, the World Bank makes initial disbursement to PR. PR makes disbursements 




in the Ministry of Health‟s Planning Department provided me with this timeline of 
when he expected Round 7 monies to start flowing to Uganda‟s PR: signing was 
expected in August/September 2008, following which a 3-month delay might be 
anticipated before actual disbursement (Interview 16
th
 April 2008). Given that the 
country‟s application had been approved in November 2007, this estimation points to 
a full 12-month wait for the funds. Furthermore, as the interviewee who provided this 
insight reminded me, the Round 7 application had taken the country four months to 
prepare. In light of this 16-month timeline therefore, it is hardly surprising that the 
same official was heard to exclaim, “It‟s not worth it” (MoH Interview 16
th
 April 
2008).   
 
If you now recall the earlier vignette about the multiple delays preceding the sign off 
on Uganda‟s Round 6 TB grant, it becomes clear that Uganda‟s experience with 
Round 7 is not without precedent. To recap, the TB Round 6 signing was delayed by 
a series of errors made in the applicant country. Yet even taking those into account, 
the finding that there was a wait of “one year and three-quarters” between submitting 
the TB application and grant disbursement seems excessive (WHO Interview 22
nd
 
April 2008). Inefficiencies in the GFATM‟s disbursement processes have been 
picked up in a number of studies including Uganda‟s Global Fund Tracking Study, 
which in 2005 was already illustrating how impediments to signing could delay the 




                                                                                                                                          
requests, progress report and annual audit; disbursement requests; extension of initial 2 year funding. 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/rounds/applicationprocess/ [Accessed 20/01/09]. 
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 Shakow (2006) finds that while the GFATM‟s approval is swift relative to other HIV/AIDS GHIs, 
its disbursement is slow, finding “The average time from approval to first disbursement is now 12.5 
months. Thus, while speed was an important selling point when the Global Fund was founded…in 
some instances it has proven to be not that much faster than the Bank‟s MAP projects, and large 
amounts have sometimes sat around undisbursed…” (Shakow 2006: 26). WHO underlines however, 
that the problem is not specific to the GFATM and that the disbursement processes of most GHIs are 
“not optimal and would benefit from simplification” (WHO 2009). Oomman et al. on the other hand, 
while on the whole happy with the GFATM‟s disbursement processes, did note that they were slower 
than both the PEPFAR and MAP equivalents, “The Global Fund process is slightly slower and less 
predictable than that of PEPFAR and the World Bank since the approval of disbursement requests is 
subject to more thorough review…” (Oomman et al. 2007: 65). Nabyonga et al. (2009) have noted 
discrepancies between the provided budget and expenditure figures at the end of the financial year in 
Uganda‟s health sector, which are partly blamed on unpredictable GHI funding: “The GFATM and 
GAVI are examples with probabilities at several stages from grant approval, periodic disbursements, 




To return to the Round 7 country proposal, another interesting fieldwork finding 
concerned TB‟s unsuccessful Round 7 application. One respondent provided the 
following explanation for why he believed the TB application had been turned down 
in Round 7 despite the HIV/AIDS and malaria applications both being approved:  
 
“We got feedback [from the TRP] although some people say one of the things 
that‟s not written in the feedback is that at the time of the application for 
Round 7, Round 6 had not been signed. So some people were saying we‟re 
probably not even wise at all to ask for more money when the other one is not 
signed even” (Interview 22
nd
 April 2008). 
 
It is remarkable that this statement essentially mirrors the comment of the UAC 
representative in the preceding newspaper excerpt, who suggested it was “illogical” 
of Uganda to apply for Round 8 before signing off on Round 7. Yet the fact that 
partners were still found to be developing the proposal by early June 2008 (the end of 
the fieldwork period) – one month prior to the Round 8 deadline – begs the question: 
why hadn‟t it been firmly impressed on Uganda that if a funding round has not been 
signed off upon, no applications for a subsequent round will be considered? Indeed, 
is this even a GFATM stipulation or rather a rule of thumb countries are deducing 
from their own experiences (from trial and error)? A confounding search through the 
GFATM guidelines provides little enlightenment. It is therefore disheartening to 
consider the wealth of resources and effort that Uganda‟s Health and HIV/AIDS 
stakeholders expended putting together the country‟s Round 8 proposal before 
pulling out at the last minute. Moreover, when pondering why Uganda decided 
against applying for Round 8 one should not dismiss the relative unpreparedness of 
the TB and malaria programs to develop their sections without sufficient technical 
expertise. It seems likely that the failure to apply was a combination of both factors, 
neither of which bodes well for the GFATM: that the country wasted so much time 
and money on a proposal that was suddenly perceived to have no chance of serious 
consideration is an indictment of the Fund‟s insufficient guidance; that the country‟s 
malaria and TB partnerships didn‟t believe they could put together a decent proposal 
without significant external expertise in the time allotted points to a flawed and 





That the NSA may prove an application route more suited to the Ugandan context is 
irrelevant at this point as Uganda continues to play catch up on a series of signing 
and disbursement delays that show no sign of abating. Indeed a glance at the 
GFATM website attests that while Uganda did at least submit a proposal for Round 
9, it was unsuccessful in all three disease components.
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 Viewed in this light the 
GFATM funding strictures (relating to round and performance-based funding) 
become analogous to the 400m hurdles - if you miss one hurdle it‟s likely you‟ll miss 
the next and the next. There‟s little opportunity for a fresh start or a clean slate, 
which is what Uganda was hoping for with the LTIAs. The flawed GFATM model is 
rapidly decimating the image of the Fund in Uganda in the eyes of government and 
donors alike. Moreover, it begs the question: what has happened to GFATM‟s 
commitment to allocate grants according to need?  
 
 
The Tension Undermining the GFATM Vision: „Needs-Based‟ 
Versus „Quality Proposal-Based‟ Resourcing168 
 
The original GFATM Framework Document was clear that “In considering proposals 
the highest priority should be given to those proposals from countries and regions 
with the greatest need…” (GFATM 2002: 9). That there remains a need in Uganda is 
played out in the country‟s annual health statistics, which repeatedly point to 
resource gaps in the targeting of HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. Nothing new there 
then, where the statistics have caused pause for thought in recent years is over reports 
that the country‟s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate has stagnated (the current figure is 
6.4% (UAC 2007: i)).
169
 Regularly heralded as the developing world‟s HIV/AIDS 
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 http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/fundingdecisions/notapproved/#9 [Accessed 15/05/10] 
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 The Five-Year Evaluation of the GFATM notes that: “Notwithstanding some differences in view on 
„needs based‟ versus „quality proposal based‟ resourcing, there was a general expectation that 
competition for and allocation of additional resources for AIDS, TB and malaria would be in some 
relative proportion to their respective needs” (Macro International 2009: 11).  
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 The HIV/AIDS National Strategic Plan suggests that Uganda has entered the third phase of its 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Whereby phase one was signified by rapidly rising prevalence rates, which 
peaked around 1992, phase two (1992-2000) saw those rates decline. The third phase of the epidemic 
(since 2000) has so far been characterised by a stabilisation in prevalence rates, although there‟s 




success story, it would be a worrying indictment of aid - and the GHIs in particular - 




The change in the country‟s HIV/AIDS epidemic coincides with an uncomfortable 
development in Uganda: the emergence of the questionably aligned PEPFAR 
initiative as the more reliable of the country‟s two HIV/AIDS GHIs (in terms of 
annual funding).
171
 Helped in no small part by the spate of GFATM disbursement 
delays and application failures addressed in this chapter.
172
 The situation is such that 
the GFATM was forced to issue Uganda with US $4.2 million for the emergency 
purchase of antiretroviral drugs in 2009, after the country came close to suffering a 
total stock out (Wasswa 2009).
173
 The obvious question therefore is how has it come 
to this - Uganda having to appeal to the GFATM for emergency funding?  Where has 
the Fund‟s vision to prioritise needs over quality-based proposals in the round system 
gone awry?  
 
Disappointingly, it seems that the GFATM, just like the traditional donor model it 
once aspired to avoid, has become overtly risk averse (indeed more so), prioritising 
the need for an airtight proposal (in order to guarantee micro-accountability) over the 
needs of the applicant country. In the current scenario, the countries in the greatest 
need are often the countries least equipped to access funding. Of course the signs 
were there at the beginning, when the Fund opted to emulate Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunisation and become a performance-based funding mechanism.  
Even so, it appears that the GFATM has grown distrustful of even that safety net, 
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 When the NRM first championed the issue. Please see context chapter for further elucidation. 
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 A PEPFAR study suggested that the lack of evidence base for budget allocations and rationale 
linking the allocations to performance, were undermining the ability of the GHI to harmonise and 
align (IOM 2007: 99). 
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 Officially PEPFAR money should be the least predictable of the GHI funding initiatives as the US 
Congress approves funding on an annual basis. In practice however, Uganda has been receiving 
escalating volumes of PEPFAR funds each year since FY2004. 
http://www.pepfar.gov/countries/uganda/index.htm [Accessed 15/05/10] 
Indeed, the comparative predictability of the PEPFAR funds (even though they are not well aligned 
due to Congressional earmarking) may go some way to explaining the comment that the GFATM: 
“It‟s not worth it” made by a MoH official in this chapter (Interview 16
th
 April 2008). In short, 
Uganda is relatively confident that the PEPFAR funds will keep coming. 
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 Dwindling ARV stocks in Uganda were attributed to a combination of factors: a successful testing 
policy, policy changes that increased the number of people eligible for the treatment and the global 
financial crisis. Please note that Uganda had actually asked the GFATM for $8million in emergency 




with the rounds-based application process now so cumbersome that countries aren‟t 
consistently being given the chance to „perform‟ or „fail‟ later down the road. Here, 
the suggestion isn‟t that the GFATM should simply throw caution to the wind and 
lend to any country that applies, after all “All aid donors…have an obligation to 
ensure that the funds they provide are used for the purpose intended, and that they 
are utilized as efficiently as possible.” (Riddell 2007: 235) The issue is that the Fund 
should by now have devised a means of managing risk. 
 
The Five-Year Evaluation of the GFATM points to failure of the Fund to effectively 
manage risk, finding that “The lack of a robust risk management strategy during its 
first five years of operation has lessened the Global Fund‟s organization efficiencies 
and weakened certain conditions for the effectiveness of its investment model” 
(Macro International 2009: 44). Indeed business theory dictates that risk isn‟t a thing 
to be avoided but something to be managed, and it was in this vein, that an earlier 
study of the GFATM suggested applicant countries be risk assessed and categorised 
according to the results, so that “processes can be streamlined for lower risk grants, 
while more resources can be allocated to those deemed to be higher risk” (Booz 
Allen Hamilton 2007: 8). Yet this hasn‟t happened. 
 
The Fund‟s inability to manage risk is indicative of the drive for managerialism in 
development (Mosse 2005) whereby micro-accountability and transparency are 
touted as the antidote to politically-driven aid. The unplanned consequence of the 
donor efficiency drive and attempts to make decision-making more visible has been 
the bureaucratisation of development (also labeled “governmentality” by Ferguson 
(1990: 64)), the burden for which falls most heavily on the shoulders of the aid 
recipients.      
 
The twists and turns of the Ugandan case study exemplify how the GFATM‟s 
aversion to risk has impacted on the members of Uganda‟s Health and HIV/AIDS 
partnerships individually and collectively by forcing them to engage in a complex 
and burdensome application process which seeks to convince the Fund that the risk 




been mitigated. In the current scenario, it is the GFATM‟s in country „partners‟ who 
are asked to absorb most of the risk which, on a sliding scale starts with the financial 
and operational expense of devising the proposal, moves onto the financial outlay 
involved in contributing to the pot of an aid instrument in regular policy flux, 
increases to see organizations and coordination forums embark on potentially 
damaging deviations from their core mandates, and culminates in a government 







Despite the costs associated with producing a GFATM proposal it is sobering to 
learn that over the course of nine funding rounds just 42% of submissions have been 
approved.
175
 Furthermore, that the GFATM is currently living from hand-to-mouth in 
terms of available financing (for Round 9 it was found to have approved more 
applications than it presently had the funding to serve).
176
 And yet the system 
continues to be skewed in favour of the aid instrument and to the countries‟ 
detriment. Shakow for instance has pointed out that almost all the burden involved in 
the GFATM transaction is placed on the recipients “in this performance-based, 
country-driven system” (Shakow 2006: 21).  
 
To place the current scenario into context, one needs to impress that prior to the 
inception of the GFATM, countries such as Uganda would have received HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria monies as a matter course, through un-pooled arrangement 
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 With regards to the use of country forums as the CCM for the GFATM, Chapter Four of this thesis 
also touches on the issue of risk avoidance in the Fund, highlighting its strategy of including CSOs as 
mandated CCM members. This plays on the oft-cited argument that CSOs are well suited to the role 
of government watchdog.  
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 GFATM observer NGO Aidspan has calculated the percentage of proposals approved in each 
funding round; their results are as follows: Round 1: 28%; Round 2: 43%; Round 39%; Round 4: 
40%; Round 5: 31%; Round 6: 43%; Round 7: 49%; Round 8: 54%; Round 9: 53% (Aidpan 2009b). 
The average rate of approvals over the 9 rounds therefore is 42.2%   
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 GFATM observer NGO Aidspan notes that for Round 9 “the Fund does not currently have enough 
money to pay for the Round 9 proposals that were rated Category 2B by the TRP. However, the Fund 





from their bilateral and multilateral donors.
177
 So while of course the pre-GFATM 
set-up would have been extremely arduous for the recipient country – with the 
government having to report to multiple donors to account for multiple funding pots 
– the key difference then was that its efforts were being expended on monies already 
flowing. In the original Framework Document (GFATM 2002), the Fund was 
conceptualised as a rapid disbursement instrument, intended to harmonise aid inputs 
and reduce the bureaucratic burden in countries that could demonstrate a tangible 
need. The reality however, has been more bureaucracy in pursuit of an uncertain 
reward. The donor frustration and expenditures alluded to in this chapter impress that 
donor agencies on the ground still want Uganda to access the money. It is after all 
their money.
 178
  But the GFATM‟s convoluted application process has become a 
stumbling block to the country accessing it.  
 
In Uganda, it has been the coordination architecture underpinning the Health and 
HIV/AIDS partnership that has borne the brunt as a result of the GFATM‟s deviation 
from a needs-based approach. It is these foundations – which thanks to the input of 
Uganda‟s Development Partners enjoy financial and technical underpinnings - that 
have been forced to bend and sway in accordance with the Fund‟s current (yet 
intransigent) demands. Whether this will prove to be to Uganda‟s credit or detriment 
remains to be seen. 
 
Remarkably, a lot of what the GFATM has asked for in Uganda has been framed in 
terms of „participation‟. As such every stakeholder voice must be represented in 
country proposals and on the CCM irregardless of the financial and opportunity costs 
incurred and the unfeasibility of reconciling countless special interest concerns. My 
argument however, is that the GFATM has never really enjoyed that clear an idea of 
what it wants, at least beyond checks and balances to ensure it can account to its 
donors. Participation and coordination therefore are really the means to an end – 
providing new checks and balances in the form of ever more stakeholder interest to 
facilitate the continuation of funding - rather than the ends themselves. Moreover, 
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 The professed additionality of GFATM funding remains open to debate. Refer back to footnote no. 
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even these might prove to be but a short stop on the road to somewhere else. Just as 
the NSAs now threaten to replace the GFATM‟s funding rounds, who knows 
whether broad stakeholder participation will survive the GFATM‟s next 
remodelling? Maybe a GFATM country presence is the next logical step.  
 
Of course the true irony of the current situation is the GFATM, thanks to the 
maligned version of the partnership model it has staked its reputation upon, has put 
itself at the greatest risk of all – threatening its long-term sustainability. This is the 
warning presented in the Five-Year Evaluation of the GFATM: 
 
“A loss of partner and donor confidence can occur if the Global Fund‟s 
organizational reputation were to diminish because of poor financial 
management, or because of ineffectiveness of the grants, or inefficiency in 
the organizational processes, thereby reducing its comparative advantage in 
the health development architecture” (Macro International 2009: 46). 
 
The situation in Uganda where the Fund has become a source of criticism – “$60 
million of nuisance” (Interview 9
th
 May 2008) - and exasperation – “it‟s not worth it” 
(Interview 16
th
 April 2008) - shows that this is a very real risk that needs to be 
addressed if the country‟s health and HIV/AIDS stakeholders aren‟t to withdraw 
their participation from the Fund‟s “large-scale experiment” (Oomman et al. 2007: 
3).  More seriously however, the risk presented by entrusting Uganda with life saving 
funds needs to be re-conceptualised by the GFATM Secretariat and offset against the 






COORDINATION TO BUILD POLICY CONSENSUS AS 






In this chapter I forward the proposition that with aid conditionality out of favour, 
several of Uganda‟s Health Development partners are attempting to use 
„coordination‟ techniques to build consensus around their own development 
objectives. In this way policy actually follows practice (Mosse 2005) as creating 
consensus only serves to legitimise what development partners are already doing in 
the health sector. Indeed a failure to build consensus need not create the impetus to 
change agency policy, particularly if what you are doing is found to be effective. 
Instead it is likely that more consensus building/coordination is what is really 
required. 
 
Mosse (2004, 2005) set out to challenge the conventional view that practice follows 
policy by posing a very simple question, namely what does policy do? In my own 
work, I have tried to ask a similar question of „coordination‟. Asking what does 
coordination do? And what might be the value of that action? In this chapter, I am 
guided by Mosse once again, taking as my starting point his proposition “that policy 
primarily functions to mobilize and maintain political support, that is to legitimise 
rather than to orientate practice” (Mosse 2004: 648; also see Apthorpe 1997).
179
 For 
it was only once I had internalised the legitimising effects of policy, that I was able 
to make sense of the behaviours I witnessed amongst Uganda‟s Health Development 
Partners as they sought to build policy consensus around their own development 
objectives using coordination techniques.
180
 To understand why development 
                                                 
179
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partners working in Uganda‟s health sector may now need to be legitimised through 
policy, it is necessary first to underscore the new competitiveness in development, as 
introduced by the Paris Declaration.  
 
Where once Easterly‟s (2002) “cartel of good intentions” rang true (which suggested 
that donors would never criticise one another for fear of drawing fire on themselves), 
the Paris Declaration has held up a yardstick to the actors in development and 
provided them with a purpose-built vocabulary by which to judge one another (e.g. 
“your aid is aligned but your activities are not well harmonised”).
181
 Moreover, just 
as certain aspects of the Paris Declaration – „alignment‟, „harmonisation‟, 
„ownership‟ - now reward development partners when they engage in what would 
once have been termed political lobbying (now read „coordination‟ activities), other 
Paris stipulations – to undertake division of labour exercises and exit sectors where 
you don‟t demonstrate comparative advantage – are actively threatening livelihoods. 
For partners serious about their Paris commitments therefore, the struggle is to 
remain relevant in your sectors (and in your host countries), whether this be through 
policy input, financial contribution or both. The following quote from SIDA‟s health 
representative for Uganda attests to the pressures at work: 
 
“SIDA is following the Paris Declaration like its own Constitution, really 
taking it ad verbatim as you say. It has meant that we have lost health in a 
number of countries. So right now we actually only have bilateral health 
support in Uganda and Zambia. And well Mali and Burkina Faso but that‟s 
delegate - you know silent partnerships…we are there in terms of funding but 
not in terms of anything else. So it‟s Uganda and Zambia. So everybody has 
agreed, and also the Swedish government, that with these two countries – 
we‟re in health in these two countries – now we really have to put in a lot 
more effort and being [Sector] Lead would just really reflect that we‟re 
serious, we‟re going to stay here, and really feel like we can do a lot” (SIDA 
Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). 
 
The key points of the SIDA tale - being reduced to two health sectors, under 
immense pressure to show comparative advantage and win Sector Lead in the 
division of labour exercise in Uganda - raises the spectre of something unimaginable 
                                                 
181
 In Uganda, an evaluation on the implementation suggested that Paris had: “provided a basis for 




pre-Paris: donors without recipients. By which I mean, aid donors who have lost their 
mandate to have a say in the national policy of aid-recipient countries, which over 
time could erode the broader case for giving aid to that country. Of course, such a 
threat only applies to donors who demonstrate a serious commitment to the tenets of 
Paris (i.e. the school of donors who derive some legitimisation from playing by the 
rules). Nevertheless, post-Paris, this once implausible threat exists.  
 
Furthermore, it‟s important to appreciate that the pressures now bearing down on the 
aid architecture transcend donor organisations. Comparative advantage, added value 
and a demonstrable influence in policymaking are just some of the criterion used 
now for the allocation of public funds. It is not only aid flows at threat in the aid 
architecture therefore, but organisational raison d‟êtres. The inclusion of a WHO 
case study in this chapter attests to this point.  
 
Therefore, while this chapter is first and foremost concerned with explaining the 
coordination techniques Health Development Partners are employing to build 
consensus around policy objectives in Uganda‟s health sector, such efforts need to be 
viewed against the backdrop of a competitive aid system, and the legitimising effects 
of policymaking.  
 
I will introduce the case material forthwith. First however, it may be useful to posit: 
when and why did policy get to be so important in development? 
 
 
The New Aid Orthodoxy: Getting Policy Right 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I alluded to the apparent fluidity and 
interchangeability of the terms that epitomise the modern development vocabulary 
(Mosse has termed them “master metaphors” (Mosse 2005: 9)). In this chapter, it is 
the increasingly difficult relationship that exists between the terminology of 
„coordination‟ and „ownership‟ when implementing the modern aid partnership that 




incongruous proposition that accompanies the joint usage of these terms: that a 
nation state - in which an increasing number of external partners demand a seat at the 
policy table - can claim „ownership‟ of the policies developed through multi-
stakeholder consultation. Aside from the obvious dilemma this proposition poses for 
the sovereignty of the nation state/aid recipient (Okuonzi and Macrae: 1995), I would 
also stress the conundrum this development imperative poses for the aid donor, 
namely: how to advance individual agency objectives during the era of aid 
effectiveness with its emphasis on fostering equitable partnerships? It is this 
conundrum that underpins the second utility I shall argue accompanies coordination 
activities in Uganda‟s health sector: an attempt to further donor policy objectives 
through consensus building.  
 
In their 1995 article, “Whose Policy is it Anyway?” Okuonzi and Macrae draw on 
two case studies to suggest how aid conditionality has at times been used to buy 
policy in Uganda‟s health sector. The background to the article was that following 
decades of instability in Uganda - and the resultant policy vacuum - donors had 
become accustomed to initiating large vertical projects without any interference from 
the state. However, this unfettered dominance was challenged in the 1990s when the 
new NRM government devised the first strategic plan for the health sector: the 
National Health Plan (MoH 1989). Fundamentally unhappy with what would now be 
conceived of as a nationally owned plan, Okuonzi and Macrae underline how 
“getting „policy‟ rather than „project‟ right” suddenly became a major concern for 
Uganda‟s major health donors who sought to amend the national strategy using their 
official development assistance as leverage (Okuonzi & Macrae 1995: 130). A key 
instrument they employed at this time was aid conditionality. I shall return to how 
this was achieved by Nordic donor Danida in due course (in a bid to explaining its 
current dealings in the sector); for now however, it is important to note that in the 
new millennium, with overt aid conditionality and project aid – i.e. the traditional 
donor tools for manipulating and/or circumventing state decisions - distinctly out of 
favour, donors‟ aspiration to “get policy right” is stronger than ever. I shall argue that 





To underline the central connection between consensus building as a method for 
amending policy and the logic of „ownership‟- as both an ethos of the new aid 
agenda and a measured target of the Paris Declaration - it is significant that back in 
1994, a study by Foltz had already underlined the importance of national ownership 
to the success of any policy in which aid donors shared a vested interest. In her 
opinion, the host government‟s perception of ownership was crucial to a policy‟s 
sustainability on three levels: to ensure reform was adopted in the first place, to 
increase the likelihood that the host government would be willing to contribute 
financially to the policy‟s implementation (i.e. securing its financial sustainability), 
and to increase the likelihood that the policy would be implemented by national 
institutions as opposed to parallel management units (i.e. aiding the policy‟s 
longevity by simultaneously building national capacity). In short, despite writing her 
article during a period when aid conditionality was still very much en vogue, Foltz‟s 
insight into the factors which contribute to the long-term sustainability of a policy 
were already undermining the capacity of aid conditionality to achieve long-term 
policy change if the national government was not on board with the changes. It is this 
proposition: that aid can‟t in itself buy sustained policy change in an aid recipient 




The second component of my argument takes this understanding one step further: it 
acknowledges that, in line with the aid effectiveness directives of the new 
millennium, most donors now don‟t even have the tool of aid conditionality at their 
disposal (i.e. the leverage to force a policy into existence), and as such, need to create 
a sense of national ownership around policy just to get it off the ground. Finally - and 
to complicate matters further – my stance also recognises that a recent proliferation 
in the number of actors demanding a say in policy discussions at the central level in 
Uganda means there are now more voices than ever – each with their own 
interpretation of what it means to “get policy right” - competing for the government‟s 
ear regarding health.
 183
 The consequence of all these factors acting together is that 
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the need to build consensus around policy initiatives is now a fundamental 
requirement for all partners wanting to further their individual concerns in country. 
Or to frame it another way: Uganda‟s Health Development Partners are now having 
to convince the Ugandan Government and one another that their interests are in 
everyone‟s interest.  
 
Remarkably, Okuonzi and Macrae had already predicted this need for change in the 
aid relationship back in 1995 when they underlined the fatal flaws in using aid 
conditionality for policy change (for sustainability, accountability and sovereignty). 
Their recommendation at this time was that “The situation has heightened the need 
for policy partnerships between international and national actors, rather than the 
politics of domination which currently predominates” (Okuonzi & Macrae 1995: 
131). As such, they were of the opinion that while donors – and other actors – did 
have a valuable contribution to make to policy discussions in Uganda, the national 
ownership of policy changes had to be made paramount. Their tacit suggestion was 
that donors would be better off building coalitions and supporting national fora for 
debate and discussion rather than continuing to throw their weight around in the 
partner country. 
 
In this chapter I intend to demonstrate how three of Uganda‟s Health Development 
Partners (HDPs) are undertaking the recommendation to revise the traditional aid 
relationship and attempting to build policy consensus in Uganda‟s health sector 
through coordination measures. In doing so, I will focus on three very different 
organisations – Danida, the World Health Organisation and USAID – in a concerted 
effort to expose the different manifestations of this change, while nevertheless 
underlining the discreet value still attached to aid flows within the health partnership. 
Moreover, in recognition of Foltz‟s stance regarding ownership as a prerequisite for 
the sustainability of policy, the underlying question I will level against each of the 
case studies organisations will be: has the complication of having to instil national 
ownership in policy prescriptions been resolved by any of these HDPs, and if so, by 





I turn first to Nordic donor, Danida. 
 
 
Danida, Essential Medicines and Wearing “Two Hats” in the 
Health Sector 
 
Out of the three case studies I shall present in this chapter, Danida‟s position in 
Uganda‟s health sector is the most striking for three reasons. Firstly, for the radical 
transformation of its partnership with the Government of Uganda over a twenty year 
period whereby it has gone from operating in parallel to the state, to offering aid with 
strict conditionalities, to championing Uganda‟s national systems and policies. 
Secondly, for the unique modus operandi of its in-country team, whereby a sub-
section of the Danida health team physically sits at Uganda‟s Ministry of Health. 
Thirdly, for the pragmatic and innovative approach its field staff take to 
implementing a donor programme that (as they recognise) fully exemplifies the 
contradictory nature of the modern aid effectiveness agenda - asking them to 
combine partnership with policing at the country level - which they do by assigning 
their government counterparts at the Ministry meaningful lines of accountability. 
 
I shall introduce each of these issues in turn, beginning with the evolution of the 
Danida-GoU partnership. Here I employ a study of Danida‟s key involvement in 
Uganda‟s essential medicines programme as a backdrop.  
 
As the Danida Health Sector Programme Support Phase III (HSPS III) document 
attests, “Danida has a strong history of supporting the Pharmaceutical Sector in 
Uganda in policy development, institutional development and the development of 
sustainable purchasing storage and medicine distribution systems” (Danida 2005: 
43). Indeed, it is this long standing interest in Uganda‟s medical supply chain that 
Okuonzi and Macrae chose as a focus of their 1995 study, in which they identified 
certain programmatic areas where aid conditionality had been used to buy policy 
reform in Uganda‟s health sector. To provide a brief synopsis of the Okuonzi and 




Uganda Essential Drugs Management Programme (UEDMP) was facilitated through 
assistance provided by Danida and the Danish Red Cross; and that despite being 
initially conceived of as an emergency programme, the UEDMP quickly evolved to 
become the main source of drugs and medical equipment for the whole of Uganda. 
When the first phase of the UEDMP ended in 1990, Danida offered to finance a 
second ten-year phase of the programme, but crucially at this point, with certain 
conditions attached.
184
 These sparked opposition from both the local authorities and 
the national press who accused Danida of trying to monopolise Uganda‟s drug 
supply and to tie aid for essential medical supplies to Danish suppliers. In response, 
Danida issued an ultimatum to the Government of Uganda: enact its policy 
recommendations or see the Essential Drugs Programme cease. Thus when in 1993, 
the Drug Policy and Authority Bill - that Danida was backing - had still not been 
tabled for review, the donor finally flexed its muscle, cutting Uganda‟s drug supply 
by two-thirds. Yet this show of strength notwithstanding, the Drug Policy and 
Authority Bill was rejected at its first reading in May 1993, and only pushed through 
on its second reading – following several amendments - later that year. 
 
Now clearly the narrative of a Danida that employs aid conditionality to force 
through policy objectives sits at odds with the popular perception of it today as one 
of the world‟s most progressive bilateral donors. Yet two points stand out from the 
Okuonzi and Macrae case study: firstly that Danida‟s initial involvement in Uganda‟s 
pharmaceutical sector had been while in emergency/humanitarian project mode; and 
secondly, that despite its brief foray into the politics of domination, Danida had 
nevertheless failed to unilaterally impose its will on a resolute Ugandan government.  
 
 To put the events of that time into perspective, it is apparent that Danida had 
monopolised debate and activities surrounding essential medicines in Uganda for 
long enough to think that it alone knew the best prescription for Uganda‟s future 
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 1. Enact a new drug policy providing laws for the manufacture, procurement, distribution, 
marketing, storage and quality control of drugs. 2. Only allow drugs approved by the government to 
enter the country. 3. Set up a national drug authority to oversee drug importation, manufacture and 
distribution. 4. Make the Central Medical stores autonomous from the MoH and place it under Danida 
administration; rename it National Medical Stores (NMS) and allow it to sell drugs to government, 
non-government and private facilities; make NMS the only agency responsible for the procurement 




procurement arrangements. However, it had underestimated the growing confidence 
of the NRM government in the 1990s to challenge its position. Indeed, this first part 
of the Danida narrative exemplifies the steep learning curve faced by every donor 
who has opted to make the move from project to programme mode in recent years: 
accompanying this new foreign policy direction will have come the revelation that 
whether it‟s done passively (as in this case when there was a delay in the Drug and 
Authority Bill being tabled) or actively (as in this case when the Bill was outright 
rejected), the recipients of development aid are now empowered to delay and/or 
reject, to accept and/or subvert the recommendations of the aid givers. It is this 
understanding that underpins the rhetoric of „partnership‟ and „ownership‟ 
characterising the new aid agenda. 
 
Turning now to look at the contemporary Danida pharmaceutical programme in 
Uganda, I would posit that the donor agency has at some point made the connection 
between policy and ownership since its negative involvement with the 1993 Drug 
and Authority Bill. In a very literal pursuit of partnership, Danida has situated a team 
of full-time advisors at Uganda‟s Ministry of Health (known as the HSPS III Support 
Unit).
185
 I shall expand on this unusual modus operandi in due course. Now however, 
I shall concentrate on just one of its team members: the Medicines Management 
Advisor. This appointment epitomises the revised partnership model favoured by 
Danida Uganda in the new millennium.  
 
The Medicines Management Advisor is a full-time position that physically situates a 
Danida technical advisor within the MoH pharmaceutical team to assist with the 
implementation of Component Five - pharmaceutical sector support- of Danida‟s 
Health Sector Programme Support Phase III (HSPS III) to Uganda‟s Health Sector 
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 The HSPS III Support Unit at Uganda‟s Ministry of Health is comprised of four technical advisors 
- a Senior Technical Advisor (the unit manager), a Public Health Advisor, a Financial Advisor and a 
Medicines Management Advisor – and their administrative support. This Unit is overseen by the 
HSPS III Coordinator at the Danish Embassy. The HSPS III programme document states that: “It is 
absolutely critical that the functions of the HSPS Coordinator be separated from the functions of the 
Senior Technical Advisor because the latter is part of the MoH organizational structure and will not be 




Strategic Plan Phase II (HSSP II) (Danida 2005).
186
  The job description for the 
position states that, “The Medicines Management Advisor will be attached to MoH 
Headquarters in order to provide support for technical and management capacity-
building in the provision of essential medicines…” (Danida 2005: 114). As such, the 
planned outputs of Component Five – which includes such targets as “MoH able to 
fund essential cost-effective medicines and health supplies…” and “Department of 
Pharmaceutical Services and Health Supplies established and functioning” (Danida 
2005: 67) - are for the most part designed to be fulfilled by, and attributable to the 
Ministry rather than the donor. Indeed, a key point to stress about Danida‟s 
pharmaceutical component – and the broader HSPS III - is that it has been designed 
within the existing policy and strategic framework governing Uganda‟s health sector, 
and thus neatly fulfils the Paris objective of „alignment‟.
187
 In this way, the MoH 
should emerge both as a beneficiary of the Advisor‟s appointment, and as the 
protagonist in the partnership. Indeed, according to the national framework for the 
health sector, Danida‟s Medicines Management Advisor shouldn‟t even (in theory) 
have any more input into policy discussion than any other HDP in the sector, in spite 
of his physical advantage.
188
 Instead he should be adding value at the MoH by virtue 
of his unique vantage point and skills set; the latter of which he should of course be 
disseminating to the national team. In short, the real value of the Danida Medicines 
Management Advisor should be to help the MoH operationalise Uganda‟s existing 
policy objectives in the pharmaceutical sector in the critical ways that contribute to 
their sustainability: by increasing national capacity and by fostering ownership. This 
makes sense considering Uganda‟s health sector is no longer operating in the policy 
vacuum that characterised it in the 1980s. Instead it is currently typified by a plethora 
of policy objectives still to be funded and operationalised.
189
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 Danida‟s HSPS III contains 5 components: 1) Support to district health services, 2) Support to the 
districts in the north, 3) Central-level support to MoH, 4) Support to training enrolled comprehensive 
nurses, 5) Pharmaceutical sector support (Danida 2005). 
187
 HSPS III was designed within the framework of Uganda‟s PEAP, HSSP II, NHP, SWAp and MoU 
(Danida 2005: cover page). 
188
 For the Pharmaceutical sector, discussion to feed into policy will occur in the Medicines and 
Procurement Technical Working Group. A multi-stakeholder forum, this working group will provide 
the technical basis of policy recommendations made further up the chain, at the Health Policy 
Advisory Committee. See Appendix 2 outlining the health sector‟s organisational structure.  
189
 Excerpt from the Annual Health Sector Performance Report FY 2006/07: “At the current level of 
funding, HSSP II is only 42% funded based on the best estimate scenario and 65% funded at the 





Having said all that, it would be naive to suggest that the Danida Support Unit at the 
MoH is totally disinterested in influencing outcomes in this programmatic area, 
especially given the volume of funding the donor has assigned to it. Indeed, as a 
proportion of the HSPS III budget, the pharmaceutical component is the most 
important: at 42.5% of the total (Danida 2005: 102). Moreover, the funding Danida 
has pledged to provide to Uganda‟s Essential Medicine Credit Line (EMCL) over the 
duration of HSPS III distinguishes it as the donor‟s single biggest spend in the health 
sector - even surpassing the volume it has assigned to sector budget support/Poverty 
Action Fund funding.
190
 Finally, the significance of funding to the EMCL is 
increased again considering that, unlike other facets of the health budget – which are 
managed by the Support Unit in Uganda – EMCL money is one stream of Danida‟s 




The Essential Medicines Credit Line is a basket funding mechanism co-financed by 
Danida and the Government of Uganda to pay for essential cost-effective medicines 
and health supplies.
192
 A rudimentary explanation of how it works is that each of 
Uganda‟s districts is allocated a proportion of money – a credit line - with which to 
buy drugs from a predetermined shopping list at the National Medical Stores.
193
 This 
gives the districts (Uganda‟s healthcare providers) the autonomy to buy medicines 
according to their particular needs, as opposed to having the centre make blanket 
decisions on their behalf. How Danida retains some influence over this delegated 
basket modality is as a direct result of the country team‟s peculiar modus operandi, 
which sees its advisors undertaking targeted capacity building activities at the MoH. 
To provide two literal examples, out of the activities listed to be undertaken by the 
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The grand total of the pledged funding for five years of HSPS III is 416,200. Within this, the total 
pledged to the Essential Medicine Credit Line is 100,000 while the total pledged to the PAF is 90,000 
(budget figures are given in Danish krone ‟000) (Danida 2005: 102). 
191
 PAF money is also different as it goes directly to the Ministry of Finance. Everything else in the 
Danida budget is channelled through the HSPS II Support Unit (i.e. the Danida health team on the 
ground in Uganda). 
192
 Because the GoU will draw on PAF money to finance its share of the EMCL, other HDPs will be 
indirectly contributing to this basket fund. What marks Danida out is that it supplies PAF money and 
direct funding to the EMCL. See box 1, p23-24 for an explanation of basket funding. 
193
 Private not-for-profit health providers (who deliver 30% of Uganda‟s health care and receive a 
government subsidy) have a similar set up whereby they can use credit line money to buy essential 




Medicines Advisor at the MoH, activity four is “Support the further development of 
resource-based planning and allocation strategies for the sustainable provision of 
cost-effective medicines and health supplies...” (Danida 2005: 67). 
 
Remarkably, one of the initiatives currently being undertaken at the MoH – with 
Danida (and WHO) technical support – is the development of The 3-Year Rolling 
Procurement Plan for Essential Medicines and Health Supplies (MoH 2007c). The 
purpose of this plan will be to quantify every input into the health sector – including 
parallel donor procurements – and to strive to align these inputs with quantified 
needs. The Rolling Plan is a nationally driven initiative, developed by the 
pharmaceutical division at the MoH (Interview 9
th
 May 2009). Yet as one can see, it 
fits in nicely with the activity assigned to the Danida Advisor above, and as such can 
benefit from his technical input. Moreover, because Danida as a donor is a key player 
in coordination activities within the health sector, the broader Danida country team 
are also in a key position to promote the Plan in coordination forums - such as the 
Medicines and Procurement Technical Working Group, the HDP Group and the 
HPAC – using in those instances their diplomatic influence to highlight the problems 
of over and under funding that continue to accompany unaligned donor inputs to the 
sector.
194
 In this way, the Rolling Plan contains the potential to make the money that 
Danida contributes to the EMCL more effective and more efficient in the long-term 
by reducing waste and duplication across the sector. 
 
Moving on, another of the listed activities to be undertaken by the Medicines 
Advisor at the MoH with regards to the EMCL is as follows:  
 
“Continue support to the management of the Essential Medicines Account at 
MoH, including development and operation of the required information, 
reporting, accountability, and tracking systems through MoH through NMS 
and JMS [Joint Medical Stores] to end-users” (Danida 2005: 67).  
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 At the PEPFAR‟s Uganda‟s Dissemination and Stakeholders‟ Consultation held in Kampala on 3
rd
 
May 2007, I witnessed the Danida HSPS III Coordinator use a break out session to raise awareness 
about the 3-Year Rolling Procurement Plan for Essential Medicines and Health Supplies. Her 




If one fully considers the implications of this activity, one can see that Danida 
Uganda has devised a very subtle way of subverting the traditional donor model of 
micro- managing its funds, and in a manner that serves to tick off all the boxes of the 
Paris definition of “harmonisation.” As such, instead of independently accounting for 
every penny of Danida funding to the EMCL in a parallel mechanism, the Medicines 
Management Advisor and the HSPS Senior Advisor are actually in place to assist the 
MoH create accountability for its “own” basket fund. This is underscored by the fact 
that Danida doesn‟t maintain any parallel indictors in the health sector, thus 
encouraging the MoH to strengthen the national Health Management Information 
System and to improve its own capacity to analyse data. That is not to say of course 
that the Danida team does not check the MoH‟s figures (aside from the oversight of 
the Danida advisors at the Ministry, all of the HSPS III accounts are subject to 
annual external audit) but as one WHO commentator said of the Danida working 
model in Uganda‟s pharmaceutical sector, it can be summed up by the phrase “hands 
off but eyes on” (WHO Interview 8
th
 November 2007).  
 
To continue in the vein of accountability, it was interesting that the Senior Advisor of 
the MoH-based Danida Support Unit (who is also the Support Unit manager) 
repeatedly hinted at a direct connection between the concepts of “accountability” and 
“ownership” when talking about the team‟s changing modus operandi at the MoH.
195
 
To provide a key example, the Senior Advisor explained how the Support Unit had 
decided to revise the manner in which they were managing funds allocated to 
programme Component Two - support to the districts in the North. While previously 
the Support Unit had maintained a purse of money at the centre, out of which 
northern districts could appeal individually for a share, the HSPS team opted to 
emulate the credit line system they‟d developed for essential medicines, except to 
fund essential medical equipment for all of Uganda‟s districts. The result is a second 
basket fund, “owned and operated” by the MoH, and with two additional 
contributors, the GoU and the United Nations Population Fund.
196
 The true value of 
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 He has been in the current position for approximately 3 years. 
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 To expand the programme and make it country wide, Danida also convinced the GoU and UNFPA 




the fund however, is again derived from the empowerment of the districts to 
determine their own needs. As the Senior Advisor explained: 
 
“You have donors who sit in New York or Copenhagen, or wherever it may 
be, or people sitting here deciding what the districts need instead of you 
know, saying: „This is your money‟…Let them be the ones to make their own 
mistakes, instead of us making mistakes like we always do” (Danida 
Interview 7
th
 May 2008). 
 
This reasoning provides a fairly compelling argument for one means through which 
ownership might be fostered within the aid relationship. Indeed it‟s interesting to 
underline how much the modus operandi of the HSPS III team has altered in the last 
few years to embrace the simple logic that “they have ordered themselves, they were 
involved in the process, its their resources…[the hope is] it would be more effective” 
(Interview 7
th
 May 2008). In particular, the Senior Advisor seems to have played an 
integral role in completely overhauling the Danida country model, having been 
struck on arrival by the inconsistencies between the rhetoric and reality of Danida‟s 
partnership in country. Notably, the biggest thing he had a problem with was the 
illusory structure of accountability the HSPS III was imposing on the MoH.  
 
While accountability for the entire HSPS III programme had originally been 
attributed to designated persons within the higher echelons of the MoH, the Senior 
Advisor immediately recognised that there were whole swathes of the Danida 
programme over which those staff had no mandate.
197
 To provide some examples: 
for Component One - PAF support - whereby the money goes straight to the Ministry 
of Finance, the MoH has no mandate; for Component Two - support to districts in 
the north - whereby the money was originally allocated via the Support Unit (in the 
pre-credit line arrangement), the MoH had no mandate; for Component Three - 
central-level support to the MoH - accountability for money entering every division 
of the Ministry had been assigned to the Director of Planning, who had no mandate 
for funding outside his own department; and finally, Component Four – support to 
the training of enrolled comprehensive nurses in the private not-for-profit schools - 
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 The Permanent Secretary and the Director of Planning at the MoH were assigned unworkable lines 
of accountability in the earlier Danida set up. The HSPS III model has now been redesigned to 
delegate meaningful responsibilities (Danida Interview 7
th




had literally nothing to do with the Ministry at all, neither had certain aspects of 




The reason this unfair and unenforceable chain of accountability for the Danida 
health programme had gone unchallenged for so long was because previous 
incarnations of the MoH Support Unit had been operating as a traditional expatriate 
donor support team - actively micro-managing every penny of the budget, and 
allocating neither money nor responsibility to the MoH. This contradiction is 
exposed if you refer back to the HSPS III programme document, which explains in 
laborious detail how the Support Unit – and not the MoH - would achieve 
accountability for Danida‟s budget.
199
 The Senior Advisor sums up the role he was 
originally recruited to play as follows, “You are having two hats on”, that of: 
“technical advisor” and “policeman” (Danida Interview 7th May 2008).  
 
Given the influence of the „good governance‟ agenda on the aid partnership in recent 
years, I would argue that the extolled lines of accountability between the Danida 
health programme and the MoH were intentionally superficial, yet nevertheless 
serving a valuable purpose: by providing the semblance/trappings of meaningful 
partnership while posing little or no risk to the donor. The Senior Advisor said this of 
the earlier set up: 
 
“This Support Unit was in the past pretty much run as an old donor unit. You 
know like a lot of donors still have…it was made pretty clear that basically 
you are supposed to run this show here and make sure that all the money is 
correctly spent and audited and accounted for…So there‟s a certain amount of 
lip service paid to what is the right thing to say, and then there are other 
expectations in terms of what you‟re supposed to do” (Danida Interview 7
th
 
May 2008).  
 
As with the restructuring of the HSPS Component Two budget (to become a credit 
line for medical equipment), the current HSPS III Support Unit has now completely 
overhauled the original accountability structures for the programme, trying where 
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 For instance, Danida was providing funding to the Pharmaceutical School at Makerere University. 
199
 Every component chapter of the programme document ends with a section entitled “Criteria for 




possible to directly allocate funding and responsibility to the Ministry. In this new 
mode of working, the Senior Advisor retains a watchful eye over the use of the 
Danida budget (for instance co-signing on planned expenditures) but has, where 
feasible, handed over the actual purse strings to the MoH.  
 
Having argued that the delegation of accountability might be one way in which the 
dilemma of ownership can be resolved in the aid relationship (thus contributing the 
sustainability of policy), a prerequisite for assigning such responsibility to the aid 
recipient – as determined by the Senior Advisor - is transparency. In his own words, 
“In the SWAp process as far as I am concerned, if you don‟t have the money, the 
currency you have to pay back with is transparency…And it goes both ways…I‟m 
not just blaming the government here” (Danida Interview 7
th
 May 2008). In short, if 
one considers a lot of the behaviours that undermine partnership principles to arise 
from the risk aversion of donors, then you can begin to understand why the concepts 
of „partnership‟ and „ownership‟ have become much maligned in the aid partnership: 




The Danida Support Unit has been able to delegate more accountability to the MoH 
by asking for modes of reporting unprecedented in Uganda‟s health sector: they‟ve 
asked the MoH to produce detailed work plans to align their daily activities with the 
policy objectives contained within the national Health Sector Strategic Plan II. In 
addition they have asked the MoH to account for the expenditures linked to those 
activities that are directly funded by Danida. Clearly this could be viewed as a new 
intensity of donor micro-management if it weren‟t for the facts that the work plans 
are not specific to Danida-funded activities (and are instead improving financial 
planning for all MoH activities), and that Danida is offering up an equal measure of 
transparency to the MoH.
201
 Danida has now linked HSPS III support with the MoH 
work plans, and equally accounts to the MoH on the minutiae of where its budget is 
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 Chapters Four and Seven deal in more detail with risk aversion and the good governance agenda, 
which this thesis argues serve to undermine the potential for meaningful coordination/partnership in 
Uganda‟s health sector.  
201
 The MoH work plans aren‟t Danida specific but cover the full range of activities the Ministry 
intends to operationalise in a given financial year. That said Danida‟s involvement in capacity 




being spent in the health sector. Thus whereas a large proportion of donor funds 
continue to pass through a metaphorical black box, the MoH-Danida partnership has 
been reinvigorated in recent years by the introduction of mutual accountability.  
 
The final lesson I would draw out of the Danida case study, in order to explain why 
the relationship between the HSPS Support Unit and the MoH may now prove more 
conducive to the concept of national „ownership‟ is to concur with the Walt et al. 
standpoint that “people matter” (Walt et al. 1999b: 274). Indeed, what‟s interesting 
about the Danida case study and the innovative manner in which the Support Unit at 
the MoH has remodelled its relationship with the national health authority is that it so 
perfectly evokes the Walt et al. conclusion that “aid relationships are strongly 
mediated by particular personnel in country offices and their involvement in the aid 
process, in both positive and negative directions” (Walt et al. 1999b: 276).
202
 
Subsequently, while presenting this case study of Danida‟s health programme in 
Uganda, I would stress that the transitory alchemy of this particular incarnation of 
the HSPS Support Unit offers little or no insight into Danida‟s other relationships 
around the world. Instead, I would argue that the modus operandi currently employed 
by the Danida Support Unit can only really be explained by the people it currently 
employs, and in particular by the ethos of the Unit‟s Senior Advisor, who was driver 
behind the delegation of meaningful responsibility at the Ministry, and who explains 
the reasoning behind that as follows, “I refuse to be part of bypassing the whole 
thing. We‟re here for a few years then we pack up and go home” (Danida Interview 
7
th
 May 2008). 
 
I can further exemplify that people (and their vantage points) matter by highlighting 
the manner in which the interviews at the MoH‟s Support Unit exposed differences 
of opinion between the Support Unit and the Danish Embassy in Kampala, thus 
evoking a new understanding of the “two hats” analogy - with Support Unit staff 
dividing their allegiances between the Embassy and the MoH, and impressing on the 
Embassy that “it‟s not our money, it‟s basically money belonging to the government” 
(Danida Interview 7
th
 May 2008). This blurred line of allegiance was best illustrated 
                                                 
202




by the Public Health Care Advisor within the Support Unit, who explained that she 
had been working in the same department at the MoH for ten years (employed for the 
first five years by the MoH and for the last five by Danida). She described her 
division of labour as follows: “I would imagine that currently more than 90-95% of 
my time is just straightforward technical work – it‟s not Danida specific” 
(Danida/MoH Interview 9
th
 May 2008). I would suggest that such extensive 
integration into the MoH structure – although an extreme model of coordination not 
suitable for most donor agencies - bodes very positively for the national „ownership‟ 
of the Danida health programme.  
 
Danida Case Study Conclusion 
Having suggested at the beginning of this discussion that Danida Uganda may be one 
of the few donor agencies to have successfully made the connection between the 
concepts of  „policy‟ and „ownership‟, I have sought to underline the various ways in 
which the donor has sought to coordinate with the MoH to create a more meaningful 
partnership. And while I have been determined to impress the Danida ethos of 
aligning its policy objectives with the country‟s own strategic framework, I have 
hopefully also demonstrated the ways in which the advisory unit at the Ministry is 
feeding into wider policy debate and (perhaps more importantly) policy 
implementation at the country level: by building capacity at the MoH, by increasing 
mutual transparency across the aid partnership, by assigning meaningful lines of 
accountability at the MoH, and by fully integrating the HSPS III team into the MoH 
structure.  
 
Moreover, while it hasn‟t been a major focus of this discussion, it‟s important to 
underline again the role that the broader Danida health team (including the Embassy 
division) plays within Uganda‟s multi-stakeholder sector forums: the Technical 
Working Groups, the Health Development Partners Groups and the Health Policy 
Advisory Committee. This further integration into the coordination fora of the health 
sector provides alternative technical and diplomatic routes through which Danida – 
in its function as a Health Development Partner - can attempt to create consensus 




objectives have been consciously aligned with those of the nation state gives the 
Danida staff a degree of moral authority not enjoyed by those HDPs championing 
concerns outside the sector‟s national strategic framework.     
 
To now consider the facet of the argument that recognises the recent proliferation of 
actors in the health sector competing for the government‟s ear regarding policy 
formation, then one can immediately see the advantage Danida has wrought by its 
two-tiered approach to sector coordination. In this light, the analogy of “wearing two 
hats” in the health sector can be translated to mean covering all bases in the pursuit 
of policy consensus: fostering meaningful partnerships with both the state and the 
other HDPs in the health sector.  
 
In this section I have argued that there are advantages to Danida‟s unique approach 
to coordination measures in Uganda‟s health sector, and yet logic dictates that it is 
not a modus operandi that Uganda‟s other development partners could easily 
emulate. Indeed it would be ridiculous and totally contrary to the ethos of 
harmonisation if Uganda‟s other HDPs were to request office space at the MoH. It is 
a working arrangement particular to Danida‟s positive reputation in country. The 
questions then are: what other coordination models are currently on offer to the 
partners? And are these any more or less conducive to building policy consensus in 
the health sector.  
 
I turn now to the second case study organisation: the World Health Organisation. 
 
 
The Changing Remit of the World Health Organisation 
 
In a discussion looking at the potential of consensus building to inform policy in 
Uganda‟s health sector, the WHO case study serves as a useful benchmark against 
which to measure Uganda‟s other Health Development Partners. There are four 
reasons for this premise. The first is that unlike donors who may choose to opt in or 






(see box 12) - actively mandate it to play a role in national policy debate and 
development. The second is that while donors still enjoy the luxury of picking and 
choosing their causes (they can be said to have „aligned‟ even if their interest only 
targets a small handful of the sector‟s needs), the mandate of the UN‟s Specialised 
Agency for Health dictates its interest be holistic - confined to neither sector nor 
nation. The third is that as the WHO Country Office (WCO) is not an implementing 
body, it has to rely predominantly on the national healthcare system to operationalise 
its recommendations (its budget doesn‟t stretch to the long-term funding of civil 
society organisations) and as such it has to maintain a good working relationship 
with its government partners. Finally - and of course in relation to all of the above - 
the important fact that WHO is not a donor means that technical expertise and 
coordination activities constitute its main bargaining chips in Uganda‟s health sector 
partnership.  
 













In short, in a health sector where political manoeuvring can still trump established 
sector priorities if enough money is put on the table (see the USAID/PEPFAR case 
study in Chapter Four), the ability of WHO to foster policy consensus in the sector is 
absolutely essential if it is not to become obsolete. Thus while donors - and even 
civil society organisations - bring a material advantage to the health partnership in 
 
1) Providing leadership on matters critical to health and engaging in partnerships 
where joint action is needed 
  
2) Shaping the research agenda and stimulating the generation, translation and 
dissemination of valuable knowledge 
 
3) Setting norms and standards and promoting and monitoring their implementation 
 
4) Articulating ethical and evidence-based policy options 
 
5) Providing technical support, catalysing change, and building sustainable 
institutional capacity 
 
6) Monitoring the health situation and assessing health trends.   
 




Uganda, the main currency WHO consistently delivers is technical assistance.  The 
following statement by the WHO Representative for Uganda provides an insight into 
the pressure that puts his team under, “We have to be on top of everything…that‟s 
our job” (WCO Senior Staff Meeting 10
th
 September 2007). Another telling phrase to 
emerge during the interviews carried out at the Uganda World Health Organisation 
Country Office (WCO) centred on the notion that the body had to continually 
demonstrate “added value” (WHO Interviews 19
th





While WHO‟s first core function - to provide leadership on matters critical to health 
and to engage in partnerships where joint action is needed – was enshrined in the 
original WHO Constitution, WHO‟s Eleventh General Global Programme of Work 
2006-2015, A Global Health Agenda (WHO 2006) elevates this function to a new 
prominence in the new millennium.
203
 It states that the new Programme of Work 
differs from the previous ones in that:  
 
“it examines current problems, the challenges they imply, and the ways in 
which the international community, not just WHO, must respond to them 
over the next decade. It defines a common health agenda for the world and 
the actions needed to carry it out” (WHO 2006: 1). 
 
In short, the document underlines that the challenges facing global health require 
joint action “within and without the conventional health sector”, and as such the 
organisation‟s overarching objective must be to shape “the evolving role of WHO as 
the directing and coordinating authority in international health work” (WHO 2006: 
1). 
 
It is remarkable that out of the numerous challenges Engaging for Health addresses, 
several prove particularly salient to the subject of this thesis: the document records a 
vast increase in the number of actors engaging in health partnerships over the last 
decade and the implications this has for accountability, efficiency and coordination; 
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it notes that aid is often not being used to support national health priorities and 
suggests that developing governments will require more WHO assistance to 
encourage their various partners to harmonise and align. Finally, it underscores the 
disproportionate volumes of aid now being targeted at a narrow range of 
interventions as a result of the surge in global funding initiatives (to the detriment of 
other programmatic areas). In this manner, while reasserting its role as the authority 
at the heart of the global health architecture, the Eleventh Programme for Work is 
significant for depicting the changing WHO as a key protagonist within the new 
architecture of aid. Indeed, it even employs the language of aid effectiveness when it 
asserts that “WHO will work with others to harmonize the global health architecture, 
and provide forums for the increasing number and type of entities involved to engage 
in dialogue on local and global health challenges” (WHO 2006: 31).  
 
So how does this change of global focus translate at the country level in Uganda? 
Well the first thing to say is that - in the same manner as WHO‟s technical guidelines 
- the crux of its intentionally broad Programme of Work has already been 
systematically disseminated and assimilated through the different tiers of the 
organisation - from Geneva HQ, to the Regions and finally to the individual WHO 
Country Office (WCO) – all the while being remoulded according to the scale and 
the context of the tier in question. The consequence is that a common theme to 
emerge from all the interviews at the Uganda WCO was the significance of fostering 
strategic alliances and partnerships at the country level to facilitate the work of the 
organisation.
204
 And again to highlight the consistency of the WHO message 
throughout its tiers, the national government/Ministry of Health was judged in every 
interview to be WHO‟s most important partner within the sector. 
 
The “Global Health Agenda” contained within the Eleventh Programme of Work 
outlines seven priority areas intended to be adopted by all stakeholders (as part of the 
broader partnerships).
205
 Crucial to this - a discussion that argues for a direct link 
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 The seven priority areas are: 1) investing in health to reduce poverty; 2) building individual and 
global health security; 3) promoting universal coverage, gender equity and health-related human 




between the ownership and sustainability of national policies - is that all seven 
priorities depicts the nation state as the key protagonist in any partnership. To 
provide some examples, in priority one - investing in health to reduce poverty – one 
learns that: “The role of government is central” (WHO 2006: 14), while for priority 
two - building individual and global health security - “Government plays a decisive 
role” (MoH 2006: 14-15). For a body that derives professional and to some degree 
moral authority from its extolled neutrality, this pro-state message from the WHO 
during this, the era of public-private partnerships and „good governance‟, could be 
construed as slightly outdated.
206
  Yet it is depicted in the “Global Agenda” as 
entirely innocuous and sustained at the country level in Uganda in a similarly 
understated manner.  
  
While recognising the core function of the UN specialised agency for health to set 
norms and standards globally, this discussion will focus on the reality of 
operationalising that mandate. In short, the discussion will confine itself to the 
mechanics of partnership at the country level because with little core funding at the 
WCO level (beyond office and staff costs), it is only through the promotion of 




To turn first to the logistics of the partnership the WCO maintains with the 
GoU/MoH, the sheer breadth of support offered by WCO attests to the non-monetary 
value of the relationship to the state. To use the WCO‟s support of the national 
HIV/AIDS programme as a example, one learns that in 2006 the WCO supported the 
National AIDS Control Programme: to scale up preventative and curative care, to 
develop and launch a national road map for the acceleration of HIV prevention, to 
develop and disseminate a new antiretroviral therapy (ART) policy, to develop the 
HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2007/8-2011/12 (UAC 2007), to develop a national HIV 
                                                                                                                                          
harnessing knowledge, science and technology; 7) Strengthen governance, leadership and 
accountability.    
206
 Chapter Seven will highlight that WHO‟s pro-state view is not one shared by the global funding 
initiatives GFATM and PEPFAR.  
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 The biennial budget for the core functions of WCO in Uganda is only about US $1million, 98% of 
which is salaries, utilities, rent etc. In addition, WCO may receive some extra-budgetary funds raised 
at the WHO Geneva or WHO Afro level (although Afro money is rarer and is generally for isolated 
incidents e.g. epidemics, national immunisation or small proposals in Africa). This amount again is 
small – around US $4-5m every two years (WHO Interview 19
th




drug resistance monitoring plan, to develop patient monitoring tools, to support 
operational research studies in areas of ART adherence and task shifting, and to build 
capacity at the district level through the provision of training materials for HIV 
managers and support for technical supervision visits aimed at strengthening 
HIV/AIDS service delivery (WCO 2007).
208
  In addition, and in a manner that 
benefited both the National Aids Control Programme and the National Tuberculosis 
(TB) and Malaria Programmes, the WCO also assisted the government with the 
development of the new Long-Term Institutional Arrangements (aimed at restoring 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) confidence in 
Uganda) and by assuming the temporary role of third party procurement agent for 




A similar picture of far reaching assistance emerges if we address the support offered 
by WCO to the National TB programme. In this case WHO technical and financial 
assistance supported: programme management, planning (including support for the 
development of a 5-year strategic plan for TB control), monitoring and evaluation, 
resource mobilisation, capacity building and the strengthening of TB/HIV 
collaborative efforts in country (including the development of the national policy 
guidelines). The picture to emerge therefore is of a close and sustained working 
relationship with Uganda‟s MoH. While other Health Development Partners may 
also supply technical assistance to the ministry, the key difference is that theirs is 
externally commissioned, transitory and, more often than not, employing expatriate 
staff.  
 
To readdress the “people matter” (Walt et al. 1999b: 274) argument previously 
evoked in the Danida case study, I need to emphasise in this case the comparative 
advantages of the WCO team over those of donor units. The first point to emphasise 
is its scale: whereas most donor health teams boast between one and ten staff 
members, it is incredible to note that in 2006 WCO employed over 70 members of 
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 When you consider that a serious charge levelled against harmonisation 
measures is its time heaviness then one might deduce that a larger team has a better 
chance of being heard in all fora.
211
 While the second point concerns the nationality 
of the WCO staff, it is only to attest to the longevity of their postings: the majority of 
the staff are Ugandan and thus it was not an uncommon finding of the fieldwork to 
encounter staff who had been in their current job for the better part of a decade (at 
least at the time of fieldwork). To those familiar with the nature of expatriate donor 
postings, the continuity of the WHO workforce (in Uganda) will resonate. If one 
agrees that a key facet of partnership activities is personal interaction, one can 
immediately see the potential of the WCO staff to foster policy consensus with its 
main partner in Uganda, the MoH. The programmatic examples highlighted above 
suggest that it does so in several ways. Firstly and most obviously through sustained 
contact with the Ministry; secondly, by introducing and adapting generic WHO 
policy guidelines at the national level (in other words by virtue of the organisation‟s 
professional authority); and thirdly, by the sheer breath and scale of the 
organisation‟s involvement across programmes and fora. I shall deal with each of 
these points in turn. 
 
The interviews carried out at the WHO Country Office in Uganda dealt exclusively 
with National Professional Officers (NPOs), a position that aligns members of staff 
with a WHO programme (e.g. malaria or health systems). This means that in almost 
all cases the NPO will have a counterpart in a similar department at the MoH, with 
whom they share a technical focus. In this aspect the WCO team shares something in 
common with the Danida Support unit except on a much larger scale. Clearly the key 
difference between the WCO modus operandi and that of the Danida Support Unit 
however, is that while there will be regular contact between the WCO technical staff 
and their counterparts at the MoH, there remains a physical separation. For the 
current WHO Representative (WR), this distinction has proved important and it was 
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 For details on the size and modi operandi of Uganda‟s other Health Development Partner teams see 
Chapter Four. 
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 An anecdote to support this comment comes from a SIDA representative relatively new to her 
posting. A one-woman health team, she told me that despite the SIDA programme boasting health and 
HIV/AIDS components, she had not yet found the time to attend the AIDS Development Partners 
forum. She simply didn‟t have the time to attend all of the salient health and HIV/AIDS fora (SIDA 
22
nd




interesting that an issue to emerge from the interviews concerned a NPO who had 
taken up semi-permanent residency at the MoH.
212
 The NPO explained the logic 
behind his positioning as follows, “[I] took it as if it was better to be next to the 
partner…So if I needed a file I would just pick it and come back and work. If we 
needed dialogue we‟d simply walk across and talk to the manager and something like 
that.” A change of WR however, put an end to this arrangement and ordered the NPO 
in question back to the WCO saying “Why should we sit there like we‟re employees 
of the Ministry of Health?” (Interview 22
nd
 April 2008). It seems in this instance that 
given its close working relationship with the Ministry, the physical separation of the 
WCO and MoH staff is symbolic – an assertion of the WHO‟s autonomy – and the 
importance of this is perhaps better understood if I introduce some comments made 
by external partners during the fieldwork period. The first – from a CSO 
representative - suggested that the WCO staff were too close to the GoU and not as 
impartial as they should be (MSF Interview 25
th
 April 2007). The second – from a 
bilateral donor - alluded to the conflicted positioning of WHO vis à vis a government 
that is at once a member of the UN and a recipient of its expertise: “I think also they 
feel they‟re in the lap of the government a little…you know it‟s complicated, they 
have like a dual role” (SIDA Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). This latter interviewee 
suggested there had been a general disappointment amongst the donors that the WR 
had not been a little bolder at the Health Policy Advisory Committee (the most 
important multi-stakeholder forum for health in Uganda), although she was 
sympathetic as to why not. Such comments are too easily reinforced when you 
consider this NPO statement on the WCO‟s working relationship with the MoH: “I 
think we are brother and sisters…We hardly move without them. Actually we can‟t 







An external perception of the WCO as too close to the Ugandan government and the 
organisation‟s subsequent efforts to maintain a tangible separation highlight a serious 
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complication in the partnership discourse, by suggesting that being on good terms 
with one partner can actually be to the detriment of other relationships. In the context 
of the Ugandan health sector where there is a diverse range of external stakeholders, 
it is enlightening that WHO – possibly the best-placed organisation to influence 
national policy and in a manner that doesn‟t challenge national sovereignty – is still 
under immense pressure to foster partnerships with other stakeholders at the country 
level if it is not to be discredited. In short, one is reminded that beyond its technical 
aspects, policy making is also an exercise in diplomacy – a point I shall return to.  
 
The second means through which WHO attempts to build policy consensus at the 
country level – and probably the best tool in its armoury to defend itself against 
accusations of government co-option – is of course the organisation‟s technical 
expertise.  
 
The WHO of the 21
st
 Century still wields significant influence in developing health 
sectors, and while Uganda is no longer experiencing the policy vacuum of the 1980s, 
it is clear that the generic policy guidelines emanating from Geneva HQ continue to 
make an important contribution to health policy at the national level. Every WHO 
interviewee described the means through which the agency‟s global guidelines are 
made contextually relevant (to align with Uganda‟s Health Sector Strategic Plan II), 
attesting to the flexibility of the overarching WHO programme. Moreover the WCO 
Annual Report (WCO 2007) underscores how often the main points of the generic 
guidelines are assimilated into national policy. And yet there is a sticking point, and 
it‟s related to an assertion already made in this discussion: that Uganda‟s health 
sector is now characterised by a plethora of unfilled policy objectives. As this 
interviewee said of the WHO‟s global strategies, “There‟s flexibility…The 
objectives are broad and therefore many activities can fit in as changes emerge. The 
only inflexibility comes in – it must be supported with funding” (WHO Interview 
16
th
 November 2007). In short, while WHO may still have the technical authority to 
wield – the authority to get a policy on the table - there‟s still the little matter of 





Before turning our full gaze to the issue of politics in the policy sphere, I would like 
to underscore the final means through which WCO staff help to build policy 
consensus at the national level. While I‟ve already touched on the size/scale of the 
WHO team, I would now like to expand on this point both in terms of the far-
reaching remit of the organisation‟s country programme and the logistical advantage 
it offers the team when it comes to gaining a say in Uganda‟s plethora of health-
related discussion fora. 
 
Chapter Four served to underline that the individual objectives of Uganda‟s Health 
Development Partners tend to differ markedly and focus on a narrow set of 
programmatic objectives. The exceptions in this grouping are WHO and the religious 
medical bureaus (the latter provide around 30% of the country‟s health care 
services), which both take a horizontal approach to the healthcare system. A cursory 
look at the WHO Uganda programme attests to the unparalleled remit of the 
organisation to lobby on behalf of the under funded, unpopular aspects of health care 
provision. For instance: neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), mental health, substance 
abuse, injuries, violence, disabilities and general health promotion (WCO 2007). 
These are the issues that fail to attract notable funding in a country where the budget 
is prioritised according to the rate of mortality (and is therefore predominantly 
channelled toward communicable disease). As this NPO said of NTDs “They cause 
mainly disability and morbidity…They are neglected because mainly they are not 
associated with high mortality…so even when a donor invests money, he‟s not going 
to reap quick results of rapid mortality” (WHO Interview 27
th
 November 2007). The 
same is true of the non-communicable disease burden - the seriousness of which the 
MoH has now publicly acknowledged “Uganda is experiencing dual epidemics of 
communicable and non-communicable diseases” (MoH 2007a: 65). Funding for non-
communicable disease continues to be woefully inadequate in Uganda and the WCO 
reports that: “The current low interest of many development partners is a big 
challenge” (WCO 2007: 74).  
 
Yet in a discussion about the potential of coordination to foster policy consensus, I 




under funded aspects of healthcare gives the organisation an unparalleled opportunity 
to lay the policy groundwork of the future. As evidence, I would cite WHO Uganda‟s 
key role in developing national policies on tobacco control and avian flu (in 
conjunction with other partners) (WCO 2007). To hone in on the avian flu policy, I 
asked the NPO most closely associated with the policy‟s development how difficult 
it was to advocate on behalf of a theoretical threat when established epidemics were 
recurrent in Uganda. She admitted “it was difficult.” Moreover, that the existence of 
the policy in itself was not sufficient:  
 
“for that little money that was needed for that technical assistance and to get a 
minimum basic done, the partners were able to provide some funding. But as 
for the implementation – for what it takes to be well prepared for avian flu – a 
lot is still to be done using this nice plan because of lack of funding” (WHO 
Interview 27
th
 November 2007). 
 
The point with both initiatives is that while their impact is unlikely to be felt in the 
short-term, their existence from the point of view of building policy consensus is 
significant. Firstly, because they are now in place to inform future interventions in 
these areas should the need versus funding threshold ever be met. Secondly, because 
these issues are not typically high up on the average donor agenda, the WCO in 
conjunction with the MoH has been able to circumvent a lot of the political 
manoeuvring that accompanies policy development in the health sector. In these 
instances therefore, WHO‟s ability to influence policy at the national level has been 
derived from its far-reaching programme (from its mandate to “be on top of 
everything”), its technical authority and – in no small measure - to a degree of 
disinterest from Uganda‟s other health stakeholders. Thus while Uganda‟s health 
system no longer operates in a policy vacuum, isolated policy voids do remain – 
notable where mortality rates are low and/or donors can‟t guarantee a quick return in 
terms of impact rates – and it is in these areas that WHO still excels, working in 
conjunction with the MoH to develop nationally „owned‟ policies.
214
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the WHO-MoH partnership. She explained that while WHO could advocate on issues, it ultimately 
had to be up to the MoH to make the decisions (Interview 7
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This begs the question, what contingency plan does the UN‟s Specialised Agency for 
Health have when Uganda‟s external health stakeholders do display a vested interest 
in the policy discussion? Here I would draw your attention to an excerpt from 
WHO‟s Eleventh General Global Programme of Work cited earlier: “WHO will 
work with others to harmonize the global health architecture, and provide forums for 
the increasing number and type of entities involved to engage in dialogue on local 
and global health challenges” (WHO 2006: 31).  
 
In this, the final section of the discussion, I would argue that WHO at all levels has 
decided to fortify its role as a world technical authority on health with a 
progressively diplomatic focus. In short, compelled by the new aid environment in 
health, which champions unprecedented volumes of vertical funding and a 
multiplicity of partners, WHO has realised it can no longer hand down fixed policy 
prescriptions and see them unconditionally accepted at the national level. Nor can it 
rely solely on forging a good relationship with the national government. At the 
central level in Uganda there now exists a plethora of voices with which the 
organisation must compete for the government‟s ear. Rather than pitting itself against 
those voices, the WHO strategy is to use coordination fora to lobby its partners. In 
Uganda it does so in two ways: by ensuring the agency is represented at each of the 
salient forums and, in some instances, by actively leading or facilitating the forum in 
question. Riddell has commented on this very trend in development, noting its 
existence but also its essential problem:   
 
“The changing fads and fashions of development have also encouraged 
agencies, particularly multilateral agencies to put themselves forward as the 
„agency of choice‟ to help implement new development ideas, creating 
further overlap between and across agencies…Ironically, coordination itself 
is another area of overlap…there often remains a lack of clarity over 
precisely which agency has the mandate to coordinate the activities of other 
aid agencies and what such coordination entails, especially if this is perceived 
to challenge the authority of the host country itself.” Riddell 2007: 87) 
 
The organisational chart included as Appendix 2 to this thesis lays out the formal 
structure and fora for policy discussion in Uganda‟s health sector. Within this formal 




participation is invited, namely the HPAC and the Technical Working Groups 
(TWGs). To expand on the extent of the organisation‟s involvement, the WHO 
Representative (WR) and two members of the WCO Health Systems team regularly 
attend the HPAC, although additional WCO staff may be also be brought along if the 
need arises; in short WHO is permitted “to co-opt expertise depending on the 
agenda” (WHO Interview 2
nd
 October 2007). And while WHO is considered to be 
one of Uganda‟s Health Development Partners - who are generally represented at the 
HPAC forum by their elected Chairperson - the WR retains a more prominent 




To move on now to the TWGs, the thinking behind the organisational structure of the 
formal policy fora is that the TWGs will discuss the technical aspects of 
operationalising the Health Sector Strategic Plan II before feeding  
recommendations into the HPAC, which maintains more of a political/diplomatic 
focus. To provide some examples of the sort of TWGs that exist in Uganda, there is a 
sector budget working group, one on communicable disease and another on 
medicines and procurement. Immediately therefore one can detect the advantages 
that the WCO has over the other HDPs - being able to deliver consistent and far-
reaching technical expertise across the full spectrum of TWGs and boasting the size 




However, a caveat to the formal organisational structure of Uganda‟s health sector 
concerns an on-going complaint heard throughout the fieldwork period that the 
TWGs were not meeting as often as they should have been (or in some instances at 
all).
217
 This would clearly pose a serious fault in the WCO strategy if it weren‟t for 
the fact that the formal organisational structure is complemented by a multitude of 
informal coordination networks at the national level which continue to function 
regardless of the performance of the TWGs. In many instances these networks meet 
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more regularly and enjoy a much broader representation of stakeholders than do the 
TWGs.
218
 The WCO has sought to capitalise on such groupings, again by virtue of its 
size and far reaching programme - and thus its direct participation in them - but also 
by increasingly facilitating such forums.
219
 To provide some examples, the WCO has 
housed the Uganda Stop TB Partnership since 2004 (providing a meeting space and 
secretariat duties) - a forum which involves 27 partners including representatives 
from the national TB programme and civil society; in 2006 the WCO became the 
permanent secretariat of the Health Development Partners at the request of the other 
partners (WCO 2007); and as the lead organisation of the UN Cluster for Health, 
Nutrition and HIV/AIDS, the WCO has housed the monthly meetings of the cluster 
since 2006, helping to coordinate the response of Uganda‟s humanitarian actors. To 
elucidate briefly on the health cluster, the “added value” of WHO as the lead agency 
is two-fold: the WCO is again able to “co-opt expertise” from the broader WHO 
team dependent on the agenda; moreover, because the organisation has appointed 
itself as the “provider of last resort,” it has made itself accountable for filling any 
gaps left in the cluster‟s response (WHO Interview 19
th
 October 2007). This decision 
to assign accountability to a single partner is extremely unusual for a coordination 
arrangement. 
 
Thus, while the HPAC is commonly considered the most important forum for 
debating health policy in Uganda, a closer look at the coordination infrastructure 
attests to a wealth of discussion fora outside the formal organogram. Furthermore, 
the significance of such fora is actually elevated in view of the poorly functioning 
TWGs. WCO, more than any other HDP has attempted to operationalise the rhetoric 
of partnership at the national level in Uganda by supporting and participating in the 
broadest possible range of coordination fora. While its professional expertise has 
traditionally been its main offering in each of the forums, it is of interest that the 
UN‟s specialised agency for health is now also facilitating the rudimentary aspects of 
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partnership: the meeting space, the minutes and the refreshments. It is fair to say that 
this aspect of its work, combined with its close working relationship with the MoH, 
attests to a 21
st
 Century WHO attempting to cover all bases when it comes to “getting 
policy right” in Uganda‟s health sector.   
 
WHO Case Study Conclusion 
In the preceding discussion I have argued that WHO is attempting to build policy 
consensus in the Ugandan health sector via three means: through a sustained and 
unrivalled working partnership with the MoH, by virtue of the organisation‟s 
technical authority, and by the sheer breadth and scale of the organisation‟s 
involvement across Uganda‟s health programmes and fora. While the pro-state stance 
and technical expertise are embedded features of the WHO approach, I have posited 
that in the new millennium, the UN‟s specialised agency for health is attempting to 
add a diplomatic string to its bow. This is a response to the challenges posed by the 
new aid landscape where official development assistance has been found to subvert 
the best intentions of policymakers. However, just how well suited the WHO is to 
assuming this more diplomatic focus is subject to debate. 
 
As suggested, even external partners in-country have challenged the WCO‟s public 
claim to political neutrality, thus exposing the flaw in the partnership rhetoric which 
fails to underscore that too close a relationship with the government partner – while 
positive in the sense of fostering policy ownership - has the potential to alienate other 
stakeholders. Yet the threat of real/perceived government co-option is one easily 
levelled against any of the UN agencies, and in the case of the WCO I would argue 
that an increased involvement in discussion fora is one means for it to divert 
attention away from its weak ability to criticise the national government while 
simultaneously increasing its appeal and “added value” to other partners.   
 
A second complication involved in the WHO‟s diplomatic experiment relates to the 
ongoing gulf between policymaking and policy execution in Uganda. While not a 
central focus of this thesis, this does need to be addressed in a discussion that 




aid harmonisation and alignment so as to align health budgets with actual need, 
which poses the question: is it really within its powers to do so? The failure of 
donors to align their aid allocations with the disease burdens of developing countries 
is a continuing problem, so perhaps it bodes well that a recent study by Shiffman 
(2006) has suggested that donor budgets are determined by a combination of three 
factors: recipient need, provider interest and global policy.
220
 Within this mix, WHO 
would appear to have some of influence over defining recipient need and shaping the 
global health agenda. Yet, in relation to the socialisation process that accompanies 
the development of global health policy, it is important to note that WHO is again 
just one among a growing profusion of voices. That said within Uganda‟s health 
sector its ubiquitous presence in a multitude of fora - most notably the Health 
Development Partners Forum - shows that it is again covering all bases in a bid to 
use its technical authority to impact on the way that Uganda‟s donors target their 
budgets. Indeed, the WCO does use its vantage point to criticise the deployment of 
the development aid in Uganda. The next case study however, forces us to consider 
the value of that role when the partner in question appears totally unaffected by the 
processes of domestic and/or global socialisation.   
 
 
PEPFAR and the Prerogative to Bypass Policy 
 
Heavily influenced by the aid effectiveness agenda, which advances the properties of   
harmonisation, ownership, alignment and mutual accountability, the preceding 
Danida and WHO case studies appear driven by the premise that advancing policy 
through a democratic coordination model is somehow inherently good and preferable 
to the “politics of dominance” favoured by development partners during the 1980/90s 
(Okuonzi & Macrae 1995: 131). The following PEPFAR case study is included to 
challenge this logic.  
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The starting point for examining the PEPFAR programme in Uganda is the reminder 
that certain donors continue to display a negligible interest in influencing the 
domestic policies of the countries they give aid to.
221
  Moreover, that the strategies of 
these donors - employed in lieu of targeted coordination activities - might actually 
prove quite effective. This poses something of a challenge to the aid effectiveness 
agenda and should be addressed.  
 
Other chapters in this thesis deal in depth with the particular modus operandi of the 
US aid model (focusing on the bilateral donor agency USAID).
 222
  As such – and 
because there is significant overlap in how the USAID and PEPFAR programmes are 
managed – I will hone in on just two aspects of the PEPFAR programme: the manner 
in which its vast funding allotment enables it to delay (or is it to ignore?) adherence 
to the policy framework for HIV/AIDS developed in Uganda, and the finding that the 
parallel medicines management system PEPFAR is using to procure HIV/AIDS 
commodities for Uganda may end up providing the template for the national system.  
 
The National HIV & AIDS Strategic Plan 2007/08-2011/12: Towards Universal 
Access (NSP) is intended to act as “ a coordination tool” (UAC 2007: ii) to manage 
the multi-sectoral and multi-partnered response to HIV/AIDS in Uganda. The 
cornerstone of the new plan, which has been developed with the input of multiple 
stakeholders - including WHO and USAID/PEPFAR - is that the prevention 
component of the tripartite approach (prevention, care and treatment) is to be 
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 Chapter Four addresses the modus operandi of USAID in some detail, while Chapter Seven 
explains the manner in which the majority of US money is channelled through nongovernmental 
“implementing partners,” thus bypassing the state apparatus. 
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 The NSP suggests that Uganda has entered the third phase of its HIV/AIDS epidemic. Whereby 
phase one was signified by rapidly rising prevalence rates, which peaked around 1992, phase two 
(1992-2000) saw those rates decline. The third phase of the epidemic (since 2000) has so far been 
characterised by a stabilisation in prevalence rates, although there‟s increasing anecdotal evidence to 




The NSP acknowledges the exponential increase in – predominantly external – 
financial support for the national response in Uganda, yet lists an ongoing challenge 
to be the following:  
 
“Some external funding is not aligned to national priorities. The allocation of 
current resources has been inadvertently skewed to develop the country‟s 
capacity to deliver ART to all those in need. This has to some extent diverted 
attention from other HIV/AIDS services, including prevention and social 
support” (UAC 2007: 40). 
 
Indeed, this is a serious criticism levelled against the PEPFAR programme in Uganda 
- a programme that was said to be contributing almost 85% of the national response 
in 2007.
224
  As this WHO commentator said of the programme, “they don‟t align 
with the government plans, they don‟t use the monitoring system and they don‟t use 
the coordinating system so…” And while she agreed that the PEPFAR team was 
happy to work with the Uganda AIDS Commission (to the exclusion of others 




“PEPFAR has more money than the Ministry of Health budget annually just 
for HIV. And they don‟t want, sorry to say this…but I still believe they do 
whatever they want. Even the AIDS Control Programme doesn‟t have control 





To give an idea of the scale of funding the PEPFAR programme is awarding Uganda 





 And to clarify on the notion that control for the programme is “over our 
heads,” see the USAID/PEPFAR case study in Chapter Four. The ramifications of 
this arrangement are twofold: PEPFAR funding is not under the same pressure as 
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 Presentation made by Dr David Kihumuro Apuuli – Director General of Uganda AIDS 
Commission – at the PEPFAR Uganda Dissemination And Stakeholders Consultation held in 
Kampala on 3rd May 2007.  
225
 Uganda AIDS Commission was established as a body corporate for the prevention and control of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 1992. 
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 The first official evaluation of the PEPFAR programme noted concerns in some focus countries - 
and particularly among other donors - that PEPFAR was dominating the agenda by virtue of its size. 
The same evaluation concluded “The scope and size of the U.S. Global AIDS Initiative are closer to 
the scale of a multilateral than a bilateral effort, and while the United States is not the only donor of 
funding for HIV/AIDS programs, in some countries its magnitude makes it a dominant source and 




other aid streams to align with national priorities, nor does it have to be channelled 
through the traditional default aid recipient in Uganda, the Ministry of Finance.   
 
Given the PEPFAR/USAID country team‟s participation in the consultations that 
contributed to the development of the new NSP, the conflicting involvement of the 
PEPFAR programme in Uganda needs to be examined. In short, what factors might 
explain the major discrepancy between the programmatic foci of the PEPFAR and 
national HIV/AIDS plans? 
 
I would argue that the first clue to this question is derived from the naming of the US 
aid programme; specifically the letters in the PEPFAR acronym that establish it as an 
emergency plan. To cast back to the beginning of this chapter, even the progressive 
donor bilateral agency Danida had at one time felt emboldened to challenge the 
national system following unfettered involvement in the health sector during the 
1980s when it had acted in emergency/humanitarian project mode to provide the 
country with essential health commodities. Furthermore, just as the humanitarian 
response in Uganda continues to operate largely independently of the national health 
system, the connotation of implementing an emergency plan continues to suggest 
that the normal rules of alignment and harmonisation do not apply when it is a 
humanitarian need that is going unmet.
227
 PEPFAR Phase I, which ran from FY2004-
2008 (ending at midnight on 30
th
 September 2009), was said to be the “emergency 
phase” of the US programme, while PEPFAR Phase II (FY2009-2013) is touted to be 
more about building national capacity and creating long-term sustainability.
228
 Thus 
PEPFAR‟s non-alignment with the new NSP during the fieldwork period (March 
2007- June 2008) could feasibly be explained by the persistence of the emergency 
phase of the emergency plan, which was supported by a volume of funding that 
produced its own unstoppable momentum.  
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 It is mainly external, nongovernmental partners – such as those coordinated by the UN Cluster – 
who meet the emergency/humanitarian health need in Uganda. Even the national budget allotment for 
such work, while miniscule, is separated from that of the health sector and is housed under the Office 
of the Prime Minister. 
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 The foci of the two phases were explained at PEPFAR Uganda Dissemination and Stakeholders 




However, any suggestion that PEPFAR Phase II – which commenced in October 
2009 – would be more likely to align with the revised national focus on prevention 
was not something the HIV/AIDS sub-team leader at USAID could confidently attest 
to at the time of the fieldwork. As she explained, even the country team wasn‟t privy 
to what Phase II would look like (by Spring 2008), and the one advance estimate 
they had received had suggested that the prevention component would constitute 
approximately 20% of the revised programme (USAID Interview 30
th
 April 2008) – 
a figure that would signal no change in the original prevention earmark attached to 
Phase I. And while a 20% focus wouldn‟t allude to a total disregard of the NSP - 
which, based on its “high funding scenario” would ideally earmark 28.3% of 
resources to prevention activities (UAC 2007: 46) - it hardly suggests an ethos of 
unequivocal donor alignment. An important qualification to make at this point is that 
a successor to the original PEPFAR 5-year plan was never guaranteed – PEPFAR 
Phase I was a finite initiative - hence the element of uncertainty about what Phase II 




To relate this point now to the aid effectiveness agenda and the seeming disregard of 
the PEPFAR programme to the tenets of alignment and harmonisation, the question 
remains as to why the future alignment of Phase II with Uganda‟s NSP was never 
assured, despite the national plan having garnered the input and support of the 
USAID country team? I would argue that there are three reasons for this. The first 
underscores that PEPFAR is an international programme and as such its targets and 
earmarked funding reflect that focus. The original US Five-year Global HIV/AIDS 
Strategy (US Department of State 2004) aimed to prevent 7 million new infections, 
to treat at least 2 million people, and to provide care and support to 10 million people 
living with HIV/AIDS in the focus countries during the 5-year programme.
230
 
                                                 
229
 The PEPFAR programme was re-authorised in 2008, meaning that we now know what Phase II 
looks like.  
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 An evaluation of the early years of PEPFAR questions the empirical base of the programme‟s 
performance targets, finding “The Leadership Act did not provide a rationale for the derivation of the 
performance targets for prevention, treatment and care” (IOM 2007: 67). Nevertheless, Oomman et al. 
underline just how important those targets have become: “Progress against these targets is the 
principle way that Congress assesses PEPFAR‟s performance; as a result, PEPFAR is highly 
orientated towards meeting these numerical targets” (Oomman et al. 2007: 11). They also note the 
downside of this approach: “The emphasis on targets leads PEPFAR to prioritise speed and efficiency 




Moreover, the original Leadership Act that established the Fund in 2003 dictated that 
PEPFAR money should be allocated as follows: 55% for treatment, 15% for care, 
20% for prevention (of which 33.3% be spent on abstinence until marriage 
programmes) and not less than 10% for orphans and vulnerable children (of which at 
least 50% shall be provided through NGOs).
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 Indeed, the heightened appeal of the 
treatment component deserves special mention at this point, as it may serve to 
explain why PEPFAR is unlikely to align with Uganda‟s prevention focus in the near 
future. Morrison attributes the prioritisation of the treatment earmark to the USA‟s 
fixation on numerical targets and attribution for results:  
 
“Making the case for providing treatment to extend the lives of people living 
with HIV is inherently more compelling than advocating prevention of HIV 
infections: the former delivers a tangible service – with observable results – 
that restores hope for individuals; the latter, when successful, is a nonevent” 
(Morrison 2007: 82). 
 
Moreover, as he points out, much of the prevention terrain is contested, confused as 
it is by moral and cultural values (Morrison 2007). On two counts therefore, 
treatment is established as the more appealing facet of the prevention, treatment, care 
continuum for donors.
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 This is amply demonstrated in PEPFAR‟s changing budget 
allocations over its first three-years: whereby the proportion of funding for treatment 
increased from 34-45%, while prevention dropped 9%, and care remained constant 
(IOM 2007: 106). To conclude this point therefore, the Uganda country programme 
was, and continues to be dictated within the very stringent confines of the 
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 The PEPFAR evaluation also questions the evidence base of PEPFAR‟s original budget 
allocations, noting that “Relatively little information existed [in 2003] with which to determine 
precisely how resources should be allocated to achieve the performance targets in the focus countries; 
thus the budget allocations could not be fully evidence-based. Even in the instances where the 
available information allowed reasonable estimates, the situation has since changed so rapidly that 
those estimates are no longer accurate” (IOM 2007: 98). 
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 A bias for treatment transcends the PEPFAR programme; the three largest GHIs operating in 
HIV/AIDS (PEPFAR, GFATM and the World Bank‟s MAP) have all been found to be 
“disproportionately focused on treatment and care at the expense of prevention” (Oomman et al. 2007: 
62). A similar bias for treatment was unearthed in an analysis of expenditure in Uganda‟s health 
sector, which found “Preferential medicines expenditure on large expensive commodities…” 
(Nabyonga et al. 2009: 8). The situation is such that Biehl (2007) has written about the 
“pharmaceuticalization of public health,” following Brazil‟s successful efforts to make access to 






 This in itself will likely preclude PEPFAR‟s 
alignment with Uganda‟s NSP in the near future. 
 
The second issue refers to the first, but also to a point better made in Chapter Four of 
this thesis, that there are often huge discrepancies between the objectives and 
sentiments of the in country team versus those of their headquarters (HQ) which, in 
some instances can render the better intentions of the field staff impotent (Office of 
the Prime Minister 2008). To elucidate, the HIV/AIDS sub-team leader at USAID 
affirmed that the country team supported Uganda‟s push on prevention and suggested 
they would have to get “creative” to try to support this at the country level despite a 
potentially conflicting mandate from HQ (USAID Interview 30
th
 April 2008).  
 
The third reason relates to an assumption – indeed the assumption that underpins the 
aid effectiveness agenda (and which Shiffman (2006) has already called into 
question) – that donors will prioritise a recipient need framework when attempting to 
improve the effectiveness of their aid and only then will favour behaviours that 
promote alignment, ownership and harmonisation. While we continue to work on this 
assumption, the reasoning behind the stance of the PEPFAR programme remains 
opaque. It is only when we set it aside and allow for the possibility that the PEPFAR 
programme is actively prioritising a provider interest framework that its programme 
objectives begin to make sense. Shiffman makes this point directly when explaining 
the US administration‟s burgeoning interest in HIV/AIDS:  
 
“A provider interest framework presumes that the interests of constituencies 
in industrialized states are paramount. Donors may prioritise a disease 
because political elites perceive a disease to be a national threat. For instance, 
in 2000 the Clinton administration labelled the global spread of HIV/AIDS a 
national security threat…In consequence, for the first time the United States 
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 The targets for Phase II are as follows: treat 3 million, prevent 12 million new infections and 
provide care for 12 million. The funding conditions for Phase II aren‟t as strict as in Phase I but 
remain quite specific. Guidelines stipulate that over half of the funds must be spent on treatment and 
that at least half of all money directed towards preventing sexual HIV transmission should be for: 
“activities promoting abstinence, delay of sexual debut, monogamy, fidelity, and partner reduction.” 




Security Council became involved in the fight against an infectious disease” 




Indeed, the point Shiffman alludes to here about the inclusion of the US Security 
Council is borne out by the multi-agency approach adopted by the PEPFAR 
programme, which sees a host of US agencies, beyond the traditional bilateral aid 




Furthermore, this provider interest theory goes some way to explaining why 
domestic policy is not awarded the same degree of reverence by the PEPFAR 
programme as it is by say, the Danida or WHO programmes. In short, the US 
administration having assumed ownership of the threat posed by the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic has similarly chosen to retain ownership of the policy framework that 
accompanies it. From this standpoint the importance of making Phase I of the 
PEPFAR programme an „emergency phase‟ begins to take on new meaning: the 
evocation of a humanitarian intervention imbued the programme with a moral 
authority to bypass the red tape and institutional inadequacies of the aid recipient 
country to reap quick results, while failing to make it entirely explicit that the threat 
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 Morrison likens the US‟s conceptualisation of HIV/AIDS to that of terror, explaining its public 
appeal: “In post-September 11 America, HIV/AIDS inherently resonated with the public‟s new, raw 
consciousness of terror. Here was a disease with special, pernicious properties: it lay unseen, 
spreading quietly for years” (Morrison 2007: 72). An evaluation of PEPFAR also points to the loftier 
goals of the programme, noting that “Global security is profoundly influenced by our increasing 
health interdependence…The PEPFAR initiative should be seen not only as an important investment 
in the lives of many individuals and their families, but also as an investment in global security” (IOM 
2007: xi).   
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 The following US government departments are described as PEPFAR implementing agencies: the 
Department of State, USAID, the Department of Defence, the Department of Commerce, the 
Department of Labour, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Peace Corps. 
http://www.pepfar.gov/agencies/index.htm [Accessed 17/06/09].  
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 Oomman et al. (2007) record praise for the PEPFAR programme, in relation to its speedy 
disbursement and user-friendly funding request system. Yet they are also explicit that “PEPFAR 
money is channelled primarily outside the government system. Recipient governments are not 
involved in oversight, although they do receive information about planned activities from PEPFAR 
staff” (Oomman et al. 2007: 29). Nabyonga et al. acknowledge the implications of this mode of 
working for Uganda: “Given the slow bureaucracy in the public systems, donors may prefer to bypass 
the national systems and spend the money among the private sector for quick results. The implication 
is increased expenditure on non-HSSP objectives, poor alignment on sectoral expenditure, and overall 




During its emergency phase the PEPFAR programme enjoyed five years of relative 
freedom to bypass the policy mechanisms and national systems that impinge on the 
daily lives of Uganda‟s other Health and AIDS Development Partners. During this 
time, PEPFAR became an embedded component of the HIV/AIDS response in 
Uganda (compare the relative financial security of the ever increasing PEPFAR 
funding to the unpredictable and fragmented GFATM rounds).
237
 Consequently, one 
might posit why now, in its second phase, the programme should chose to opt into a 
more meaningful partnership at the country level when not mandated to do so. 
Moreover, if the main argument used to persuade the US administration to adopt the 
tenets of alignment, ownership and harmonisation is centred on the logic of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, then the case presented could appear fairly unconvincing. A 
surprise finding of a report tied in with the development of the 3-Year Rolling 
Procurement Plan for Essential Medicines and Health Supplies was that the medical 
supply chain management model employed by the PEPFAR programme – which has 
been highly criticised in Uganda for bypassing the national system – has proved 
incredibly successful (MoH 2007d).  
 
The topic of medical procurement and supply management provides a common 
strand with which to juxtapose the programmatic approaches of the three Health 
Development Partners addressed in this chapter, because while Danida and WHO 
have opted to play the long game in Uganda‟s health sector, the PEPFAR has 
performed more in the role of an humanitarian aid programme. Of course the framing 
of the diverging approaches is central to their justification: while Danida and WHO 
concern themselves with the Paris tenet of „ownership‟ and the long-term 
sustainability of policy in view of Uganda‟s maturing sector-wide approach in health, 
the PEPFAR programme is dealing with a global emergency. The approaches pit 
capacity and consensus building against unfettered intervention.  
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 Indeed the unusual and strained relationship between the GFATM and PEPFAR deserves special 
mention, as the US has played an integral role in undermining the influence of the multilateral aid 
instrument in recent years. Morrison describes the competition that now exists between the two 
instruments as “zero sum” (Morrison 2007: 83), noting that the US has fallen short of its original 
commitments to the GFATM, challenging the Fund‟s ability to meet its existing commitment and/or 
emerging demands. Brainard (2007a) has attributed the US‟s declining interest in the GFATM with its 




The emergency framing of the PEPFAR programme is applied to the issue of supply 
chain management in the US Global Five-Year Global HIV/AIDS Strategy. In a 
section entitled “rapidly scale up supply chain management to support HIV/AIDS 
treatment, prevention and care,” the intention to bypass national structures is made 
explicit:  
 
“In the short-term, the approach will require a combination of outsourcing 
some logistics functions to the private sector, rapidly building a vertical 
distribution and information management system with external technical 
assistance, and improving the storage conditions, distribution networks, and 
human capacity skills…” (US Department of State 2004: 70). 
 
How this translates on the ground is that the PEPFAR programme contracts John 
Snow Inc/DELIVER, an American company which uses the Medical Access model, 
to procure antiretrovirals (ARVs) for Uganda.
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 Once in the country, PEPFAR then 
contracts the National Medical Stores (NMS) to store the ARVs, before using the 
Medical Access model again for distribution. PEPFAR also funds some technical 
assistance in country with regards to the procurement system, which shall be 
elucidated on shortly. The main point to emphasise here however, is that the way 
donors are supposed to procure, store and distribute in Uganda is through NMS. The 
PEPFAR practice of simply using the national procurement agent for 3
rd
 party 
storage has been hugely frowned upon in Uganda. Yet even the NSP acknowledges 
that “weakness in the forecasting, procurement, and distribution/supply chain” (UAC 
2007: 36) is weakening the HIV/AIDS response in Uganda and resulting in frequent 
stock-outs of essential commodities.  
 
The weakness in the national procurement system is the reason each of the Health 
Development Partners addressed in this chapter have dedicated resources to it. The 
national 3-Year Rolling Plan developed with technical input from Danida and WHO 
is a direct response to the current problems, and it is a part of the whole process of 
advocating on behalf of, and rolling out that plan that the WHO contributed to An 
Evaluation of the First Rolling 3-Year Plan: Year 1 Implementation of the Plan 
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(MoH 2007d). The Evaluation unearthed three major findings: that Uganda 
continued to experience an unacceptable level of essential supply stock outs, that the 
GFATM – which also uses a parallel procurement agent – showed a budget 
performance of just 61% (i.e. of pledged versus received procurements) and that the 
Medical Access model employed by PEPFAR had performed beyond everyone‟s 
expectations. As this WHO commentator said of the PEPFAR result:  
 
“Contrary to what most of us has been thinking in the past about the 
inefficiencies of PEPFAR, the evaluation finds that actually PEPFAR has 
done so well. So well. Very efficiently. In fact there‟s a recommendation that 





The comment above again underscores the unchallenged assumption underpinning 
the aid effectiveness debate (that parallel working has to be bad). It is revealing to 
note how deeply the assumption is now embedded in the day-to-day working of 
Uganda‟s Health Development Partners. 
 
To expand on the findings of the evaluation in regards to the Medical Access model, 
a central attribute of the US model was identified as its ability to track ARVs all the 
way from the supplier to the end beneficiaries. This denotes a degree of micro 
management not yet available within the national system, yet one very much in 
keeping with the demands of the world‟s most risk-averse bilateral donor. The 
ramifications of the findings are such that the evaluation goes on to make this 
surprising recommendation: 
 
“The Medical Access model could be scaled up to the handle GF-ARV 
[Global Fund ARV] procurement in the short term (FY 08-09), and replicated 
– possibly as a prime vendor model with storage and distribution facilities 
nested within NMS – for public sector provision of ARVs in the medium to 
longer term.” (FY 09-10)” (MoH 2007d: 7).  
 
The recommendation to replicate the procurement model utilised by the PEPFAR 
programme in Uganda signals a major change in stance toward the US programme 
within the country. Whereas its mode of parallel working had previously provoked 




disrupt their system and bring it into the mainstream which is inefficient. Rather, 
why don‟t you study what they‟re doing and see if you can get some lessons?” 
(WHO Interview ii 8
th
 November 2007). The finding and the response both point to 
the lack of empirical grounding of the aid effectiveness agenda, and demonstrate how 
quickly embedded assumptions can be upturned when the evidence is finally 
presented.  
 
So far this part of the PEPFAR case study has juxtaposed the PEPFAR and 
Danida/WHO approaches in the area of medical supply management. I need now to 
add another layer of complexity, because the fact is that the USAID/PEPFAR 
programme funds technical support to the National Medical Stores. Furthermore, it is 
a vocal supporter of the 3-Year Rolling Plan at the country level and is now 
proposing to station an ARV logistics person in the medicines management division 
of the MoH to help with the operationalisation of the plan (in the same division as 
the Danida Medicines Management Advisor is situated). In short, this aspect of the 
US aid programme is hugely contradictory: for while it supports the national system 
with technical assistance and has agreed to feed programme data into the 3-Year 
Rolling Plan, it remains adamantly opposed to using the national system except as a 
storage facility. Finally, and to confuse matters even more, the findings of the 
Rolling Plan Evaluation mean its conflicted stance has now garnered some reluctant 
support at the country level.  
 
While it is not the objective of this chapter to unearth the undisclosed objectives of 
the PEPFAR programme in Uganda, a source of contention related to its funding of 
technical assistance to the NMS is worth exploring. In 2007 the PEPFAR programme 
asked Supply Chain Management Systems (SCMS) to carry out an evaluation of 
NMS.
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 The resulting report provoked a strong response from those of Uganda‟s 
Health Development Partners with a history of providing long-term support to the 
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 Supply Chain Management Systems is a PEPFAR-funded project, implemented by The Partnership 
for Supply Chain Management. The latter is a consortium of 17 companies (with a specialisation in 
providing procurement and logistical support), established in late 2005 by PEPFAR, and managed 
under a contract with USAID. “The stated goal of the partnership is to support the provision of an 
uninterrupted supply of HIV/AIDS commodities flowing through an accountable system” (IOM 2007: 




organisation, notably WHO and Danida. Yet the complaints voiced weren‟t 
concerned with the report‟s controversial content – for instance describing the new 
Danida-funded warehouse as: “fit for the storage of expired drugs” and suggesting 
Danida should pay for a new software system (Danida Interview 9
th
 May 2008)  – 
but with its lack of transparency and the bullish manner in which SCMS appeared to 
be attempting to foist its recommendations on the country. A central issue (at the 
time of fieldwork) was that Uganda‟s health stakeholders hadn‟t been able to access 
the full report – despite its main findings being readily disseminated – with SCMS 
apparently unwilling to release it. As this WHO commentator explained, the salient 
MoH technical working group had repeatedly asked that the report be officially 
submitted so that it would have the chance to respond to it. By November 2007, he 
said he was now growing concerned because “They have not done that. They prefer 
to go and talk to some big person there, some big person there. We hope that big 
person will veto or prevail…but it could backfire.” This same interviewee perceived 
that SCMS had “an agenda” and that this was “to substitute NMS” (WHO Interview 
ii 8
th
 November 2007). 
 
Given what is known about the private funding agreement the PEPFAR programme 
has signed up in Uganda, the suggestion that one of its project partners might be 
attempting to veto the official policy discussion mechanisms is hardly far fetched.
240
 
Moreover, as the WHO interviewee underlined, the PEPFAR programme has form of 
contracting external partners who over time appear to become permanent fixtures of 
the national response. Here he cites the USAID-funded DELIVER/JSI, the 
organisation responsible for introducing the Medical Access model, and which has 
been supplying the country with ARVs so successfully for the past five years (WHO 
Interview ii 8
th
 November 2008). Indeed, an evaluation of the early years of PEPFAR 
also make explicit mention of the Partnership for Supply Chain Management 
Systems (the PEPFAR-established consortium which implements SCMS), attesting 
that the concerns raised in Uganda are not isolated. The evaluation criticises the 
Partnership for “lacking adequate transparency in sharing plans for an exit strategy” 
(IOM 2007: 164), and suggests it may actually be undermining national supply 
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 The private funding agreement that allows PEPFAR to channel off-plan and off-budget funds into 




capacity by operating a parallel system.
241
 Certainly, a look on the SCMS website in 
2010 fails to contradict such concerns, as it becomes clears that the PEPFAR-





PEPFAR Case Study Conclusion 
An examination of the PEPFAR programme in Uganda provides an interesting 
juxtaposition to the Danida and WHO case studies. As a prism through which to 
view the substantive value of the aid effectiveness agenda it plays a devil‟s advocate 
role, showing that the behaviours advocated in the agenda are subject to challenge. 
Indeed, the picture to emerge of the PEPFAR programme when judged by the 
standards of the agenda is strangely conflicting. Thus is the programme bypassing 
national policy or trying to reconcile a global agenda to a local one? Is it 
undermining the short-term capacity of the national procurement system or providing 
a possible template for its long-term development? Is it building the capacity of 
National Medical Stores or planning its demise?   
 
I would argue that when it comes to PEPFAR, the issues continue to be confused by 
three factors: the „emergency‟ tag attached to the programme at the country level 
which originally gave it free reign to bypass the national system, by the scale and 
channels of its aid, and to a lesser extent, by the external perception of the US 
HIV/AIDS programme as being in some way suspicious – a perception which the 
programme at once condemns yet conspires to perpetuate through its lack of 
transparency.
243
  What is clear is that the assumptions that underpin the aid 
effectiveness agenda  - while not empirically based – have come to provide an 
acceptable means for partners to denigrate the US programme. However, it is a non 
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 WHO echoes this concern: “A particular concern is that when improvements result from the 
creation of parallel systems by GHIs, they may compromise opportunities to help build and maintain a 
country‟s own procurement and management supply system” (WHO 2009: 4). A final concern shared 
by the WHO and the PEPFAR evaluation relates to the sustainability of such arrangements (IOM 
2007; WHO 2009). 
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 Having initially been brought in to carry out a discrete evaluation in 2007, SCMS has since moved 
into quantification and forecasting, procurement, logistics capacity management and warehouse 
management in Uganda. http://scms.pfscm.org/scms/where/ug [Accessed 10/05/10]. 
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 PEPFAR Implementation: Progress and Promise attests to the lack of transparency in the aid 




sequitur to suggest that because the PEPFAR programme is not „aligned‟, 
„harmonised‟, or „owned‟ it is not successful. 
 
USAID/PEPFAR staff regularly participate in the country‟s health coordination fora, 
attending the Health Development Partners Group, the AIDS Development Partners 
Group, the Health Policy Advisory Committee and the technical working group on 
communicable disease. In addition, they organise their own fora, like the PEPFAR 
Uganda Dissemination and Stakeholders Consultation (which I myself attended in 
May 2007). Yet just how meaningful their participation can be in such arenas in light 
of the Congressional earmarking and numerical targets governing the PEPFAR 
programme is questionable. Could it be therefore, that the USAID/PEPFAR 
programme is genuinely interested in a bit of self-legitimisation abroad, and/or that 
the programme could eventually win round its critics with more concerted efforts at 
diplomacy and consensus building in country? I for one would like to think so. 
Certainly, regardless of its early bullish reputation in Uganda, the aid programme has 
its partners in a bind: the scale of PEPFAR funding to the country is now such that 
Uganda‟s HIV/AIDS and health stakeholders have no choice but to engage with it. 
To put it into the words of one Health Development Partner: “They [PEPFAR] are 
the ones who have the money so we have to find a way of bringing them into the 





In this discussion I have juxtaposed three very different organisations to demonstrate 
some of the ways in which Uganda‟s Health Development Partners are attempting to 
build policy consensus to further their organisational objectives in country. My 
intention was never to pit one organisation against the other, just to illustrate that 
even development partners like Danida and WHO – who appear to demonstrate a 
genuine commitment to the Paris principle of ownership - are engaged in acts of self-
legitimisation when they attempt to win policy approval through coordination 




commends the efforts of those development partners who work to reconcile their 
organisational objectives to those of their host country. If, at the end of the day the 
rewards of such efforts are a) the continuance of aid flows (through Danida), or b) 
the vindication of a raison d‟être (for WHO) than so be it. It is not cynical to be 
realistic about the competitiveness that drives the modern aid industry (itself once a 
vocal proponent of market-centric, neoliberal values). Indeed, given the sterling 
reputation of the Danida health programme in Uganda, it may come as something of 
a surprise to learn that it too was waiting to hear its fate in the division of labour 
exercise taking place in Uganda‟s health sector at the time of fieldwork, with the 
indications being that it would leave (Interview 7
th
 May 2008). In short, Danida (like 
Nordic counterpart SIDA) was found to be taking its Paris commitments very 
seriously.  
 
However, the inclusion of the USAID/PEPFAR case study in this chapter reminds us 
that for most signatories, the Paris Declaration is continued to be viewed as a pick 
and mix checklist, whereby the more inconvenient commitments can be overlooked. 
Thus while the evidence cited in the USAID/PEPFAR case study would suggest that 
USAID/PEPFAR is not subject to the same preoccupation with policy as Uganda‟s 
other HDPs, this should not be equated with a general disinterest in legitimisation. 
The difference between Danida and WHO, and PEPFAR is that the PEPFAR 
programme is legitimised not by validation within focus countries but by meeting the 
performance targets established for it in Washington. By owning the threat posed by 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and framing PEPFAR as a humanitarian initiative, the US 
PEPFAR programme has redesigned the incentive structure for aid. Subsequently, it 
has (thus far) sidestepped the need to seriously impact on HIV/AIDS policy in 
Uganda. However, PEPFAR Phase II might yet force the US programme out of 
isolation, as it transitions from emergency mode to a sustainable, systems 
strengthening approach. While in emergency mode there was at least some 
suggestion that PEPFAR might eventually leave Uganda. The current indications of 
Phase II are that it‟ll be there for some time. Perhaps facing a long game, even the 
















The clarion call of the neoliberal agenda was the diversification of actors and funding 
sources within health provision to capitalise on the market and compensate for the 
inefficiencies of the state. With old-school neoliberalism out of favour, 
development‟s „good governance agenda‟ has served to sustain the message, 
although in this instance emphasising the developing state‟s deficiencies in 
absorptive and institutional capacity, and proselytising on behalf of the 
democratisation of health (GFATM 2008b).
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 Wood (1997) has underscored the 
distinction, noting that under the „good governance‟ agenda the state‟s role is at once 
reinstated and curtailed: today the state is there to define, guarantee and regulate 
health entitlements, not to single-handedly deliver services. Such thinking has paved 
the way for the proliferation of private and non-governmental organisations in 
development and laid the foundations for a binary framing in development, which 
serves to depict the developing state in terms of its weaknesses and civil society in 
terms of its strengths (Crewe and Harrison (1998) have noted the development 
industry‟s tendency toward oversimplification and paired opposites).  
 
Korten (1990) was first to note the growing tendency for civil society organisations 
(CSOs) to be employed as „public service contractors‟ in developing countries, with 
Robinson (1997) establishing that support for this trend emanated predominantly 
from donors. In this chapter, I examine this trend in Uganda, positing that aid donors 
are capitalising on the coordination drive in the health sector to attempt to dilute state 
control. They are doing so through the promotion and facilitation of increased civil 
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 The promotion of CSO activity in developing health systems is a natural corollary of the good 
governance agenda promoted by the World Bank, which since 1998, has been advocating for an 




society participation in each aspect of the sector‟s delivery and deliberation 
mechanisms. Riddell (2007) laid the foundations for such an investigation, noting 
that:  
 
“A growing number of official donors view NGOs [non-governmental 
organisations] not merely as different from, and as working in parallel to, 
recipient governments, but as a means of bypassing governments which they 
judge to be either not sufficiently committed to or unable to deliver the 
poverty-reducing impact required” (Riddell 2007: 160). 
 
While civil society organisations (CSOs) in Uganda – and in particular Faith-Based 
Organisations – enjoy a long-standing tradition as service providers within the 
country, the key difference defining the current aid climate is for their influence to be 
formalised and extended from the parish/district level to the centre, thanks in a large 
part to support issuing from the Health Development Partners and the Global Health 
Initiatives - specifically the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
and the President‟s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief. The result is a sharp increase 
in the number and diversity of stakeholder voices represented at Uganda‟s foremost 
health discussion forum, the Health Policy Advisory Committee. In short therefore, a 
very literal manifestation of state dilution is being prescribed by health donors in 
Uganda. 
 
In forwarding the proposition that coordination measures in Uganda‟s health sector 
attempt to check state dominance, I shall pinpoint three developments as supporting 
evidence: the Long-Term Institutional Arrangements (LTIAs) - devised initially for 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria but now proclaimed as the blueprint 
for all aid-centric relations; the new basket funding mechanism for CSOs: Uganda‟s 
„Civil Society Fund‟- itself a by product of the LTIAs; and the supplementary 
coordination networks being established – at least in part - to provide a united voice 
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 Rather than being contained in one document, the LTIAs have been refined via a series of 
documents, which express the iterative exchange the country was engaged in with the Global Fund 
Secretariat during 2006 and 2007. I draw on five of those documents in my thesis. References for 
these are to be found in an annexed section at the end of the main bibliography. An explanation of 




Before addressing these developments in detail however, it is important to briefly 
acknowledge the concessions to centralised dominance the Ugandan state has already 
made in relation to its health sector - via its decentralisation model and sector-wide 
approach (SWAp) – and impress the unlikelihood that it will prove a passive 
observer when faced with subtle attempts to dilute its influence further.
246
 Rather, 
Uganda‟s experiences of both decentralisation and the SWAp should demonstrate 
that the nation state has, and will continue to actively negotiate proposed concessions 
to its authority. In this way, the current efforts of Uganda‟s Development Partners 
threaten to evoke Ferguson‟s anti-politics machine, with development appearing to 
depoliticise everything it touches, all the while performing “its own pre-eminently 
political operation of expanding bureaucratic state power” (Ferguson 1990: xv). 
 
 
 Decentralisation and the Sector-Wide Approach 
 
As Chapter Two has already suggested, Uganda‟s 1990‟s health reforms garnered 
widespread international praise and attention for the NRM government. Yet, as 
numerous case studies latterly stimulated by the reforms now attest, they have to 
some extent failed to issue the radical curtailment of central power they once 
inferred. Nonetheless, as I shall discuss, they can still be argued to have laid the 
foundations for the recent challenges to state power that form the basis of this 
chapter. 
 
According to the Rondinelli (1981) typology, Uganda has employed the “devolution” 
model of decentralisation where the main emphasis is on strengthening local 
government to enable it to assume responsibility for service provision at the district 
and sub-district levels. A key feature of the Ugandan model has been to award the 
country‟s districts with block grants to spend according to district-owned work plans. 
Yet however radical this move may have originally been viewed (Bossert and 
Beauvais 2002), the “discretionary” component – i.e. the proportion of the grant that 
the district is wholly free to allocate - has been found to be seriously constrained in 
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Uganda (Hutchinson 1998), undermining the potential check to state power that 
decentralisation was anticipated to facilitate. Thus, by financial year 2006/07, local 
governments were found to receive “up to 10% flexibility in the use of the sector 
recurrent conditional grant non-wage to finance either un-funded or under-funded 
activities within a sector or in another sector” (MoH 2007a: 92).  
 
Moreover, just as Uganda‟s centre has retained its financial dominance over the 
districts despite the decentralisation model, the districts have also been found to be 
sidelined by the various coordination forums discussing health policy in Uganda‟s 
capital:  “While district representatives participate in various SWAp-related 
structures (e.g. JRMs and TWGs), these structures remain largely under the control 
of the centre, and the extent to which the districts play an active role in these 
structures is questionable” (Oliveira-Crux et al. 2006: 32). The degree to which this 
marginalisation has occurred as a result of geographical barriers as opposed to firm 
intent deserves careful consideration; for instance Jeppsson would suggest that 
gathering district officials outside their respective districts has “symbolic value” 
(Jeppsson 2002: 2053) and denotes that processes are run according to conditions 
determined by the centre. Irrespective of whether or not you take this view however, 
the ramifications of exclusion remain the same: despite decentralisation in Uganda, 
the local government input at the central level is curtailed and districts are compelled 
to align annual work-plans to national policies, the development of which they have 




The next feature of the Ugandan decentralisation model however, can be argued to 
have laid the foundations for the enlarged role the Long-Term Institutional 
Arrangements have now earmarked for civil society in Uganda‟s health sector: the 
permission for districts to contract services out to CSOs. 
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 Having examined the decentralisation process in the health and forestry sectors in Nepal, Harper 
and Tarnowski had cause to wonder if decentralisation wasn‟t actually consolidating the state‟s 
dominance, noting “Paradoxically, or so it seems to us, despite enunciatory claims to centralization, 
these programmes are producing an entire apparatus through which the state is able to govern its 
people, its health and management of resources, in an increasingly centralized manner” (Harper and 




“In Uganda, district governments were permitted to contract out services to 
non-governmental organizations and mission health providers. NGOs 
managed nearly a fifth of all health facilities in Uganda and their already 
significant influence was expected to grow as decentralization permitted 
service contracting” (Bossert and Beauvais 2002: 23).  
 
 I shall argue that it is currently the augmented role envisioned for CSOs - rather than 
the districts - that represents the covert threat to state control underpinning the 
coordination rhetoric that characterises Uganda‟s health sector. Firstly however, it is 
necessary to situate the recent ascendancy of CSO influence in another health system 
reform of the period: the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). 
 
Uganda‟s SWAp represents another reform that has fallen short of the expectations 
placed upon it to mitigate state control over the sector. Again, this has partially 
derived from assumptions incurred by sector decentralisation, which affirm that the 
centre‟s role is changed from one of service provision to one of stewardship: 
  
“What makes SWAps attractive is that they are perceived as being able to 
strengthen governments‟ ability to oversee the entire health sector, develop 
policy and plans, and allocate and manage resources. They envisage a 
different and expanded role for MoHs, for example, where policy-makers will 
look beyond the public sector, to explore the potential role of other 
stakeholders, whether service deliverers in the private sector or financiers” 
(Walt et al. 1999b: 280). 
 
Key to this statement – with regards to this discussion - is the notion that the state 
can explore the potential of non-governmental stakeholders to assist with service 
provision in Uganda; indeed other commentators have built on this idea, claiming 
that “SWAps, at least in theory, encourage the input of civil society in both the 
design and monitoring of government sector policies and practices” (Elsey et al. 
2005: 153). Naturally, this argument is made all the more vehemently in a 
developing country context where the budget envelope for health is notoriously 
constrained. 
 
Yet, while Uganda‟s SWAp certainly set the stage to increase the number of CSOs 




potential to increase non-governmental input into sector decision making or policy 
setting. To elucidate, one study found that while local governments had invited CSOs 
to attend district level committees, this did not in itself guarantee “a two-way flow of 
information.”  Instead it seemed the intention of the district authorities was simply to 
advise and coordinate the CSOs; and that they were “not as yet ready to accept the 
role of civil society organisations in advocating the health needs of women and men” 
(Elsey et al. 2005: 154). Similarly, at the central level, Jeppsson‟s 2002 study failed 
to find any evidence of increased sway being enjoyed by Uganda‟s health service 
implementers – whether district or CSO-based - as an outcome of the SWAP. Instead 
districts were experiencing the same treatment they had been doling out to CSOs - 
facing a prescriptive MoH as opposed to a facilitative one.  
 
An unexpected consequence of the Ugandan SWAp therefore was an augmentation 
of state influence at the centre. Interestingly, Jeppsson attributes the reaffirmation of 
state power during SWAp development as a consequence of the processes involved:  
 
“During the SWAp process in Uganda, the role of the MoH has emerged 
clearer and stronger…most important is the power emerging from the 
negotiation process proper, which is the core of the SWAp process. The main 
questions are who directs the process, who participates in the process and 
who decides the boundaries of the sector and what it should contain. The 
process is seen as a stage where power relations interact” (Jeppsson 2002: 
2059). 
 
This point is a crucial one considering the central role processes now play in 
coordination fora in Uganda. Earlier chapters have offered up numerous examples of 
how the rules of engagement between the Government of Uganda and its Health 
Development Partners have been negotiated and formalised over the years in line 
with aid effectiveness rhetoric concerning „coordination‟, „harmonisation‟, 
„ownership‟ and „alignment‟; and, given the amount of energy both sides have 
evidently expended into deciding upon them, it should come as no surprise to find 
that issues of power and control are at their crux. What is interesting to this 
discussion however, is the success with which the Ugandan state has so far defended 




sector reforms. That this has been achieved through deceptively bureaucratic 
processes is instructive.  
 
So far I have attempted to demonstrate that while the reforms instigated by Uganda‟s 
central government have certainly facilitated a diversification and increase in the 
number of stakeholders engaged in health service provision, it was a non sequitur 
that the value the state attached to the districts and CSOs as health implementers 
would extend to see it consulting them on matters of policy or financing. What 
follows in this chapter therefore, is a discussion of the recent developments in the 
health sector that appear to hold renewed potential for CSOs to challenge the centre‟s 
dominance. Promoted under the guise of aid effectiveness and its drive towards 
increased „coordination‟, it is critical that two of the three developments discussed – 
the Long Term Institutional Arrangements and civil society‟s emerging coordination 
forums – draw on the limited concessions already made by the government via the 
decentralisation and SWAp reforms and are primarily concerned with getting civil 
society involved in the “negotiation process proper” (Jeppsson 2002: 2059); while 
the remainder – the „Civil Society Fund‟ - aims to bypass the processes of 
government altogether using a re-working of the donor project modality: basket 
funding. Yet, whether central to, or actively bypassing the centrally-owned 
processes, the three developments hold one thing in common: each is being heavily 
promoted by Uganda‟s donors to the health sector - the Health Development Partners 
and the Global Health Initiatives. Notably, the Ministry of Health is also openly 
embracing each of the three developments whole-heartedly. Although, as established, 
the Ugandan nation state has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to subvert the best 






The Long-Term Institutional Arrangements 
 
The Long-Term Institutional Arrangements (LTIAs) devised for the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) can be seen to have capitalised on 
the concessions made by the Ugandan Government to civil society in the original 
decentralisation and SWAp arrangements by finally offering it meaningful 
participation in Uganda‟s “negotiation process proper” (Jeppsson 2002: 2059). Two 
key features of its recent promotion include representation at the Health Policy 
Advisory Committee (HPAC) and the future appointment of a second Principal 
Recipient from civil society to manage Global Fund grants for the non-public 
sector.
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 I shall elucidate on the precise nature of the dispensations the LTIAs have 
made for Uganda‟s CSOs shortly. Firstly however, it is necessary to situate them 
within the broader ethos of the GFATM. 
 
The GFATM and Civil Society 
A cursory look at GFATM discourse highlights the diverse range of values the aid 
instrument attaches to non-governmental organisations in recipient countries. They 
are at once depicted as central to the GFATM‟s creation, as advocates for policy 
change and future funding, and as articulating the voice of people living with the 
three diseases. Furthermore, for CSOs engaged in service provision, it is suggested 
that they are key to scaling up health provision and grant absorption in recipient 
countries (GFATM 2007a). Finally, and in line with current „good governance‟ 
rhetoric, they are attached additional values as catalysts “for democratic processes as 
vulnerable and marginalized groups acquire more and more a key voice in national 
policy” (GFATM 2007a: 29); and as watchdogs, guarding against the worst failings 
of the nation state: “The sense of ownership that civil society has with regards to the 
Global Fund is a critical motivating factor for them to act as watchdog, holding 
countries as well as the Global Fund accountable for these finite resources” (GFATM 
2007a: 14). Indeed, this latter value deserves further attention in the Ugandan case, 
because it was in fact a Ugandan CSO that turned whistleblower in the GFATM 
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mismanagement scandal (Cohen 2008).
249
 Remarkable no doubt, but rather than 
being the exception that proves the rule, this one-off incidence of civil society 
holding government to account in Uganda needs to be put into perspective. The 
CIVICUS Global Survey of the State of Civil Society (Heinrich 2007) – which 
evaluates the quality and role of civil society in 44 case country studies – makes clear 
that the capacity of global civil society to perform in a watchdog role or even input 
into national budgetary decisions remains grossly underdeveloped (Riddell 2007 also 
points to the inadequate evidence base to support the argument that CSOs can deepen 
the transparency and/or accountability of institutions in aid-recipient countries). As I 
have readily observed in development therefore, it‟s the single case example and not 
the broader sample that has set the international agenda for the aid donors. Moreover, 
as I have come to expect, the purposive case study getting the most mileage is 
Uganda.  
 
In view of the multitude of values the GFATM has attached to civil society it should 
come as no surprise to learn that the GFATM is vigorously pushing the need to 
include CSO representation in the processes of government at the country level. That 
several of the values it has identified are ideological rather than empirical is at no 
point depicted as an impediment to CSO potential.  
 
The Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) is the vehicle the GFATM has fixed 
upon to facilitate CSO participation in grant receiving countries - this is the 
coordination mechanism through which GFATM country proposals are developed 
and grant implementation is monitored.
250
 The CCM is depicted by the GFATM as a 
hub for “country-level partnerships,” “participatory decision-making” and “local 
ownership,” and except in exceptional circumstances, each GFATM applicant 
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 Cohen (2005) documents the chain of events that led to the exposure of the GFATM 
mismanagement in Uganda: a representative of an anonymous Ugandan CSO emailed the Head of 
GFATM watchdog NGO Aidspan on 13
th
 June 2005. That tip off was passed on to the GFATM, 
which sent a legal counsel to meet with the whistleblower a few weeks later. The GFATM then asked 
accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers to audit the $26 million it had so far disbursed to Uganda. 
On 24
th
 August, GFATM grants to Uganda were suspended based on the findings of that audit. 
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 An explanation of the Country Coordinating Mechanism (and other GFATM entities) is outlined in 




country is expected to establish one.
251
 Yet, inherent to the GFATM 
conceptualisation of the CCM is a profound contradiction: while countries are 
permitted to adapt the CCM model according to national preferences – in order to 
create “ownership” – they are nevertheless strongly encouraged (or is that 
mandated?) to include non-governmental players as equal partners in their designs.
252
 
It is a contradiction the GFATM has itself identified: 
 
“Since the inception of the Global Fund, a programmatic tension had 
developed between the Global Fund‟s focus on principles, which stipulate, 
among other things, that countries should determine how they will manage 
their own processes…and the need expressed by key stakeholders involved in 
these processes for more guidelines and regulations to avoid malfeasance by 
those looking to benefit from involvement with the Global Fund at the 
expense or exclusion of other groups” (GFATM 2007a: 29).  
  
The importance of ensuring CSO inclusion has been felt so strongly on the GFATM 
Board that there has even been talk of issuing penalties for countries that refuse to 
comply:  
 
“Requirements alone may not be able to guarantee the effective participation 
of civil society (including vulnerable and marginalized groups) in Global 
Fund processes, unless they are enforced and unless consequences exist for 
CCMs that do not comply. Therefore, the Global Fund must decide how it 
can continue to encourage countries to determine the operation of their CCMs 
– maintaining country ownership – while at the same time upholding the 
principles embodied in the Framework Document [GFATM 2002] which 
explicitly highlight the importance of having a range of partners fully 
involved in its processes” (GFATM 2007a: 32). 
 
In short, the GFATM‟s fervent promotion of CSO involvement in CCM structures 
has more than a ring of aid conditionality. This is further evidenced in the guidelines 
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circumstances a Non-CCM proposal can be submitted. “Reasons include political or environmental 
instability, or because the populations implicated may be criminalized or persecuted” (GFATM 
2007a: 34). 
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 Interestingly the GFATM won‟t allow that the inclusion of civil society in CCMs is a condition 
precedent (CP). Instead it stipulates that while the following are “not really conditions precedent. 
They must be met before the TRP can review the proposal, but they are not CPs to the grant.” These 
include: 1. CCM members representing the non-government sectors must be selected /elected by their 
own sector(s) based on a documented, transparent process, developed within each sector, and 2. All 
CCMs are required to show evidence of membership of people living with and/or affected by the 




and minimum requirements the GFATM has established for CCMs. Thus one learns 
that “The CCM was designed to mirror the structure of the Global Fund Board” 
(GFATM 2007a: 29), where CSO participants should have full voting status and 
comprise 40% representation, and find that three out of the six Minimum 
Requirements set for CCM eligibility for funding would appear to mandate CSO 
participation. These require that CCMs exhibit a “Transparent selection process for 
CCM Membership of non-governmental members,” “Membership of persons 
affected by HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria,” and “Ensure the input of a broad range of 
stakeholders” (GFATM 2008a). 
 
The issue centres on that persistent neoliberal view of the nation state highlighted in 
the opening paragraph. This suggests that states can neither be relied upon to 
guarantee adequate public services for their citizens, nor now be trusted to spend aid 
funds in a scrupulous and transparent manner.  
 
The sixth minimum requirement of the CCM states that “When the PRs and Chair or 
Vice Chair(s) of the CCM are the same entity, CCMs must have a conflict of interest 
plan” (GFATM 2008a). That the national government would hold both seats is 
clearly not the outcome desired by the GFATM. The inferred ideal is to have a vice-
chair from a non-governmental body. Yet even with CSO representation, the role the 
state plays in CCMs continues to be problematised in GFATM discourse:  
 
“the national government has a powerful voice in CCMs and in country-level 
Global Fund processes. Given the strong representation of government in 
many countries, some groups – civil society in particular – may feel too 
intimidated to express their perceptions. In cases where they are expressed, 
the uneven balance in representation may affect whether or not these views 
are considered” (GFATM 2007a: 34).    
 
In short, it would appear that what the GFATM is envisioning through its multi-
stakeholder CCMs is a dilution of state power. What I find noteworthy is that it is a 
lack of cohesion within civil society – rather than qualms over national sovereignty - 
that is portrayed as the single biggest impediment to achieving this end. As such, 




representation within these processes” (HIV/AIDS Alliance & GFATM 2008: 5). 
Clearly the potential power of coordination groupings – which ostensibly improve 
sub-group participation in national processes – is not lost on the GFATM. Thus it is 
the rhetoric of „coordination‟ - and its associated terms „partnership‟ and 
„participation‟ - which serve to mask the tacit purpose behind the GFATM‟s 
objective to ensure civil society representation in its CCMs: its desire to offset state 
power through the realisation of participatory democracy. That the democracy it 
extols may need to be imposed top-down, signals the pragmatic modification the 
Fund is willing to make to its definition of country „ownership‟ for the greater good.   
  
Later in this chapter, I shall outline how certain CSOs in Uganda are currently 
heeding the GFATM‟s advice to coordinate in a bid to strengthen their voice now 
they have been invited to join the discussion table, in addition to highlighting some 
of the factors which may still impede their ability to act as an equal partner vis à vis 
the Uganda nation state. Before doing so however, it is useful to clarify exactly what 
concessions civil society is now, in theory, entitled to enjoy as a consequence of the 
GFATM‟s influence in Uganda. 
 
The Long-Term Institutional Arrangements and Civil Society 
The LTIAs are a set of practical guidelines for the management of development aid 
in Uganda. They are the product of a broad stakeholder consultation undertaken in 
the country following the GFATM‟s suspension in 2005, and are a reminder of the 
country‟s ongoing efforts to rebuild donor confidence following the scandal.  
 
The overriding principle of the LTIAs is “the realignment of all funding mechanisms 
to existing institutional arrangements…” (Doc 1. 2006: 5). As such, it was been 
decided that two existing coordination fora - the Health Policy Advisory Committee 
(HPAC) and the Partnership Committee of Uganda AID Commission – will come 
together to subsume the role of CCM for Uganda, with the HPAC concentrating its 
efforts on the TB and Malaria grants, and the Partnership Committee on the 
HIV/AIDS grants (this division of labour is fully elucidated upon in Chapter Four). 




parallel body, dislocated from the state apparatus and dedicated solely to GFATM 
business. At this point I should impress that I will be concentrating solely on the 
ramifications of the new CCM arrangement for the HPAC forum. This is because the 
HPAC is a forum dedicated to operationalising the health SWAp in Uganda, while 
the composition and focus of the Partnership Committee reflects Uganda‟s 
multisectoral approach to HIV/AIDS, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Accordingly, an important stipulation to note within the new LTIAs is that 
membership of the HPAC forum should be expanded to include civil society 




Other LTIAs-derived concessions relating to CSOs include the potential to appoint a 
second Principal Recipient (PR) from civil society to manage non-public GFATM 
grants, a CSO holding the position of Vice-Chair within the CCM and the 
development of the „The Civil Society Fund‟ (which is addressed in the next section 
of this chapter).  
 
A cursory glance at the above synopsis would appear sufficient to satisfy any 
interested parties that the LTIAs are a Uganda „owned‟ initiative and that the 
resultant concessions the government has made to civil society have been voluntary. 
However, in view of the GFATM‟s stance regarding non-governmental 
representation in CCMs it is surely wise to dig deeper. The point is not to reach a 
definitive conclusion over whether the state‟s hand was forced or not. It is stimulated 
solely by the fact that prior to the adoption of the LTIAs, civil society was excluded 
from the HPAC. And here, I need to make a distinction, civil society had enjoyed 
representation on Uganda‟s earlier CCM, but this had been as a member of a parallel 
body, established in line with the GFATM‟s original preference to have a Project 
Management Unit oversee its grants to Uganda. Moreover, the value of that 
representation was questionable given that the Ugandan government had handpicked 
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distinguishing the Bureaus is to say that, unlike CSOs, the Bureaus do not operate in project mode. 




the members (Donoghue et al. 2005). Donoghue et al. (2005) explain that while 
Uganda‟s original CCM had originally consisted of 15 members, it had nearly 
doubled in size by April 2004, and now included three representatives from civil 
society and one from the private-for-profit sector. Their study points out that the 
Ugandan government actually boycotted the initial meeting held by civil society to 
discuss the GFATM. Moreover, that once the different partners did come together, 
there was tension between the government and CSO representatives over how the 
budget would be shared. To sum up therefore, civil society remained excluded from 
the “negotiation process proper” (Jeppsson 2002: 2059) in Uganda until the adoption 
of the LTIAs, meaning the newest incarnation of the CCM could feasibly be depicted 
as something of a Trojan horse.  
 
A Working Group was set up in Uganda in January 2006 to aid the process of 
developing the LTIAs. Chaired by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development (the MoFPED is Uganda‟s Principal Recipient for the GFATM), the 
group included representatives from Uganda‟s ministries of Health, Labour, Gender 
and Social Development, from the Uganda Aids Commission, from the donor groups 
– the Health Development Partners and the AIDS Development Partners – and from 
civil society. A logical and representative grouping of Uganda‟s health stakeholders, 
it is nonetheless significant to this discussion that civil society was represented in the 
LTIAs deliberations from the outset.  
 
Throughout their deliberations, a major focus of the Working Group was to 
“maximize the potential of civil society in achieving national objectives…” (Doc 1. 
2006: 7). As such, salient questions were posed, including “What are the advantages 
and disadvantages of appointing an additional PR for civil society, in addition to 
maintaining the MoFPED as the public sector PR?” (Doc 1. 2006: 7), and “How can 
genuine engagement of all stakeholders, in particular civil society in decision making 
bodies for health and HIV/AIDS responses be strengthened?” (Doc.1 2006: 9). Initial 
recommendations included: the selection of a second Principal Recipient for CSOs 
and the private sector, that resources passing through this channel would be off-




Partnership should be extended to enable the “active engagement of Civil Society at 
national level as members of policy-making bodies...” (Doc 1. 2006: 27). A final 
caveat to the Working Group‟s initial recommendations was that an interim funding 
arrangement should be devised until such a time as a second PR for civil society 
could be appointed.  
 
The GFATM‟s Minimum Requirements for CCMs were addressed in the last section. 
In developing the LTIAs, Uganda carried out an assessment of HPAC against the 
Minimum Requirements, highlighting how it fulfilled each of the conditions. Thus 
for example, in the 2006 assessment one learns that the CSO Steering Committee 
“has been reminded” to use the principle of having persons affected by HIV/AIDS, 
TB and malaria as members of the CCM when selecting their HPAC representatives 
(Doc 3. 2006: 15); that Uganda has (in principle) opted to have two Principal 
Recipients; and that the conflict of interest requirement was not deemed applicable to 
Uganda because the CCM Chair and Vice-chair have been appointed from different 
ministries - Finance and Health respectively (Doc 3. 2006).  
 
It was interesting in 2007/08 to assess how the Minimum Requirements had been 
actualised at the country level. Subsequently, I found that a very literal translation of 
the requirement to have persons affected by the diseases in membership had been 
achieved in Uganda whereby “All the 3 representatives of civil society organizations 
sitting in HPAC are persons living with the diseases” (Doc 4. 2007: 9). I also 
discovered that a second Principal Recipient from civil society has still not been 
appointed and in fact the very idea seemed to have been put on the back burner. 
When I asked about this in an interview at the Ministry of Finance, I was told that 
although there was still a tentative plan to proceed in this direction, civil society was 
yet to “mature” and that the second PR idea was now something that might 
“possibly” happen “eventually” (MoFPED Interview 25
th
 April 2008). Indeed, to all 
intents and purposes, it is the new „Civil Society Fund‟ (addressed in the next 
section) that is fulfilling the second PR function in the meantime. Finally, I found 
that there had been an objection from the GFATM to the suggestion that two 




chair seats at the CCM and as a result, one of the civil society representatives to gain 
HPAC membership had since been appointed Vice-Chair. 
 
What then does the early implementation of the LTIAs in Uganda tell us about state 
and/or GFATM influence in Uganda‟s health sector?  
 
The Ugandan state has certainly been persuaded to make structural changes which – 
at least superficially – appear to benefit civil society yet it is nonetheless clear that it 
has negotiated these compromises at every turn. Hence, the idea of a second PR is 
agreed in theory but distinctly on hold, a CSO representative is Vice-Chair of the 
CCM but this was not the GoU‟s first choice and time will tell how much influence 
she can wield; and yes, CSO representation was permitted to the HPAC for the first 
time but the state employed a „two bird, one stone‟ tactic to circumvent the need to 
have additional CSO members living with the disease. In short, just as the potentially 
radical health reforms of the 1990s were seen to be quietly compromised in Uganda, 
in 2007/8 moderate adjustments were already being made to the LTIAs, indicative of 
the state‟s unwillingness to relinquish its dominance over the health sector. That is 
not to say that the concessions it has made to CSOs are not substantial. For instance 
CSOs, together with the Faith-based Organisations and the private sector now hold 6 
out of the 17 votes at HPAC (Doc 4. 2007: 7), where, I should underline, CSOs are 
now full members (regardless of whether the forum is performing in its new role as 
CCM for the GFATM or in its traditional role as a policy advisory body for the 
sector). But the concessions are nonetheless ring-fenced. Lest one should forget, civil 
society now holds 6 out of the 17 votes within an advisory body, and not a decision 
making one. And as I shall establish toward the end of this chapter, the power to veto 
is still one monopolised by the state. 
 
In order to examine GFATM influence in Uganda with regards to the LTIAs, the 
context into which the LTIAs were delivered first needs to be stressed. GFATM 
grants to Uganda were suspended in August 2005 following reports of 
mismanagement. Prior to that point, the Ministry of Finance was the Principal 




Management Unit implemented the grants. It was the disjuncture between these 
different bodies that created the circumstances for mismanaging the money.
254
 The 
GFATM suspension was subsequently lifted in November 2005 when it was agreed 
new institutional arrangements would be devised through a “broad consultation 
involving all stakeholders” (Doc 1. 2006: 4). That the GFATM was able to persuade 
GoU to undertake this “broad consultation” is hardly surprising given the importance 
of GFATM money to the national health budget, and in light of the government‟s 
open admission as to the failings of the previous working arrangement. Moreover, in 
the context of the earlier gross mismanagement of its grants, it is rather logical that 
the GFATM would subsequently prefer to have civil society presiding as 
„watchdogs‟ over grant processes on the ground.  
 
Whether the GFATM could have actually mandated civil society participation in 
Uganda‟s CCM at this time remains a contentious issue – unresolved even at the 
GFATM Board level (at least in 2007) – yet it seems unlikely that it would have 
needed to do so in this case. With regards to Uganda, I would suggest that yes, the 
idea to invite civil society to join the CCM/HPAC originated from the GFATM.
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Indeed a top MoH official confirmed this during an interview, acknowledging, 
“Global Fund was more comfortable having those [civil society and private sector] 
in” (Interview 7
th
 April 2008). However, given the extenuating circumstances, it is 
doubtful that the GoU was strongly opposed to the suggestion. As underlined in an 
earlier section, the Ugandan state is not averse to change or reform, no doubt because 
it is quite adept at circumventing threats to its central dominance. Furthermore, as I 
have sought to demonstrate with regards to the LTIAs, the GoU has successfully met 
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 Again I would refer you to the GFATM discourse, which insists that the following are “not really 
conditions precedent. They must be met before the TRP can review the proposal, but they are not CPs 
to the grant.” These include: 1. CCM members representing the non-government sectors must be 
selected /elected by their own sector(s) based on a documented, transparent process, developed within 
each sector, and 2. All CCMs are required to show evidence of membership of people living with 




The Civil Society Fund 
 
Uganda‟s new „ Civil Society Fund‟ is recognised as an integral component of the 
LTIAs and, as such, has attained the full backing of the GFATM: “Consistent with 
the GFATM principles, The Uganda Civil Society Fund (CSF) was designed to 
facilitate proactive and productive civil society involvement in the National 
HIV/AIDS response through public and private partnership” (Doc 4. 2007: 26). Yet, 
just as the LTIAs have become the blueprints, not just for GFATM, but for all aid 
relations in Uganda, so the significance of the CSF now transcends GFATM funding 
to encompass a range of multilateral and bilateral inputs for HIV/AIDS activities.  
 
Cognisant of its Paris credentials (in particular the harmonisation principle), the CSF 
is being promoted as a basket funding mechanism intent on coordinating 
development assistance to CSOs engaged in HIV/AIDS interventions in Uganda. Its 
guiding principles include: alignment with national policies; transparency and user 
friendly processes; rapid disbursement of funds; addressing critical gaps in the 
national response; effectiveness and efficiency; capacity building at all levels for 
sustainability; and partnership between civil society, donors and government (Doc 2. 
2006: 43).  
 
Although still in its infancy, the GFATM and Health Development Partners are 
already watching the Fund intently to see if it could be expanded to encompass 
tuberculosis and malaria funds as well.  
 
There are several aspects of the CSF‟s development and operating model that made it 
interesting to this, a discussion of a proposed attempt to dilute state control in 
Uganda‟s health sector through the promotion of increased civil society participation. 
Common to them all is strong donor backing, and an avowal that coordination – be it 
of funding, or CSO activity – has the ability to increase the efficacy of the 
HIV/AIDS response in Uganda. I shall address these issues shortly. First however, I 
would underline what has been conspicuous in the development of the CSF by its 




designed to bypass the state budget) might be incompatible with Uganda‟s sector-
wide approach in health. Thus while there are plenty of assurances as to the CSF‟s 
alignment with national strategic plans, there is no comment on the fact that 
government structures are being actively bypassed by the Fund‟s modus operandi. 
 
The concept of developing a basket fund for HIV/AIDS was developed by the AIDS 
Partnership in Uganda. This is a broad coordination network encompassing the 
Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC), salient UN agencies, bilateral donors, people 
living with HIV/AIDS and representatives from civil society, the private sector, 
scientific bodies and academia. In spite of the diverse range of stakeholders involved 
in the Partnership, it is significant that it was actually a USAID/PEPFAR-funded 




Core Initiative had already been working on a pooled funding mechanism to 
strengthen civil society‟s engagement with orphans and vulnerable children through 
the Social Development Partnership Fund when the CSF was being discussed, and it 
is three key features of this model that have been incorporated into the CSF design 
with very little alteration (Doc 4. 2007: 44 & 52). I shall introduce these now in turn. 
 
The first feature of the Core model to be adopted was the appointment of a Steering 
Committee, made up of different stakeholders to provide overall strategic guidance 
for the Fund. The composition of the CSF Steering Committee is as follows:  two 
representatives from the Uganda AIDS Commission, one from the Ministry of 
Health, one from the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, two 
AIDS Development Partners and four civil society representatives (including one 
from the private sector) (Doc 4. 2007: 45). The composition of the Committee is 
remarkable because even if the representatives from Uganda AIDS Commission are 
counted as „government‟ officials, the fact is the „government: non-governmental‟ 
ratio on the committee stands at just 4:6.
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 In short, there is not even an equal 
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 Core Initiative is a USAID-funded global programme aimed at improving community and faith-
based responses to HIV/AIDS through grants, capacity building and networking.   
http://www.coreinitiative.org/ [Accessed 24/10/08]. 
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balance of government representation on the Steering Committee of a Fund intended 
to strengthen Uganda‟s national response to HIV/AIDS. 
 
The second notable feature of the Core Initiative model adapted for the CSF is a 
tripartite management structure whereby non-governmental organisations are 
contracted to assume the following roles: Financial Management Agent (FMA), 
Technical Management Agent (TMA) and Monitoring and Evaluation Management 
Agent (MEMA). The idea is that each of the management agents has a very specific 
mandate, which includes providing support to grantees according to their particular 
expertise (e.g. one appointment by May 2008 had been the international accounting 
firm Deloitte and Touche as TMA). It is this central capacity-building role that 
constitutes the third component of the Core model taken up by CSF.  
 
A long-term objective to improve the capacity of CSOs is central to the ethos of the 
Fund, and another way in which its principles mirror those of the GFATM. This is 
demonstrated by the set up of Regional Agencies to disseminate support to CSOs at 
the district level, and the fact that even unsuccessful CSF applicants will be offered 
constructive feedback in order to improve their chances of success in subsequent 
funding rounds (WHO Interview 15
th
 November 2007).  
 
In the battle against Uganda‟s HIV/AIDS epidemic, the weak capacity and 
fragmentation of CSOs has been portrayed as a stumbling block (Doc 4. 2007). 
Significantly, it is those same factors which the GFATM has identified as weakening 
CSO representation vis à vis the nation state. It is striking therefore, that an overt 
objective of the CSF to raise CSO capacity for the HIV/AIDS response could also 
have a secondary effect: potentially improving the capacity of civil society to better 
negotiate with the Ugandan government. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
to HIV/AIDS. http://www.aidsuganda.org/ [Accessed 24/10/08]. As outlined in the 2001 Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan, such institutions “are responsible to Government but have some freedom to 





I mentioned earlier that the GFATM is just one of the funding sources being 
channelled through the CSF. Other donors to it include: DFID, Irish Aid, Danida and 
USAID/PEPFAR (USAID Interview 30
th
 April 2008). As such, the volume of aid the 
CSF has already attracted is substantial - a recent suggestion in the Ugandan press 
put the figure at Ugandan Shillings 50 billion (Daily Monitor Reporter 2008), which 




USAID/PEPFAR has already assigned US$8.1 million to the Fund (USAID 
Interview 30
th
 April 2008), which is a bit of a coup considering the US‟s 
congressional constraints over aid allocation. Indeed, USAID/PEPFAR‟s role in the 
CSF deserves further mention. Not only did one of its programmes provide the 
template for the operational model, there is now the potential that it will be 
responsible for contracting and overseeing all three of the management agents 
employed to manage the fund; not that this is at the behest of the other donors 
however. A USAID interviewee was able to tell me something of the behind-the-
scenes wrangling that has occurred during the CSF negotiations which go some way 
to exposing the myth of seamless stakeholder coordination on the ground.     
 
While the CSF Steering Committee was happy that USAID should oversee the FMA 
and TMA, it was against USAID having the responsibility for contracting the 
Monitoring and Evaluation Management Agent as well – the fear being that this 
would mean USAID would be “in charge” of the Fund (USAID Interview 30
th
 April 
2008). However, regulations specific to the other bilateral donors means that they are 
not permitted to assume the role; for instance, Irish Aid cannot contract 
independently and must do so through the GoU, while Danida isn‟t allowed to fund 
Monitoring and Evaluation in country.
 259
 A final caveat to the debate over the third 
management agent relates to why USAID/PEPFAR money has been allowed into the 
CSF in the first place. USAID is unable to channel aid via other donors. It is 
however, permitted to contract non-governmental agencies directly. Therefore as 
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 The newspaper article failed to specify the time period over which the money would be distributed. 
The CSF grants will be performance-based and only granted for one year at a time. Therefore it is 
unlikely that this figure is what the CSF would allocate annually. 
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long as USAID is the donor who contracts the management agencies it can put 
PEPFAR money into their pot. Indeed it is this stipulation that has complicated the 
case further, as USAID wouldn‟t actually be permitted to contribute to the 
monitoring and evaluation of the CSF if not appointed lead donor for that agent. The 
current state of play in 2008 was that USAID would oversee all three management 





An interview at USAID (USAID Interview 30
th
 April 2008) suggested that even 
discounting the above dispute, the stakeholders involved in the CSF haven‟t 
coordinated well, largely due to inefficiency and poor internal communication. One 
telling comment was that their aim to present one common position to the 
government hadn‟t been achieved consistently, and that there had been instances 
whereby the UAC and local governments had attempted to divide and rule the donors 
in order to get their own way. Even now that the CSF is up and running, it is reported 
that disagreements persist over how the Fund will be managed in the longer-term. 
Yet despite the problems, the USAID interviewee maintained that the CSF remained 
a great concept and pragmatically allowed that: “anything involving multiple 
partners is always challenging” (USAID Interview 30
th
 April 2008). 
 
Such comments are enlightening and belie naive assumptions about the cohesion of 
development partners (Walt et al. 1999b). The heterogeneity of Uganda‟s health 
stakeholders‟ is discussed at length in Chapter Four so I won‟t dwell on the subject 
here other than to reassert my understanding that even the idea of a cohesive „nation 
state‟ is problematic. As Chapter Four demonstrated, the problem with „coordination‟ 
– as advocated in aid effectiveness discourse – is that it is incredibly difficult to do. 
So even though Uganda‟s donors may agree in principle that increased CSO 
participation in Uganda‟s health sector would contribute positively to the country‟s 
governance ratings, their own lack of cohesion is a potential impediment to the ideal. 
That the state regards dissonance as a weakness to be exploited is aptly demonstrated 
by the „divide and rule‟ tactic attempted by the governmental stakeholders during the 





I have already mentioned the donors who have chosen to participate in the CSF, and 
highlighted the central role USAID has, and is continuing to play, in its development. 
It could be that the US – indeed the biggest proponent of using CSOs or 
„implementing partners‟ in project mode – is starting to subtly influence the way 
other donors function despite their outward criticism of it.
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 Speaking about basket 
funding as a modality (and not about the CSF in particular) a Danida representative 
expressed why he supported it:  
 
“I‟m all for Basket Funding, you can hear that. I feel that because of the 
weakness here [Uganda]… you know you always get concerns in terms of 
agreeing to general budget support or sector budget support or whatever else 
we call it. But as far as I‟m concerned there‟s a lot of territory between that 
and the old traditional kind of project support…I mean you don‟t have to 
jump from crawling to flying. You know there are a few steps in between, 
which I think are beneficial in actually going through and making sure we 
have a clear dialogue between the donors and the government. And there are 
good guys and there are bad guys within the Government as everywhere else. 
And if you like to, you know, give everyone the benefit of the doubt, I think 
you should also strengthen the hand of those with the right intentions. And if 
you give too much then you can give a lot of rope for people to hang 





It seems that the issue uniting both support for basket funding and for a greater role 
for civil society is that of governance then, or rather residual concerns within donor 
circles as to how much trust can be put into the Ugandan government.
261
 From this 
standpoint therefore, the CSF has additional value as a risk mitigation strategy.  
 
The USAID operating model has in no doubt been heavily influenced by Congress‟ 
long-standing and open distrust of aid recipient countries; views that it has 
maintained in spite of the political correctness inherent to modern „partnership‟ 
rhetoric. Resolutely risk-averse therefore, USAID has already developed effective 
checks and balances to manage its aid at the country level. Moreover, Phase One of 
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whether this has been done through a CSO broker. 
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the PEPFAR programme (the emergency phase) has refined the USAID model - 
basically ensuring the donor agency‟s metamorphosis from implementing agency to 
“wholesaler of wholesalers” (Brainard 2007: 47; also see IOM 2007).
262
 In the era of 
„good governance‟ and with aid resources for the „big three‟ at an all time high, it‟s 
just possible that the US aid model will emerge as the exemplar for donors wanting 
to divert increased funding to civil society.  
 
It should be remarked however, that not all of Uganda‟s Health Development 
Partners have as yet signed up to the CSF. An example of this, SIDA, would prefer to 
carry out a thorough assessment of the Fund in operation before deciding whether or 
not to partake. When asked what reservations it might have, an interviewee at the 
organisation replied: 
 
“I‟m not sure if it‟s really effective…There‟s a lot of donors that are putting 
money in there and it‟s a lot of funding, and all of a sudden I think, wait a 
second, it‟s a lot now, is it really the right way?...I just feel I really need to 
look through the civil society fund, how it‟s organised, how it‟s functioning. 
And is that really something we believe in? That type of work? I mean it‟s all 
new and no one really knows what will be the outcome...I don‟t know if the 
workload will be less. I feel harmonisation has meant much more work …But 
I don‟t know, it could also be a trend” (SIDA Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). 
 
The SIDA comments highlight a central characteristic of modern aid initiatives: a 
lack of empirical grounding.
263
 Recalling the disconnect between development 
plans/policy and outcomes identified by Ferguson (1990) and Mosse (2005), and the 
Walt et al. comment that “there may be unexpected consequences from the 
introduction of new aid instruments aimed to improve coordination…” (Walt et al. 
1999b: 279) the SIDA representative would prefer to see what happens with the fund 
before deciding whether to sign up. Here then is an experienced development 
professional not entirely convinced of one of the key selling points of basket/pooled 
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funds - that the CSF will reduce the workload for the participating donors. A second 
concern she expressed related to accountability: “I feel like the Civil Society Fund, 
my money…Huh my money…My money is going through the fund and then all of a 
sudden we‟re there with all the…ah! I just feel that needs a lot of monitoring also.” 
(SIDA Interview 22
nd
 May 2008). In short, for this SIDA representative, another 
extolled advantage of the CSF remained in doubt.  
 
In terms of monitoring the use of money channelled through civil society, Uganda‟s 
CSF donors could yet come to regret their current haste to adopt a PEPFAR-style 
model of contracting. To date the transparency of the PEPFAR programme has left a 
lot to be desired, leading to serious concerns about the proportion of PEPFAR funds 
being expended on CSO overheads (Oomman et al. 2007). Moreover, the situation 
got so bad with regards to the PEPFAR programme in 2006, that the aid initiative 
was forced to admit it had lost track of some of its funding - a situation blamed on 
the logistical nightmare of tracking funds through proliferating numbers of CSO 
partners, with many not yet able to meet the programme‟s exacting reporting 
requirements (Washington Times Reporter 2006). Yet questions over the value for 
money aspect of using CSOs in service delivery extend far beyond PEPFAR‟s 
funding. In Uganda, one study has suggested that up to 70% of CSO funding is 
currently spent on administration (Nabyonga et al. 2009: 8). Such a figure is surely 
irksome to any national government that now finds itself in direct competition with 
civil society for funding.
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 It also points to a double standard in development 
whereby governments are being subjected to relentless financial scrutiny over the aid 
they receive, while civil society organisations are being given - at the very least - 
enough rope to hang themselves with.  
 
The uncertain empirical grounding of Uganda‟s Civil Society Fund also throws up 
questions about how the CSOs that implement its grants will be affected. Thus in the 
case of the CSF, the anticipated outcomes include improved CSO capacity and better 
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alignment to national plans, but what might the “unexpected consequences” be? 
(Walt et al. 1999b: 279).  
 
Donoghue et al. (2005) remarked that CSOs in Uganda were already employing 
additional staff to try and capitalise on GHI funding opportunities as far back as 
2005, while Oomman et al. (2007) have commented on the immense pressure now 
facing USAID/PEPFAR to find enough CSOs to channel escalating PEPFAR monies 
into (originally USAID/PEPFAR had drawn on CSOs with a track record of pushing 
money out quickly, but it has now exhausted that supply and is always on the hunt 
for new partners).
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 USAID/PEPFAR has pioneered the competitive bidding process 
and this is the model being adapted for the CSF. Subsequently, it appears that CSOs 
will face two types of threats from engaging in such a process: the cost of failure – 
should their scarce resources be invested in a failed proposal – and/or a distortion of 
organisational mandate.
266
  With regards to the latter, I would propose that one 
potential side effect of the CSF could relate to the exacting criteria of the Fund‟s 
Request For Applications (RFAs). To provide some examples: one RFA posted in 
Uganda‟s press in May 2008 called for CSOs engaged in HIV/AIDS prevention to 
target specific areas identified in the National HIV & AIDS Strategic Plan‟s 
Comprehensive Package (UAC 2007); another was aimed solely at: “strengthening 
district level provision for orphans and other vulnerable children” (both were 
published in the Daily Monitor on 19
th
 May 2008, p24). Faced with such restrictive 
RFAs, I would theorise that some CSOs - previously engaged in a wide range of 
health interventions – might opt to limit their remits in order to secure funding. Yet if 
this were to happen, would externally exposed specialisation in the pursuit of one- to 
three-year grants really benefit Uganda‟s health CSOs in the long-term?  
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Figure 4: Request for Applications – HIV Prevention – from CSOs 
wishing to apply for grants from the Civil Society Fund (Daily Monitor, 





Hulme and Edwards identify the availability of aid finance as the most obvious 
pressure facing non-governmental organisations for cooption: 
 
“The acceptance of increasing volumes of foreign aid involves entering into 
agreements about what is done, and how it is to be reported and accounted 
for. This fosters an emphasis on certain forms of activity at the expense of 
others, on upward accountability…and on particular techniques and donor 
definitions of „achievement‟ throughout the organisation. Not surprisingly as 
NGOs get closer to donors, they get more like donors” (Hulme and Edwards 
1997: 8). 
 
In this vein, it has been noted that “Official donors provide three times as much 
money for NGOs [non-governmental organisations] to carry out development and 
humanitarian projects and programmes on their behalf as they provide to support 
activities which NGOs themselves choose to implement” (Riddell 2007: 48). From 
this vantage point, any suggestion that the CSF has the potential to check state power 
or improve governance ratings is founded on a contradiction, as the comparative 
advantages for which civil society are praised are endangered by the very mechanism 
conspired to strengthen it. Left unchecked, this could prove to be a serious oversight 
in the Fund‟s design.   
 
The ideological appeal of coordination and harmonisation measures is proving a 
powerful force in international donor circles. With regards to the CSF, this has been 
evidenced by Uganda‟s biggest health donors choosing to contribute to the Fund 
from the outset. Yet the Fund‟s extolled advantages are subject to doubt and even the 
central notion driving the CSF (and the other initiatives addressed in this chapter), 
that civil society can somehow contribute to „good governance‟, is open to challenge 
(Robinson and Friedman 2005; Court et al. 2006; Riddell 2007; Roy 2008; also see 
Heinrich 2007).  
 
To sum up, in this section I have identified the ways in which the CSF could be 
viewed as attempting to mitigate state control in Uganda‟s health sector through the 
use of a USAID/PEPFAR-inspired basket modality, designed predominantly to 
channel HIV/AIDS funds away from the GoU and into the safekeeping of Uganda‟s 




CSF‟s operating model, two factors appear to mitigate its potential: a lack of 
empirical grounding - which fails to take into account the “unintended” (Ferguson 
1990: 21) or  “unexpected consequences” (Walt et al. 1999b: 279) of the new aid 
instrument - and a lack of cohesion between Uganda‟s health stakeholders, which has 
already been shown to present the GoU with opportunities to divide and conquer. 
 
 
CSO Coordination  
 
So far in this chapter I have focused on the ways in which the GFATM, the Health 
Development Partners and - to a lesser extent - the Ugandan state have facilitated a 
greater space for civil society in Uganda‟s health delivery and debating mechanisms, 
and considered whether the participation being offered them disguises a deeper 
purpose. I would now redirect your attention to the intended beneficiaries of the 
concessions to find out how CSOs are capitalising on the opportunities now available 
to them. Central to this part of the discussion is the shared Jeppsson and GFATM 
view that national processes are “a stage where power relations interact” (Jeppsson 
2002: 2059). Subsequently, that it is “important for civil society organizations to 
coordinate and develop networks to increase their representation within these 
processes” (GFATM 2008a: 5). 
 
At the time of fieldwork in 2007/08, CSO representation at the Health Policy 
Advisory Committee/Country Coordinating Mechanism (HPAC/CCM) was still a 
relatively new phenomenon – the civil society representatives joined in Spring 2007 
– yet their presence had already elicited some strong reactions from established 
members. Complaints centred on three things: the CSO representatives‟ tendency to 
be issue- rather than sector-driven:  
 
“They know only project mode of operation. And they have no experience 
whatsoever of what it means to run an institution day in, day out, 365 days a 
year for 50 years. They don‟t know that and so the quality of the input that 
they give to the HPAC is very shallow” (UCMB Interview 13
th





On their having - what appeared to be - a disproportionately loud voice in group 
discussions - one interviewee commented that the CSO Vice-Chair seemed to have 
the “ear of the Chair” (USAID Interview 13
th
 May 2008), while a representative for 
the Faith-based Organisations complained, “Well our voice, we are together – the 
[Religious Medical] bureaus we represent 30% of the services delivered to the people 
– and we matter less than the most vocal of the AIDS activists” (UCMB Interview 
13
th
 May 2008).  
 
The third criticism related to their organisational skills: 
 
“They‟re weak. They are represented but they – and I know this from 
themselves – are not sufficiently organised. They feel they need to have other 
forums where they can meet, just like we have with the Development Partners 
Group, to discuss their different views and come up with a joint leading point. 
They don‟t need to feel the same about everything but they can also have a 
lead who takes in the views of different NGOs and CSOs and 





Out of the different criticisms being levelled at civil society at the HPAC/CCM, it 
was the last one relating to their organisational capacity that resonated most strongly 
with the CSO representatives themselves. Indeed, that they appeared issue-driven 
and disproportionately voluble at the forums was likely a by-product of their lack of 
coordination and inexperience in the new setting. Keen however to build on the 
unprecedented opportunity afforded them to engage in meaningful participation at 
the national level, Uganda‟s health CSOs were found to be working hard to amend 
their shortcomings. 
 
In Chapter Four I addressed the manner in which Uganda‟s Health Development 
Partners (HDPs) have chosen to coordinate themselves.
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 Significantly, it is this 
model that the civil society representatives attending HPAC now aspire to emulate (I 
say „significantly‟ because of course it recalls the Hulme and Edwards (1997) 
suggestion that the closer CSOs get to donors, the more they resemble them). CCM 
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 The HDPs have created a separate forum in which to arrive at common positions, which they then 





Vice-Chairwoman (from civil society) described the HDP coordination model as a 
“beautiful example,” yet was realistic that it would a challenging ideal for Uganda‟s 
CSOs to emulate: 
  
“They [the HDPs] are maybe about fifteen or twenty or so and we are 
thousands so we can definitely not fall into their shoes immediately. Our 
desire would be to move towards a more coordinated system like they have 
but given our diversity and our challenges we still have some steps to that” 
(MACIS Interview 24
th
 April 2008).   
 
The challenges facing Uganda‟s health CSOs are fourfold: as with all civil societies 
they are “made up of many different groups, wanting different outcomes, often 
displaying conflicting values” (Walt et al. 1999b: 282); “They have similar 
harmonization issues to the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, at the ground level 
but with much more limited resources and forums to address them” (GFATM 2007b: 
39); and they are “severely disadvantaged” when it comes to accessing technical 
assistance. (GFATM 2006: 21)  Finally, there is but a scant tradition of CSO 
coordination groupings within the country to draw upon. As such it was perhaps no 
coincidence that the CSO representative elected as CCM Vice-Chairwoman had 
already had some experience of heading a CSO coalition, in this instance the Malaria 
and Childhood Illness NGO Secretariat (MACIS). Nevertheless the scale of that 
operation – coordinating around 70 CSOs engaged in malaria and child health 
activities – is unlikely to have adequately prepared her for the task ahead.  
 
Given its advocacy for their participation, it is striking that the GFATM sends out a 
somewhat contradictory message to CSOs preparing to actively engage in national 
processes for the first time: thus while placing the onus firmly on CSOs to organise 
themselves - “Ultimately, the responsibility for increasing civil society engagement 
lies within civil society itself” (GFATM 2008a: 5) - it nevertheless advises that they 
strive towards an operational model of “representative democracy” (GFATM 2007a: 
32). Yet how easy this is to achieve with a poor communication infrastructure and a 





A recent example demonstrates how literally the Ugandan CSO representatives have 
interpreted the responsibility to represent their constituents. The example concerns a 
CCM meeting to discuss the Round 8 GFATM proposal, at which – one of the 
bilateral donor participants later conveyed to me with some exasperation - the CSOs 
had requested US $500,000 to facilitate multi-tiered consultations around the country 
to feed into the civil society component of the proposal, yet had only allowed two 
weeks to conduct the consultation (USAID Interview 13
th
 May 2008).  
 
The problem of Uganda‟s CSOs realising the GFATM ideal of representative 
democracy is further compounded by an extended notion of who their constituents 
are. When asked what the CSOs wanted to achieve from their involvement within the 
HPAC/CCM, the CCM Vice-Chair replied:  
 
“Our ultimate aim as civil society is to ensure that the voices of the mothers, 
of the children, of the communities where we work can be heard. These very 
good experiences, practices can be used to inform policy, so that when 
policies are made and debated they are based on reality in the communities” 
(MACIS Interview 24
th
 April 2008). 
 
In essence, this understanding of „constituent‟ has enlarged the task of representing 
thousands (of health CSOs) to that of millions (of Uganda‟s health users), and of 
course this is exactly what the GFATM hoped the CSOs could bring to the policy 
table. Yet quite how three CSO representatives situated in Uganda‟s capital are to 
manage such a task is unclear. Let us remember at this point that they receive no 
additional salary for their participation in HPAC/CCM. 
 
A final complication to the representative democracy ideal was presented by one of 
HPAC‟s original non-governmental members, the Executive Secretary of the 
Ugandan Catholic Medical Bureau (UCMB).
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 Traditionally allied with Uganda‟s 
Protestant and Muslim Bureaus at the HPAC, he explained that the idea the three 
Bureaus should coordinate, or “try to speak with a united voice” at the HPAC, was 
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 Earlier in this discussion we differentiated Uganda‟s Religious bureaus – or Faith-Based 
Organisations – from everyday CSOs, essentially on the grounds that they are permanently based in 





suggested recently – crucially by an external source - and was something that they 
were all immediately reticent about. That is not to say the three Bureaus haven‟t been 
willing to assume a common position in the past - “we try to keep the cartel compact 
because if we handle issues separately we are not going to have success” - but that 
they ultimately remain three separate organisations, subsequently “none of us can 
represent the other.” He underlined the central flaw in the representative democracy 
ideal from the vantage point of the Bureaus: 
 
“You sit at a table alone and then you have to take a decision or you have to 
decide to sign a document…and assuming you‟re representing the others, it 
assumes a structure of coordination, and or, consensus that does not exist. 
And the onus on creating this structure is left on us. Well it‟s a little too 
much, we have the onus of having everything because we don‟t get money 
from government or from development partners to do this kind of work” 
(UCMB Interview 13
th
 May 2008). 
 
While the CSO representatives at HPAC/CCM differ from the Religious Bureaus in 
their clear willingness to represent their counterparts, they have nevertheless found 
themselves in a similar bind: having to create an effective coordination mechanism 
so that they can arrive at common positions before they attend the HPAC/CCM, and 
having to do so retrospectively. Subsequently, one year after they joined the 
“negotiation process proper” (Jeppsson 2002: 2059) in Uganda, the CSOs announced 
their plans to rectify this deficiency. Speaking at the Mid-Term Review of Health 
Sector Strategic Plan II (MoH 2005) in May 2008, the CCM Vice-Chairwoman 
(from civil society) delivered a closing statement on behalf of Uganda‟s health 
CSOs, which included this salient detail: 
 
“I have some good news, that a section of CSOs is taking up a leadership role 
and are presently working on a widely consultative strategic mechanism for 
improving coordination of CSOs involved in implementation of HSSP II. 
This is aimed at providing CSOs with an effective channel to galvanise our 
operations and will provide us with a channel for CSO voices to appropriate 
policy and decision making on issues of concern to CSOs at national, district 
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Still in its infancy, it will clearly be some time before it‟s possible to report back on 
the progress of the CSOs “consultative strategic mechanism.” Yet that the CSOs 
have even considered it essential to attempt, shows that the value of arriving at one 
common position before attending the HPAC/CCM extends beyond one of sheer 
convenience. Like other processes involved in negotiating with the state, this 
discussion has demonstrated that there is power imbued in the act of arriving at a 
consensus with your peers. The Executive Secretary of the UCMB touched upon it 
when he alluded to the “cartel” the three Religious Bureaus attempted to keep 
“compact;” and the development partners paid the price for not achieving it during 
the discussions for the CSF when their government partners attempted a tactic of 
divide and rule. The essential ingredient of effectively coordinating with your peers 
therefore appears to be masking difference to attain strength in numbers.   
 
In this vein, it is interesting to note that at the 2008 Mid-Term Review, the CSO 
Closing Statement also included an overt declaration of support for Uganda‟s 
Medical Bureaus (which in this statement are referred to as PNFPs or Private Not-
For-Profits):  
 
“The efficient use of budget support by the PNFPs demonstrates that CSOs 
can be a truly reliable partner in the delivery of health services. We therefore 
continue to urge the Ministry of Health and Development Partner to look into 
the issues of funding CSOs including; stagnation of support to PNFPs; more 
streamlined engagement with the non-facility based CSOs and the Private 





This statement alludes to several key issues, which serve as further evidence that 
coalition building is a viewed as a powerful strategy to improve group standing vis à 
vis the nation state. The first refers to the role of the PNFPs as key service providers 
in Uganda – they collectively own and manage 30% of Uganda‟s health services and 
have been established in the country for upwards of 50 years. The second refers to 
the Bureaus ongoing dispute with the GoU over the stagnation of their subsidies – in 
real terms subsidies to the PNFP have been decreasing by 10% annually for four 
years. I shall elucidate on these issues shortly but the point to highlight at this 




CSOs to HPAC/CCM can be construed to say, “We are the same as the Religious 
Bureaus. Like them we can be trusted to use resources efficiently. You should 
definitely consider channelling some money through us.” The suggestion however is 
a non sequitur – the CSOs differ from the Bureaus in every respect except their non-
governmental status - therefore, that they have been allowed to make such a 
statement reveals the aspirations of both the CSOs and the Religious Bureaus to 
forge a mutually beneficial yet largely superficial alliance to advance their separate 
agendas. For the Bureaus, the alliance denotes just one in a long line of attempts to 
persuade the government of Uganda to increase their subsidies. 
 
While this is predominantly a discussion of CSO engagement in Uganda‟s health 
sector, the narrative of the Religious Bureaus and their attempts to resolve their 
funding problems with the GoU may still provide some insight into what CSOs can 
expect to gain from their promotion to the HPAC/CCM forums.  
 
Two aspects of the PNFPs funding arrangements are salient to this discussion. 
Firstly, that in 1996 – suffering money problems – the Bureaus presented the GoU 
with a simple proposition: “If you help us we can continue. If you keep ignoring us 
you will soon have to invest quite a lot because you will have to substitute what we 
are doing” (UCMB Interview 13
th
 May 2008). Secondly, that having agreed to 
provide the PNFP with a regular subsidy, the GoU asked whether the Bureaus would 
like their funds to be channelled directly or through the newly established 
decentralised system. The PNFP chose the latter in order to support the sector as a 
whole; it later transpired that they would be penalised for choosing this, the route of 
“moral authority.” 
 
The Global Health Initiatives have proved detrimental to the PNFP‟s funding 
arrangement with the government because they have contributed a lot of additional – 
yet earmarked funding - that has bypassed the centre‟s budget and gone directly to 
the points of service delivery. The consequence has been to make the Ugandan 
government complacent about the PNFP, yet conversely very interested in civil 




their funding going down, the Religious Bureaus have so far avoided competing for 
GFATM money for fear of losing their government subsidy. They are reconsidering 
this position now, attempting to “calculate how much they do matter in HIV/AIDS, 
TB and malaria,” yet those are not easy figures for the PNFP sector - which has 
always taken the horizontal approach to health care - to disaggregate (UCMB 
Interview 13
th
 May 2008).  
 
The Health Development Partners have been loyal supporters of the PNFP and have 
repeatedly championed their cause.
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 Nevertheless, the issue seems to have fallen 
off the agenda at the Health Policy Advisory Committee. Subsequently, the Religious 
Bureaus have pragmatically sought out new alliances and fora in which to lobby. 
Indeed, it was surely an astute move on their part to get on side with the CSOs, 
which, at least for the time being, have the ear of Uganda‟s largest donors. 
 
The narrative of the PNFPs seems to hold two clear messages for the CSOs if they 
choose to hear them. Firstly, beware development trends: if you‟re out of favour with 
donors then you‟ll likely be out of favour with government. So while the PNFPs have 
maintained the support of Uganda‟s bilateral donors, they are still off the radar of 
Uganda‟s biggest health funders - the Global Health Initiatives - and are thus not 
very high on the government‟s agenda. Secondly, once your importance to the state 
has diminished, it may no longer matter very much that you hold a seat at the 
discussion table. Experience has shown that the Ugandan state has devised subtle 
ways of sidelining unpopular viewpoints. Subsequently, while the MoH openly 
renews it commitment to raise its funding subsidy to the PNFP at its annual health 
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 The Bureaus are honorary members of the HDPs – they were originally invited as observers by 
Irish Aid and DFID – and can in fact be understood to be “HDPs” by virtue of the additional resources 
they bring to the health sector. 
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 The need to support the PNFP was carried over as one of the undertakings of the annual Joint 
Review Mission in 2007 for the third year in a row. The renewed undertaking stated: “Health Sector 
2008/09 budget to cater for the close of the remuneration gap between PNFP and public health 




Qualifying Civil Society‟s Concessions  
 
The ability of the nation state to circumvent divergent opinions is the final caveat to 
this, a discussion of the potential of civil society to dilute its dominance in Uganda. 
Several interviewees have voiced their concern that decisions regarding the health 
sector are being reached with little or no feedback to the stakeholders in the HPAC, 
suggesting that the golden age of the SWAp, and subsequently the HPAC, is over 
(UCMB Interview 13
th
 May 2008; also see MoH 2008b).
272
 Of course the Health 
Policy Advisory Committee – as the name signifies – is nothing more than an 
advisory committee, and in the organisational structure of the health sector, sits 
below the Top Management Committee of the Ministry of Health (TMC): a closed-
door forum, which retains the right to veto any recommendations made below it in 
the chain. During the so-called “golden age” advice emerging from HPAC seemed to 
impact and create interchange between it and the TMC, yet now the resounding 
complaint is that decisions are not only being made in a seemingly arbitrary manner 
at this higher echelon but that no feedback is being received lower down the chain 
(USAID Interview 13
th
 May 2008).  
 
In short, the reduction of HPAC‟s influence appears to come at the very time that its 
membership has expanded. This at once suggests that the GFATM strategy to utilise 
civil society to check state dominance is not as yet without its loopholes, and adds 
weight to the argument forwarded in Chapter Four - that „coordination‟ of the sort 
implied in the Paris Declaration is still viewed as a piecemeal check list from which 
all partners are guilty of picking and choosing. That said, the division of power, even 
within the GoU structures remains a complicated one and will have some bearing on 
the future of Uganda‟s health CSOs. To summarise the issue here: Uganda‟s Ministry 
of Health is widely criticised for being weak (both within government and by its 
Development Partners). A hangover from the mismanagement of the GFATM, when 
a lot of the top management of the MoH were sacked or suspended and its staff 
demoralised, the new management is still working to rebuild stakeholder and GoU 
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 The Mid-Term Review Report notes that: “There is an emerging view…that the earlier dynamism 




confidence. Insightfully, one Health Development Partner described the interim 
before the shake up as “rotting time” (BTC Interview 10
th
 April 2008). In short, 
while the general consensus is that the top management staffing at the Ministry is 
now sound, the overriding feeling is still that: “The malaise [at the Ministry] is going 
away but it‟s a long hill to climb” (BTC Interview 10
th
 April 2008). This has resulted 
in the Ministry of Finance retaining a disproportionate influence over the health 
budget, which has in turn encroached on the ability of the Ministry of Health to set 
health priorities. Perhaps the biggest indication of this is that in Uganda the Ministry 
of Finance is the Principal Recipient for the GFATM; in most other countries it is the 
Ministry of Health. Another example sees the Ministry of Health work with the 
Ministry of Finance to develop the Sector Budget Framework Paper (which sets the 
priorities of the sector) only to find its input restricted by the volume of money 




Until the Ministry of Health regains the wider trust of the government, the Ministry 
of Finance will continue to wield an unbalanced level of influence over it. Moreover, 
now that the GFATM has agreed (in principle) to provide its aid as budget support to 
the Ministry of Finance (MoFPED Interview 25
th
 April 2008) it is likely that the 
GFATM too will wield some considerable sway over the sector budget. Therefore, 
until such a time as the GFATM sees fit to revise its policy towards civil society, I 
would suggest that CSO representation will be guaranteed at Uganda‟s HPAC/CCM.  
 
However, quite what CSOs will actively get out of having this position remains to be 
seen. Until Uganda‟s health CSOs resolve their organisational problems, it is likely 
that the issues they champion at HPAC/CCM will prove too numerous, too mixed 
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 A country study on the implementation of the Paris Declaration in Uganda confirms this 
suggestion: “The only limitation is that the final budget allocations approved differ significantly year 
on year from those initially approved by the sectors in consultation with DPs [Development Partners], 
and the overriding influence of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and 
Parliament creates the impression that the budget formulation process only seeks to legitimise 
decisions already made at much higher levels than the sectors. This tends to erode the confidence of 
the sectors in their ability to influence budget allocations” (Office of the Prime Minister 2008: 40). 
Equally, the Mid-Term Review Report remarks on: “The reported decline in the quality of Budget 
Framework Papers, the lack of adequate consultation in BFP development and lack of transparency in 
the allocation of the approved budget…” and the manner in which: “the health budget is being heavily 
earmarked at MFPED level before it reaches MOH, leaving little room for internal reallocation” 




and too minute – in short, too like project objectives – to be taken seriously. That‟s 
not to suggest however, that they won‟t be heard. My own concern is that until civil 
society is better organised, its representatives will continue to be a disruptive force at 
the HPAC/CCM.
274
 In short, for CSOs to make a positive impact at the forum they 
need to streamline their position and to start tackling issues from the perspective of 
the sector-wide approach. The great flaw in the GFATM strategy for their inclusion 
however, is that neither of those measures are either necessarily achievable and/or 
beneficial to civil society in the long-term.  
 
In their bid to dilute the centre dominance in Uganda‟s health sector (in wanting to 
influence policy) the CSOs involved directly, and indirectly with the HPAC/CCM 
forums will be forced to make a trade off: between broader agendas, common 
positions and increased funding, and specialisation, diversity and financial 
independence. The greatest downside to this trade off is that the potential payoffs 
they‟re chasing are far from guaranteed. Aside for the numerous logistical problems 
civil society will undoubtedly face attempting to build an effective coordination 
network, this study has highlighted two issues that could seriously undermine the 
ideal of meaningful engagement. The first recognises that the Ugandan state has 
grown adept at going through the motions in the pursuit of aid flows (thus a seat at 
the policy discussion table may not prove that important); the second acknowledges 
that the international development agenda is highly vulnerable to trends. Civil 
society‟s biggest concern should be a contingency plan in case – whilst in the midst 
of the “negotiation process proper” (Jeppsson 2002: 2059) - it suddenly finds its own 
influence being diluted. Indeed, this is the warning implicit in development critique 
Participation: the New Tyranny, which draws on Wood (1999) and Cohen (1985) to 
impress the dangers facing the excluded when finally invited to participate:  
 
“those people who have the greatest interest to challenge and confront power 
relations and structures are brought, or even bought, through the promise of 
development assistance, into the development process in ways that 
disempower them to challenge the prevailing hierarchies and inequalities in 
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 Chapter Five confirms that multi-stakeholder forum, the HPAC, has already experienced serious 










The drive for the greater inclusion of civil society in service delivery and policy 
deliberations in developing countries has been building momentum since the turn of 
the millennium, and is now firmly entrenched in the discourse on aid effectiveness – 
in the Monterrey, Rome and Paris commitments – and in the strategic plans of donors 
agencies, the Global Health Initiatives and aid-recipient governments.
 275
 Such 
unqualified support has contributed to what is now the resilient depiction of civil 
society as a global public good (Riddell agrees that “most official donors remain 
content to continue to provide broad support to CSO- and NGO- strengthening 
efforts on the (unproven) assumption that it is a „good thing‟” (Riddell 2007: 304). In 
Uganda this has translated into a series of unprecedented concessions for the 
country‟s non-governmental health „partners‟.   
 
Yet there are several serious problems inherent to the current framing of civil society 
in development. The first recognises that a universal definition for what constitutes 
„civil society‟ is lacking (Riddell 2007).
276
 The slippery terminology means that a 
„CSO‟ can just as easily be a solitary man who runs his local football team as an 
international children‟s charity or a US university. It says nothing about the 
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 To provide some examples: 1.Uganda‟s Joint Assistance Strategy states: “The government should 
continue to promote genuine government and civil society partnership in the context of PEAP 
implementation and monitoring” (UJAS Partners 2005: 10). 2. The GFATM Framework Paper states 
that CCMs should include broad representation, including from civil society; states the Fund‟s 
intention to support programmes that: “Stimulate and are integral to country partnerships involving 
government and civil society” (GFATM 2002: 4); and articulates the Fund‟s aim to “Strengthen the 
participation of communities and people, particularly those infected and directly affected by the three 
diseases, in the development of proposals” (GFATM 2002: 3). 3. Volume 3 of the 2001 PEAP: 
Building Partnerships suggests that CSOs have a role to play in fighting corruption and should have 
be given the opportunity to feed into sector reviews (MoFPED 2001). Uganda also boasts a draft 
National Policy on Public-Private Partnerships in Health (MoH 2003).   
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 A quick glance at the international literature on civil society reveals a multitude of terms that are 
used interchangeably to mean approximately (but not necessarily) the same thing, e.g. “voluntary and 
community organisations,” “civil society organisations,” “nonprofits,” “nongovernmental 
organisations,” and “charities.” As Riddell has acknowledged: “Civil society is a slippery concept for 




organisation‟s income, and fails to denote a philanthropic mission (“uncivil society” 
is all too real a phenomenon (Heinrich 2007)). Not surprisingly therefore, the idea of 
CSOs coming together – as the third sector - to mitigate against the failings of state 
and market is hugely flawed. As is the idea that inclusion is always the best avenue 
for civil society itself, especially while the scope of „partnership‟ on offer remains 
deeply unequal. Yet these are the messages Uganda‟s development partners are 
uncritically promoting.  
 
In encouraging civil society to partake in national processes and to compete for 
public sector funding, Uganda‟s donors are evoking the Hulme and Edwards (1997) 
proposition that CSOs risk losing their comparative advantages by getting “too close 
for comfort.” Moreover, on the off chance that the „good governance‟ agenda, or 
donors‟ faith in their role as „watchdogs‟ is later called into question, Uganda‟s 
CSOs could well find themselves tossed aside and depleted of all the things that 
originally made them powerful in their own right.  
 
As during the neoliberal era, the nation state continues to be problematised in 
development (Crewe and Harrison 1998). The difference is that in the era of „good 
governance‟, civil society is universally championed. Such a binary framing is 
rationalised on the grounds of weak public sector capacity yet, as demonstrated using 
the Ugandan case study, this framing also serves to justify the attempted check on 
state power being attempted by donors in developing countries. This gentle 
subterfuge (although, I would suggest that it‟s quite apparent to all involved what is 
being attempted) is of course necessary in light of the principle of national 
sovereignty; furthermore, because donor organisations and the Global Health 
Initiatives can‟t be seen to meddle in national politics directly. As Ferguson (1990) 
and Escobar (1995) have established, the illusion of apolitical aid remains the most 
persistent framing in international development.  
 
When employing their current tactic however, donors should stay alert to the 
unintended or “instrument-effects” (Ferguson 1990: 256 citing Foucault 1979; also 




change, and Ugandan civil society at present so unprepared for the challenge of 
coordination, donors may have already activated Ferguson‟s “anti-politics machine” 
in Uganda, which works by depoliticising “everything it touches…all the while 
performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of expanding 










The Rhetoric Versus The Reality Of Aid Coordination 
 
This thesis has set out to show that aid coordination of the type extolled in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Paris High-Level Forum 2005), which uniformly 
weights the tenets of ownership, harmonisation, alignment, managing for results and 
mutual accountability, is not fully reflected in the reality of coordination activities 
being undertaken in Uganda‟s health sector. This is not to suggest that those values 
aren‟t important to the salient stakeholders, only that the rhetoric of coordination, 
which is after all venerated for its “intuitive force” (Buse and Walt 1997: 449; Walt 
et al. 1999a: 207) rather than its empirical grounding, was unlikely to translate into a 
workable set of aid management principles that could be applied in any context.  
 
Therefore whilst Uganda‟s Development Partners may maintain that the foremost 
reason they group together is “to increase the effectiveness of development 
assistance in support of the national goals and systems of the Government of 
Uganda” (Local Development Partners Group Terms of Reference, 7), a closer look 
at their Terms of Reference alludes that it is a pragmatist‟s approach to partnership 
they are pursuing.
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 Hence the admission that the Local Development Partners‟ 
Group (LDPG) is “first and foremost, a forum governed by the principles of 
consensus and it is respectful of differences regarding policies and modalities” 
(LDPG Terms of Reference, 10); and the caveat that “the principle of inclusivity 
must be observed. Financing modalities or agency specific procedures should not 
exclude any development partners from participating” (LDPG Terms of Reference, 
6. iii.). Such assertions belie the suggestion that a Paris-style version of aid 
harmonisation is at work in Uganda‟s health sector, with inclusion and its 
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 I.e. The umbrella grouping for all of Uganda‟s Development Partners sub-groups, including the 




undisclosed advantage - strength in numbers - trumping the need to conform to a 
common set of standards or behaviours.  
 
In their original critique of aid coordination, Walt et al. (1999a) noted that few of the 
coordination mechanisms they had witnessed in developing health sectors had 
excelled. To recap, this was because:  
 
“few are led by recipient authorities, few embrace all donors active in the 
sector or a large proportion of aid, few command sufficient authority to 
ensure participant compliance, and as a result, few actually dramatically 
enhance the overall effectiveness of aid deployment or ensure that donor 
contributions support recipient goals. Fourth, it is admittedly difficult to 
judge the effectiveness or impact of aid coordination…”  (Walt et al. 1999a: 
213). 
 
If one now applies these criteria to the coordination processes and mechanisms 
evoked by the Ugandan study, it is surprising how similar the findings are nearly a 
decade on from the original study. To sum up, the empirical chapters in this thesis 
have confirmed that the potential of coordination processes and mechanisms in 
Uganda‟s health sector to attain their stated objective – i.e. to increase the 
effectiveness of aid – is mitigated across the board. The common barriers to 
meaningful coordination are the voluntary and non-punitive nature of partnership 
agreements and - the net consequence of such shaky foundations - differing levels of 
involvement and compliance by all stakeholders. How then to explain the tenacious 
commitment of all stakeholders to an ethos that remains unproven and resource-
heavy at the country level in the face of superficially disappointing outcomes?  
 
While it may be possible to identify several similarities with the Walt et al. (1999a) 
study, it only makes sense to suggest that coordination measures in Uganda‟s health 
sector have not excelled if you accept aid effectiveness to be the primary goal of the 
exercise – something this study has refused to. Rather, this thesis has used a 
purposive case study of Uganda‟s health sector to explore whether or not there might 
be additional fruits to be reaped from the labour of aid coordination. Subsequently, 
having reviewed the empirical findings, I would acquiesce that aid effectiveness is 




sector. Yet, it is the tangible short-term payoffs which explain partners‟ fidelity to 
that ideal . 
 
 
Questioning What Coordination Does? 
 
This thesis aligns itself with the school of development critique (e.g. Ferguson 1990; 
Escobar 1995; Crewe and Harrison 1998; Mosse 2005) that seeks to unpack 
development by asking the questions: how does development work? What does it 
do? Accordingly, this study has posed the question “what does aid coordination do in 
Uganda‟s health sector?” finding that actually it does quite a lot beyond its professed 
aim to improve aid effectiveness. At the macro level therefore, this study has posited 
that aid coordination permits the framing that aid to Uganda remains justifiable at 
current levels, in spite of repeated governance infringements (a point I shall expand 
upon in the next section). While at the micro level, the study has suggested that even 
a partial adherence to the aid coordination ethos throws up a host of rewards and/or 
fringe benefits which go some way to explaining partners‟ faithfulness to it.  
 
Coordination‟s micro and short-term benefits were explored in the empirical chapters 
of the thesis and expressed in the form of Mosse-inspired propositions (Mosse 2004, 
2005). To briefly recap:    
   
Chapter Four „Coordination to visibly pursue the most readily pick and mix element 
of the new aid agenda‟ used empirical data to establish the founding premise of this 
thesis: namely that aid coordination of the type extolled in the rhetoric of the Paris 
Principles is not reflected in the everyday reality of partnership activities in Uganda‟s 
health sector. This, it was argued, is the logical outcome of even (superficially) 
homogenous partners - in this instance the donor sub-group of the Health 
Development Partners (HDPs) - having to navigate their innate differences to pursue 
working relationships with their peers. The comparative difficulty of the HDPs then 
having to form working relationships with their counterparts in the host government 




dismiss the aid coordination ethos as unworkable however, Chapter Four makes the 
case that Uganda‟s stakeholders have pragmatically opted to interpret „coordination‟ 
as just another slippery development term, which they can pursue on a partial basis 
without rejecting the overarching ethos. This was found to confer several discrete 
advantages on Uganda‟s Health Development Partners including „strength in 
numbers‟, which the HDPs attained by masking their differences to present a united 
front in their dealings with government.  
 
Chapter Five „Coordination to Meet the Current Demands of the Contrary and Risk 
Averse Global Fund‟ challenged the premise that the current impetus for multiple 
stakeholders to feed into country proposals for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) is to ensure the production of participatory and 
needs-based proposals (which in theory should improve the utilisation and 
effectiveness of grants). Instead the chapter offsets the costly and time consuming 
imperative for partners to „participate‟ in the proposal against the reactive policy 
evolution and reactive growth of the GFATM, which has seen the Fund make several 
u-turns in its policy toward Uganda and demonstrate an inability to manage risk. 
Coordination mechanisms and fora in Uganda were thus found to have availed the 
country of the requisite resources (e.g. Partnership Funds) to support GFATM 
proposal development and to oversee grant management (i.e. existing multi-
stakeholder coordination fora have now subsumed the role of Country Coordinating 
Mechanism). Viewed together, the Fund‟s prioritisation of a quality-based over a 
needs-proposal and its insistence that all partners participate in GFATM processes at 
the country level can be construed as the Fund‟s attempt to introduce extra oversight 
over Uganda‟s grants following the 2005 embezzlement scandal. „Coordination‟ 
therefore, has become the latest in a growing list of the GFATM‟s conditionalities or 
„conditions precedent‟ for Uganda, i.e. another criterion the country must meet to 
access grants.  
 
Chapter Six „Coordination to Build Policy Consensus as an Act of Legitimisation‟ 
alludes to the new competitiveness in the modern aid environment, arguing that there 




to justify their continued presence in Uganda‟s health sector. This premise is 
explored using two case studies: one of bilateral donor Danida and another of the 
UN‟s Specialised Agency for Health, the World Health organisation. Both 
organisations are found to be capitalising on coordination fora and activities in the 
health sector to stay relevant (by staying relevant in policy). The idea of legitimacy 
with regards to policy-making is then explored using a very different case study 
subject: the US President‟s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Owning the 
threat posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic and deriving its legitimacy from meeting its 
own targets, the PEPFAR program in Uganda is shown to have little interest in 
Uganda‟s domestic policy, and at best, a superficial interest in aid coordination. 
Found to be operating a very successful parallel delivery system for antiretrovirals in 
country, the PEPFAR programme also challenges the ideological foundations of the 
aid effectiveness agenda. Nevertheless, as PEPFAR transitions from its emergency 
phase to become a more embedded feature of the national HIV/AIDS response, there 
is at least the suggestion that the US aid programme will have to emerge from its 
relative isolation in Uganda to engage in some consensus building of its own.  
 
Chapter Seven „Coordination to Dilute State Control‟ sets out the role Uganda‟s 
health donors are playing in augmenting the space for civil society organisations 
(CSOs) in Uganda‟s health sector. Catalysing their transition from service providers 
to potential policy makers, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GFATM) is found to have forced the hand of government to allow civil society 
representation in the country‟s most important multi-stakeholder sector forum for 
health, the Health Policy Advisory Committee; while the GFATM, together with 
several of Uganda‟s Health Development Partners and the US PEPFAR programme, 
are found to have vastly increased the funding envelop for civil society organisations 
operating in Uganda‟s HIV/AIDS field. While on the one hand the chapter argues 
that the impetus to carve out a greater space for CSOs is a natural consequence of the 
aid coordination ethos, it also posits that the donor prescribed changes could be 
construed as an attempt to dilute state power in Uganda. In this light, aid 
coordination has emerged as the acceptable means of situating watchdogs at the 




Ugandan government. However, whether or not the CSOs in question will benefit in 
the long-term from their elevated status in Uganda‟s health sector remains open to 
conjecture. Similarly, the best laid plans of the aid donors are called into question, 
for failing to take into account the Ugandan state‟s adept ability to ward off 
challenges to its dominance. 
 
To conclude, it is the short-term properties that serve to explain the appeal of aid 
coordination in Uganda‟s health sector, rather than its long-term - and largely 





Prescribing Coordination, Turning Aid into a Stick 
 
In Uganda‟s health sector, it is notable that the majority of the changes and/or 
innovations wrought by aid coordination appear largely donor driven, thus the notion 
of „prescription‟ in this thesis (remember the advocacy for aid coordination 
originated on the side of the donors, with aid‟s recipients initially sceptical (Walt et 
al. 199a)). And because it is still the aid donors that set the development agenda, it is 
now de rigueur for external partners to demand a say in the “negotiation process 
proper” (Jeppsson 2002: 2059) in aid recipient countries; furthermore, that say has 
now been validated by the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, with its 
emphasis on principles like harmonisation, alignment and managing for results. The 
normalisation of Development Partners‟ expanded role is expressed in the 
vocabulary of „partnership‟ and „participation‟ at the country level. Consequently, 
one is now expected to accept that civil society is as important a player in the health 
sector as the government, and/or that external aid donors are well placed to feed into 
domestic policy. It is a state of affairs that is hard to reconcile with the principle of 
national sovereignty, yet it is one that I would argue has been instrumentally 
facilitated by the aid coordination drive.  
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devising an empirical way to measure the impact of aid. At present there is no consensus over how 
this should be done (OECD/DAC Development Evaluation Network 2005), and health aid remains 




Walt et al. commented on the unspoken power of aid coordination when they 
posited, “It would appear that interest in coordination is inextricably linked with 
influence, and that coordination tools, and particularly leadership therein, provide the 
potential to enhance leverage over policy direction or resource allocation” (Walt et 
al. 1999a: 215). Similarly, in Jeppsson‟s reference to the “negotiation process 
proper” in Uganda‟s health sector, the “process” is defined as the “stage where 
power relations interact,” while the power is imbued in the seemingly 
inconsequential details of “who directs the process, who participates in the process 
and who decides the boundaries of the sector and what it should contain” (Jeppsson 
2002: 2059). Having conducted the Ugandan case study I strongly concur with these 
assessments. Having unearthed a host of bureaucratic devices used to determine who 
gets to participate in the processes and under what conditions in Uganda – moreover, 
having been excluded from certain coordination fora myself on the basis of a 
Memorandum of Understanding – it has become obvious to me that the devil is in the 
detail. Whether real or imagined, the pursuit of influence/power is inextricably tied 
up with the aid coordination drive at the country level. How else to explain the 
energy being expended on such vague undertakings as „dialogue strategies‟ when the 
proffered reward (more effective aid) is unlikely to be achieved in the short-term or 
even prove quantifiable?  
 
Yet I do need to qualify my stance, because while I align myself with the school of 
post-development critique that believes power is exercised through policy, practice 
and institutions (Ferguson 1990, Escobar 1995, Crewe and Harrison 1998, Cooke 
and Kothari 2001, Mosse 2005 etc), and hope that my study contributes positively to 
that body of work. I don‟t hold with the idea that Uganda‟s aid donors are neo-
colonial bullies trying to dominate their host government, if for no other reason than 
I agree with Mosse (2005) Crewe and Harrison (1998) that donors just aren‟t that 
powerful. What I hold with instead, is the notion of cautious and risk averse donors, 
who, having already been let down in Uganda, are attempting to find new ways of 
reassuring their national governments and tax payers that continuing to give aid to 
the country‟s health sector is the correct undertaking. Aid coordination provides 




claim that as a donor representative you personally sat in on national budget 
discussions and/or participated in the Technical Working Group tasked with updating 
a strategic plan is extremely reassuring. Equally, if from your proximity to the 
“negotiation process proper” in Uganda (Jeppsson 2002: 2059), you can also convey 
to donor headquarters that the Ugandan government appears genuinely regretful of 
past mistakes and is now making great strides towards increasing transparency and 
forming closer working partnerships with external partners then all the better, 
because after all, a successful framing as Mosse (2005) has explained requires all the 
interpretative communities with something at stake to sustain it.
279
 Hence I must 
underline the critical role the Ugandan government has played and continues to play 
in doing just enough (and no more) to support the aid coordination drive in the health 
sector: engaging with donors, setting up public enquiries to investigate corruption, 
inviting civil society to join the Health Policy Advisory Committee. Yet all the 
while, keeping the reigns of decision making just out of reach. 
 
The year 2005 represented a turning point in donor-government relations in Uganda, 
with the exposure of two financial scandals involving the GFATM and the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) turning out to be just the first in a 
series of events which have made the justification of aid to Uganda difficult to 
reconcile with donor concerns over governance (recall the slow move to multi-party 
politics, the removal of presidential term limits, and the threat of punitive anti-gay 
legislation). And yet the aid continues to flow, although significantly, it too has 
changed its dynamic. A strange corollary of the aid effectiveness drive has seen aid 
evolve (most specifically aid delivered as budget support) into a “stick” with which 
to beat bad performers. Equally, the mergence of disparate aid flows into single pots 
as donors increase the volume of ODA being channelled through pooled funding 
arrangements (e.g. basket funds and joint budget support) has made the multi-donor 
threat of mass aid reduction and/or withdrawal a possibility in Uganda. The ethos of 
aid coordination has facilitated both these developments. 
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I would posit nonetheless, that the framing (Mosse 2005) underpinning the 
coordinated donor threat to reduce, withdraw or reprogramme aid away from direct 
budget support delivered by Uganda‟s Local Development Partners in February 2010 
(Observer Media Ltd 2010) remains less stable than the alternate framing which 
permits donors to continue to provide ODA at current levels (and which I shall 
reiterate shortly). The empirical data in Chapter Four denoting the heterogeneity of 
Uganda‟s Health Development Partners and the repeated allusions to the non-
conformist USAID/PEPFAR aid model belie the framing of coordinated or 
homogeneous donors. Furthermore, the recent donor ultimatum in Uganda is 
rendered unconvincing on several counts. Firstly, for ignoring the symbiotic 
relationship that exists between donors and recipients - each party needs the other, 
and in fact the donors probably need the recipients slightly more (Riddell (2007) has 
documented the proliferation of new aid donors over the last forty years). Therefore 
while the spectre of aid donors without recipients was raised in Chapter Five, the 
suggestion that donors would willingly put themselves out of a job is sadly 
unpersuasive; both the evidence that donors continue to give politically motivated aid 





Secondly, one should not ignore the moral imperative attached to giving aid (Riddell 
2007) and health aid in particular. Even the GFATM didn‟t cut all its inputs to 
Uganda when the mismanagement scandal broke – it continued to provide 
antiretrovirals during the grant suspension, and is in fact obliged to do so for two 
years in the event of future suspensions. Surely the same moral imperative applies to 
Uganda‟s other health donors, particularly if one concurs with the view that donors 
are to blame for the culture of aid dependency that now exists within the health 
sector (Erixon 2005).
281
  Or with the assessment that foreign aid has actually proved 
the corrupting factor in Uganda‟s once unblemished reputation (Barkan 2005). With 
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 Turn to Chapter One and the sub-section „Introducing Aid Selectivity‟ to see how these points are 
grounded in the literature. 
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 Erixon‟s comment is not specific to Uganda. It simply states that aid in high volumes removes the 





regards to the GAVI mismanagement, it was telling that even the Ugandan press felt 
compelled to point out that “The only people not yet indicted for gross negligence 
would be the donors writing cheques for monies used so irresponsibly” (Ssemogerere 
2007). Viewed from this perspective, the checks and balances offered by the aid 
coordination drive might actually provide a means for donors to help rectify their 
past mistakes, by ensuring aid is used for what it‟s intended, and by helping to reduce 
the culture of aid dependency in Uganda by encouraging aid to be channelled in 
directions that reap sustainable improvement. The only stumbling block to the check 
and balance – i.e. the „good governance‟ - logic underpinning the broader aid 
effectiveness agenda is again national sovereignty. Once you reach a point where the 
checks and balances are being externally prescribed - where Development Partners 
conspire to speak with “one voice” and wield a “stick” when calling for reform, 
when the conditionalities of Global Health Initiatives impinge on national processes 
and change the composition of sector fora, and when donors conspire to bypass state 
systems altogether in favour of the unregulated and unaccountable third sector – then 
an infringement is surely imminent. 
 
Finally, the “experimental nature” (Riddell 2007: 178) of official development 
assistance is an important backdrop to this discussion, because while Uganda‟s 
Development Partners and the Global Health Initiatives may all have very clear ideas 
about what they would like the impact of their aid to be, as it stands the evidence 
base to support both their ideology and their strategies is absent:  
 
“The discourse about the impact of official aid takes place on the mistaken 
assumption that there is sufficient evidence of sufficient quality „out there‟ to 
prove that it works or that it doesn‟t. As a result, far too much discourse about 
aid effectiveness is little more than a game of chasing shadows” (Riddell 
2007: 255). 
 
Thus while an understanding of aid‟s trial and error approach would suggest that 
interested stakeholders need to exercise some patience - to wait and see if the 
ideology of aid effectiveness can be sustained by the practices. The inherent flaw in 
that logic, for the school of post-development critique at least, is that the site of aid‟s 




back to sovereignty. Even when an aid-recipient country conspires to „participate‟ in 
the experiment (as Uganda has with the GFATM for instance), the current power 
imbalance in the aid relationship renders the Paris ideals of „ownership‟ and „mutual 
accountability‟ hugely problematic. In short, is a country with defined needs and a 
notable resource gap really to turn down aid just because it comes with strings 
attached? Surely the more likely scenario – and the one seen playing out in Uganda 
with regards to the health sector – is that the government will conspire alongside its 
donors to keep the aid flowing. That this can be achieved using the rhetoric of 
„partnership‟ and the mechanisms and processes of aid coordination is a finding of 
this study. In this way, the GoU should be depicted as a skilled aid “broker”, not a 
duped victim, and the country‟s donors as development “translators” whose role is 




Indeed, out of all the factors considered, it is the experimental nature of aid that 
renders the donor threat to withdraw aid from Uganda unconvincing, because whilst 
Uganda – like much of the African continent since the colonial era - has long been a 
laboratory for the experimentation of donors, it has provided far more successes than 
its peers, and has, as a consequence, attracted a growing volume of external funding. 
An impressive record of economic growth, a marked reduction in the HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate and policy innovations such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
have rendered the country a „donor darling‟ and an exemplar for what can be 
achieved with official development assistance. Uganda then has been crowned aid‟s 
“success” story (Barkan 2005), a crown it retains despite marked concerns over 
governance and Museveni‟s increasing resemblance to the archetypal „Big Man‟.
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This, above all else, remains the dominant framing in which the majority of interests 
are tied up. Therefore while aid coordination may have made it possible for the 
country‟s donors to turn aid into a “stick,” the threat in Uganda should be regarded as 
an empty one. Put simply, out of all the countries in development‟s portfolio, the aid 
experiment cannot be allowed to fail in Uganda. Decades of investment preclude it.  
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 Even in the face of actual „failure‟ – and in reality the means of measuring the 
impact of aid is not up to the task of denoting either success or failure at this time 
(see OECD/DAC Development Evaluation Network 2005; Centre for Global 
Development 2007) – what matters is that the parties involved won‟t allow the aid 
experiment in Uganda to allowed to be seen to fail. The ability to construct an 
interpretation that suits all parties is the essence of Mosse‟s (2005) work on 
interpretative communities. The more likely scenario for an aid withdrawal in 
Uganda would be for donors to exit on a positive; for instance „Uganda has reached 
middle-income status and graduated from the need for future aid inputs‟. Such a 
framing would allow all parties to separate unscathed, whilst cementing the notion of 
Uganda as aid‟s great “success” story only further. Yet such an exit plan remains a 
far-fetched hypothesis for the time being. 
 
  
The External Significance of Aid Coordination 
 
In conclusion, I am unconvinced by the coordinated donor threat in Uganda and 
stand by my original proposition that while ostensibly aid coordination may appear 
to be important for its internal significance - as an organising principle to improve 
the effectiveness of aid - in fact, the value of coordination stems from its external 
significance. Aid coordination boasts tangible, short-term advantages. Moreover, in 
the medium-term it has become important for creating the façade of partner unity that 
now permits the continuance of aid flows to Uganda (in the face of serious 
governance concerns). In this view all partners are complicit in the framing that 
official development assistance to Uganda is at once necessary and effective, and its 
government cooperative and deserving.  
 
While the tradition of aid coordination preceded the advent of the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness, the widespread popularity of this international development 
commitment has only contributed to the stability of this framing in Uganda.
284
 The 
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tenacity with which the international community maintains this framing attests that it 
isn‟t ready to let go of aid‟s “success” story just yet. Put simply, the repercussions of 
reframing Uganda as an aid “failure” would be too detrimental. Or at least for those 
involved in the highest echelons of the aid relationship, i.e. the “development brokers 
and translators” (Lewis and Mosse 2006). 
 
Suggestions For Future Research 
As acknowledged in Chapter Three, the thesis is by its nature a limited piece of 
research, which in this instance is demonstrated in my having taken Uganda‟s Health 
Policy Advisory Committee as my basic research sample. There remain other 
samples and lines of enquiry worth pursuing. Firstly, and in a sense this would have 
been the logical alternative for my own study if my access problems to the higher 
echelons had indeed proved intractable, there is a urgent need to explore the 
ramifications of the aid coordination ethos further down the hierarchy, at the level of 
the health care providers. To some extent I began this line of enquiry when I began to 
investigate the effects of aid coordination on those civil society organisations invited 
to join the HPAC in Chapter Seven. However, it is clear that the organisations I 
addressed in this study enjoyed an atypical status by virtue of their elevated status.  A 
subsequent study is now needed to explore the ramifications of aid coordination at 
the district level in Uganda, among the service implementers not privy to the 
“negotiation process proper” (Jeppsson 2002: 2059), and to ask whether experiences 
here regarding the success or failure of international aid policy have any means of 
looping back into the national and international consciousness. In light of Mosse‟s 
(2005) writing on interpretative communities and dominant framings in 
development, one might assume probably not. Secondly, it would be pertinent to ask 
how the aid coordination drive is being played out in other government sectors in 
Uganda, if only to test that the hypothesis that donor interest in providing health aid 
is disproportionately high. It is feasible that other sectors may look very sparse in 
terms of active donors, thus undermining the need for a dedicated coordination 
apparatus. Thirdly, a future, complementary study would be useful to look at aid 
coordination across the East African region more broadly, to see how aid 
                                                                                                                                          
amnesia allows for aid‟s constant reinvention, which as Mosse argues is necessary to keep aid and 
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APPENDIX 2: UGANDA‟S HEALTH SECTOR 




































TOP MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
(TMC) 
 
HEALTH POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE / COUNTRY 
COORDINATING MECHANISM FOR THE GLOBAL FUND 
(HPAC / CCM) 
 
- Ministries of Health, Finance and other salient line ministries 
- Uganda AIDS Commission / Partnership Committee 
- Health Development Partners  
- Uganda‟s Religious Medical Bureaus 
- New members under new Long-Term Institutional Arrangements: 
o Civil society representatives (including vice-Chair of CCM) 
o Private sector representatives 
 
SENIOR MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 
(SMC) 
 
TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS 
(TWGs) 
 
- Sector Budget Working Group (technical working group for HPAC) 
- Basic Packages TWGs (e.g. malaria, TB, HIV/AIDS etc) 
- Other TWGs (e.g. Human Resources, Medicines and Procurement, 
Infrastructure and the Private Partnerships in Health) 
- Departments 
 
„↨‟ signals two-way flow of discussion 
 
Source: Adapted from Annex 3 to the LDPG Terms of 
Reference - „Development Partner Coordination in 







APPENDIX 3:  LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PARTNER 





1. The Government of Uganda‟s Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) has been endorsed by 
development partners as the focus for all efforts to help reduce the incidence of poverty in the 
country. In 2003, Government and development partners signed the Partnership Principles as 
a framework to guide the delivery of development assistance to the PEAP. The Rome and 
Paris High Level Forums on Harmonization added an international context to local 
harmonization work with specific harmonization objectives spelt out in the Paris Declaration. 
 
2. These developments have necessitated a more formal and structured approach from 
development partners than was provided so far by the LDG. These LDPG Terms of 
Reference are the result of that work. They may be amended by the LDPG at any time. 
 
 
I. General Information 
 
3. The name of the development partner‟s forum in Uganda will be the Local Development 
Partner Group (LDPG). It replaces the Local Donor Group (LDG). 
 
4. Membership of the LDPG is open to any bilateral partner, multilateral bank and UN agency 
that provide development assistance to Uganda.
285
 The LDPG is a high level forum and 
LDPG representation will normally comprise of the Head of Missions and/or the Head of 
Agencies or Development Cooperation. 
 
5. The objective of the LDPG is to increase the effectiveness of development assistance in 





6. The members of the LDPG recognize a set of principles that include the following, but may 
be reviewed, amended and augmented as necessary: 
 
i) The PEAP is the principle instrument and overarching framework for 
Government and development partners. The rationale for the harmonization 
efforts in supporting the PEAP is to increase the effectiveness of the 
development assistance to Uganda. The PEAP offers an organized framework 
within which this takes place. 
 
ii) The Partnership Principles are to be used by LDPG members to articulate the 
entry-point for delivering development assistance to the PEAP. It elaborates 
Government‟s vision for how partners engage in key processes such as the 
PEAP, PER/MTEF and poverty monitoring. 
 
iii) The principle of inclusivity must be observed. Financing modalities or agency 
specific procedures should not exclude any development partners from 
                                                 
285
 Membership currently comprises of ADB, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, European Commission, 





participating in LDPG/Government work related to harmonization and 
implementation of the PEAP. 
 
iv) Each LDPG member will seek to ensure that any individual constraints to 
harmonization are acknowledged at an early stage so that solutions may be 
identified. This includes synchronizing headquarter missions in line with the 
calendar of key processes, promoting joint missions and, as far as possible, 
adhering to „quiet times‟ agreed with government. 
 
v) The LDPG should be able to evaluate its overall performance (possibly using 
the indicators of progress of the Paris Declaration) in terms of facilitating 
Government delivery of outcomes, Collective and increasingly harmonized 
efforts of the LDPG should result in significantly improved effectiveness and 
quality of development assistance to Uganda while reducing transaction costs 
for both partners and Government. 
 
 
III. Objectives    
 
7. The central objective of the LDPG is to increase the effectiveness of development assistance 
in support of the national goals and systems of the Government of Uganda. 
 
8. The LDPG will promote the wider application of the Rome and Paris Declarations by 
increasing stronger linkages with sector/thematic groups in order to: 
 
i) harmonize dialogue at the policy, program and project levels; 
 
ii) improve linkages to key processes (annual budget, PER/MTEF, PEAP implementation 
review) and the use of national systems for programming, financing and review; 
 
iii) facilitate the use of joint reviews, joint analytic work and other harmonization initiatives; 
 
iv) promote mainstreaming of all cross-sectional issues, including HIV/AIDS, which has 
been identified as a continued LDPG priority; 
 
v) facilitate dissemination of best practice to other groups. 
 
9. Sub-groups are encouraged to propose issues for discussion at LDPG meetings. This will 




IV. Scope of Work 
 
10. The LDPG is, first and foremost, a forum governed by the principles of consensus and it is 
respectful of differences regarding policies and modalities. This Section describes how 
LDPG objectives will be realised in practical terms through the conduct of LDPG meetings. 
 
11. Sector Issues: Prior to the monthly LDPG meetings, the Secretariat will coordinate with 
donor sector groups to highlight sector issues that need to be discussed with the Economist 
Group for any feedback prior to the LDPG meeting. Sector issues may be included on the 
agenda and a representative of a relevant sector would be invited to provide a short briefing 





12. Special Issues: Each meeting may consider a topic of special interest. This may be informed 
by forthcoming national meetings/events (budget, PER, PEAP etc) or by nomination by a 
LDPG member. Special issues should attempt to meet the LDPG objectives. 
 
13. Standing Briefs: Standing briefs (economy, PEAP, harmonization etc) will be shared, as 
needed, electronically before each monthly meeting through Secretariat. Questions regarding 
these briefs may be raised at the meeting. 
 
14. LDPG members may also consider joining the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) in 
support of the Government‟s PEAP (including inter alia embarking on a joint annual review 
and sharing joint analytical work). The update of this document would be synchronized with 
Government‟s PEAP revision process to allow full alignment and consistency with the new 
PEAP. 
 
15. The Scope of Work will be reviewed whenever felt to be appropriate to ensure that LDPG 
work is both meaningful and focused. 
 
16. At the LDPG meetings, conclusions will be formulated and agreements will be made on the 
basis of voluntary consensus. The LDPG will agree amongst its members how work will be 
taken forward, particularly with regard to follow-up discussions with Government and who 





17. The LDPG will have one Chair and one Deputy Chair. The Chair will be the World Bank 
Country Manager (or designate) and the Deputy will be selected among bilateral 
development partners from the LDPG on a one year rotating basis. The World Bank Country 
Office will provide the permanent Secretariat and maintain the records of the LDPG 
 
18. The Chair will represent the views of the LDPG members in further consultations with 
Government or other institutions. Where it is deemed necessary to have a larger group 
meeting with Government partners, the meeting will agree on the most appropriate members 
to best represent the issues involved. Equally, the LDPG may nominate any other members to 
speak on their behalf if this is felt to be more appropriate. 
 
19. The LDPG will meet at 10am on the second Tuesday of each month. The Secretariat will 
issue a notice in advance confirming the meeting. The LDPG may agree to alter the date of a 
meeting or decide not to hold a meeting in a particular month. At the time of issuing notice of 
the meeting, the Secretariat will circulate a detailed agenda including issues raised by sector 
groups (see para 11), depending on the situation. Individual members may propose issues to 
be included on the agenda. These proposals may be made in due time to the Secretariat. The 
Secretariat will draft and circulate minutes of the previous meeting, together with the agenda 
of the forthcoming meeting to members in due time. Communication shall normally be by 
email. 
 
20. The Secretariat, in conjunction with, and under the direction of the Chair, will be responsible 






Source: the „Local Development Partners Group Terms of Reference‟ were supplied as hard copy 
(BTC Interview 10
th




APPENDIX 4: HEALTH DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS 
(HDPs) GROUP TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
 
May 31 2006 
 
It has been agreed that a formal structure be established to coordinate the Development Partners 






The group is open to representatives from all organisations/agencies listed in the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Ministry of Health (on behalf of the Government of Uganda) and the 
Development Partners dated 23
rd
 August 2000. In addition representatives from other stakeholder 
groups will be invited from time to time to participate in meetings. 
 
 
2. Purpose of this Group 
 
2.1 The group is not intended to duplicate function of HPAC or any existing group. 
2.2 The purpose of the group is to: 
a) Provide a more formal forum for coordination between the Development Partners 
working in health; 
b) Reduce transaction costs for both agencies and Government in implementing the 
Health Sector Strategic Plan, and 
c) Strengthen the partnership between GoU and Development Partners to ensure more 
effective implementation of HSSP through the health SWAp process. 
2.3 Specifically it will: 
i. Provide a forum for discussion on issues in the health sector; 
ii. Enable partners to coordinate and collate joint responses to issues in 
the health sector and to key studies and other documents; 
iii. Provide a means by which the partners can communicate amongst 
themselves and with the Ministry of Health more effectively; 
iv. Provide a forum to discuss issues raised or to be raised at HPAC and 
make recommendations for issues to be included on the HPAC agenda 
in the future; 
v. Enable HDPs to contribute more effectively to the Joint [Review] 
Mission in the sector by: 
- Supporting HPAC to ensure that the review of progress against 
the undertaking from the previous joint [review] mission and a 
general programme review happens well in advance of the joint 
[review] mission. 
- Coordinating input from the HDPs to the agenda of the joint 
[review] mission at least one month in advance of the scheduled 
start of the mission. 
- Contribution to the organisation of the programme as required, 
including district visits. 
- Coordinating HDP involvement in the Aide Memoire writing 
group. 
- Supporting to ensure that appropriate follow up action takes 
place after the joint [review] mission, including finalisation and 




vi. Provide a forum for coordination of input from the HDPs into CG 
Process as it relates to the health sector. 
vii. Enable the HDPs to liase with other relevant coordination mechanisms 
and NGOs to ensure a wider understanding of the issues in the health 
sector and wider participation in policy and other debates. 
 
 
3. Consensus/Joint Ownership 
 
3.1 Throughout, the emphasis of HDP will be on joint ownership of the process and building 
consensus. 
3.2 However, if it is not possible to reach consensus on any issue, any minority views will also 
be represented to the Ministry of Health. 
3.3 It is recognised that WHO has a global mandate to take the lead in health technical issues. 
Any technical health opinion expressed by WHO should not be considered a minority view. 
3.4 The existence of the Group does not preclude individual contacts between agencies and the 





4.1 The group will normally meet once a month. 
4.2 If necessary additional meetings may be called in between the regular monthly meetings. 
This is especially likely to happen during the preparation for Joint [Review] Missions. 
4.3 When necessary, ad hoc sub-groups may be set up to carry out specific tasks. 
 
 
5. Coordination of HDP 
 
One agency will take on the coordinator [Chair] of HDP for a period of one year (July-June). 
Separate terms of reference are provided for the coordinator. 
 
 
6.  Review 
 
The functioning of the HDP and the coordination process will be reviewed after every 6 months 
and any changes to these terms of reference deemed necessary will be made following each 












Source: the „Terms of Reference for the Health Development Partners Group‟ were provided as hard 
copy (BTC Interview 10
th






APPENDIX 5: HEALTH POLICY ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE (HPAC) TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
 
Purpose and Establishment 
 
1. The Health Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC) was established as a forum for the 
Government, Development Partners and other stakeholders to discuss health policy and to 
advise on the implementation of the Health Sector Strategic Plan. 
 
2. HPAC is a donor/stakeholder coordination mechanism. It uses and works through the 







3. HPAC will consist of: 
- Ministry of Health 
- Development Partners who are signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding 
- Ministry of Local Government 
- Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
- Water Development Department 
- Ministry of Education and Sports 
- Ministry of Public Service 
- Religious Medical Bureaus, and 




4. From time to time, HPAC may co-opt members to address specific issues that may arise. 
Members may be co-opted from external organizations that are not necessarily operating in 
the health sector, other Government Ministries and departments, district officials and NGOs. 
The time period and tasks for co-opting more members will be specified. 
 
5. In line with the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) principle of the Government taking the 
leadership of the policy process, HPAC will be chaired by the Director General of Health 
Services, who is the technical head of the health sector. 
 
6. In the absence of the Director General one of the two Directors at the MoH headquarters will 
act in his place. 
 
7. The HPAC Secretariat will be in the Health Planning Department. One Health Planner will 





8. HPAC will meet at least once quarterly. 
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 Please note that this version of the Terms of Reference precedes 2007, when permanent 
membership of the HPAC was extended to include civil society and private sector representation in 







Other functions of HPAC 
 
9. HPAC will also provide a forum for information and experience sharing. 
 
10. HPAC will provide a forum for the resolution of disagreements or conflicts among health 
sector stakeholders. 
 
11. HPAC will identify tasks that need to be undertaken through special assignments. The 
assignments will largely be carried out by the Ministry or other Government departments. 
HPAC will propose terms of reference for each such assignment. Working Groups may be 
established to carry out specified assignments. 
 
12. HPAC will approve the work plan, budget and expenditures for the Partnership Fund and 
receive quarterly statements on the use of the Fund. 
 
 
Duration of HPAC 
 
13. HPAC will remain in operation during the entire period of the health Sector Strategic Plan II, 
or as long as will be jointly agreed by the Government and its Development Partners. 
 
14. The Terms of Reference of HPAC will be reviewed from time to time to reflect appropriate 























Source: The „Terms of Reference for the Health Policy Advisory Committee‟ are included as Annex 6 
to the „Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Uganda and the Development 






APPENDIX 6: 2005 MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UGANDA‟S HEALTH 




MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING between the Government of Uganda and the following 
Development Partners: 
 
African Development Bank 
Austrian Agency for International Development 
The Kingdom of Belgium 
Danish International Development Assistance 
Commission of the European Union 
Development Cooperation Ireland 
Department for International Development of the United Kingdom 
French Cooperation 
German Development Cooperation 
German Development Services 
International Development Association – World Bank 
Italian Cooperation 
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
Netherlands Cooperation 
Norwegian Agency for International Development 
The Kingdom of Spain 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
United Nations Population Fund 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations Children‟s Fund 
Joint United Nations Programme On HIV/AIDs 
United Nations High Commission For Refugees 
United States Agency For International Development 
World Food Programme 
World Health Organization 
 
 
THIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING made this …………… day of 
…………… 2005 between the Government of the Republic of Uganda, represented by its Ministry of 
Health P.O. Box 7272, Kampala, Uganda (here in after referred to as the Government) of the one part 
and Development Partners of the other part.  
 
WHEREAS the Government is desirous of continuing to implement the National Health Policy and 
the second Health Sector Strategic Plan (herein referred to as HSSP II) for the duration of five years, 
from July 2005 to June 2010, through a sector-wide approach. 
 
AND WHEREAS the Development Partners are in agreement to implement a sector-wide approach, 
which will address the health sector as a whole in planning, monitoring and in allocation of resources. 
 
AND WHEREAS the Government and Development Partners (herein after referred to as all parties) 
agree to support common programs of work in which planning, review, monitoring and policy 
development are undertaken as joint effort through consultation. 
 






Section 1: Interpretation 
 
This Memorandum of Understanding is not a legal document but reflects the commitment of all 
parties, who recognize it as guidelines in which the health sector operationalizes the partnership in the 
implementation of the Health Sector Strategic Plan II. 
 
 
Section 2: Objectives of the Sector-Wide Cooperation 
 
2.1 The overall objective of cooperation under this Memorandum of Understanding is to 
implement the National Health Policy and Health Sector Strategic Plan II through a sector-
wide approach, which addresses the health sector as a whole in planning and management, 
and in resource mobilization and allocation. 
 
2.2 The Uganda Health SWAp is here defined as: “a sustained partnership led by national 
authorities, with the goal of achieving improvements in people’s health in the context of a 
coherent sector, defined by an appropriate institutional structure and national financing 
programme through a collaborative programme of work, with established structures and 
processes for negotiating strategic and management issues, and reviewing sectoral 
performance against jointly agreed milestones and targets.” 
 
 
Section 3: Obligations of the Government 
 
The Government undertakes, where practically possible and in line with general Government policy, 
to: 
 
3.1 Provide overall leadership in planning, administration, implementation and monitoring of 
Health Sector Strategic Plan II. 
 
3.2 Make financial contributions as detailed in the annual approved work-plan and budget and 
ensure timely release of such funds. 
 
3.2 ensure that all district health plans (strategic and operational) are consistent with the Health 
Sector Strategic Plan II. 
 
3.3 Endeavour to ensure that all resources for the Health Sector Strategic Plan II are reflected in 
the resource envelope and the Medium and Long Term Expenditure Frameworks, following 
the guidance provided by Ministry of Finance. 
 
3.5 Ensure that the proportion of the overall Government budgetary allocation to the health 
sector increases annually in real terms over the five-year period of the Health Sector Strategic 
Plan II. This is clarified in the “Official Statement on the Government‟s Commitment to 
Financing the Health Sector.”  
 
Financial resource requirements and gaps detailed in the Health Financing Strategy, HSSP II 
shall be available to the Ministry of Finance and partners. 
 
3.6 Ensure that there is an effective reporting system to provide financial and health management 
information data on time. 
 
3.7 Consult all development partners prior to any changes in health policy or the Health Sector 
Strategic Plan II. This consultation shall be carried out in accordance with the agreed 





3.8 Negotiation between the Ministry and Health and partners is officially made known to all 
stakeholders. 
 
3.9 Ensure that all partnership structures are operational.  
 
 
Section 4. Obligations of Development Partners 
 
The development partners shall: 
 
4.1 Synchronize their own planning, review and monitoring processes as far as possible with 
those established to monitor the implementation of the Health Sector Strategic Plan II. 
 
4.2 Synchronize their support and activities with the Government budget cycle of July to June. 
 
4.3 Adopt the use of Government systems except where specifically negotiated and agreed to and 
indicated in writing by the partner or bilateral. 
 
4.4 Provide comprehensive information regarding resources provided to third parties to support 
the health sector in Uganda. Also endeavour to ensure that these parties actively coordinate 
with Ministry of Health and that these resources support the HSSP II. 
 
4.5 Negotiate with Ministry of Health all new programmes or initiatives in matters if health and 
health services to be implemented in the districts before going to the Local Government and 
must be included in the district annual work plan. 
 
4.6 Ensure that the support provided should as much as possible avoid distorting the existing 
government systems and strategies. 
 
4.7 Use the existing Health Management Information System (HMIS). 
 
 
Section 5. Obligations of Both Government and Development Partners 
 
All parties shall: 
 
5.1 Fund only activities that are reflected in the framework of the Health Sector Strategic Plan II. 
 
5.2 Aim to meet agreed disbursement commitments in a timely manner and as detailed in the 
agreed work plan and budget. 
 
5.3 Ensure that financial information in all grants and credits, including details of procurement 
and technical assistance, are provided in a timely manner to the Ministry of Finance and 
reflected in the plans and budgets of Government. 
 
5.4 Bring to the attention of all parties any cases of non-compliance with the Government rules 
and regulations. 
 
5.5 Ensure the mainstreaming of gender, governance, HIV/AIDS and environmental issues in 
their policies, planning, service delivery and evaluation. 
 
5.6 As provided in the Constitution of Uganda, ensure that other marginalized groups of society 
such as the poor, the displaced and the disabled are specifically addressed. 
 
5.7 Aim at increasing annually the total funding by all parties to the health sector over the five-





5.8 Collectively rationalize the existing partnership structures to ensure efficiency and better 
alignment with structures of HSSP II. 
 
5.9 Use the principles of the MoU as the basis for any negotiation for support to the health 
sector. The support negotiated should have long-term commitment and clear strategies for 
financial sustainability and exit strategies. 
 
 




6.1.1 The Government shall develop an organizational framework and structures for the 
partnership which will be reviewed by all parties during the joint review mission.  
 
6.1.2 The Health Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC), on which the Government and 
Development Partners are represented, shall advise the Government on the implementation of 
Health Sector Strategic Plan II and will meet at least quarterly. 
 
6.1.3 Partners shall make greater use of the Inter-agency Coordination Committees (ICCs), 
Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) and the health sector Working Groups SWG) to 
undertake the bulk of the detailed work and feed up to the HPAC for strategic decision and 
oversight. These structures are subsidiary and must regularly report to HPAC and the SWG. 
 
6.2 Monitoring and Review 
 
6.2.1 The Joint Review Mission (JRM) shall be held once a year. The mission will review the 
performance of the health sector during the previous financial year and agree on sector 
priorities and resource allocation for the next Financial Year. The JRM shall also monitor the 
implementation of the MoU. 
  
6.2.2 The Sector Working Group shall discuss and endorse the Budget Framework Paper for the 
health sector including Ministry of Health Headquarters, determine and assess the project 
proposals. The SWG shall also review and endorse revision of the budget.  
 
6.2.3 The Health Policy Advisory Committee shall receive regularly the following monitoring 
reports: 
- Quarterly Area Teams monitoring reports 
- Quarterly Ministry of Health performance review report 
- Quarterly progress report on implementation of JRM undertakings. 
 
6.2.4 The Government shall organize a Joint Midterm Review (JRM) and an End Evaluation by all 
parties of the implementation of Health Sector Strategic Plan II, which will take place before 
the end of the third year and the last quarter of implementation respectively. All parties shall 
agree on the timing, terms of reference and composition of the review mission and end 
evaluation, and on preparatory studies to be undertaken in advance of the missions. 
 
6.2.5 The Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix of the Health Sector Strategic Plan II shall specify 
indicators to monitor the performance of the sector and shall provide a basis for the review 
and evaluation. 
 
6.2.6 The Government shall continue to hold the National Health Assembly in which districts, 
urban authorities, central ministries, NGOs and other stakeholders, including development 
partners will be expected to participate. The National Health Assembly will be held at least 
once every two years. The Government will define the terms of reference of the assembly, 





6.3 Sector Reporting 
 
The Government shall, based on annual output targets, produce an annual report on the 
performance of the sector within three months of the end of every financial year. The annual 
report shall contain league tables of performance against agreed indicators for districts, 
hospitals and Ministry of Health departments and divisions. 
 
6.4 Financial Systems 
 
6.4.1 Development Partners shall make all endeavours towards channelling resources using 
existing Government systems of budgeting, disbursement, accounting and audit, and where 
necessary, take steps to strengthen these systems. The Ministry of Health shall be audited by 
Auditor General once annually and this will be supplemented by periodic external 
independent audit as agreed by all parties. 
 
6.4.2 Partners shall use government‟s preferred funding option i.e. direct budget support, taking 
into account their policies and legal obligations. Other funding mechanisms used include: 
- Supply of specific goods and services 
- Stand alone donor designed and managed projects 
- Traditional project aid integrated into HSSP II 
- Earmarked support for specific programme area e.g. GAVI, RBM, TB. 
 
6.4.3 Financial flows audit (tracking study), covering 3 – 4 previous financial years shall be 
conducted and the report presented at the Joint Review Mission. Audits of agreed financial 
sub-systems such as payroll and value-for-money audits shall also be conducted as and when 
necessary and also presented to the Joint Review Mission. 
 
6.4.4 Development partners shall recognize the importance of timely disbursement of funds and 
shall work towards ensuring that budget releases are made according to a schedule agreed 




6.5.1 Development partners shall work towards the use of Government procurement procedures 
taking into account the legal obligations of the development partners. Cost effectiveness and 
value for money will be guiding principles in procurement.  
 
6.5.2 Routine, pooled procurement through the national procurement agency (agencies) and 
common logistics management is the preferred option. In the case of specialised procurement 
or requirements outside the scope or capacity of the national procurement agency (agencies), 
other procurement modalities may be used. These include: 
- International joint procurement services that respond to national procurement 
plans (e.g. for new vaccines or other commodities characterised by limited 
manufacturing capacity or unfavourable market dynamics). 
- Procurement and management through projects or other specialised 
arrangements (e.g. for ARVs through GFATM) for limited period with 
appropriate steps to strengthen national procurement capacity and to integrate 
procured commodities into existing national logistics management systems. 
 
6.5.3 The provisions in paragraph 6.5.1 shall apply to the procurement of services, goods, works, 
medicines and other supplies. All parties will work towards the continued improvement in 
information flow and transparency in this area. 
 
6.5.4 An Annual procurement plan integrating all the planned procurement in the health sector 




both government and development partners. Quarterly progress report on the implementation 
of the procurement plan shall be availed to stakeholders. 
 
6.6 Technical Assistance 
 
6.6.1 Short term Technical Assistance shall be identified and determined on a demand driven basis 
according to the needs and priorities of the Government in consultation with Development 
Partners. Use of Ugandan or regional consultants will be encouraged where expertise is 
available. Terms of reference will be developed by the Government and agreed with 
Development Partners. Candidates for technical assistance shall be reviewed and approved 
by the Government and development partners. The forum to discuss Technical Assistance 
will be the Health Policy Advisory Committee.  
 
6.6.2 Long Term Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Health will be determined on a demand 
driven basis according to the identified gaps in the sector. Terms of reference will be 
developed by the MOH and posts will be advertised regionally and internationally. Caution 
will be taken to ensure that any recruited TA does not work as an extra pair of hands but 
offers high-level technical advice and builds the capacity of relevant people and systems in 
the department. The TA will be supervised by the Commissioner (first level supervisor) of 
the relevant department. Termination of contract or request for renewal will be accompanied 
by an appraisal report, which should be discussed between the TA and first level supervisor 
and signed by the Director General. In the event that a national assumes the functions of a 
TA, remuneration should be on the same terms as for international staff. 
 
6.7 Understanding of Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) 
 
Periodic refresher seminars on SWAp principles shall be organized for health sector 
stakeholders, preferably every year, in order to: 
- Update stakeholders on SWAp principles, and 
- Help minimise misunderstanding. 
 
 
Section 7: Collaboration with the Private Sector 
 
7.1 All parties recognize the important role the private sector is playing in health service delivery 
and resource mobilization. The parties further recognize that there are four categories of 
private health care providers in Uganda, each of which plays a unique role in the health 
sector. These are: 
a) Religious Non-Governmental Organizations (Facility Based) 
b) Other Non-Governmental Organizations, including community based organizations 
(Non Facility Based) 
c) Private enterprises such as private clinics, pharmacies and hospitals 
d) Traditional healers, including traditional midwives. 
 
7.2 All Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) delivering services at the district level shall be 
required to negotiate with the Ministry of Health before going to the districts. They will be 
required to plan with and report to the designated District and Health Sub Districts officials 
in their areas of operation 
 
7.3 All the above categories of the private sector are partners in the implementation of the Health 
Sector Strategic Plan. Collaboration between the parties to this Memorandum of 
Understanding with the private sector shall be through mechanisms of collaboration already 
established or that will be established between the Government and the private sector 






Section 8: Prevention and Settlement of Disagreements and Conflicts 
 
8.1 The Parties shall work in a spirit of openness, transparency and consultation. Effective 
information flows and dialogue are crucial in building and sustaining confidence and trust. 
 
8.2 All parties shall adhere to the Code of Conduct. 
 
8.3 In the event of disagreement or conflict, dialogue will be the first recourse for resolving the 
problem. The Health Policy Advisory Committee and the Joint Missions offer opportunity to 
identify and address potential problems. Unilateral actions shall be avoided. 
 
8.4 In the event of continuing disagreement a high level meeting shall be arranged between 
Government and the development partner (s) with a two-week period of notice. 
 
 
Section 9: Amendment/Termination of Memorandum of Understanding 
 
9.1 Any amendments to the terms, operational modalities and change of status or name of any of 
the parties to this Memorandum of Understanding may only be made through written 
agreement between the Government and development partners who are signatories to the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 
9.2 Termination of this agreement may be effected by any signatory on giving 90 days notice 
(which will include the reasons for the termination) to all partners. 
 
 
Section 10: Inclusion Of New Development Partners 
 
Any new partners wishing to cooperate with the Government under the provisions of this 
Memorandum of Understanding will be free to do so upon signing this Memorandum of 
Understanding. The new partners must present their programmes to the partners. 
  
 The Memorandum of Understanding will be posted on the MoH website.  
 
 
Section 11: Commencement Date 
 
This Memorandum of Understanding shall be deemed to have come into effect upon signing 
by respective representatives of the Government and the development partners, and shall be 
effective for the five years of the Health Sector Strategic Plan II. 
 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized representatives if the parties hereto, 





Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 



































Source: the „Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Uganda and the 
Development Partners‟ was supplied as hard copy (BTC Interview 10
th
 April 2008). 
 
